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

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ENGLISH LINGUISTICS
1500—1800

(A Collection of Facsimile Reprints)

Selected and Edited by

R. C. ALSTON, Ph.D.

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WILLIAM WARD

AN ESSAY ON GRAMMAR
1765

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Ward's *Essay* was by far the most comprehensive of the many grammars of English produced during the Eighteenth Century. It was re-issued three times, in 1778, 1779, and 1788. The second part was abridged and formed the basis for his *Practical Grammar of the English Language* printed at York *ca.* 1766.

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AN

ESSAY

ON

GRAMMAR,

AS IT MAY BE APPLIED TO THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

In TWO TREATISES.

The one SPECULATIVE, being an Attempt to inveſtigate proper Principles.

The other PRACTICAL, containing Definitions and Rules deduced from the Principles, and illuſtrated by a Variety of Examples from the moſt approved Writers.

Ne quis, tanquam parva, faſtidiat Grammatices Elementa; non quia magnæ ſit operæ Conſonantes a Vocalibus diſcernere, ipſaſque eas in Semivocalium Numerum, mutarumque partiri; ſed quia interiora veluti ſacri hujus adeuntibus apparebit multa rerum ſubtilitas, quæ non modo acuere Ingenia Puerilia, ſed exercere altiſſimam quoque Eruditionem ac Scientiam poſſit.

QUINCTIL.

By WILLIAM WARD, A. M.

Maſter of the Grammar-School at Beverley in the County of York.

LONDON,

Printed for ROBERT HORSFIELD, at the Crown in Ludgate-Street.

MDCCLXV.

PREFACE.

TWO very different opinions concerning the ſubject of grammar have prevailed in the world, and thoſe who entertain either of theſe opinions may be inclined to look upon any new treatiſe on the ſubject as quite unneceſſary. Hence it is poſſible that thoſe perſons may not think the following performance worthy of a peruſal; and on this account it is neceſſary, in this place, to conſider both theſe opinions, and to ſhew how far the one or the other is authorized by reaſon.

The firſt opinion is, that grammar has been treated of already by ſo many writers in ſo many languages, that whatſoever can now be ſaid upon the ſubject muſt be little more than a repetition of what has been ſaid by former grammarians.

The other opinion is, that language having been formed at the firſt without regard to the principles of grammar, is not ſubject to them; but that uſe and cuſtom are the only teſts of what is right or wrong in

it, and the only certain directors for the application of it.

With regard to the firſt of theſe opinions, I can with truth aſſure my reader, that he will find the ſpeculative treatiſe to be at leaſt original. The old terms of grammar are indeed retained; but the inveſtigation of every part of the ſubject that is of any conſiderable moment, is altogether new. I am likewiſe in hopes, that ſome advances in the art will appear to be made, and ſome difficulties cleared up in almoſt every part of the ſubject. For having ſhewn in the firſt place (as I hope, with ſufficient evidence) the true nature of the conceptions annexed to ſingle nouns and verbs, I have accounted for the ſeveral modes of proceeding by which theſe conceptions are again united into conceptions more and more complex at pleaſure. This is by much the moſt difficult part of grammar, and, as Mr. Locke complained long ago, has not been ſufficiently attended to by the generality of thoſe who have written on the ſubject.

In the ſecond place; as the nature of words themſelves requires certain grammatic forms to be introduced into language for the ſake of direction and preciſion, in joining the words of a ſeries properly together, I have ſhewn what is the effect of each of theſe forms, and why ſome languages have a greater variety of them than others: and particularly why the Latin and Greek have a much greater variety of them than the Engliſh.

And

And in the third place; becauſe the act itſelf of applying words comes in aid on many occaſions, ſo as to aſcertain what the words themſelves leave undetermined; I have ſhewn how, and in what inſtances, this comes to paſs.

I have conſulted ſeveral grammarians of note, who have written in ſuch languages as I am acquainted with; but have not received from them ſo much ſatisfaction as I hoped for, on any of the points above-mentioned. Indeed the two laſt points have been either quite overlooked, or at leaſt touched upon very ſlightly: and yet no leſs depends upon them than the aſcertainment of the particulars in which affirmation conſiſts. Now ſurely the nature of affirmation ought to be fully cleared up in a treatiſe of rational grammar. For words are connected together with no other intention but to affirm or to deny; and therefore the principal part of the buſineſs of a ſpeculative grammarian is to ſhew how this intention is accompliſhed. Indeed all the particulars above-mentioned are of ſo great importance in the art of grammar, that, if any conſiderable degree of ſatisfaction can be given concerning them, it is ſurely worth the while to take ſome pains for the ſake of ſuch ſatisfaction. It is true, that ſome of theſe particulars are of an abſtracted nature; and when ſuch are treated of, a ſteady attention is neceſſary to comprehend what is ſaid concerning them. But thoſe who acknowledge the neceſſity of being well verſed in the principles of grammar, in order to arrive at a compleat knowledge of the nature of language,

will

will not be unwilling to apply their attention ſteadily upon a treatiſe in which *an attempt is made to inveſtigate the moſt general principles of the art:* and if my reader will favour me with ſuch attention, I would gladly hope that he will find no great difficulty in following me through any part of the work.

But thoſe who think that cuſtom and precedent are the only principles on which the application of language proceeds, will be apt to ſay, that the attention which is beſtowed upon *the inveſtigation of rational principles of grammar*, is merely thrown away both by the writer and reader. Yet ſurely there are ſuch principles; for can it be imagined, that any conſiſtent method of communicating the rational diſcurſive operations of one man to another, can be the random effect of accident? Or can it be denied that every language is ſuch a method? If then the plan of any language is not the effect of chance, it muſt be the effect of reaſon; and ſurely whatſoever the reaſon of any man, or of any community of men, can eſtabliſh, the reaſon of other men may account for. It has been long obſerved, that algebraic ſpecies, when uſed in connected ſeries, form a kind of language applicable to quantity only; and the reaſon why theſe artificial marks do ſo, is evidently becauſe the letters expreſs conceptions ſimilar to thoſe which are denoted by noun ſubſtantives, and the ſigns by which the letters are connected, denote diſcurſive acts ſimilar to thoſe which are denoted by the ſigns of caſes, whilſt the mark of equality denotes affirmation. Hence it comes to paſs, that all the ſpecies on the one

ſide of the equation are conſidered but as one quantity, and all the ſpecies on the other ſide alſo as one quantity, and the whole quantity on the one ſide is equal to the whole quantity on the other. But the actual operations of addition, ſubtraction, &c. by which the parts on either ſide are to be reduced all to one quantity, cannot be performed ſo long as the unknown quantity remains on that ſide: therefore it is clear, that the ſigns do not perform theſe operations, but are only marks invented to regiſter the ſeveral kinds of diſcurſive operations by which the mind proceeds in its inveſtigation; and the ſigns of caſes are exactly of the ſame nature with theſe ſigns, only leſs definite and preciſe. Now ſurely no man will ſay that there are no general principles on which the application of algebraic ſpecies proceeds, and if this cannot be ſaid, neither can it be truly ſaid, that there are no general principles on which the application of language proceeds. And if the former are clearly diſcovered, why may not the latter? But it is alledged, that every language at the firſt was rude and imperfect, the confuſed jargon of ſavage uncultivated men. Every art was at firſt in a rude and imperfect ſtate; yet the natural reaſon of man gave birth to every art: and the ſame reaſon, aſſiſted by trial and experience, continued to improve it: ſo that language, in this reſpect, is only on the ſame terms with other arts and ſciences. Now it is allowed, that there are general principles which obtain in other arts and ſciences; and why not ſo in language? The perſons who would refer every thing in language to mere uſe and cuſtom, ſeem to me to con-

ſider

ſider *readineſs of execution*, as the ſame thing with *propriety of execution*: and it muſt be granted, that, in all the practical arts, readineſs of execution entirely proceeds from conſtancy of uſe and practice. But, in other practical arts, every one is ſenſible, that when readineſs of execution is not regulated by ſome conſiſtent plan, the reſult of ſuch execution is uſually faulty. It is true, that, in all the practical arts, much uſe may ſupply the practitioner with ſo many precedents, that ſome of them may be uſed as patterns by which to regulate almoſt any inſtance of execution that ſhall occur. But it ſhould be conſidered, that the art of applying the patterns or precedents pertinently, is a kind of ſpeculative plan by which the practice of each art is regulated; that even this uſually requires the inſtruction of a maſter; and that the inſtruction of this maſter (though not reduced to a regular ſyſtem written down) ſupplies, ſo far as it goes, the place of ſuch a ſyſtem. If the practitioner is ingenious and induſtrious, he will, by his own obſervation and reflexion, improve upon the inſtructions which are given him, and perhaps will, in many inſtances, carry on his reflexions till they become general principles of the art which he practiſes: and, if ſo, he arrives at ſcience in theſe inſtances.

Thoſe who propoſe uſe and precedent as the only rules of language, in effect, propoſe the proceeding above-mentioned; for they only ſay, that every man's own reflexion may, from the cuſtom of the language in which he ſpeaks, form within his own mind what will

will be equivalent to a plan of grammar, and which, though not drawn up in exact method, will anſwer all the purpoſes of practice. I ſhall not undertake to determine what a man may do, but it is evident, that very able men have not done what is above ſuppoſed; for whoſoever ſhall peruſe the SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH GRAMMAR WITH CRITICAL NOTES, lately publiſhed by Mr. Dodſley, will find that our authors, of the higheſt reputation, have fallen into ſuch inaccuracies as would not be pardoned in a ſchool-boy, if they appeared in a Latin compoſition. And ſurely the worthy author of the above-mentioned book has done very great ſervice to the language, by pointing out the inaccuracies, and by ſhewing, in his very judicious preface, the true ſource from whence they have ſprung. This proves beyond all diſpute the neceſſity of attending to practical grammar in our own language. It is farther urged, that mode and cuſtom muſt be the only rule of ſpeech, becauſe every living language is perpetually changing by their ſole influence: but ſo is the execution of every practical art whatſoever; for does not the ſtile of building, that of furniture and utenſils of all kinds, vary continually by the ſame influence, as likewiſe the methods of cultivating the earth, of making war, of carrying on navigation, and of conducting the employment of almoſt every profeſſion? Yet there are general principles by which men conduct themſelves in all theſe inſtances, and ſuch there are alſo by which the application of language is conducted, if men would take the pains to find them out.

But ſtill it may be ſaid, that practical grammar may be attended to, without troubling ourſelves with deep ſpeculation on the nature of language in general; and this muſt be allowed to be true. But even practical grammar cannot *be written*, ſo as to give ſatisfaction to a perſon of ſagacity, without firſt conſidering the general nature of the ſeveral parts of ſpeech; for as the application of language is exceedingly extenſive, and as the ſignification of the words and ſigns made uſe of, is of a very complicated nature, much abſtract conſideration becomes neceſſary to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral particulars of the ſignification of the ſame part of ſpeech one from another; and eſpecially in the noun and verb. Every part of ſpeech in ſome particulars of its ſignification approaches to the nature of ſome other part of ſpeech, and if theſe particulars are not very carefully obſerved by a writer on grammar, his definitions will be inaccurate; for the definition of one part of ſpeech will comprehend ſome other part:- and if definitions are thus formed, they will be of little or no uſe. And on the other hand, if grammatic definitions are made as accurate as the ſubject admits of, they muſt be founded on properties of the conceptions of the mind which are ſomewhat remote from common obſervation. This creates an appearance of difficulty and abſtruſeneſs in theſe parts of grammar; and therefore it is not proper to trouble children with very exact definitions at their firſt entrance upon language. Yet ſurely it may not be amiſs to tell a child, that a noun ſubſtantive denotes objects or things ſo conceived, that if ſeveral of them be taken together, they may be counted

counted by the numbers *one*, *two*, *three*, &c.: and that verbs denote ſtates ſo conceived, that any of them may be conſidered as repeated *once*, *twice*, *thrice*, or any number of times at pleaſure, which the objects denoted by ſubſtantives cannot be. The other parts of ſpeech may likewiſe be diſtinguiſhed to a child by marks which may be eaſily comprehended, and a liſt of ſeveral of them, as of the pronouns, conjunctions, and prepoſitions, may be actually given: which will enable the child to diſtinguiſh them readily from other parts of ſpeech. This, and the care of a diligent teacher in reſolving the language, will do a great deal towards giving the child a due apprehenſion of the uſe of grammatic rules and diſtinctions; and as reaſon improves, and reflexion encreaſes, more perfect inſtructions may be given by the maſter, and will be underſtood by the child.

But as many perſons, who are arrived to maturity of judgment, may have occaſion to learn a language, or to improve their knowledge of it; the definitions in a grammar for the uſe of ſuch perſons muſt be as accurate as poſſible, and the rules as general as poſſible; and if they ſhould at firſt appear to be ſomewhat abſtruſe, the ſtudent muſt be told, that the nature of the ſubject makes this unavoidable; and therefore that he muſt be content to attend cloſely to them till they are well underſtood; and that, if they are once perfectly comprehended, the application of them will become obvious on any occaſion. Thus far every learner is concerned to underſtand the grammar of any particular

language which he would write correctly. But thoſe who profeſs to teach any language, would do well to carry their reſearches ſtill farther concerning the nature of human ſpeech; becauſe ſuch reſearches, if prudently made, will enable them, in many inſtances, to give thoſe whom they teach, general views of the reaſons of conſtruction, which is the only ſure way of fixing the art of grammar in their minds, ſo as to enable them to know when they may ſafely depart from the ordinary rules, and how to do it with advantage. And as this proceeding is the duty of a teacher, it is likewiſe neceſſary for all who would be as ſkilful in language as teachers ought to be. I am far from thinking the following treatiſes are fully ſufficient to anſwer the purpoſes above-mentioned; but ſpeculative or rational grammar has hitherto been little cultivated in England, and if this treatiſe ſhall contribute to turn the thoughts of men of reflexion to it, I ſhall think that I have done ſome ſervice.

I have given the ſubſtance of the practical grammar in verſe, for the eaſe of memory. In this I have undoubtedly ſubjected myſelf to much poetical criticiſm; but if I have made the liſts of irregular words more eaſy to be remembered, by putting them into rhime, however harſh, or the rules more eaſy to be acquired and retained by the ſame means, I am very little ſollicitous for my reputation as a poet. We are all apt to cenſure the aukward meaſures of the rules for the genders of nouns and the preterperfect tenſes of verbs in the common Latin grammar, and yet no method has hitherto been

been discovered which answers the end so well as these rules do, although many very ingenious men have attempted other methods.

I have received some assistance in this work from a very learned and ingenious treatise, called HERMES; as likewise from the Grammaire Raisonnée of Messieurs de Port-Royal, with the Abbé Fromant's very useful and ingenious reflexions upon it; also from Father Buffier's Grammar: I have had some advantage from Sanctius's Minerva; some from Dr. Wallace's short piece of English Grammar, and more from the excellent Introduction mentioned above; I have also received some helps from Dr. Ward's four Essays on the English language, especially from the list of verbs published at the end of these Essays; I have likewise made some use of Mr. White's treatise of the English verb; but above all, Mr. Johnson's Dictionary has been of use to me. I could not have written several parts of the Practical Grammar, had not this most excellent performance supplied me with examples, and other helps. If I have not done injustice to the originals which I have followed, I shall hope that my practical treatise may be serviceable to learners of all kinds, which was my only view in writing it: there is much more in it than is necessary, or even convenient, to trouble a child with at the first; but not more than is necessary for grown up persons who may be desirous to learn the language, or the grammar of it. My design was to make a grammatical knowledge of the English language a step towards gaining the like knowledge in other languages,

guages, eſpecially in the Greek and Latin: therefore I have followed the uſual heads which are found in the grammars of theſe languages. To depart from theſe heads may perhaps ſeem more conciſe; but, in reality, little advantage is gained by it; at leaſt no advantage, which is equivalent to the inconvenience of a new plan and new terms, to thoſe who have been accuſtomed to the old. I have avoided all diſputes with former writers on grammar: for my intention and inclination was not to cenſure, but to inveſtigate, and to apply what I ſhould inveſtigate. I doubt not but I have been guilty of miſtakes in ſo very abſtruſe a ſubject as that of ſpeculative grammar, and of omiſſions in ſo extenſive a ſubject as that of a practical grammar of a language ſo little reduced to rule as the Engliſh has hitherto been. But if any perſon ſhall be pleaſed to inform me of any defect in the work, I will endeavour to amend it, if my health and leiſure ſhall permit me to do it.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

Page

OF the intent of the ſpeculative treatiſe, and of the method which will be obſerved in it 1

A deſcription of language, and general definition of grammar 2

Of articulate ſounds and letters uſed to denote ſuch ſounds 3

Why the articulations of the voice are difficult to be aſcertained preciſely 4

Why the alphabets of the preſent European languages are very imperfect 5

Of vowels, conſonants, and words 7

Of accent and emphaſis. 8

Of points and ſtops 9

BOOK I. SECTION I.

THAT the noun and the verb are the principal parts of ſpeech 11

That the nature of the conceptions annexed to nouns and verbs is beſt ſhewn by conſidering them in one view 12

General definition of a noun including both the ſubſtantive and the adjective ibid.

General definition of a verb including both the infinitive mood and the participles ibid.

The definitions above, conſidered and explained particularly 13—21

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. II.

	Page
Definition of a noun ſubſtantive in particular	22
That the definitions of a noun ſubſtantive which have been given by former grammarians are defective	23
Three of the principal of them conſidered particularly	23—28

SECT. III.

Of proper names	30

SECT. IV.

Of common or appellative names	31

SECT. V.

Of the nature of the conceptions which are annexed to common or appellative names	31—32
Of the characteriſtics of ſpecies	32—34

SECT. VI.

Of the proceeding of the mind in forming the conceptions which are annexed to common or appellative ſubſtantives	36
Why none of the antient languages can be made uſe of at preſent on ordinary occaſions	37

SECT. VII.

Of aggregate ſpecies	38

SECT. VIII.

Of dividual ſpecies	39

SECT. IX.

Of correlative ſpecies	ibid.

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. X. Page

Of abſtract ſpecies 40

SECT. XI.

Of the proceeding of the mind in forming the conceptions denoted by verbs 42

SECT. XII.

Of the numbers of noun ſubſtantives 46

SECT. XIII.

Of the caſes of nouns in general 48
Whence the grammatic terms of caſe *and* declenſion *are derived* 51

SECT. XIV.

Of the ſigns of the caſes of ſubſtantives 53
That this is the moſt abſtruſe part of grammar 55
The eſſential property of an oblique caſe 58
That the explanation of the nature of an oblique caſe requires a previous explanation of the nature of the tranſitive verb 58
The nature of the tranſitive verb explained 59
Of the effect of the ſign of *between two ſubſtantives* 63
That this effect may be produced by a participle of a verb tranſitive, or by a relative clauſe 64
Of the ſign of *in dependence upon verbs* 66
Of the ſign than ibid.
Of the ſign for 67
Of the reſt of the ſigns of caſes 68
That one and the ſame relation among objects may be denoted by different ſigns, and why it may be ſo 69—70
Why the ſigns of caſes and prepoſitions bear a leſs determinate ſignification than nouns and verbs 71—72

CONTENTS.

SECT. XV.

Of the caſes of ſubſtantives in particular.

Page

Of the nominative caſe, and why the mentioning of a noun by itſelf in this caſe conveys no information to the hearer 73

SECT. XVI.

Of the genitive caſe 74
Why ſome uſes of this caſe are of ambiguous meaning 76

SECT. XVII.

Of the ſign of *in dependence upon verbs* 82

SECT. XVIII.

Of the dative caſe 86

SECT. XIX.

Of the accuſative caſe 88
That the denial of caſes in Engliſh ſubſtantives, is only diſputing about the name, a caſe 89

SECT. XX.

Of the vocative caſe 90

SECT. XXI.

Of the ablative caſe.

Of the ſign from 91
Of the ſign by 92
Of the ſign with 93—94
Of the ſign in 95—96
Of the ſign for 96—98
Of the ſign than 99—102

SECT. XXII.

Of the article in general 103
Of the indefinite article in particular 104
Of the definite article in particular 108

BOOK

CONTENTS.

BOOK II. SECT. I.

	Page
OF the noun adjective	113
An adjective may be equivalent to the oblique case of a substantive	114
Therefore an adjective is properly called a noun	ibid.
But an adjective, in its usual application, cannot be considered as of the same nature with a participle	116
That grammatic distinctions of case, gender, and number, are not absolutely necessary in adjectives, and why	118
That the English adjectives must be placed as near as possible to their substantives, and why they must be so	119
The great inconvenience arising from the diversity of grammatic gender in adjectives, hence the want of such diversity is an excellence of the English language	120

SECT. II.

Of the comparison of adjectives	ibid.

BOOK III.

Of the pronoun.

OF the pronouns personal	125
Of the characteristics of the species which these pronouns denote	126
Why antecedents are necessary to pronouns	127
In what instances antecedents are not necessary to pronouns of the first and second person	ibid.
Why it would be inconvenient to distinguish species by such marks or characters as are not constant or habitual in the individuals of such species	130
Whence the grammatic name, person, *is derived*	132

CONTENTS.

SECT. II.

Of the pronouns poſſeſſive.

Page

They are adjectives, and not the genitive caſes of the perſonal pronouns 133

SECT. III.

Of the relative pronoun.

There are ſeveral adverbs which include the power of a relative pronoun in their ſignification 134
A deſcription of the nature of this pronoun ibid.
That it reduces a clauſe in which it is uſed to the nature of an adjective, although the clauſe bears the form of a compleat ſentence, but this clauſe can only be united with the ſame object which the relative repreſents 136
How compleat ſentences are turned into relative dependent clauſes, ſhewn by examples 131
Of the connexion between the relative and its antecedent 140
That this connexion is very different from that between a perſonal pronoun and its antecedent 140—141
Wherein the difference conſiſts, ſhewn and proved by examples 141—142
The nature of adjectives and coaleſcent participles explained by that of a relative clauſe 143—145
Why the relative pronoun can ſeldom be uſed without its antecedent actually mentioned 146
Of the power of the compound relative what 147

SECT. IV.

Of the interrogative pronoun.

Shewn to be the relative pronoun in effect, as well as in grammatic form 148
The nature of a queſtion explained which is not aſked by the help of an interrogative pronoun 152

CONTENTS.

SECT. V.

Page

Of the demonſtrative pronouns, the power of each of them conſidered 153

BOOK IV. SECT. I.

Of the verb.

DEFINITION of a verb 157
Of the ſeveral characters or capacities of the verb 158

SECT. II.

Of the verb objective, its nature and uſe 158—160

SECT. III.

Of the verb coaleſcent, its nature and uſe 161—163

SECT. IV.

Of the verb definitive, in what its power differs from that of the verb in its other characters 164—167
That the eſſence of a verb does not conſiſt in affirmation, or in any particular exertion of the judgment required in its application 168—169
Of the verbs called impersonal in grammar, ſhewing that they all relate to ſubjects either expreſſed or taken for granted as known to the hearer 169—170
The nature of the definitive verb is ſhewn to be rightly determined in what is ſaid of it above, by the conſideration of the nature of the words which deſtroy its definitive power 170—171
The exact difference determined between a coaleſcent participle and a definitive verb 171

Why

CONTENTS.

Why the definitive verb muſt not depend on any ſort of word which abſolutely requires to depend on ſome other word in order to compleat its ſignification — Page 172

How the time is determined to which the definitive forms of verbs relate — 173—174

SECT. V.

Of the different ſorts of verbs.

Of the nature of verbs tranſitive and intranſitive — 175—176

The verb to be *conſidered in particular* — 177—178

Of the application of names of time, diſtance, and meaſure, in dependence upon the verb to be — 179

SECT. VI.

Of verbs as diſtinguiſhed into ſorts by difference of grammatic forms — 180

Of the active, paſſive, and middle voice *of verbs* — 181—182

SECT. VII.

Of the conjugation of verbs.

In what the variation of the forms of the Engliſh verb conſiſts — 183

Why there is but one conjugation of regular Engliſh verbs — 185

How the irregular verbs may be nearly reduced to rule — 186

SECT. VIII.

Of the moods of verbs in general — ibid.

SECT. IX.

Of the moods of verbs in particular — 187

SECT. X.

Of the definitive moods of verbs in general — 188

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. XI.

Of the definitive moods in particular.

	Page
Of the indicative mood	190
Of the imperative mood	191
Of the potential mood with a particular inveſtigation of the import of its ſigns, may, can, ſhould, would, *and* muſt	193—195
Of the ſubjunctive mood	195

SECT. XII.

Of the tenſes of verbs.

Of the tenſes of the indicative mood	196—197
Of the different power and uſe of ſhall *and* will	198—200
Of the tenſes of the indicative mood as applied to ſuppoſed or imaginary ſtates	201
Of the tenſes of the imperative mood	202
Why there is ſometimes a paſt form of this mood	ibid.
Of the tenſes of the potential mood	203
Of the tenſes of the ſubjunctive mood	204

SECT. XIII.

Of the perſons of verbs	206

SECT. XIV.

Of the verbs which are uſed as the ſigns of tenſes of other verbs	207
Whence theſe ſigns came into the Engliſh language	209
The ſame participle in the regular Engliſh verbs, expreſſes either an active or paſſive paſt ſtate by the help of different ſigns	212

BOOK

CONTENTS.

BOOK V. SECT. I.

Of the adverb.

Page

DESCRIPTION of its nature 213

The names of parts of time, diſtance, meaſure, &c. are uſually applied as adverbs, although no notice is given by any grammatic form 214

SECT. II.

Of the conjunction.

Deſcription of the nature and power of a conjunction 216

Of conjunctions in general as joining words 217

——*as joining ſentences* 220

In particular of the conjunctions copulative 221

——*disjunctive* 224

——*diſcretive* 225

——*conditional* 226

——*adverſative or conceſſive* 227

——*redditive* 228

——*cauſal* 229

——*illative* 230

——*reſtrictive* 232

—*caſual or ſentential demonſtrative* 238

That a relative pronoun is frequently equivalent to a perſonal pronoun depending upon a conjunction, and why it is ſo 240

Of the peculiar caſt of ſome ſentences in Latin by the application of the relative pronoun in a peculiar manner 241

This ſhews that the nature of a relative pronoun, of a verb definitive, and objective, and of a cauſal conjunction is properly determined in this treatiſe 242

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. III.

Of the prepoſition.

	Page
That the very ſame connexion amongſt objects, or verbal ſtates, may be expreſſed different ways in the ſame language, and why	243
A liſt of the Engliſh prepoſitions	246
Of prepoſitions in inſeparable compoſition with ſome other word	249
Theſe are uſually the French, Latin, and Greek prepoſitions, becauſe moſt of the compound words in Engliſh have been derived from theſe languages	250

SECT. IV.

Of the interjection, its general nature deſcribed	251
This part of the work cloſed by placing the ſeveral kinds of connexion of the conceptions of the mind of man, as denoted by words, in one view	252

BOOK VI. SECT. I.

OF the power of uſe or cuſtom in language	255
That conformity to it is not the teſt of what is beſt in language	258—259
A definition of taſte	259
Why general rules are not followed in every inſtance in any practical art; not even in arithmetic	260

SECT. II.

Of words in connected conſtruction.

Why a ſeries of words muſt take the form of a ſentence in almoſt all inſtances, in order to anſwer the intention of a rational ſpeaker	262
Why a ſingle definitive verb in Latin and Greek may, on ſome occaſions, anſwer the effect of a whole ſentence	263

CONTENTS.

Page

Why words which have no verb in them may, on ſome occaſions, have the ſame effect 266

That the whole application of language is reducible to one ſimple proceeding; this proceeding deſcribed 269

Of the order in which the words of a ſeries may be placed in conſtruction 271

That the concords in grammar have no other foundation or uſe, but that of ſhewing which words of a ſeries are to be taken in immediate union with each other 272

The rule of the firſt concord, i. e. *that between the nominative caſe and the verb* 273

Why the obſervation of this concord is attended in Engliſh with very little difficulty ibid.

The rule of the ſecond concord; that it is anneceſſary in Engliſh, and why it is ſo 274

The rule of the third concord; that it extends in Engliſh to all the pronouns, even the pronouns poſſeſſive ibid.

That the determination of the caſe of the relative *is not properly a rule of concord* 275

Of the conſtruction of infinitive verbs and participles, without or with other words in dependance upon them, ſo as to anſwer the effect of one noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe 276

That the participles in Greek and Latin have not the objective character ibid.

That the want of this is a defect in both the languages; proved by inſtances 277

Whence the names gerund *and* ſupine *in the Latin grammar have probably been derived* 279

It is proved by examples, that the objective verb, either without or with words in dependance upon it, is equivalent to one ſubſtantive in any caſe, both in Greek, Latin, and Engliſh 280

Of ſerieſes of words, each whereof is equivalent to a whole ſentence, and yet is made to anſwer the effect

	Page
of one ſubſtantive in ſome caſe, with examples of this conſtruction in Greek, Latin, and Engliſh	281
Of abſolute conſtruction in Greek, Latin, and Engliſh	284
What is the effect of this kind of conſtruction	285
That it is very frequent in the Latin, and why it is ſo	ibid.
Examples ſhewing that the frequency of abſolute clauſes in Latin ariſes from a defect in the language	286
That the uſe of an abſolute clauſe is an effectual confirmation of what has been ſaid of the nature of an oblique caſe	288
Of the excellence of the Engliſh language, on account of the ſimplicity of its ſyntax	289
That the complaint of the Engliſh being weakened by the auxiliar verbs, or by any other means, is without foundation	290
Of the Engliſh language as applied to poetry	291
Why it cannot fall into the meaſure of the Latin and Greek heroic verſe	ibid.
Why it falls eaſily into iambic, trochaic, or anapæſtic meaſures	ibid.
What was probably the power of the expletive particles in Greek	292
That the plan of conſtruction of the Greek is very indeterminate, and why it is ſo	ibid.
Of the Engliſh as applied to oratory	293
That there is as great variety in the firſt ſyllables of Engliſh words as probably can be in thoſe of any language, and why there is ſo	294
That there is a greater variety in the final ſyllables of Engliſh words, when uſed in actual conſtruction, than can be in the Latin or Greek, and why there is ſo	ibid.
Two principal ſources of inaccuracy in Engliſh writers	ibid.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OF THE

PRACTICAL GRAMMAR.

Page

OF the heads into which practical grammar is usually divided 297

INTRODUCTION.

Concerning orthography, or the pronunciation and spelling of syllables and words in English 298
The English alphabet 299
Of the vowels in general 300
Of the consonants in general 301
Of the vowels in particular 303
Of the consonants in particular 308
Some rules in verse for the pronunciation of j consonant, th, c, *and* g 317

BOOK I. SECT. I.

Of etymology.

OF the sorts of words whereof language consists 319
A short account of the general nature of the noun and verb in verse, for the sake of memory, and afterwards in prose 321

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. II.

Of the noun.

Page

Short deſcription of a noun ſubſtantive in verſe and proſe 324

SECT. III.

Of the ſorts of noun ſubſtantives 325

SECT. IV.

Of the numbers, declenſion and caſes of ſubſtantives, in verſe and proſe 326

Of the regular declenſion of Engliſh ſubſtantives, with its four ſubordinate varieties, in verſe and proſe 331

SECT. V.

Of the article, in verſe and proſe 334

Examples of the regular declenſion, with its four varieties 336

A liſt of irregular Engliſh ſubſtantives, in verſe and proſe 340

SECT. VI.

Of the genders of Engliſh ſubſtantives, in verſe and proſe 342

SECT. VII.

Short account of the noun adjective, in verſe and proſe 343

Of the compariſon of adjectives, in verſe and proſe 345

Of the pronoun.

An enumeration of the ſorts of pronouns, in verſe and proſe 347

SECT. VIII.

Short account of the pronouns perſonal, in verſe and proſe, with their declenſion 348

SECT. IX.

Short account of the pronouns poſſeſſive, in verſe and proſe 352

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. X.

Short account of the relative pronouns, in verſe and proſe, with their declenſion — Page 353

SECT. XI.

Short account of the interrogative pronouns, in verſe and proſe — 358

SECT. XII.

Short account of the demonſtrative pronouns, in verſe and proſe, with their declenſion — 359

SECT. XIII.

Short account of the verb, its general nature, and the ſeveral characters which it bears, in verſe and proſe — 370

SECT. XIV.

Of the different ſorts of verbs, in verſe and proſe — 377

SECT. XV.

Of the voices and conjugation of verbs, in verſe and proſe — 380

SECT. XVI.

Of the moods of verbs, in verſe and proſe — 381

SECT. XVII.

Of the tenſes of verbs, in verſe and proſe — 384
Of the different uſe of ſhall *and* will — 386

SECT. XVIII.

Of the numbers and perſons of verbs, in verſe and proſe — 390

SECT. XIX.

Of the manner of compoſing the grammatic forms of the Engliſh verb — 392
The conjugation of the verb to have — 393
The conjugation of the verb to be — 396

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. XX. Page

Of the roots of Engliſh verbs 400

SECT. XXI.

The conjugation of the regular Engliſh verb exemplified in the verb to call, *through all the voices* 402

SECT. XXII.

Of the roots of the irregular Engliſh verbs, with liſts of the ſeveral ſorts of them, in verſe and proſe 411

Of the formation of the tenſes and perſons of all ſorts of verbs, with rules in verſe for this purpoſe 420

SECT. XXIII.

Of the adverb; a deſcription of it, in verſe and proſe 423

A liſt of the Engliſh adverbs which do not end in ly, *with a ſhort account of the meaning of each of them* 424

Of the negative, redditive, relative, demonſtrative, and conjunctive adverbs 427—431

SECT. XXIV.

Of the conjunction; a ſhort deſcription of the nature of a conjunction, in verſe and proſe 432

A ſhort account of conjunctions as joining words 433

A ſhort account of the copulative, disjunctive, diſcretive, conditional, adverſative or conceſſive, redditive, cauſal, illative, exceptive, reſtrictive, and ſentential demonſtrative or caſual conjunctions, with liſts of thoſe of each ſort 434—439

SECT. XXV.

Of the prepoſition; a ſhort deſcription of the nature of a prepoſition, in verſe and proſe 439

A liſt of the Engliſh prepoſitions, as likewiſe of the principal French, Latin, and Greek prepoſitions, which unite in inſeparable compoſition with other words 441

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. XXVI.

Page

Of the interjection; a short description of the nature of this part of speech, in verse and prose 442

A list of the English interjections, with a short account of the import of each of them 443

BOOK II.

Of syntax.

A Definition of syntax 447

Of the general nature and use of what is called concord *in grammar* ibid.

That the order of position of words in English answers many of the purposes of concord 448

Nine rules for the English order of position given in verse, and likewise in prose, and these rules confirmed by examples from writers of the greatest authority 449—452

Of the first concord. The rule given in verse and prose, and illustrated by examples and observations 453

Of the second concord. The rule given in verse and prose, and illustrated by examples and observations 457

Of the third concord. The rule given in verse and prose, and illustrated by examples and observations 459

Of the case of the relative. The rule given in verse and prose, and illustrated by examples and observations 461

Of the construction of the oblique cases of substantives.

Of the genitive case in dependance on substantives. The rule given in verse and prose, and illustrated by examples and observations 463

Of substantives depending on verbs by the sign of. *The rule given in verse and prose, and illustrated as the foregoing* 465

CONTENTS.

Page

Of the conſtruction of the dative caſe. The rule given in verſe and proſe, and illuſtrated as the reſt 468

Of the Engliſh verbs which admit of two ſubſtantives in dependence on them without any ſign, although one of them anſwers to a dative caſe. The rule given in verſe and proſe, and illuſtrated as the reſt 469

Of the accuſative caſe. The rule given in verſe and proſe, and illuſtrated as the reſt 471

Of the vocative caſe in the ſame manner ibid.

Of the ablative caſe.

By the ſign from, *in the ſame manner* 472

By the ſign by, *in the ſame manner* 473

By the ſign with, *as the reſt* 475

By the ſign in, *delivered as the others* 478

By the ſign for, *as the others* 480

By the ſign than, *as the others, with a large illuſtration* 482

Of the conſtruction of ſubſtantives in like caſes.

The rule in verſe and proſe, with many examples, and a large illuſtration 484

Of the conſtruction of ſingle words, or ſerieſes of words, ſo as to have the effect of one ſubſtantive in ſome caſe, although without any ſign. The rule delivered and illuſtrated like the reſt 486

Of whole ſentences uſed as ſubſtantives. The rule delivered and illuſtrated like the reſt 488

Of the conſtruction of verbs impersonal. The rule delivered and illuſtrated as the reſt 491

Of the conſtruction of participles.

The rule, &c. as the reſt 494

Of nouns uſed adverbially. The rule, &c. as the reſt 495

Of conjunctions as joining words. The rule, &c. as the reſt 496

Of the conjunctions and indefinites which require a verb of the ſubjunctive mood. The rule, &c. as the reſt 497

CONTENTS.

	Page
Of the conſtruction of prepoſitions. The rule given in verſe and proſe	498
All the prepoſitions conſidered in order, and the principal kinds of connexion which are denoted by each prepoſition ſhewn and confirmed by examples	499—519
Of the conſtruction of interjections	519
Of abſolute conſtruction. The rule in verſe and proſe, and illuſtrated by examples	520
Of figurative conſtruction.	
Of the figure ellipſis	522
Of the Engliſh verbs which take an infinitive mood after them without the ſign to. *The rule given in verſe and proſe, and illuſtrated as the reſt*	523
Of pleonaſm	525
Of enallage.	ibid.
Rule in verſe to determine the character of the particle that	526
Of the figure hyperbaton	527
That we ſhould be cautious when we place the noun ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe before a verb tranſitive. The inconvenience of this proceeding ſhewn by examples	528
BOOK III.	
Of proſody.	
DEFINITION of it	531
Of the quantity of ſyllables in Engliſh words, with regard to the length of time taken up in pronouncing each ſyllable	ibid.
Of what is called accent *in Engliſh*	532
Thirteen rules for the quantity of Engliſh ſyllables laid down in verſe and proſe, and confirmed by examples	532—542

Of

CONTENTS.

	Page
Of the compoſition of Engliſh verſes	542
Of the feet *uſed in Engliſh verſes*	543
That the due rithmus or modulation of our verſes depends upon the feet or proper ſucceſſion of ſhort and long, or long and ſhort ſyllables	ibid.
That a certain number of ſyllables are not ſufficient to conſtitute a verſe properly, unleſs due regard be had to the ſucceſſion above-mentioned, ſhewn by an example	ibid.
Of the ſeveral kinds of meaſures uſed in Engliſh verſification, viz. the iambic, the trochaic, the dactylic, and the anapæſtic; each of theſe meaſures treated of in order, and examples of verſes of different lengths in each kind of meaſure given from the beſt Engliſh poets	544—553
Why rhime is moſt abſurd in Latin verſes, and why thoſe who uſed rhimes in Latin always uſed what in Engliſh is called double rhime	554
But that this is no reaſon againſt rhime in Engliſh verſes, and why it is not	ibid.

ERRATA in the SPECULATIVE GRAMMAR.

page	line	
13	18	for *ſar* read *for*.
49	28	read *and the circumſtances*.
65	23	read *by a ſubſtantive*.
74	19	inſtead of *cannot only* r. *can not only*.
77	3	the word *by* ſhould be in roman letters.
108	21	read *indefinite article*; *ſeeing every man*, &c.
136	3	r. *a noun adjective, or dependent*, &c.
163	28	for *definitive* read *objective*.
173	20	for *cannor* read *cannot*.
174	22	dele *of*.
188	21	for *adjectively* read *objectively*.
192	26	inſert *the* before *compoſition*.
199	14	the words *(but himſelf and I)* to be in a parentheſis.
204	12	inſert *paſt* before *ſtate*.
280	17	for *Sanctï* read *Sanctii*.
283	11	for ιχυς read ισχυς.
287	21	for *reſponſe* read *reſponſe*.

ERRATA in the PRACTICAL GRAMMAR.

page	line	
305	18	for *treaſurer* read *treaſure*.
307	14	for *ſound* read *ſound*.
308	11	for *word* read *words*.
334	29	for *concerning* read *concerning*. after page 360, page 369 follows by miſtake.
383	21	for *pontential* read *potential*.
404	22	for *ſecond preterite* read *ſecond indefinite*.
407	17	for *firſt preterite* read *firſt indefinite*.
421	8	for *to be about to be* read *to be about to ſee*.
432	25	before *references* inſert *the*.
450	28	for *poſitive* read *poſſeſſive*.
492	20	for *article* read *particle*.
514	10	for *before* read *with*.
538	18	for *firſt* read *ſecond*.
541	22	for *ability* read *ability*.

INTRO-

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.

Of the method which will be obſerved in the following treatiſe.

ALTHOUGH the principal intent of this treatiſe is to explain the principles upon which the application of language proceeds, and eſpecially of the Engliſh language; it is nevertheleſs neceſſary to give ſome account of the ſigns or ſymbols themſelves, which are a kind of inſtruments to be applied in the uſe of language, as the marks of certain kinds of conceptions and operations of the mind of man. This account will therefore be given in the firſt place, ſo far as relates to language in general.

I ſhall proceed, after this account is given, to conſider the nature of the conceptions which are annexed to the ſeveral ſorts of words whereof language conſiſts, and to account for the union of theſe conceptions into conceptions more and more complex at the pleaſure of the mind of man, and to ſhew what is the reaſon that words muſt be reduced to the form of a compleat ſentence for the purpoſe of expreſſing truth or falſhood. This cannot be done till the nature of affirmation is explained, and the application of ſeveral ſorts of words is ſhewn, which have the power of deſtroying affirmation. Hence the ſeveral ſorts of words whereof language conſiſts muſt be particularly conſidered

one after another, that the particular power of each ſort may be diſcovered, and the effect of its application in any inſtance may be known. For till this is done, the connective part of the ſignification of words cannot be explained; which yet is the part of language that requires explanation the moſt. I ſhall have an eye to the Engliſh language principally throughout the whole enquiry. But as the properties obſerved in many ſorts of words, and ſeveral of the properties of connected conſtruction, equally obtain in all languages; theſe properties will be accounted for as they are found in different languages. And as the plan of conſtruction of the Latin and Greek is very different from that of the Engliſh; the reaſon of this difference will be ſhewn. For this proceeding will enable us to form ſome judgment of the advantages and diſadvantages of theſe languages when compared with our own.

In order to avoid confuſion in this enquiry, it is neceſſary to give each ſort of words a particular name. And as the ſorts and names already eſtabliſhed in grammar, are ſufficiently exact to prevent confuſion, it is unneceſſary to make any alteration in them.

It has been obſerved long ago by the writers on the Latin and Greek grammar, that the ſorts of words found in theſe languages may be conveniently reduced to eight or nine. Theſe writers have called words, when thus conſidered, "*the parts of ſpeech*," and have given them the names of "*Noun—Pronoun—Verb—Participle—Adverb—Conjunction—Prepoſition—Interjection.*" This diviſion ſuits the Latin; but in Greek and Engliſh there is another part of ſpeech, called "*the Article.*"

Theſe parts of ſpeech will be each of them conſidered particularly in the order in which they are here ſet down, except the article. For it will be proper to conſider its particular nature, next in order after the noun ſubſtantive; becauſe of the eſpecial relation

relation which it has to that of the ſubſtantive. But it will be neceſſary to conſider the general nature of ſeveral of the parts of ſpeech together on many occaſions, for the ſake of diſcovering the properties which thoſe parts of ſpeech have in common with each other, as likewiſe the properties in which they diſagree.

SECTION II.

Of language conſidered with regard to the ſounds, letters, and other ſymbols, uſed in the expreſſions of which it conſiſts.

THE word "*language*," in its moſt extenſive acceptation, may comprehend every method by which the knowledge of the perceptions, thoughts, and purpoſes, of one man can be conveyed to another. But as the application of certain ſounds of the voice, and that of letters, uſed as marks of the poſitions of the organs of ſpeech by which theſe ſounds are formed, are by much the moſt general and effectual of all the methods of communicating our thoughts; theſe ſounds of the voice, and letters applied to repreſent them for the ſake of ſuch communication, are generally conceived to conſtitute what is properly called "*language*." And the art of grammar is "The art of "applying theſe ſounds and letters conſiſtently for the purpoſe "of communicating the thoughts of one man to another."

The ſounds of the voice which are applied in language are uſually called "*articulate ſounds*," to diſtinguiſh them from the ſounds which brute animals, or inanimate things, are capable of producing. For although the voice of man is capable of imitating theſe ſounds, this is done by ſuch poſitions of the organs of ſpeech, as require more time or labour in adjuſting them, than the production of articulate ſounds in the intercourſe of ſpeech admits of.

It is found by experience, that the principal of the articulate ſounds of the human voice, are formed by poſitions of the organs of ſpeech, attended with manners of emitting the breath, which are reducible to a few kinds. The obſervation of this, produced the invention of letters. For what is called the force or power of a letter is, the direction which it gives to the reader to place his organs of ſpeech in a certain poſition, and to emit his breath in a certain manner. If all the poſitions of the organs of ſpeech, and all the manners of emitting the breath which each poſition admits of, could be exactly determined; an exact alphabet might be made which would ſuit the ſounds of all languages whatſoever. But theſe poſitions, and manners of emitting the breath, are capable of a very great variety of degrees of approach towards each other; and hence the articulate ſounds run into one another, as muſical ſounds do, by almoſt imperceptible degrees. When therefore the articulate ſounds were firſt attempted to be regiſtered by letters, only the principal and leading articulations had letters aſſigned to them, and the others were either left to be underſtood, or were ſupplied by two or more letters which denoted the two extreme articulations between which the articulation required was thought to exiſt.

When letters were once invented, almoſt every nation ſeems to have adopted thoſe already found out, and to have adapted them, as far as could be done, to the articulations of its peculiar language. Now almoſt every language has articulations peculiar to itſelf, and therefore ſhould have peculiar characters for ſuch articulations. But almoſt all the European nations have adopted the Latin letters, although they have not aſſigned the ſame letter to the ſame articulation. For to mention no more; the French have aſſigned the letter (e) to the ſame articulation which the Engliſh have denoted by (a). And the Welch have evidently aſſigned ſeveral letters to articulations very different from thoſe to which other nations aſſign the ſame letters. This application of

of the ſame alphabet to different languages, and not to the ſame articulations, is manifeſtly the principal reaſon which has occaſioned both deficiencies and redundancies in the manner of expreſſing ſounds by letters, at leaſt in the Engliſh and French languages, and probably in moſt of the languages of Europe. For the Celtic and Runic and German words which remain in theſe languages, require articulations which were probably not uſed in the Latin; as the Latin words which are taken into theſe languages, had probably articulations which were not uſed either in the Celtic or Runic or German languages. Therefore in order to ſuit languages made up of a mixture of words taken from ſeveral languages, a more complex alphabet ſhould have been formed than that which might have ſuited any one of the languages before they were mixed together. But this not being done, the ſimple articulations of the German, or Celtic, were frequently denoted by two or more letters of the Latin alphabet; and the Latin letters were frequently retained in Latin words, when uſe had affixed articulations to theſe letters different from thoſe which the Romans affixed to them. Thus for inſtance; a ſimple articulation which the Engliſh received from the Saxons, is denoted by the two letters (th). This articulation is like that denoted by (s) except that the tip of the tongue reſts againſt the inward edge of the upper teeth, whilſt all or moſt of the breath is forced through the teeth, ſo as to make the ſides of the tongue vibrate; and this occaſions the ſound which foreigners find ſo difficult to be pronounced. As a ſimple letter is wanting in Engliſh for the articulation abovementioned; ſo, on the contrary, ſeveral articulations, which are exactly the ſame, are ſometimes denoted in Engliſh by one letter, and ſometimes by another. Thus the articulation uſually denoted by (s) is denoted in the words, "nation, vex-" ation," and many others, by a (t). And abundance of inſtances may be produced, both of defects and redundancies, in the letters which are applied to the Engliſh language. Many ſpeculative men have propoſed methods of rectifying theſe improprie-

proprieties; and no doubt much may be done towards regulating the written marks of articulations, in any particular language. But whoſoever conſiders attentively what Dr. Wallace and Dr. Holder have ſaid on the articulations by which the ſounds of language are formed, will be ſatisfied, that it is not poſſible to determine exactly the great variety of articulations which the organs of ſpeech admit of: and if this cannot be done, all attempts to make an alphabet perfectly exact muſt be ineffectual. For although the principal articulations ſhould be marked each by a diſtinct letter; and although points or other marks ſhould be applied to aſſiſt in what the letters themſelves do not fully determine; yet the intermediate articulations would partake of the principal ones in ſuch various degrees, and in ſuch nice combinations, as no marks could effectually aſcertain. Hence much muſt be left to the ear, and to the imitation of ſounds actually heard, when pronounced by thoſe who are thought to ſpeak any language well.

But although ſeveral of the articulations of ſpeech are ſo difficult to be exactly aſcertained; it is obvious to perceive that ſome of them are altogether vocal, and others not ſo; that is to ſay, that ſome of them produce ſounds which may be continued as long as the ſpeaker continues to impel his breath, without any change of the poſition of his organs of utterance; but that other articulations either prevent all paſſage of the voice, and ſo produce no ſound, or if they do admit the voice to paſs, the ſound produced is ſo indiſtinct, or ſo diſagreeable, that ſuch articulations are never uſed ſingle in language.

The letters which denote the firſt kind of articulations are called "*vowels*," and thoſe which denote the latter kind "*conſonants*," becauſe they muſt attend ſome vocal articulation in order to modify its ſound, ſeeing of themſelves they either produce no ſound, or no diſtinct or agreeable one.

Such

Such articulations as may either continue unchanged, or can be commodiouſly run one into another, during one impulſe of the breath, form the ſounds which are expreſſed by "*ſyllables.*" Hence a ſingle vowel may form a ſyllable; becauſe the articulation denoted by it may continue unvaried during one impulſe of the breath; but no ſingle conſonant can form a ſyllable; for if the articulation denoted by any conſonant ſhould continue unvaried during one impulſe of the breath, either no ſound would enſue, or one ſo indiſtinct or diſagreeable, that it would not be conſidered as an articulate ſound. The articulations denoted by two vowels may be run into each other during one impulſe of the breath; and when this is done, thoſe ſounds are produced which are denoted by diphthongs. And the articulations denoted by two or more conſonants may be run into the articulation denoted by a vowel, or even into the complex articulation denoted by a diphthong; and when this laſt proceeding is made uſe of, the ſyllable will be as complex as the organs of ſpeech are capable of uttering with one impulſe of the breath.

The "*words*" of language each of them conſiſt of one or more ſyllables. For one vocal impulſe, at leaſt, of the breath muſt be made in forming every articulate ſound; but any number of ſyllables which can be conveniently pronounced without taking breath, may be included in one word. The ſyllables included in every word conſiſting of more than one ſyllable, muſt be ſuch as will eaſily ſucceed each other in ſpeaking; for it will appear in the following work, that every ſingle word in language denotes either ſome *one* conception, or ſome *one* mode of eſtimation of the mind, and therefore no ſingle word admits of any diſcernible intermiſſion in pronouncing the ſeveral parts of it.

It is apparent that the ſound of any ſyllable may be pronounced with leſs or more force exerted in the emiſſion of the breath, and this in ſeveral keys or pitches of the voice. For

the voice may be kept at one certain pitch in pronouncing a ſeries of words or ſyllables, and it may be kept at another pitch in pronouncing the ſame ſeries over again (and almoſt every man's voice admits of continued ſpeaking in three of theſe pitches at leaſt) and a particular ſtreſs may be laid upon any ſyllable without altering the key or pitch which the ſpeaker makes uſe of, and this ſtreſs is what we now call "*accent*," although the word properly denotes a modulation of the voice, and not merely a ſtreſs of utterance. When a ſeries of ſeveral words is pronounced together, it contributes much both to the agreeableneſs of ſound, and to the preciſion of ſenſe, to uſe ſome degree of modulation in every clauſe. The Greeks ſeem to have modulated ſeveral ſingle letters in their uſual ſpeech; which letters are the circumflexed vowels in this language; but this cuſtom is not uſed in any language now ſpoken that has come to my knowledge. Yet it is probable that all nations in continued utterance uſe ſome modulation, by raiſing or depreſſing the voice in ſome ſyllables of a clauſe above or below the note in which the moſt of the ſyllables of the clauſe are ſpoke. This modulation is uſually called "*emphaſis*," and is very different in different languages, and even in different provinces where the ſame language is uſed, and that when words are ſpoke which expreſs the very ſame meaning. Therefore the uſual emphaſis with which a particular ſentence is ſpoke muſt be learned by actually hearing it ſpoke, or by ſetting it to a muſical ſcale. But the ſyllable of a particular word which is to have a ſtreſs laid upon it, in whatſoever key or pitch the word is pronounced, may be aſcertained by a mark; and, as ſome words have more ſyllables than one which require ſome additional ſtreſs of the voice, though not equally ſtrong; two or more marks may be uſed to denote different degrees of the ſtreſs of voice. But this proceeding muſt be conducted by different rules in every different language, and therefore has little relation to univerſal grammar.

There

There are yet ſome marks to be conſidered, which are uſed at preſent in the written language of almoſt all nations. Theſe are the points or ſtops, by which ſentences and clauſes of ſentences are ſeparated, in writing, from each other; we have four of them in Engliſh of the following forms " —,—;—:—." theſe are diſtinguiſhed by the names of " *comma*—*ſemicolon*—*colon*—and *full ſtop*;" and theſe, in Engliſh pronunciation, not only direct certain breaks or pauſes to be made in continued ſpeaking, and thoſe pauſes of different lengths; but likewiſe direct certain tones of the voice to be uſed in pronouncing the ſyllables which precede each of them. There is no poſſibility of giving any certain account of the tones which each of theſe " *points* " requires, becauſe they vary according to the remiſneſs or eagerneſs with which the ſpeaker delivers his thoughts. Nor can any certain directions be given where to uſe any of them, except the full ſtop; which is always placed at the end of a ſentence. But if any one has a clear conception of the meaning of what is written, he will eaſily perceive where the points are to be placed; and if he has obſerved good ſpeakers or readers, he will eaſily perceive what tones are to be uſed previous to each point. But all this muſt reſpect ſome one language, and not language in general, of which I am principally to treat at preſent. I therefore proceed to that which is the principal intention of rational or ſpeculative grammar, viz. to explain the proceeding of the mind in forming the conceptions annexed to words, and in applying theſe conceptions by the means of words, ſo as to communicate the perceptions, thoughts, and purpoſes of one man to another.

A Speculative Grammar.

BOOK I.

SECTION I.

Of the noun and verb in general.

THE ſlighteſt conſideration of the nature of language, is ſufficient to diſcover that the noun and verb are the principal parts of ſpeech: for no ſingle word, which is not a noun or a verb, expreſſes compleat ſenſe; nor does any ſeries of words, which has not a noun or a verb, or both the one and the other, in it, expreſs ſuch ſenſe. And upon a cloſer conſideration it will appear, that the general nature of the one of theſe parts of ſpeech, when determined, will contribute much to illuſtrate that of the other. I ſhall therefore proceed to give a general view of both of theſe parts of ſpeech together, in order to account for ſome general properties in which the verb appears to agree with the noun, whilſt yet the nature of a conception denoted by a verb in any of its forms (participles not excepted) is eſſentially different from a conception denoted by any ſort of noun.

In order to this I ſhall uſe the word "*object*" in a ſenſe ſomewhat more extenſive than that in which it is commonly applied; and that I may not be miſunderſtood, it is neceſſary to

give notice, that by the word "*object*" is meant, in the following treatiſe, not only whatſoever produces an image in the eye, whence the conception thereof is conveyed to the mind; but likewiſe whatſoever produces any ſenſation, or gives occaſion to any internal conception, ſuch as that the mind can employ its diſcurſive powers upon that conception only.

DEFINITIONS.

" Nouns are the names of objects, as the conceptions thereof " are diſtinguiſhed in the mind by conſtant marks or characters, " which are conceived to be evidences of a conſtant principle " of exiſtence peculiar to each object, whether ſuch principle " is to be taken notice of or not."

Two ſorts of conceptions of objects, which are apprehended to be in themſelves of the nature mentioned in this definition, have introduced two ſorts of nouns into the uſe of language. Theſe are the noun ſubſtantive, and the noun adjective.

In the conceptions annexed to ſubſtantives, notice is taken of the peculiar ſeparate principle of exiſtence of the object which each ſubſtantive denotes.

In the conceptions annexed to adjectives, no ſeparate principle of exiſtence is to be taken notice of. This is the reaſon why theſe words, " *whether ſuch principle is to be taken notice of* " *or not*," are added to the definition.

" Verbs are expreſſions of ſtates of being, as diſtinguiſhed in " the mind by marks or characters, which may be conceived as " evidences of a principle of exiſtence in the ſtates. But not " of a principle of ſuch a nature as to be conſtantly in each " ſtate, or peculiar to each period into which the ſtate may " be diſtinguiſhed."

As

As the conceptions denoted by nouns repreſent *objects* ſo exceedingly various; and the conceptions denoted by verbs likewiſe repreſent *ſtates of being* ſo exceedingly various, it is difficult to diſcover any property which is not found in any verb, ſo general as to extend to all nouns; and to diſcover a property which is not found in any noun, ſo general as to extend to all verbs. Yet the conſtant and peculiar principle of exiſtence, upon which the definition of the noun as given above is founded, and the inconſtant and occaſional principle of exiſtence on which the definition of the verb is founded, are ſuch properties as effectually diſtinguiſh the conception denoted by any noun, whether ſubſtantive or adjective, from the conception denoted by any verb in any of its forms (participles not excepted.) But as this may not appear at the firſt ſight to my readers, it is neceſſary to conſider the ſeveral parts of each of the definitions, in order to ſhew that the diſtinctions upon which they are founded are juſt.

Of the firſt definition, ſo far as the ſubſtantive is concerned in it.

As the conceptions denoted by noun ſubſtantives take notice of the principle of exiſtence, which is apprehended to be conſtant in each object, and peculiar to it; theſe conceptions are made to repreſent the objects themſelves, and of conſequence become ſubject to number. Hence if ſeveral ſubſtantives are joined by the conjunction "*and*," the expreſſion thus formed will be that of one complex conception: but the object which it repreſents will conſiſt of more individuals than are comprehended in the ſignification of either ſubſtantive uſed alone. Thus "*a man and virtue*" is the expreſſion of a plural conception; although the conception denoted by "*a man*" and that denoted by "*virtue*" are each of them ſingular. And the expreſſion "*men and virtues*" denotes a greater number of objects than either "*men*" or "*virtues*" uſed alone.

Now

Now any two ſubſtantives may be united by the conjunction "*and*" into an expreſſion of one complex conception; and as ſuch conception always repreſents objects increaſed in number, it is evident that the objects denoted by ſubſtantives are conſidered as in themſelves eſſentially ſeparate. Hence the conceptions denoted by ſubſtantives are conceptions ſeparately aſcertained in the intellect, and laid up in the memory as ſo aſcertained. For were they not ſo, they could not repreſent objects, as each of them is ſeparately diſtinguiſhed from other objects by a principle of exiſtence peculiar to itſelf.

Very many objects denoted by ſubſtantives have really no ſeparate principle of exiſtence in themſelves; as for inſtance, all the "*virtues—vices—arts—ſciences*, and all *relations—qualities—attributes*," and in general all objects, the conceptions whereof are uſually called abſtract ideas. But the mind conſiders theſe objects as if each of them had a peculiar conſtant principle of exiſtence in itſelf; and this the mind does merely for its own convenience. Therefore the conceptions of theſe abſtract objects are ſeparately aſcertained in the intellect, and laid up in the memory as ſo aſcertained, in the very ſame manner as the conceptions of beings are, each whereof has a principle of exiſtence peculiar to, and inherent in, itſelf, independent of any mode of conception of the mind of man.

Of the firſt definition, ſo far as the adjective is concerned in it.

The conception denoted by a noun adjective cannot be ſeparately aſcertained in the intellect, and laid up in the memory as ſo aſcertained. For if it were conſidered under ſuch aſcertainment, it would become the conception of an abſtract object, to which the mind gives a ſeparate principle of exiſtence; and ſuch conception might be denoted by a ſubſtantive which correſponds with the adjective. As for inſtance, the conceptions denoted by the adjectives "*woody—fertile—extenſive—deſolate*," if conſidered

dered as ſeparately aſcertained in the intellect, become the abſtract conceptions which are denoted by the ſubſtantives "*woodi-* "*neſs*—*fertility*—*extent*—*deſolation*;" and ſo of other inſtances. Hence it is clear, that every adjective expreſſes a conception, which in itſelf is capable of repreſenting an abſtract object. But the grammatic form of the adjective gives notice, that the conception is never to be ſo conſidered, when it is expreſſed by its adjective name. All adjectives expreſs abſtract conceptions: even ſuch adjectives as are derived from ſubſtantives which are the names of real beings. As for inſtance, the conceptions denoted by "*manly*—*brutiſh*—*earthy*" are not the ſame with thoſe denoted by the ſubſtantives, "*man*—*brute*—*earth*," but with thoſe denoted by "*manlineſs*—*brutiſhneſs*—*earthineſs*;" and ſo of other inſtances. It is true, that many adjectives have no abſtract ſubſtantives correſponding with them, becauſe ſuch have not been found neceſſary in language. But the conceptions denoted by ſuch adjectives are abſtract conceptions, notwithſtanding they have no abſtract ſubſtantive names. Thus the adjectives "*Trojan*— "*Sicilian*—*Miltonic*" do not denote the ſame conceptions which the ſubſtantives "*Troy*—*Sicily*—*Milton*" denote; but abſtract conceptions formed from the objects denoted by "*Troy*—*Sicily* "—*Milton*," although theſe conceptions have no ſubſtantive names. Now abſtract objects (ſuch as thoſe denoted by "*man-* "*lineſs*—*brutiſhneſs*," above mentioned) have no principle of ſeparate exiſtence, but ſuch as the mind of man gives them for its own convenience; and as ſuch principle is given to them merely for the convenience of the mind of man, it may be taken away from them whenſoever the like convenience requires it. And whenſoever this ſeparate principle is to be conſidered as taken away from an abſtract object, the conception of it is denoted by an adjective. Hence an adjective unites with a ſubſtantive, ſo as to form a kind of name of the object repreſented by the expreſſion. For the principle by which the object exiſts is taken notice of in the conception which the ſubſtantive denotes, and the conception denoted by the adjective takes no notice of any

principle of exiſtence, but unites with the conception which does take notice of ſuch principle. So that the principle remains ſuch as the ſubſtantive denotes it, whether an adjective be added to the ſubſtantive or not.

Hence it is manifeſt, that what is denoted by an adjective cannot be the object of number, becauſe it is never attended to ſeparately by the mind of man; ſeeing it is to be conſidered as deſtitute of all principle of ſeparate exiſtence.

The definition of the verb conſidered particularly.

The conceptions denoted by verbs muſt have ſome of the properties of the conceptions which are denoted by ſubſtantives, and ſome of the properties of thoſe denoted by adjectives. For as the ſtate denoted by a verb may be conſidered as having a principle of exiſtence in it, the ſtate under ſuch conſideration will be repreſented to the mind by a conception that is ſeparately aſcertained in the intellect, as the conception denoted by a ſubſtantive is; and ſuch conception muſt of conſequence become the object of number. The forms of the infinitive mood of verbs denote verbal ſtates under this kind of conception, as in the expreſſions "*to think and to ſpeak—to have laboured and to labour.*" For each of theſe expreſſions denotes a plural conception. But theſe verbal ſtates exiſt by a principle, which is not conſtant, nor peculiar, to each individual portion of the ſtate which may be denoted by one and the ſame form of one and the ſame verb. Therefore this principle may be communicated to the ſtate and then with-held; and then communicated, and then with-held; and ſo on: and this proceeding will diſtinguiſh the parts or periods of a verbal ſtate one from another, although each part or period is conceived to exiſt by one and the ſame principle. Hence verbal ſtates become ſubject to a kind of number, to which the objects denoted by ſubſtanves are not ſubject. This number expreſſes the ſeveral times that a ſtate denoted by

by one and the ſame verbal form is repeated, as in the expreſſions "*to ſpeak once—twice—thrice—many times*," &c. The participles in Engliſh are uſed in this conſtruction, as well as the forms of the infinitive mood of verbs; as in the expreſſion "*ſpeaking once—twice—thrice—many times*," &c. So that the conceptions denoted by participles thus uſed, repreſent ſtates, as each has a ſeparate exiſtence; but as that exiſtence depends upon a principle which may be communicated to the ſtates occaſionally, and with-held occaſionally. Hence the participles in Engliſh are continually uſed in conſtruction like ſubſtantives; for they may denote ſtates, as having in them a principle of exiſtence, although not conſtantly. If this principle is conceived to be with-held from any period of a verbal ſtate, ſuch period becomes the object of memory only, for its exiſtence is over. If the principle is conceived to be continued, ſuch period is an object of actual perception, for its exiſtence continues. If it is only foreſeen that a principle of exiſtence will be communicated to a verbal ſtate; the period of ſuch ſtate, to which the principle will be communicated, is an object of foreſight only, for its exiſtence is unbegun. It is this manner of conceiving the exiſtence of verbal ſtates, which gives occaſion to the three Engliſh forms of the infinitive mood of verbs. As "*to be—to have been—to be about to be*;" and likewiſe to the three participles, "*being—having been—about to be*," whereof the two forms, "*to be—being*," expreſs a ſtate of being, as it is the object of actual perception: the two forms, "*to have been—having been*," expreſs it as an object of memory: and the two forms, "*to be about to be—being about to be*," expreſs it as an object of foreſight.

The verb in the infinitive mood is uſed, in all languages that I am acquainted with, on many occaſions, as if it were a noun ſubſtantive. But the participles are uſed in this manner in no language which I am acquainted with, but the Engliſh only. It is by means of participles uſed as ſubſtantives, that we perform in Engliſh, what in Latin is performed by thoſe verbal

forms which are called gerunds and ſupines; and what in Greek is performed by the article placed in different caſes before the infinitive forms of the verb. Thus what is expreſſed in Engliſh by "*of ſpeaking—in ſpeaking*," may be expreſſed in Latin by "*loquendi—loquendo*," and in Greek by τυλεγειν—τῳλεγειν, &c. For as verbal ſtates muſt be conſidered, on many occaſions, as objects exiſting by a principle of being which is in them; whenſoever they are ſo conſidered, the expreſſions of theſe ſtates muſt be uſed in the ſame kinds of conſtruction in which ſubſtantives are uſed. For the verbal ſtates under this conſideration become ſeparate abſtract objects; only the principle by which each ſtate exiſts is not conceived to be peculiar to it only, nor to be conſtantly in it. The conceptions of verbal ſtates thus formed, are of conſequence to be applied on the ſame principles, on which the conceptions of abſtract ſtates are applied, when theſe conceptions are denoted by ſubſtantives. Or, in other words, they muſt be denoted by expreſſions which admit the ſigns of caſes to be united with them. And hence it comes to paſs, that the infinitive mood of the Latin verb is declined by caſes; as "*dicere—dicendi—dicendo—dicendum—dictum—dictu:*" and that the infinitive mood of the Greek verb is declined by the caſe of the article prefixed to it; as, το λεγειν—τȣ λεγειν—τῳ λεγειν.

But although the conceptions of verbal ſtates may be ſeparately aſcertained in the intellect, and laid up in the memory as ſo aſcertained; in the ſame manner as the conceptions denoted by ſubſtantives: yet verbal conceptions muſt be made to unite with the conceptions denoted by ſubſtantives, or by any words uſed as ſubſtantives; and this in order to anſwer the principal purpoſe of connected language. For when the conception of any object is raiſed in the mind of the hearer by mentioning its name, or by uſing a ſeries of words equivalent to a name; ſuch object muſt be repreſented in ſome ſtate of being, which it either might or might not have been in, for any thing the hearer knew before the ſpeaker told him. Becauſe, if this is not done, the

ſpeaker conveys no new information to the hearer. Therefore, in order to accompliſh this moſt neceſſary point, ſome verb is placed in immediate dependance on the name or expreſſion of the object which is to be repreſented as in the ſtate of being which the verb denotes; and this ſtate is conſidered as having an occaſional exiſtence given to it, for the purpoſe of repreſenting the object as in the ſtate. Now the occaſion may require that this ſtate ſhall be conſidered as exiſting before the time, or at the time, or after the time, in which the words are ſpoke. And this way of conſidering the exiſtence of a verbal ſtate has introduced theſe forms of the verb which conſtitute the tenſes of the indicative mood. Or the occaſion may require that the exiſtence of the ſtate ſhall be conſidered as the effect of ſome command or entreaty; and this has introduced the forms of the imperative mood. Or it may be requiſite to conſider the exiſtence of the ſtate as attended with no impoſſibility, contradiction, or abſurdity. This has produced the Engliſh forms of the verb which have "*may*" and "*might*" before them. Or it may be requiſite to conſider the exiſtence of the ſtate as the effect of power, capacity, or of inevitable neceſſity; and this has produced the forms of the Engliſh verb which have "*can—could—muſt*" before them. I ſhall ſhew at large, when the verb is treated of in particular, wherein thoſe definitive forms differ in ſignification from the infinitive forms, and the participles. But it is clear that a verbal ſtate, as expreſſed by any of the tenſes of any of the moods, is apprehended to have a principle of exiſtence which may be conceived as with-held from it at the pleaſure of the mind. If this principle is conceived to be always with-held from any part or period of a verbal ſtate, ſuch part or period can have no exiſtence. Hence the negative particle "*not*," when united with a verb, expreſſes a ſtate which is without actual exiſtence, ſometimes conſidered as an abſtract ſtate, and ſometimes as in conjunction with ſome particular object; becauſe the principle by which it ſhould exiſt is never communicated to it. Now the occaſions of connected language continually require us to conſider

ſtates of being which are prevented from exiſting, and that by various means, and this at any time paſt, preſent, or to come; and hence the negative particle is ſo frequently found in conſtruction with verbs in all their forms.

It is evident, that the ſtates denoted by verbs are all of them abſtract ſtates; for if they had any real exiſtence ſeparate from that of other objects, the principle of ſuch exiſtence muſt be in the ſtates themſelves. And of conſequence ſuch principle could not be conſidered as with-held from, and much leſs as never communicated at all to, the ſtates, at the pleaſure of the mind of man. Therefore no object, which is conceived to have a principle of being inherent in itſelf, can be denoted by a verb. As for inſtance, no ſuch object as is expreſſed by "*mind*—*body* "—*a man*—*a beaſt*—*a tree*—*a mineral*," &c. can be denoted by any verb. But ſtates, the conceptions whereof are formed by abſtraction from the objects above mentioned, may be denoted by verbs, if theſe ſtates are conceived to exiſt by a principle which may be communicated to them, or with-held from them, at the pleaſure of ſuch objects as have a real principle of exiſtence in themſelves, or of any object to which the mind aſſigns ſuch principle for its own convenience.

Therefore the ſame conceptions which are denoted by verbs, may be denoted by adjectives, if the occaſional principle by which verbal ſtates are conceived to exiſt is not attended to. Hence the conceptions denoted by verbs may unite with thoſe denoted by ſubſtantives, much in the ſame manner that adjective conceptions unite with ſubſtantive conceptions; except that the verbal conception will carry along with it the notion of the inconſtancy of the principle by which it exiſts. But the adjective conception will carry no ſuch notion along with it. For it directs, that no notice is to be taken of any principle of exiſtence as in it, but as in ſome object, with the exiſtence whereof it unites. Hence the adjective conception is to be adjuſted properly

perly to coaleſce with that exiſtence, ſo as *to continue* united with it. If then the notion of the inconſtant principle, by which the ſtate exiſts, be quite abſtracted from the conception denoted by a verbal form, ſuch form will become of the nature of an adjective. Therefore, when verbal forms are uſed to denote conſtant or habitual ſtates, they appear to differ in no reſpect from real adjectives; as is manifeſt in the Engliſh expreſſions, "*a la-*" *bouring man—a running horſe—the ſinging pſalms—an accom-*" *pliſhed gentleman—a determined reſolution*," and innumerable other inſtances.

The definitive forms of verbs coaleſce with the objective names, or expreſſions on which they depend, as participles do: but theſe forms have part of their ſignification, ſuch as no other forms of verbs, nor any other ſorts of words, have. This part of their ſignification ſhews, that the expreſſion on which any of them depends is ſufficiently compounded for the ſpeaker's preſent occaſion (as I ſhall ſhew at large when the verb is treated of in particular.) But this part of the ſignification of a definitive verb makes no alteration in the nature of the ſtate denoted by the verb itſelf. For this is ſtill conceived to depend for its exiſtence on a principle which is occaſionally given to it, or taken from it, or never given to it at all, according as it ſuits the ſpeaker's purpoſe to repreſent the ſtate. And therefore the verb in its definitive forms does not depart from the eſſential property of a verb in its infinitive and participial forms, viz. that of expreſſing a ſtate which has a principle of exiſtence that is neither conſtantly in it, nor peculiar to it.

In order to avoid a ſuperfluous repetition of words, I ſhall call a conſtant principle of exiſtence peculiar to a particular object, and to it only "*an incommunicable principle of ex-*" *iſtence.*"

And

And a principle of exiſtence which is not conſtantly in, nor peculiar to, a verbal ſtate, although it is occaſionally in it, "*a* "*communicable principle of exiſtence.*"

SECTION II.

Of noun ſubſtantives in particular.

NOUN ſubſtantives are the names of objects, as the conceptions thereof are ſeparately compleated in the intellect, and diſtinguiſhed by marks, or characters, conceived to be evidences of a principle of exiſtence which is conſtant and peculiar to each object; or, in other words, which is incommunicable to any other object.

The conſideration of the proceeding by which the mind of man acquires the conceptions, whereof noun ſubſtantives are the names, will explain the ſignification of any ſubſtantive, ſo far as ſuch ſignification is different from that of any other ſort of word, except that of a verb in the infinitive mood (the Engliſh participles being conſidered as included in this mood.) And the conſideration of the principle of exiſtence, which is conceived to be ſhewn by the characters that diſtinguiſh the objects denoted by ſubſtantives, will explain the difference of ſignification between a noun ſubſtantive, and a verb in the infinitive mood.

The power of the mind is not merely paſſive in acquiring the conceptions above mentioned, as it is in receiving the perceptions which are conveyed to it by the ſenſes. But the attention is confined to ſome particulars of what may be before the mind at once, ſo that the reſt are diſregarded, till the particulars which are intended to be taken into the ſignification of one ſubſtantive, or verbal name, are fixed in the intellect. We acquire

acquire in our earlieſt infancy the cuſtom of exerting this power of confining or checking the attention. For this is conſtantly done, when particular things (and theſe moſt commonly the objects of ſight) are pointed out, or preſented to us, in ſuch a manner, that we fix our attention on them, whilſt their names are mentioned to us. When any ſet of particulars has been ſo attended to by the mind, as that it forms a conception from them ſeparately conſidered, and denoted by a ſubſtantive, or verbal name; the event is, that whenſoever the conception recurs to the mind, the name recurs with it by mere recollection. And converſely, whenſoever the name is mentioned to a perſon, who has not the conception which it denotes, actually in his mind, but who has previouſly formed it, and annexed it to the name; this conception recurs by mere recollection to ſuch perſon. Hence when what we call the ſenſe of a noun ſubſtantive, or of an infinitive verb, is raiſed in the mind of a perſon to whom ſuch ſubſtantive or verb is mentioned, that perſon is not obliged to exert any new diſcurſive act in order to form ſuch ſenſe, but the whole of it recurs to the intellect at once by ſimple recollection.

The definitions which have been given of noun ſubſtantives by almoſt all the writers upon grammar, are founded ſolely on this ſingle property of the conception denoted by a ſubſtantive. Thus the definition in Lilly's Grammar is,

"A noun ſubſtantive is that which ſtandeth by itſelf, and re-
"quireth not another word to be joined with it, to ſhew its
"ſignification."

This definition is evidently true, ſo far as it extends. For as noun ſubſtantives denote conceptions which are ſeparately completed in the intellect, any one of them may be mentioned ſingly, and the meaning of it will inſtantly recur to the mind: ſo that there can be no occaſion for other words to ſhew its ſignification. But the difference between a conception denoted by a

ſubſtantive,

ſubſtantive, and a conception denoted by a verb in the infinitive mood, is not hereby aſcertained. For the verbs, " *to act*—*to* " *ſpeak*—*to be acted*—*to be ſpoke*—*acting*—*ſpeaking*—*being acted* " —*being ſpoke*," &c. require no words to be joined with them to ſhew their ſignification, any more than the ſubſtantives, " *action* " —*ſpeech*," do.

The definition of a noun ſubſtantive given by Johnſon in his grammatical commentaries (from which thoſe of Father Buffier, Ruddiman, and many others, are not materially different) is to the following purpoſe.

" A noun ſubſtantive denotes the conception of an object, " which conception ſo ſubſiſts in the underſtanding, that it may " be the ſubject of affirmation."

Theſe authors purpoſely intend to include the verb in the infinitive mood, amongſt noun ſubſtantives, and give notice of their intention to do ſo. They have manifeſtly adopted the principle firſt publiſhed (as I think) about a hundred years ago in the *Grammaire Generale et Raiſonée*, ſaid to be written according to the notions of M. Arnaud, of the Society of Port Royal. In this grammar, no form of the verb which has not the power of affirmation is allowed to be a verb. And as the infinitive forms of verbs have not this power of affirmation, they are of courſe conſidered as belonging to other parts of ſpeech. This proceeding is only ſhifting off the difficulty of ſhewing a reaſon why it is exceedingly convenient in language, that ſome forms of every verb ſhould have the power of affirmation, whilſt other forms ſhould not; as likewiſe of determining preciſely in what affirmation conſiſts.

Now the infinitive forms of verbs denote " *ſtates of being*," as the conceptions of them are completed in the intellect. Conſequently, one of theſe ſtates is as perfect in the apprehenſion of the

the mind of man, as any object denoted by a noun ſubſtantive. Hence a ſingle verbal ſtate, denoted by one of theſe infinitive forms, may be the ſingle object of the mind's eſpecial attention, and of conſequence may alone be the ſubject of a ſentence; for farther compoſition is not abſolutely required to compleat the expreſſion into that of a conception, to which the mind can confine its attention. But part of the ſignification of a noun adjective, of a verb (in all its forms but thoſe of the infinitive mood, and of the participles in Engliſh) of an adverb, of a conjunction, and of a prepoſition, relates to what muſt be denoted by ſome one or more other words. If therefore ſuch other words are not found, the compoſition is incompleat; and no definitive verb can depend on any expreſſion till the compoſition is compleated. This will fully appear when the verb is treated of in particular. Now the definitive verb determines the ſubject of a ſentence; and hence it comes to paſs that a ſingle word of any of the laſt mentioned parts of ſpeech is ſeldom made alone the ſubject of a ſentence; unleſs it be in a treatiſe of grammar, or in a dictionary, in which it is required to ſhew the ſignification of ſingle words of every part of ſpeech. But when ſingle words are thus applied; they only repreſent the ſound, or viſible appearance of each; and not the conceptions, which are annexed to each of them.

But notwithſtanding that the ſignification of the infinitive forms of verbs is compleated in the intellect, as well as the ſignification of noun ſubſtantives; it is manifeſt, that the objects denoted by ſubſtantives are apprehended in the mind, under a different mode of conception from that under which the ſtates denoted by verbs are apprehended. For, as I have already obſerved, no verb can denote an external object which has its principle of exiſtence incommunicably in itſelf; ſuch as *an animal—a plant—a mineral*," &c. the names of theſe muſt all be noun ſubſtantives; and the conceptions annexed to all other ſubſtantives have been formed in imitation of the conceptions

which are annexed to the ſubſtantives above mentioned. For the objects denoted by theſe are the firſt which require to be expreſſed by names; as being the firſt which ſtrike the attention, and occaſion it to be confined to one object only. Men are ſoon led by reflection to give ſubſtantive names to objects, which have no ſeparate principle in themſelves by which they exiſt: as to the ſeveral virtues and vices (for inſtance) and to all the ſorts of objects, whereof the conceptions are uſually called abſtract ideas. But the mind, for its own convenience, conſiders each of theſe objects, when denoted by a ſubſtantive name, as having a principle of exiſtence incommunicable to any other object; as animals, vegetables, and other external material objects are obſerved to have. Hence theſe abſtract objects are frequently repreſented, not only as real, but alſo as rational beings, ſpeaking and ſpoken to, eſpecially in poetry and oratory; but the ſtates denoted by verbs are never repreſented in this manner: for they are not conceived to have each of them an incommunicable principle of exiſtence, ſuch as is ſuppoſed in every object that is capable of ſpeaking, and of being ſpoken to: and therefore this different mode of conception conſtitutes the eſſential difference between the ſubſtantive and verbal name of an abſtract ſtate. As for inſtance, between "*action*—*contemplation*—*confidence*," and "*to act*—*to contemplate*—*to confide*," or "*acting*—*contemplating*—*confiding*," &c.

The forms of the verb "*to be*" are intended to communicate with every ſubſtantive, and with every other word, or ſeries of words, which expreſſes a compleat object of the intellect; and that in ſuch a manner, as not only to expreſs the object itſelf as "*being*," but likewiſe the conception of it, as in the ſeveral modes of being which ſuch conception may have in the mind of man. Thus the communicable nature of "*being*," as expreſſed by verbs, gives opportunity to a ſpeaker, not only to repreſent objects as they are in themſelves, but as the conceptions of them are in his mind; which is manifeſtly the principal intent of language. Now

Now the conception annexed to almoſt any ſingle ſubſtantive may be merely in the memory of the ſpeaker; or it may be impreſſed on his mind by the preſence of the object which occaſions it; or it may be barely preſented to his mind by its power of foreſight. It would be very inconvenient to vary the forms of ſubſtantives themſelves, ſo as to expreſs this "*diverſity of* "*being*" in the mind of man, which may attend the conceptions denoted by them. But it is very convenient to expreſs "*communicable being*" as an object of memory, as an object of actual perception, and as an object of foreſight, by different forms of the verb itſelf. For by uniting one of theſe forms with the name or expreſſion of any object, the conception of ſuch object is repreſented, in effect, as relating to time paſt, preſent, or to come; and this is continually required in the uſe of language. On this account almoſt all languages have forms of the verb ſubſtantive (*i. e.* of the verb which anſwers to the Engliſh verb "*to be*") ſome of which relate to time paſt, ſome to time preſent, and ſome to time to come, as theſe diſtinctions are determined by the time of ſpeaking: whereas theſe diſtinctions are included in the ſignification of very few ſubſtantives; but are added occaſionally, by uniting ſome temporary form with them. All verbs include in their ſignification the power of the verb "*to be*;" for they all denote ſtates of communicable being. This will appear fully, when we conſider in particular the nature of the conceptions which are denoted by verbs. Hence all verbs, in almoſt all languages, have grammatic forms, ſome of which relate to time paſt, others to time preſent, and others to time to come. But noun adjectives have not theſe forms, for they denote abſtract conceptions, which are not to be conſidered at any time as taking notice of any principle of exiſtence, except ſuch as is denoted by ſome other word: ſo that what is denoted by adjectives, "*remains in coaleſcence*" with ſuch principle as is in the object or ſtate denoted by the word on which the adjective depends. Conſequently, if the word be a ſubſtantive on which an adjective depends, the adjective conception unites with

the conſtant principle of exiſtence of the object denoted by the ſubſtantive. But if the word be a verb on which the adjective depends, the adjective conception unites with the inconſtant principle of exiſtence of the ſtate denoted by the verb. And hence it comes to paſs that adjectives have not thoſe forms which verbs have, to denote the principle by which they exiſt, as communicated to them, or with-held from them, occaſionally.

Theſe obſervations are here made, in order to account for Ariſtotle's definition of a noun, including both the ſubſtantive and the adjective. This definition is to the following purpoſe:

"A noun is a ſignificant word, not including time."

That is to ſay, not including time as eſtimated from a preſent point thereof, that is continually ſhifting: or not from a preſent, which is to be conſidered as always that point of time in which the noun is ſpoke. And in conſequence of this way of apprehending the conception denoted by a noun, Ariſtotle was naturally led to define a verb to be "*a ſignificant word including time*," i. e. as eſtimated from a preſent point, which is always to be conſidered as that in which the verb is ſpoke. Theſe definitions do not (any more than the two quoted before) effectually diſtinguiſh the conception denoted by a noun, from that denoted by a verb. For the ſubſtantives "*yeſterday—to-day—to-morrow*," include time in their meaning, as eſtimated in the manner above mentioned; and ſo the adjectives "*laſt—this—next*," united with the ſubſtantives "*moment—year—month*," &c. form the expreſſions "*this moment—the next moment—laſt year—this year—next year—laſt month—this month—next month*," which likewiſe include time in their meaning, and that time eſtimated as before.

All the definitions above mentioned are uſeful, though not exact. Indeed there ſeems to be no other diſtinction which

extends to the conceptions denoted by all ſubſtantives and all verbs, but that upon which the definitions are founded that were given in the former chapter.

It may be ſaid, that the objects denoted by the ſubſtantives "*attribute*—*quality*—*capacity*," and others of a like nature, none of them ſuppoſe a principle of exiſtence that is peculiar to each: becauſe the exiſtence of theſe objects is conceived to depend on the exiſtence of other objects. But if the name of any object, as "*a man*," and the ſubſtantive name of any quality, as "*good-neſs*—*vice*—*labour*," &c. be united by the conjunction "*and*," the expreſſions "*a man and goodneſs*—*a man and vice*," &c. will denote plural objects; which effectually ſhews, that "*good-neſs*" and "*vice*" and "*a man*," when denoted by ſubſtantive names, are conſidered as objects exiſting ſeparately in the apprehenſion of the mind of man.

Nouns themſelves are eaſily diſtinguiſhed from verbs, by the difference of their grammatic forms. But, in a treatiſe of rational grammar, it is neceſſary to ſhew why nouns bear grammatic forms different from thoſe of verbs. And this reaſon manifeſtly is, that the principle of exiſtence which objects denoted by nouns are conceived to have, is of a nature different from the principle of exiſtence, which is conceived in the ſtates denoted by verbs.

SECTION III.

Of the different kinds of noun ſubſtantives.

NOUN ſubſtantives are uſually diſtinguiſhed into two ſorts, the proper, and the common or appellative.

Noun ſubſtantives proper, are more uſually called proper names, and are made uſe of to diſtinguiſh particular objects with which

which men are much converſant. Such as men, women, countries, rivers, cities, ſtreets, palaces, &c.

As objects denoted by proper names are, for the moſt part, individual objects of the ſight, the mentioning of the name of one of them to a perſon who has actually ſeen the object, may place a kind of picture of ſuch object before the mind of the hearer. But if the hearer has never ſeen the object, he cannot, upon the mentioning of its name, place ſuch picture before his mind: nevertheleſs, he can talk as intelligibly concerning ſuch object, as he could do if he had ſeen it, and could place a pictureſque repreſentation of it in his mind. Only he cannot know himſelf, or deſcribe to others, every particular of the ſhape, ſize, colour, &c. of ſuch object. This obſervation will be of uſe towards explaining the nature of the conceptions which are annexed to appellative names.

SECTION IV.

Of noun ſubſtantives, common or appellative.

BECAUSE the giving a name to every particular thing, as to every leaf, for inſtance, or to every grain of ſand, would multiply names to ſuch a degree, that the mind of man could neither remember nor apply them: therefore things are conſidered as they agree in certain properties, whether natural or acquired; and in conſequence of ſuch agreement, they are reduced to claſſes or ſorts, and theſe claſſes are each of them diſtinguiſhed by a particular name. This name, with an article placed before it for the moſt part in Engliſh, is the common or appellative ſubſtantive, by which every object of its claſs (or ſpecies, as it is uſually called) is denoted. And the name is thus called, from its being an appellation common to all the individual objects of which the ſpecies conſiſts. The infinitive

forms of verbs, and the participles in Engliſh, are likewiſe names of ſpecies of ſtates of communicable being, and therefore are a kind of appellative names. But the ſpecies of ſtates denoted by them are not conceived to be made up of ſeparate individual ſingle ſtates, which can be diſtinguiſhed one from another, as particular "*men*—*horſes*—*houſes*," &c. may be. The whole plan of the application of language takes its immediate original from the nature of the conceptions which the mind of man forms and affixes to ſubſtantives and verbs; and not from the nature of the objects whence the conceptions are formed. And for this reaſon it is neceſſary to conſider the proceeding of the mind in forming theſe conceptions, before a clear account can be given of the application of words.

SECTION V.

Of the nature and formation of the conceptions which are annexed to names of ſpecies.

IF we ſuppoſe any particular object to be preſent to the mind of a man; whether the object be conveyed to it by the means of the outward ſenſes, or by the operations of the mind itſelf; the man is under no neceſſity to attend to the whole of ſuch object. But he may confine his attention to any ſet of powers, properties, or qualities, which he perceives in it; and yet he can conceive the whole object to be diſtinguiſhed by ſuch ſet of powers, properties, and qualities, from every other object which has not the like ſet in it. The object, conceived as thus diſtinguiſhed, may be denoted by a name: and the conſequence will be, that whenſoever "*any object*," which has the like ſet of powers in it, preſents itſelf to the mind of the man, the name will recur of courſe. And converſely, if the name be mentioned, the conception of an object which has the like ſet of powers, &c. will recur of courſe to the mind of any perſon who

who knows the meaning of the name. Indeed the other particulars of ſuch object, which are not included in the ſet of powers, &c. above mentioned, will not be included in the conception that is raiſed by the mention of the name; but it is nevertheleſs taken for granted as a thing known, and remembered, that ſuch conception is that of an object which the mind can contemplate ſingly.

Thus if a certain mark ſhould be ſet upon a great number of things very different in themſelves from each other, and the ſame name ſhould be given to every one of the things which had the mark upon it: and if "*any one*" of theſe things ſhould be preſented to a perſon who knew the meaning of the name, that name would immediately occur to the perſon. But if the name were mentioned to him, nothing would occur but the remembrance that a thing, with the mark upon it, is what is meant by the name. This remembrance does not enable the perſon, to whom ſuch a name is mentioned, to form an actual image of the thing in his mind; but it enables him to diſtinguiſh the thing mentioned from whatſoever is called by a different name, as not having the mark upon it. The mark itſelf, which is ſuppoſed to be ſet upon the objects called by the ſame name, may not perhaps be exactly alike upon them all; and yet the mark, as it is upon any one object, may be more nearly alike to it, as it is upon any other object, than any different mark is.

The proceeding of the man who firſt applied the ſame name, in any language, to ſeveral different objects, was much like the above-mentioned proceeding. For he perceived, that all the objects agreed nearly in ſome reſpects, and he only attended particularly to the objects in theſe reſpects, when he applied the name. Only he kept this in remembrance; that whatſoever the name was applied to, was, all of it taken together, what the mind could make the ſeparate object of its contemplation.

The

The reſpects, or particulars, in which objects ſhall agree, ſo as to entitle them all to be called by ſome one particular name, are manifeſtly at the pleaſure of him who firſt gives that name to them; as likewiſe how near they ſhall approach to perfect ſameneſs in thoſe inſtances in which they do agree. For any two objects which the mind can contemplate ſeparately, may be called by one and the ſame name, be they ever ſo different from each other in every other reſpect, but the ſingle one, "*of being* "*capable of becoming ſeparately that which the mind confines its* "*attention to.*" The agreement in this ſingle reſpect, is that which entitles whatſoever the mind does confine its attention to, in the manner already deſcribed, to be called in Engliſh "*a thing*;" ſo that, of conſequence, whatſoever can be denoted by any noun ſubſtantive, or any infinitive verb uſed ſubſtantively, may be called "*a thing.*" More and more particulars may be added at pleaſure to this circumſtance, of "*being the object of the atten-*"*tion in ſingle, ſeparate, or eſpecial contemplation*;" and as more and more particulars are added, the names given to the objects which agree in them, will become names of fewer and fewer objects.

For the more conditions, or circumſtances, are taken into the ſet wherein objects muſt agree, in order to be all of them called by one name, the fewer objects will be found agreeing in ſuch ſet.

The particular objects, all of which ſo agree, that they are any of them called by one and the ſame name, are, when conſidered together, called a ſpecies (as has been before obſerved) and I think, that the ſet of particulars in which the agreement is attended to in the individuals of any ſpecies, may be called the characteriſtic of that ſpecies.

It is not eaſy to deſcribe the characteriſtics of many ſpecies, on account of the multiplicity of particularities which are com-

prehended in them. Thus the characteriſtic of the ſpecies "*man*" contains in it all the particularities, both of mind and body, which are equally perceived in every man; but in no other ſpecies of objects. And many of theſe are very imperfectly known, notwithſtanding the moſt laborious reſearches of metaphyſicians and anatomiſts: and the ſame obtains, in ſome degree, with regard to the particularities of every ſpecies of natural objects. On the contrary, the characteriſtics of ſeveral ſpecies of abſtract objects are not capable of being deſcribed, on account of their ſimplicity. Thus the ſeveral ſpecies denoted by "*ſpace—time—power—motion—reſt*," &c. are ſo very ſimple in themſelves, that to attempt to ſhew in words what is peculiar to each, would be impertinent. But on the other hand, the characteriſtics of many ſpecies are eaſily ſhewn, eſpecially when theſe characteriſtics happen to be ſtates denoted by verbs. Thus the characteriſtics of the ſeveral ſpecies, "*ſpeaker—hearer—*" "*deliverer*," &c. are the ſtates "*ſpeaking—hearing—deli-*" "*vering*," &c.

It will appear in the following treatiſe, that the characteriſtics of the ſpecies denoted by the pronouns perſonal may eaſily be determined; and that the explanation of the nature and properties of theſe pronouns depends on the determination of theſe characteriſtics.

There is no ſpecies of external, and very few of intellectual objects, in which the individuals are all conceived to be exactly alike; whilſt yet the particulars, which entitle them all to be called by the ſame name, are conceived to be the ſame, or, at leaſt, to approach to ſameneſs in them all. Therefore the mind always remembers, that when an individual is expreſſed by the name of ſome ſpecies, to which ſuch individual is obſerved to belong; the individual has other properties, powers, &c. beſides thoſe which form the characteriſtic of the ſpecies by the name whereof it is called. Hence a liberty is reſerved of adding other

other expreſſions to every name of ſpecies, as occaſion may require, in order to diſtinguiſh the object under conſideration, from other objects which any of them may be equally called by the ſame name.

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There is conſtant occaſion, in the uſe of language, for the adding of expreſſions to names of ſpecies, in order to aſcertain the object denoted by ſuch name with more and more preciſion. And it will appear in what follows, that the dependent caſes of ſubſtantives, together with adjectives, and relative clauſes of ſentences, are principally introduced into language for this purpoſe. And, indeed, the perſons and tenſes of verbs are evidently introduced for the purpoſe of enabling the hearer to diſtinguiſh the verbal ſtate ſpoke of, from other parts or periods of the ſtate which may be expreſſed by the ſame verb applied to different perſons or times. An object aſcertained by making ſome of theſe expreſſions dependent on its name, may, together with the circumſtances denoted by theſe dependent expreſſions, be made the ſingle, ſeparate, or eſpecial object of the mind's contemplation. But in order to this, an act of diſcurſive judgment muſt be exerted, upon the addition of every dependent word, in order to form what is ſignified by each part of the complex expreſſion into a conſiſtent whole. So that mere memory or recollection will not ſerve the purpoſe of conveying the ſenſe of ſuch complex expreſſion to the mind.

It will appear, when we conſider the ſigns of caſes, and the other connective parts of ſpeech in particular, how the mind proceeds in forming the connexions denoted by each of them. But it is neceſſary, in the firſt place, to explain the procedure of the mind in forming the conceptions annexed to different kinds of names of ſpecies; and thence to ſhew particularly how the conceptions denoted by verbs unite with the conceptions denoted by ſubſtantives; whether the verbs depend upon the ſubſtantives, or the ſubſtantives upon the verbs. This will oblige us to con-

ſider the nature of verbs farther than has been already done, and that before we come to treat of the verb in particular, in the order wherein it is now, by eſtabliſhed cuſtom, ſet down amongſt the parts of ſpeech. But there is a neceſſity of giving an account of the communicable nature of the conception denoted by a verb, before the nature of the connexions ſhewn by the ſigns of caſes of ſubſtantives can be explained.

SECTION VI.

Of the proceeding of the mind in forming the conceptions of ſpecies which are denoted by noun ſubſtantives.

AS objects are reduced to ſpecies denoted by different names, principally for the ready conveyance of the conceptions which one man propoſes to raiſe in the mind of another; the convenience of conveying in the quickeſt manner ſuch conceptions, as were of the moſt conſtant occurrence, has occaſioned different communities of people to range objects into claſſes according to ſuch diſtinctions as thoſe ſeveral communities have had the moſt frequent occaſion to take notice of. All communities, of all ages and countries, have occaſion to take notice of the different forms which many ſorts of animals, plants, minerals, and other parts of nature, preſent to the ſight, as likewiſe of the different effects which they have upon the other ſenſes. And therefore, perhaps, there are no nations which have not claſſed theſe objects by the diſtinctions above mentioned. Conſequently, the names of ſpecies of objects thus claſſed, are found to agree with one another in all languages. But the names of objects thus diſtinguiſhed, make up the leaſt part of the names of ſpecies in any civilized community. For the ordinances of man concerning very many individual things are what principally occaſion theſe things to be diſtinguiſhed into ſorts denoted by different names.

Thus

Thus moſt of the utenſils, and inſtruments, which are applied in the various arts and profeſſions of life, are ranged into claſſes or ſorts, from ſome ſimilarity of uſe obſerved in each one of a ſort. And as to the diſtinctions by which men are ranged into claſſes; it is manifeſt that far the greateſt part of them proceeds from particular ranks, offices, profeſſions, trades, and other circumſtances, which are altogether of the ordinance of man, ſo as to differ in different ages and communities. Hence, in the languages of diſtant ages and nations, and in the languages of any nations which live under very different forms of religion, laws, and government, it comes to paſs that there is little agreement amongſt the conceptions annexed to names of ſpecies, which take their characteriſtics from inſtitutions peculiar to each nation. And this is one principal reaſon why theſe languages cannot be exactly tranſlated one into another; as likewiſe why none of the antient languages can be made to anſwer effectually the purpoſes of a language proper to be generally uſed at this time.

The terms of art which are found in particular ſciences, as likewiſe the names of many inſtruments, tools, and operations, which are peculiar to particular profeſſions and trades, are formed upon diſtinctions little known, or attended to, by any who are not actually engaged in the ſtudy of theſe ſciences, or in the exerciſe of theſe trades and profeſſions. Yet theſe names are all of them convenient, and many of them of abſolute neceſſity to thoſe who are converſant about the ſubjects to which they relate. And this is the only reaſon why the mind of man has particularly attended to the diſtinctions on which the conceptions denoted by theſe names are founded, and has claſſed the objects, denoted by them, according to theſe diſtinctions.

As the mind ſo naturally founds the diſtinguiſhing characters of ſpecies upon circumſtances which are the reſult of uſe and application; it is natural to infer, that the uſe and application of language

language itſelf, muſt give occaſion to ſome diſtinctions of ſpecies. The grammatical names of the ſeveral ſorts of words whereof language conſiſts, are formed upon ſuch diſtinctions. And farther, the perſonal, relative, and demonſtrative pronouns, are names of ſpecies; the individuals of each whereof are diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of other ſpecies, ſolely by the different ſituations in which they appear in the act of applying language itſelf. This will be fully ſhewn in the account of theſe pronouns in particular.

SECTION VII.

Of aggregate ſpecies.

THE ſpecies hitherto conſidered, are conceived to be made up of objects, in each of which the character is obſerved to be, by which the claſs is formed that conſtitutes the ſpecies. But the mind can take ſeveral individual objects together, and can conſider them all as one object. It frequently happens, that the individuals, of which one aggregate object is made up, are of very different kinds; and when things, in themſelves different, come to be conſidered all together as one object, it is natural to attend principally to the mode of aggregation by which they are united into one object. And it is as natural to conſider any other object conſiſting of ſeveral individuals united by the like mode of aggregation, as an object of the ſame ſpecies with the former. Hence the characteriſtics of thoſe ſpecies which are denoted by what grammarians call nouns of multitude, are uſually ſome of the principal circumſtances by which the union is formed amongſt the things or perſons, or both, which conſtitute what is conſidered as a ſingle object of ſome aggregate ſpecies. "*Community—company—regiment—troop—bundle—collection—ſet,*" are the names of aggregate ſpecies, the characteriſtics of which are formed in the manner above mentioned.

And

And the ſpecies "*whole*" may be conſidered as of the ſame order. For when any object is conſidered as "*a whole*," it is taken for granted, that it may be diſtinguiſhed into many objects, by parting it either actually, or in the mind only. But all the objects into which it is capable of being parted, are conſidered as one; and this entitles the object, ſo conſidered, to be called "*a whole*," that is, to be an object of the ſpecies "*whole*."

SECTION VIII.

Of dividual ſpecies.

THESE take their characteriſtics from ſome mere mode, by which the individuals whereof they conſiſt are ſeparated from other objects. "*Part—portion—fragment—chip—*"*paring*," and many others, are the names of ſpecies, the characteriſtics whereof are thus determined; and the proceeding by which they are determined, as likewiſe that by which the characteriſtics of aggregate ſpecies are determined, evidently ſuppoſes that there are objects of other ſpecies, whence the objects are formed which are denoted by theſe names of ſpecies.

SECTION IX.

Of correlative ſpecies.

THESE are ſpecies ſo conſtituted in pairs, that an individual of any one pair is conceived to be connected with ſome one or more individuals of the other ſpecies of the ſame pair, by means of the active and correſpondent paſſive ſtate of ſome one and the ſame verb. "*Creator—creature*," "*parent—offspring*," "*ſubject—attribute*," "*whole—part*," are pairs of correlative ſpecies. For the ſtate "*creating*" is the characteriſtic

of the ſpecies, "*creator*," and the ſtate, "*created*;" that of the ſpecies, "*creature*;" ſo "*a parent*" is, "*an object generating*," and "*offspring*" is, "*an object generated*;" likewiſe "*a ſubject*" is, "*an object having attributes*," and "*an attribute*" is, "*an object had by a ſubject*;" and "*a whole*" is, "*an object containing parts*," and "*a part*" is, "*an object contained by a whole.*" Hence it is clear, that the conception of either ſpecies of any correlative pair, ſuppoſes the conception of the other ſpecies of the ſame pair. And it will appear, when we ſpeak of the correſponding active and paſſive ſtates of any one and the ſame tranſitive verb, that either of them ſuppoſes the other; ſo that if the verb which expreſſes either of the ſtates be mentioned, there is no need to mention that which expreſſes the other; but any certain mark, or ſign, appropriated for the purpoſe, is ſufficient to direct the hearer to ſupply in his own mind the verbal ſtate, either paſſive or active, which is the correlative to that which is actually mentioned.

SECTION X.

Of abſtract ſpecies.

THE individuals which compoſe the ſeveral kinds of ſpecies hitherto mentioned, are uſually ſuch as are conceived to have an exiſtence in themſelves, independent of any mode in which the mind of man contemplates them. But the powers, properties, qualities, &c. of the individuals above mentioned, have no exiſtence ſeparate from theſe individuals. Yet theſe powers, &c. muſt be reduced to ſpecies, as well as material, and ſpiritual beings, which are conceived to have each of them a principle of exiſtence peculiar to one individual, and to no other whatſoever. The conceptions of theſe powers, &c. when attended to ſeparately from the objects in which they exiſt, are uſually called abſtract ideas. And whatſoever powers, relations,

tions, &c. give occaſion to theſe conceptions; theſe powers, relations, &c. are the individuals whereof abſtract ſpecies conſiſt. The mind itſelf gives to theſe objects a ſeparate exiſtence, which they have not in their nature, merely for its own convenience. For not being able to attend to objects which are very complex, it is able by this method of proceeding to conſider all objects by particulars; firſt attending to one ſingle particular, or to one ſet of particulars, and then to another.

Every ſpecies of abſtract objects has its diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic; by which every individual of the ſpecies is known from an individual of another ſpecies. And this characteriſtic is conceived to be an evidence of a principle of exiſtence, in each object, which is incommunicable to any other object. Whole ſets of powers, properties, &c. are included in the characteriſtics of ſpecies of external beings: but the characteriſtics of theſe powers and properties themſelves become more ſimple. So that after a few abſtractions from abſtract objects, the mind arrives at conceptions ſo ſimple, that it can proceed no farther. Thus the characteriſtics of the abſtract ſpecies, "*extenſion*—*ſolidity*—" *duration*—*power*," and of many others, are ſo ſimple, that the mind cannot form other conceptions out of them by a ſtill farther abſtraction; but is obliged to ſtop in its proceeding of making ſpecies more and more general of any of theſe orders.

Many abſtract ſpecies are of ſuch a nature, that the conceptions of them muſt be gained by abſtraction from ſeveral objects at once. All relations which are denoted by names, muſt be firſt conceived in conſequence of this kind of abſtraction; ſuch as "*equality*—*ſuperiority*—*inferiority*—*reſemblance*—*concomitance*," and many others; for none of theſe can exiſt but between two objects at the leaſt.

The more any community attends to arts and ſciences, the more names of abſtract ſpecies muſt be introduced into the

language of ſuch community. For all arts and ſciences abſolutely require abſtract conceptions to be formed, and to be reduced to ſpecies denoted by different names, before the principles of theſe arts can be tanght.

There is no neceſſity to dwell on abſtract ſpecies, as they are denoted by ſubſtantives, in a treatiſe of grammar; ſeeing the conceptions of them are formed on the ſame principles with thoſe on which the conceptions of ſpecies of external material objects are formed. Only the reflexion of the mind itſelf ſeems to be more immediately aſſiſtant in the formation of the conceptions of abſtract objects, than in that of material external objects. But the attention is equally checked or confined in the conception of each ſort. The incommunicable principle of exiſtence is equally ſuppoſed; the character of diſtinction of either ſort equally occurs to the mind on the mention of the name of the ſpecies; and the mind equally remembers that the whole object, denoted by ſuch name, is what it can make ſingly the eſpecial object of its contemplation. Hence the ſubſtantive names of abſtract objects are applied in language, on the very ſame principles with the names of thoſe objects which are obſerved to have a ſeparate principle of exiſtence in themſelves, independent of any mode of conception of the mind of man.

SECTION XI.

Of the proceeding of the mind in forming the conceptions denoted by verbs.

WHEN the conceptions, denoted by noun ſubſtantives, are formed in the mind, it is eaſy to perceive that the objects themſelves, from whence the conceptions are gained, are all of them in a certain ſtate, which may be made the cha-

racteriſtic of a ſpecies, of which all theſe objects are individuals. This ſtate is that of ſeparate intellectual "*being*," and this "*being*" is the characteriſtic of the ſpecies denoted by the ſubſtantive, "*thing*," in Engliſh. For every conception which the mind of man can conſider ſeparately, has the ſtate of "*being*" in the intellect. Whereas, every conception which is not ſo far compleated, as that the mind can conſider it ſeparately, has not yet gained its "*being*" in the intellect. And all the objects which occaſion conceptions of the former kind, may be called "*things*," if this word be taken in its largeſt acceptation. But the circumſtances which produce the latter kind of conceptions, cannot be ſo called. As for inſtance, that which is denoted by the adjective "*good* or *great*," or by the prepoſition "*of* or *to*," or by the conjunction "*and* or *but*," cannot be called a "*thing*."

The ſtate of "*being*," above deſcribed, may be conſidered in a twofold view. For it may be looked upon as an abſtract object, and as ſuch, may be ſeparately conſidered in the mind, and be denoted by the word "*being*," taken as a ſubſtantive. Or it may be conſidered as communicating with every object whatſoever which occaſions a compleat conception of the intellect, whether ſuch object be denoted by one word, or by a ſeries of words. For it is the characteriſtic of a ſpecies, whereof every ſuch object, as is above mentioned, is an individual. When this ſtate is conſidered as communicable; expreſſions of a particular form muſt be introduced into language to denote it under this conſideration; and this gives occaſion to the verbal forms "*to be—being*," &c.

Theſe forms themſelves expreſs compleat conceptions of the intellect, as noun ſubſtantives do. And therefore theſe conceptions have a compleat intellectual "*being*," but this "*being*" is conſidered as communicable with that of any object whatſoever, to which the mind can confine its attention.

Hence theſe forms may be applied for a double purpoſe in the uſe of language. For the ſtates denoted by them, may either be conſidered as ſo many ſeparate objects of the intellect; or as coaleſcing with any other compleat object of the intellect, and ſhewing the ſtate of "*being*" in which ſuch object is obſerved, or ſuppoſed. Now whatſoever modification can be perceived, or made in any object itſelf, may very naturally be conceived as a modification of the ſtate of "*being*" of ſuch object; and hence every modification, which is perceived or made in any object whatſoever, is applicable to "*verbal being:*" hence it comes to paſs, that the forms of the verb "*to be*" take into themſelves the characteriſtics of all ſpecies. For every individual object is included in ſome ſpecies, and conſequently has the characteriſtic of the ſpecies in it; and therefore the verbal communicable "*being*" of ſuch object may be conſidered as taking the ſame characteriſtic into it.

Now we obſerved, when we treated of the nature of ſpecies, that the characteriſtics of many of them are very difficult to be determined. When this happens, and it is required to unite the characteriſtic of ſuch a ſpecies with the verbal ſtate of "*being*," we place the name of ſpecies itſelf (uſually with an article before it) in dependence upon ſome form of the verb "*to be*;" and ſuch an expreſſion denotes communicable being modified by the characteriſtic of the ſpecies taken into it. Hence the expreſſions "*to be a man—a judge*," "*being a man—a judge*," are real verbs. As likewiſe all other expreſſions of like conſtruction. For nothing more than the characteriſtics of the two ſpecies, "*man*" and "*judge*," are here conſidered as modifying verbal "*being*," without any regard to the incommunicable principle of exiſtence which is in any man, or in any judge. This will fully appear, if we place the words "*being a man—being a judge*," in dependence upon any proper name; as in the expreſſion "*Mr. N——— "being a man—being a judge.*" For although there are two diſtinct objects concerned in each of the expreſſions, viz. "*Mr.*

" *Mr. N—— and a man—Mr. N—— and a judge,*" yet the ſenſe or reſult of either expreſſion is not a plural conception; which yet muſt have been the conſequence, if the incommunicable principle of exiſtence in the objects, " *a man*" and " *a judge,*" had been attended to.

But we have farther obſerved, in treating of ſpecies, that the characteriſtics of many of them are ſtates eaſily aſcertainable. As for inſtance, in the ſpecies " *haver—ſpeaker—reader,*" the ſtates " *having—ſpeaking—reading,*" are the characteriſtics; and if theſe ſtates be conſidered as taken into " *communicable being,*" the expreſſions thereof become of that kind of words which in grammar are called verbs; as " *to have—having,*" " *to ſpeak—* " *ſpeaking,*" " *to read—reading,*" &c. i. e. " *to be having—to* " *be ſpeaking,*" &c. " *being having—being ſpeaking,*" &c.

The ſtates " *having—ſpeaking—reading*" may be conſidered as ſtates of " *exertion,*" in the moſt extenſive acceptation of the word. But there are many ſtates which are the characteriſtics of ſpecies, and which may be conſidered as ſtates of " *reception* " *of the effect of ſome exertion.*" As for inſtance, whatſoever is called " *a poſſeſſion*" muſt be " *ſomething poſſeſſed;*" ſo " *a ſpeech*" muſt be " *ſomething ſpoke,*" and " *a lecture*" muſt be " *ſomething* " *read.*" Of conſequence the receptive ſtates, " *poſſeſſed—ſpoke* " *—read,*" may be united with " *verbal being,*" as well as the exertive ſtates, " *having—ſpeaking—reading;*" and they are thus expreſſed in the verbal forms, " *to be poſſeſſed—ſpoke—read,*" " *being poſſeſſed—ſpoke—read.*" Hence the diſtinctions of verbs active and paſſive appear in language. And as there are few ſtates of exertion which can exiſt without a correſpondent ſtate of reception exiſting at the ſame time, much the greateſt number of verbs have both active and paſſive forms correſponding with each other, as the ſtates denoted by theſe forms are themſelves conceived to do.

Verbs

Verbs are all of them expreſſions of ſpecies of abſtract ſtates, which the mind may conceive at its pleaſure, either as communicating, or not communicating, in their principle of exiſtence, with other objects; and this is the eſſential property which diſtinguiſhes a verb from every other kind of word in language.

Having thus explained the nature of thoſe conceptions which are denoted by ſubſtantives, and by verbs which are frequently applied in ſome of their forms as ſubſtantives; I proceed to conſider the different forms under which ſubſtantives appear in language, and to ſhew the reaſon why theſe different forms have been introduced into the uſe of ſpeech.

Theſe different forms appear in what is called in grammar, the declenſion of nouns; which ſhews them as of different numbers, and as of different caſes in each number.

SECTION XII.

Of the numbers of noun ſubſtantives.

THESE are in Engliſh only two, the ſingular and the plural; and this diverſity of number is only obſerved in names of ſpecies. For if a name is ſo peculiarly appropriated to one certain object, as to be applicable to that object only, there can be no reaſon to give ſuch name a plural form. Yet the mind may unite ſuch an object with ſome other; ſo as to form a plural object out of both. But when this is done, two different names are joined by the conjunction "*and*," as in the expreſſion "*Greece and Italy*."

But when ſeveral individuals of one and the ſame ſpecies are conſidered as forming a complex object, it would be very inconvenient

nient to repeat the ſame name as many times as there are ſingle objects included in the complex one. And to prevent this inconvenience, the formers of all languages which have come to my knowledge, have introduced the plural forms of ſubſtantives. Theſe expreſs more than one individual of the ſpecies whereof any particular ſubſtantive is the name, as united into a complex object. When the mind unites ſeveral objects of a ſpecies into a complex object, notice is uſually given of it, in Engliſh, by adding an "*s*" to the name of the ſpecies, and ſometimes by adding the ſyllable "*es*;" and in ſome few ſubſtantives by other variations, which will be taken notice of at Section IV. of the practical part of this work.

This property of plurality in ſubſtantives, confirms the truth of the definition of a ſubſtantive, as given in this book. For although ſeveral individual objects, which are each of them denoted by the ſame, or by different ſubſtantives, may be formed into one complex object; yet the object will be a plural object, *i. e.* the being of the ſeveral individuals will not unite into one.

But if ſeveral verbs, uſed as ſubſtantives, expreſs a complex ſtate, ſuch ſtate is uſually conſidered as ſingular; as in the expreſſion "*to think and ſpeak requires time*," *i. e.* the ſtates "*thinking*" and "*ſpeaking*" are conſidered as uniting their being into one. But theſe ſtates may be conſidered as ſeparate individuals united into a plural object, if the mind pleaſes ſo to conſider them; as in the expreſſion, "*to think and to ſpeak are* "*proofs of obſervation.*"

SECTION

SECTION XIII.

Of the caſes of nouns in general.

I HAVE hitherto conſidered noun ſubſtantives, both proper and common, as alſo the names of verbal ſpecies, as they denote conceptions, which the mind can make the ſeparate objects of its contemplation. But the applying them for this purpoſe only, would not anſwer the intent of language. This intent requires, that the conception annexed to any noun ſubſtantive, or to any verb, ſhould be modified innumerable ways; and this can only be done by applying one conception, ſo as to modify, or give an additional aſcertainment to another. All the connective parts of ſpeech are uſed for this purpoſe; and the Greeks and Romans have varied their nouns by alterations of the laſt ſyllables, in order to make theſe forms of the ſubſtantives themſelves connective parts of ſpeech. The noun, whether altered in its final ſyllables, or not, is conſidered as the ſame noun; and the ſeveral forms of it are, by eſtabliſhed cuſtom, called the caſes of the noun.

Now although the Engliſh nouns have little of that variation, which, in the Latin and Greek grammars, is called a caſe; it is by no means unneceſſary for the underſtanding of the ſcientific, or ſpeculative principles, on which language is founded, to explain what the caſes of nouns are in theſe languages; and to ſhew by what means the Engliſh, or any language of like conſtruction with it, ſupplies the want of caſes in its nouns. For whatſoever expreſſions correſpond with the caſes of nouns, in the languages abovementioned, muſt of neceſſity recur continually in the uſe of any language: ſeeing the caſes, in ſuch languages as have them, are introduced for no other purpoſe but to anſwer the occaſions which moſt frequently occur in the nature of

of things, for the application of nouns in dependence upon one another, or upon other words.

The ſame reaſon which has directed all nations to diſtinguiſh the plural number in their nouns by an addition to, or alteration of, the ſingular, carried on the Greeks and Romans to give notice, by farther variations of the ſubſtantive in both the numbers, when ſuch ſubſtantive was applied, not merely to raiſe a conception of a ſingular or plural object, but to be united with ſome other word, ſo as to form with it a compound expreſſion of a conception farther circumſtantiated than it is, when expreſſed only by the word with which the dependent caſe of the ſubſtantive is united in conſtruction. The mind founds its proceeding on different circumſtances, in uniting the conceptions denoted by ſubſtantives, ſo as to particularize by them the conceptions denoted by the words on which the ſubſtantives depend. This diverſity of proceeding requires diverſity of notices in connected language; and the variations of the caſes are uſed, in Greek and Latin, as notices that the mind is proceeding on different circumſtances, in forming the connection between the object denoted by the noun, firſt in one dependent caſe, and then in another, and that contained in the ſignification of the word on which the different caſes depend.

Thus in the expreſſion, " *the motion of a man*," " *from a* " *man, to a man, with a man, for a man*," the five objects denoted by the ſame name of ſpecies, " *a man*," are united with the object, " *motion*," by ſeveral modes of eſtimation, founded on different circumſtances; and the different modes of eſtimation, and of the circumſtances on which they are founded, give occaſion to different acts of the mind in apprehending and applying them. The variation of the ſubſtantive muſt be made, according to ſome regular plan, to anſwer the end purpoſed by it; for otherwiſe the ſorts of ſignification, which it is intended the different caſes ſhall bear, would be confounded one with another.

Yet as it was found, in the languages above mentioned, that all nouns could not be varied conveniently according to one and the ſame form, or pattern; the Latins are obſerved to have five forms for the variation of their nouns, and the Greeks three principal or capital forms for the variation of theirs, which are farther ſubdiſtinguiſhed; ſo that the whole number of them is uſually reckoned to be ten. Theſe forms of variation are called declenſions, and ſome ſubſtantives are varied according to one form of declenſion, and others according to another. In all the declenſions, the difference both of number, and caſe, is denoted by the variation of the laſt ſyllables; ſo that there is a neceſſity, in order to avoid the confuſion of number, that the plural termination of a caſe ſhall be different from the ſingular termination of the ſame caſe.

The caſes of every declenſion in the Latin are conſidered as ſix in the ſingular, and as many in the plural number; and are called, the nominative, the genitive, the dative, the accuſative, the vocative, and the ablative: but no declenſion has ſix different endings of caſe in either number: for the nominative and the vocative are the ſame with each other; as likewiſe the dative and ablative with each other; in the plural number of all the declenſions. And in the ſingular, either the nominative and vocative, or the genitive and dative, or the dative and ablative, are the ſame in ſome one declenſion. But as this likeneſs happens to be between different caſes in different declenſions; the grammarians, for the ſake of regularity, have eſtabliſhed ſix caſes of each number, in every declenſion; and have founded their rules for the conſtruction of the language on this eſtabliſhment.

There are but five caſes in the Greek: the ablative being either wanting, or always the ſame with the dative. But there are three numbers; a peculiar termination being appropriated to two caſes of the noun, when it ſignifies an object conſiſting of only two individuals of a ſpecies. This number is called the

the dual number, and the firſt of its caſes ſupplies, in conſtruction, the office of the nominative, the accuſative, and of the vocative; whilſt the ſecond ſupplies that of the genitive and dative.

The method which is taken in Engliſh of forming expreſſions correſpondent to the caſes of ſubſtantives in the languages above mentioned (except in one form of the genitive caſe, and in the declenſion of ſome of the pronouns) is, by retaining the terminations of the nominatives ſingular and plural, invariable; and by prefixing different particles to theſe nominatives; ſo that the ſame particle by this means contributes to the forming of two expreſſions, which anſwer to the ſame caſe ſingular and plural of the Latin noun: as appears by the declenſion of the ſubſtantive, "*dominus*," with the Engliſh expreſſions, "*a lord*—"*of a lord*," &c. as ſet down in this ſection; and in a different manner, under the declenſion of nouns, in the practical part of this book.

The method of the Engliſh, and of other languages of like conſtruction, in forming the kind of expreſſions here treated of, is more natural than that of the Latin and Greek; as it is evidently more ſimple and regular. But the caſes in theſe languages have a variety of cadence, which their correſpondent Engliſh expreſſions will not admit of.

The names of caſe and declenſion do not appear to have any obvious relation to their grammatical meaning: for the word "*caſus*," from whence the Engliſh word, "*caſe*," is derived, ſignifies "*a fall*" in Latin. But it appears, that it was a cuſtom of the antient grammarians to place the noun, with its variations, in ſome ſuch manner as the following.





To place the variations of the noun in this manner, was of conſequence to conſider it as *declining* both ways by five ſeveral falls from the nominative of each number. And hence it is that the nominative caſe is frequently called the right, or upright caſe, and the others oblique caſes; as being placed on lines oblique to the upright lines on which the nominatives ſtood *.

* See a very ingenious book, called *Hermes*, p. 277.

The

The vocative is indeed to be excepted out of the number of oblique caſes; as being in itſelf a nominative of the ſecond perſon. This will appear, when we come to ſpeak of the caſe in particular.

SECTION XIV.

Of the ſigns of the caſes of ſubſtantives.

NOUN ſubſtantives have been hitherto conſidered, as the conceptions annexed to them repreſent objects, each whereof is conceived to exiſt by a principle which is conſtant and peculiar to it; and, of conſequence, as each object may be what the mind contemplates ſingly. But there is a neceſſity of applying conceptions derived from the ſame objects, to repreſent the mere circumſtances which attend other objects, or which attend verbal ſtates. For it is not poſſible to form ſingle conceptions denoted by ſingle names, which ſhall ſuit every ſort of object, or every ſort of ſtate, which we may have occaſion to conſider; and therefore the conceptions which are ready formed, and laid up in the mind as denoted by ſeparate names, muſt be made uſe of to circumſtantiate each other, and likewiſe to circumſtantiate verbal ſtates, as occaſion may require.

Now the conceptions of all ſeparate objects, and ſtates, are formed by confining or checking the attention; and any two, or more of them, may be taken into one complex conception, merely by extending the attention to them all, and then checking it. But this conception muſt neceſſarily be attended with the increaſe of number. For when the conceptions of objects and ſtates are thus united, none of them will repreſent mere circumſtances coaleſcing with ſome other object, but each of them will repreſent an object, or ſtate, as the conception thereof

is

is ſeparately laid up in the memory; although ſuch conceptions are ſeveral of them taken together, and made to repreſent a complex plural object to ſuit a preſent occaſion. When the mind unites in this manner, the conceptions denoted by different ſubſtantives, the conjunction "*and*" is interpoſed in Engliſh between the ſubſtantives; as in the expreſſion, "*a man and* "*a woman.*" And the infinitive forms of verbs, and the Engliſh participles, may be uſed in the ſame kind of conſtruction, as "*to read and to think—reading and thinking,*" which are expreſſions that denote conceptions equivalent to thoſe of plural objects.

This kind of conſtruction therefore is of no uſe to ſhew the conception denoted by a ſubſtantive, or by a verb, as repreſenting a mere circumſtance to be united with ſome other conception repreſenting ſome object, or ſome ſtate of being. But if a ſubſtantive be uſed in dependence upon a verb; whether the ſubſtantive be in an oblique caſe or not, notice is then given, that the conception, denoted by the ſubſtantive, is to be made uſe of merely to circumſtantiate the ſtate denoted by the verb, on which the ſubſtantive depends, in whatſoever caſe it be uſed. If a ſubſtantive be uſed in dependence upon another ſubſtantive, or upon an adjective; the ſign of an oblique caſe, or ſome prepoſition, muſt be made uſe of to ſhew the nature of the dependence; unleſs when two ſubſtantives are joined together, which are both names of the ſame object. But in all the manners in which ſubſtantives are applied merely to expreſs circumſtances attending ſtates, or objects, or other circumſtances, expreſſed by verbs, or ſubſtantives, or adjectives, no increaſe of number enſues upon the application of the dependent ſubſtantives. Thus, "*to be officers,*" is the expreſſion of a ſingle ſtate; "*an habita-*" *tion of men,*" is the expreſſion of a ſingle object; and "*men* "*in arms,*" is an expreſſion of no more objects, than are denoted by the ſubſtantive, "*men*;" and in the expreſſion, "*am-*" *bitious of honours,*" no plurality is implied. Therefore it is manifeſt,

manifeſt, that the ſeparate principle of exiſtence of objects, denoted by dependent ſubſtantives, is not attended to, when the complex conception, which theſe ſubſtantives contribute to the expreſſion of, is formed in the mind; becauſe, if ſuch principle were attended to, the notion of plurality of objects would be included in every conception, which is expreſſed by any ſeries of words, in which ſeveral ſubſtantives are concerned; as likewiſe by every ſeries in which a dependent ſubſtantive in the plural number is concerned. It follows from hence, that in every conception, denoted by a ſeries of connected words, there muſt be ſome capital object concerned, to which all the circumſtances are referred, which are expreſſed by each of the dependent words in the ſeries. For the principle, by which this object exiſts, is the only one which is attended to; and therefore all the circumſtances which can be conſiſtently united in the expreſſion, muſt be ſuch as are capable of being conſidered as mere modifications, uniting in the exiſtence of ſuch capital object.

Therefore, what is principally required to illuſtrate this moſt abſtruſe part of grammar, is to determine the ſeveral manners in which objects expreſſed by nouns, or ſtates expreſſed by verbs, are capable of being modified by what is denoted by dependent ſubſtantives.

Now it appears, from the nature of the conceptions which are annexed to names of ſpecies, that one and the ſame object may be included in ſeveral different ſpecies; and that the object may have as many different names given to it, as there are different ſpecies in which it is included. As "*a man*," for inſtance, may be called "*a creature*—*an animal*—*a ſon*," or perhaps "*a father* "—*a maſter*—*a ſubject*—*a magiſtrate*," or by many other names, if he has the properties, or characters, which are the marks of diſtinction of the ſeveral ſpecies which theſe names expreſs. Therefore one and the ſame object may be expreſſed as in ſeveral different circumſtances, if ſuch object have different

ſubſtantive names applied to it. The ſame obtains with regard to verbal ſtates. For one and the ſame ſtate may be denoted by ſeveral verbs. As for inſtance, all the active ſtates denoted by verbs, may be conſidered as included in the ſtate "*to act*," or "*to be acting*;" and all the paſſive ſtates denoted by verbs, may be conſidered as included in the ſtate "*to be ſuffering*." If therefore the conception of the principal or capital object, which is concerned in a ſeries of words, be raiſed in the mind of a hearer or reader, by mentioning ſome name of ſuch object; ſeveral circumſtances of this object may be expreſſed, by mentioning other names of the ſame object, if notice be given that ſuch names expreſs circumſtances, and not capital objects. This notice is given in all languages, by interpoſing ſome form of the verb ſubſtantive (*i. e.* of the verb which anſwers to the Engliſh verb "*to be*") between two names of the ſame object; as in the expreſſion, "*a man being—having been a judge*," or "*a man who is—was—will be—may be—muſt be—might be—ſhould be—would be a judge*." For as the ſubſtantive, "*a judge*," is made dependent upon a verb, it expreſſes nothing more than a circumſtance which modifies the verbal ſtate of "*being*" in which the man is repreſented, and therefore no conception of plurality of objects is contained in any of the above-mentioned expreſſions, although the two conceptions, denoted by "*a man*" and "*a judge*," are concerned in each. This manner of circumſtantiating objects may be called "*the deſcriptive mode*," if any one pleaſes; for this mode of conſtruction is conſtantly uſed in deſcribing objects, more particularly than they are expreſſed by the names by which they are firſt mentioned. Several paſſive verbs admit of ſubſtantives in dependence upon them by the ſame mode; ſuch as the verbs, "*to be called—named—made—appointed—eſteemed*;" as in the expreſſions, "*Mr. N—— being called—named—made—appointed—eſteemed—a judge*." I ſhall go on to ſhew the reaſon why active verbs do not admit of this kind of conſtruction: but it is neceſſary to obſerve, before I proceed farther, that this mode of circumſtantiating an object

by interpoſing a verb between two of its names, never requires the dependent ſubſtantive to be uſed in a different caſe from that of the ſubſtantive, on which the verb depends. If we examine into the reaſon of this, it will quickly appear, that the object denoted by the firſt ſubſtantive, and that denoted by the ſubſtantive which depends on the verb, are repreſented in one and the ſame ſtate of being; for in the examples above, "*Mr. N*——" is "*the object called—named*," &c. and "*a judge*" is likewiſe "*the object called—named*," &c. conſequently the conceptions annexed to "*Mr. N*——," and "*a judge*," are equally conceptions of that which "*is called—named*," &c. and therefore are no more than different conceptions of one and the ſame object.

If we now take the active verbs "*to call—to name*," &c. which correſpond with the paſſive verbs above mentioned, and form the expreſſions, "*to call—name*," &c. "*Mr. N—— a judge*," "*Mr. N—— and a judge*," will each repreſent the "*object called—named*," as before; and therefore are only names of one and the ſame object under different conceptions. But the ſtate of being, in which the object under different conceptions is repreſented, is not now directly expreſſed; for the ſtates, "*to call—name*," are only mentioned, and not the ſtates, "*called —named.*" Therefore theſe ſtates are to be ſupplied in the mind by deduction from the ſtates, "*to call—to name*," which are mentioned; and the object denoted by the ſubſtantives, "*Mr. N——, a judge*," is to be conſidered as in the deduced ſtates, and not in the ſtates which are directly mentioned.

The ſubſtantives, "*Mr. N——, a judge*," are therefore in an oblique caſe, when thus applied. And the reaſon why they are ſo is manifeſtly this, viz. the mind is under a neceſſity of ſupplying, by its own operation, ſomething which is not directly mentioned, in order to determine how the conception, expreſſed by either of the dependent ſubſtantives, repreſents a mere circumſtance of the verbal ſtate, "*to call.*" Therefore the eſſential

property of an oblique caſe is, " *a direction to ſupply in the mind* " *ſomewhat not directly mentioned, in order to turn the conception of* " *an object into that of a dependent circumſtance.*" That which is to be ſupplied in this inſtance, is a ſtate correſponding to the verbal ſtate which is mentioned, in which ſtate the object denoted by each of the dependent ſubſtantives, muſt be placed. If only one ſubſtantive is made to depend on one of the verbs above mentioned, as in the expreſſion, " *to call—name—Mr. N*——;" Mr. N—— is the object " *called—named*;" *i. e.* he is in a ſtate which is not directly mentioned, but which is to be ſupplied in the mind; and therefore the ſubſtantive, " *Mr. N*——," is in an oblique caſe. This caſe is called the accuſative, in Greek and Latin; and the noun in theſe languages, when in this caſe, is ſhewn to be ſo by its termination; but the Engliſh language has no particular ſign or termination for this caſe (except in ſome of the pronouns:) mere poſition of the ſubſtantive after the verb, uſually ſupplying the place of a ſign. There is little or no occaſion for any particular ſign of this caſe beſides mere poſition; becauſe the word, which the noun in this caſe depends upon, muſt always be a verb, and that verb of a particular kind.

The grammarians have called the kind of verb, on which a ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe may depend, a verb tranſitive. The explanation of the nature of this verb will contribute much to explain the nature of all the oblique caſes of ſubſtantives, as likewiſe of all the prepoſitions; and therefore this kind of verb muſt here be particularly conſidered.

Now every tranſitive verb has two ſets of forms, which the grammarians have called the two voices of the verb. One of theſe voices is conſidered as expreſſing ſtates of action; the other ſtates of ſuffering; and this way of conſidering the nature of theſe voices, is proper enough for conveying to learners a general conception of the nature of each. But a verb in the active voice very frequently denotes a ſtate which implies no real action;

as

as for inſtance, " *to ſuffer—to reſemble—to exceed*," and many others. And ſo a verb, in the paſſive voice, frequently denotes a ſtate which implies no real ſuffering; as, " *to be got—to be loſt* " *—to be found*," and many others. The true nature of theſe ſtates is, that thoſe of each pair (that is, the active and paſſive ſtates, which are denoted by the correſpondent forms, or tenſes, of one and the ſame verb) are conceived to derive their exiſtence from one and the ſame principle; ſo that if this principle of exiſtence is communicated to, or with-held from, either ſtate of a pair, it is communicated to, or with-held from, the other ſtate of the ſame pair. Thus the ſtates, " *to ſee—to be* " *ſeen*," " *to ſpeak—to be ſpoke*," " *to love—to be loved*," exiſt each pair of them by the ſame principle: and in general, if either ſtate of any of the pairs of any mood is, " *paſt—preſent* " *—or to come*," the other ſtate of the ſame pair is, " *paſt—pre-* " *ſent—or to come*;" or if the exiſtence of either ſtate depends upon " *command—power—freedom from contradiction—duty—* " *or neceſſity*," the exiſtence of the other ſtate of the ſame pair depends on the ſame principle. Hence the ſame ſigns of tenſe and mood are uſed with each ſtate of the ſame pair; as, " *to love* " *—to be loved*," " *to have loved—to have been loved*," " *to be about* " *to love—to be about to be loved*," " *I love—I am loved*," " *I loved* " *—I was loved*," " *I have loved—I have been loved*," " *I had* " *loved—I had been loved*," " *I ſhall love—I ſhall be loved*," " *love thou—be thou loved*," " *I can—may—ſhould—would love*," " *I can—may—ſhould—would—be loved*," &c.; and ſo of the correſponding ſtates of any one and the ſame tranſitive verb. But although theſe correſponding pairs of verbal ſtates are conceived as each pair owing its exiſtence to the ſame principle; yet the ſame object is not uſually in both the ſtates of ſome certain pair at one and the ſame time; but much more frequently one object is in one of the ſtates, and another object in the correſponding ſtate. And almoſt all kind of relations may be expreſſed by conſidering one object as in one of theſe ſtates, and another in the correſponding ſtate. As for inſtance, the relation

of equality may be expreſſed between two objects, by conſidering the one object as in the ſtate "*equalling*," and the other as in the ſtate "*equalled*." The relation of "*greater*" to "*leſs*" between two objects, may be expreſſed by conſidering the one as in the ſtate "*exceeding*," and the other in the ſtate "*exceeded*." The relation of "*leſs*" to "*greater*" may be expreſſed by conſidering one object in the ſtate "*exceeded*," and another in the ſtate "*exceding*;" and ſo of a great variety of other inſtances. Now if an object is repreſented in one of theſe verbal ſtates, and another object in the ſame relation to the firſt object, as it would be if the correſponding ſtate were mentioned and this other object repreſented in that ſtate; there is no occaſion actually to mention ſuch correſponding ſtate, but to give notice by ſome ſign that it is to be ſupplied in the mind, and it will be ſupplied of courſe; becauſe the one of theſe correſponding ſtates always ſuppoſes the other. If an object is mentioned as in the ſtate denoted by the active form of any tranſitive verb, and another object is related to the firſt object by being in the correſponding paſſive ſtate; the name of ſuch correſponding object is placed in Engliſh immediately after the active verb, and this poſition is of the ſame effect as a particular ſign would be, of the relation which exiſts between the two objects. Thus in the expreſſion, "*John ſeeing—equalling—excelling—James*;" James is in the ſame relation to John, as he would be if he were repreſented in the ſtates, "*ſeen—equalled—excelled*;" and ſo of other inſtances of the uſe of the active tranſitive verb, with a ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe depending upon it. Therefore the ſign of the accuſative caſe is not the mark of any one certain relation, but of a certain kind of operation of the mind itſelf, which can be performed upon the ſort of conception that is denoted by the active form of a tranſitive verb; but not upon the conception that is denoted by any other ſort of word.

If an object be repreſented in the paſſive ſtate of a tranſitive verb, and a ſubſtantive be made immediately dependent upon

the verb, ſuch ſubſtantive is conceived to expreſs an object, which is in the paſſive ſtate itſelf that is mentioned, and not in the correſponding active ſtate; as in the expreſſion, "*a child named* "*John*," "*John*," as well as "*the child*," is "*the object named*;" and ſo of other inſtances.

Yet it is frequently neceſſary to repreſent an object in the ſtate denoted by the paſſive form of a tranſitive verb, and likewiſe to repreſent an object in the active ſtate which correſponds with the paſſive ſtate that is mentioned, as merely circumſtantiating the object in the paſſive ſtate. When this is to be done, there is no occaſion directly to mention the active ſtate; but any certain ſign, or mark, uſed with the name of the object, which is to be conſidered as if it were in ſuch ſtate, will be ſufficient to direct the mind ſo to conſider it. For as the correſponding paſſive ſtate is actually mentioned, the active ſtate is eaſily ſupplied in the mind whenſoever there is an occaſion for it. The ſign "*by*" is prefixed in Engliſh before the ſubſtantive which follows the paſſive verb, when the mind proceeds to connect its conceptions in this manner, *i. e.* by the means of paſſive ſtates actually mentioned; and by underſtanding, or ſupplying within itſelf, the correſponding active ſtates, as in the expreſſions, "*James ſeen—equalled—excelled by John*," where John is "*the object ſeeing—equalling—excelling*;" *i. e.* he is in the active ſtates, which correſpond with the ſtates, "*ſeen—equalled—* "*excelled*," that are actually mentioned in the expreſſion. Hence it appears, that the ſign "*by*," after a paſſive verb, is not the mark of any one certain relation; but of a certain kind of operation of the mind itſelf, which can be performed upon the conception denoted by a paſſive verb. It is conceived in Engliſh, that the ſame kind of operation, which is denoted by the ſign "*by*," may be performed upon other ſorts of words, beſides paſſive verbs; and therefore this ſign does not always refer to *the agent*, as it does in the examples given above; and the various uſes of this ſign will be conſidered particularly in a following chapter. But it is manifeſt that the expreſſions, "*John—ſeeing—equalling—*

"*excelling*

" *excelling—James,*" (which were produced as examples of conſtruction, by the active forms of verbs with the accuſative caſe) are exactly equivalent to " *James ſeen—equalled —excelled by—* " *John*;" inſomuch, that if the conceptions, denoted by either of the expreſſions, could be painted, the very ſame picture would be formed. This will be very evident, if we take the verbal name of a viſible ſtate of being, and apply it in both theſe modes of conſtruction; as for inſtance, the verb " *to hold.*" For the appearance which is expreſſed by " *John holding James,*" is the very ſame with that which is expreſſed by " *James held by John*;" and conſequently the very ſame picture would repreſent that which is denoted by either of the expreſſions. This diverſity of expreſſion of one and the ſame appearance, ariſes from hence; that we are at liberty to conſider either John or James as the capital object concerned in the appearance; and that if we conſider John as ſuch object, the ſtate, " *holding James,*" is a dependent circumſtance of the complex object, expreſſed by " *John* " *holding James*;" but if we conſider James as the capital object, the ſtate, " *held by John,*" is a dependent circumſtance of the complex object, expreſſed by " *James held by John*;" ſo that the conceptions of the two complex objects differ in nothing but in the modes of operation, by which the parts, whereof they conſiſt, are put together in the mind itſelf; and painting can take no notice of theſe modes of operation.

Now it is manifeſt that the objects, between which every particular kind of relation can exiſt, are each of them in a certain ſtate of being, in conſequence of ſuch relation; ſo that to conſider two objects as the terms between which a certain relation exiſts, is, in effect, to conſider one of the objects as in a ſtate of being, with which the ſtate of being, in which the other object is, has the ſame kind of correſpondence as that is which occaſions the relation. And this is manifeſtly the reaſon, why ſo many kinds of relations may be expreſſed in language, by repreſenting one object as in the active or paſſive ſtate, which is denoted by

ſome tranſitive verb; and another object as in the correſpondent paſſive or active ſtate of the ſame verb.

If verbal ſtates could be mentioned with convenience, as intervening between every two objects, which are conſidered as in ſome certain relation to each other, there would manifeſtly be no occaſion in language, for the ſign of any caſe, except that of the accuſative, and that of the correſponding ablative, which is the ſign "*by*," in Engliſh, as we have ſhewn above. But on ſome occaſions, it is utterly unneceſſary to mention the particular ſtates of being, in which objects are, that are conſidered as related to each other; becauſe the nature of the objects themſelves ſufficiently ſhews how they are related; and therefore any mark, or notice, to direct to the name, which is to be conſidered as denoting a mere circumſtance, and not a capital object, is direction enough to enable the mind to unite the conceptions denoted by two ſubſtantives, into the conception of a capital object farther aſcertained by the circumſtance which is denoted by the dependent ſubſtantive. The ſign "*of*" is uſed in Engliſh between two ſubſtantives for this purpoſe, and is prefixed to the ſubſtantive, which is to be conſidered as the name of a mere circumſtance. Thus in the expreſſions, "*a man of learning—a horſe of ſtrength*," notice is given that the ſubſtantives, "*learning*" and "*ſtrength*," expreſs mere circumſtances. So that the learning is not to be conſidered as having any principle of exiſtence, other than that by which the man exiſts; nor the ſtrength as having any principle of exiſtence, other than that by which the horſe exiſts. Hence it comes to paſs, that the dependent ſubſtantives, "*of learning*—" *of ſtrength*," are, in this application of them, exactly equivalent to the adjectives, "*learned*" and "*ſtrong*;" ſo that the expreſſions above are of the very ſame import with "*a learned man* "*—a ſtrong horſe.*" But the expreſſions may be reverſed, ſo that the word in each which repreſented the capital object, may be made to repreſent a dependent circumſtance; and that which

repreſented

repreſented a mere circumſtance, may be made to repreſent the capital object, and this merely by turning the ſubſtantives, "*a man—a horſe*," into "*of a man—of a horſe*;" and conſidering the ſubſtantives, "*learning*" and "*ſtrength*," as expreſſing objects circumſtantiated reſpectively, by what is ſignified by "*of a man—of a horſe*;" as in the expreſſions, "*the learning of a man—the ſtrength of a horſe.*" Adjectives might be made to expreſs what is here denoted by "*of a man—of a horſe*;" but it is not convenient to make adjectives from the names of real objects, and to give theſe adjectives this kind of ſignification. For every adjective (as has been already ſhewn) directs, that no notice is to be taken of any principle of exiſtence in what is denoted by it. And it is ſomewhat difficult for the mind to lay aſide the conſideration of the principle by which a real object exiſts. But it is eaſy to conſider a capital object as in ſome certain ſtate of being, and any other object by which the capital object is circumſtantiated, as in a ſtate of being correſpondent with the former ſtate. Hence the kind of relation that is given notice of by the ſign "*of*," placed in Engliſh between two ſubſtantives, may be more exactly expreſſed, by ſubſtituting ſome tranſitive verb inſtead of the ſign; as, "*a man of learning—a horſe of ſtrength*," are expreſſions equivalent to "*a man having learning—a horſe having ſtrength*;" and theſe expreſſions may be reverſed, if the correſponding paſſive ſtate, "*had*," be ſubſtituted inſtead of "*having*:" if they are thus reverſed, they will become "*the learning had by a man—the ſtrength had by a horſe*;" and both the former and the latter expreſſions may be eaſily turned into equivalent expreſſions, in which a relative pronoun is concerned; as, "*a man who has learning—a horſe which has ſtrength*," "*the learning which a man has—the ſtrength which a horſe has.*" The reaſon why a relative pronoun has this property, will be made fully appear, when that kind of pronoun is treated of in particular. It will appear that ſome verb tranſitive, either in an active or paſſive form, may be ſubſtituted for the Engliſh ſign, "*of*," on every occaſion when the ſign connects

connects two ſubſtantives; as for inſtance, "*the parts of a whole*" is equivalent to "*the parts conſtituting*, or *which conſtitute a* "*whole*;" "*a whole of ſo many parts*," to "*a whole conſtituted by* "*ſo many parts*, or *which ſo many parts conſtitute*;" "*a field of* "*corn*," to "*a field producing*, or *which produces corn*;" "*the* "*corn of a field*," to "*the corn produced by a field*, or *which a* "*field produces*;" and ſo of other inſtances of two ſubſtantives connected by this ſign "*of*." It is manifeſt therefore, that this mode of conſtruction is only a kind of ſubſtitute for the tranſitive, and correſpondent paſſive modes, above deſcribed; and that it takes place when the ſtates in which the objects denoted by the ſubſtantives are to be conſidered, are ſo obvious, that there is no occaſion to mention either ſtate particularly. This ſign, "*of*," is therefore neither the mark of relation in general, nor of one particular ſort of relation; but is the mark of a certain ſort of operation of the mind itſelf, which always requires two conceptions of a certain ſort, in order to perform it, viz. two conceptions which are denoted by two ſubſtantives. A conception which is denoted by an expreſſion that is formed by the operation above mentioned, may be eaſily turned into an adjective conception; for nothing more is required, than to omit conſidering the principle by which the capital object exiſts, and of conſequence to denote ſuch object not by ſubſtantive, but by an adjective name. Thus, "*deſire of praiſe*" becomes "*deſirous of praiſe*," "*con-* "*ſciouſneſs of guilt*" becomes "*conſcious of guilt*;" and ſo of other inſtances. Here it is manifeſt, that "*deſirous of praiſe*— "*conſcious of guilt*," are only a kind of complex adjectives; and this may ſerve, as one example, to ſhew how the mind compounds words, ſo that a whole ſeries of them taken together, becomes of the nature of a ſimple word of a particular part of ſpeech.

The ſign "*of*," in Engliſh, has yet another uſe, beſides that which requires two ſubſtantives when it is applied. In this uſe of it, the ſubſtantives to which it is prefixed are placed, not in

dependence upon other ſubſtantives, but upon verbs. The ſubſtantive, thus applied, anſwers to a Latin ſubſtantive in the ablative caſe, ſometimes without any prepoſition before it, and ſometimes with, "*a—ab—de—e—ex*;" as, "*deſcended of an an-*" "*tient family*," may in Latin be expreſſed by "*ortus antiqua*" "*ſtirpe*," or "*ortus ab antiqua ſtirpe.*" But the ſign "*of*," when uſed with two ſubſtantives, anſwers to the genitive caſe in Latin. This double uſe of the ſame ſign in Engliſh occaſions no ambiguity; becauſe, in the latter uſe of it, the ſign, with its ſubſtantive, muſt depend upon a different ſort of word from that, upon which it depends when it anſwers to the genitive caſe of Latin nouns. There is another Engliſh ſign, which always requires a certain ſort of word to be made dependent upon. This ſign is "*than*," which always depends upon ſome word that requires the act of compariſon in order to apply it, whilſt it directs to the name of the object which has in it a degree of ſome quality, which degree is made the ſtandard of compariſon. Thus in the expreſſions, "*John is taller than James—John proceeds leſs*" "*cautiouſly than James*;" the degree of tallneſs, and the degree of cautiouſneſs of proceeding, obſerved in James, are made the ſtandards of compariſon; and it is inferred, that the degree of tallneſs, obſerved in John, exceeds the degree obſerved in James; but that the degree of cautiouſneſs of proceeding, obſerved in John, comes ſhort of the degree obſerved in James. The ſign "*than*" is therefore a mere mark, or notice, which ſuppoſes a certain mode of eſtimation of the mind of man, and directs to the name of ſome object, upon ſome quality whereof this mode of eſtimotion is applied. Now to eſtimate a relation by mentioning both the terms between which it exiſts, and by ſhewing how theſe terms are connected, is in effect to compare theſe terms together in ſome certain reſpect; and if this reſpect be the poſſeſſion, or exertion of ſome quality which has an adjective or adverbial name of the comparative degree, this mode of eſtimation may be uſed to expreſs the relation. Thus the expreſſions, "*to ſtand above—below—before—behind a man*," may be turned into

into the equivalent expreſſions, " *to ſtand higher than—lower* " *than—more forward than—leſs forward than a man*;" and the force of ſeveral other prepoſitions may be expreſſed by the comparative mode of conſtruction on many occaſions; as, " *to ad-* " *vance beyond the wood*," is " *to advance farther than the wood*," &c.

Having thus conſidered the ſeveral caſes of ſubſtantives which require words of particular ſorts for their application, I proceed to conſider the ſigns by which a ſubſtantive may be made dependent upon either a noun or a verb.

Now it is manifeſt, that the verb tranſitive requires no affixed ſign in Engliſh to ſhew the ſubſtantive which denotes an object that is related to the ſtate, by being in the paſſive ſtate which correſponds with the ſtate that is mentioned. But if more objects are required to circumſtantiate a tranſitive ſtate, different ſigns muſt be uſed, to ſhew the different manners in which the conceptions of theſe objects are applied to ſignify mere circumſtances of ſuch ſtate. One of the principal of theſe ſigns is " *for*," in Engliſh. This ſign ſhews that the object, to the name of which it is prefixed, is ſo conſidered as to be " *the cauſe* " *—motive—reaſon*—or *occaſion why*" ſome ſtate exiſts, or ſome object exiſts in ſome certain ſtate; as in the expreſſions, " *to* " *work for hire—a maſt for a ſhip*," &c. This kind of relation ariſes altogether from a certain mode of eſtimation of ſome rational agent; for where there is no reaſon, there can be no final cauſes; and where nothing is propoſed or executed, there can be no motive of intention. It is therefore moſt evident, that the ſign " *for*" ſhews the object to the name of which it is prefixed, as under a certain mode of contemplation of the mind of man, and that this mode of contemplation makes ſuch object not a capital object, but a dependent circumſtance on ſomething propoſed or executed. Hence this ſign is the mark of a certain mode of contemplation of the mind of man itſelf. But this

mode of contemplation is made the characteriſtic of the ſpecies, "*final cauſe*," and of conſequence what object ſoever is under this mode of contemplation, ſuch object becomes of that ſpecies, and may be called "*a final cauſe*." So that the kind of relation in which the object ſtands, to which the ſign "*for*" directs, is aſcertained in a good meaſure by the nature of the ſpecies into which ſuch object paſſes when it has this ſign before its name.

The other Engliſh prepoſitions, which may be conſidered as the ſigns of caſes of ſubſtantives, are "*to—from—with—in*." Each of theſe are notices of particular modes of contemplation, by which the mind of man reduces the conceptions of objects to thoſe of mere circumſtances dependent on ſome capital object, or on ſome verbal ſtate. The mode of contemplation denoted by "*to*" is, in its general nature, ſimilar to that by which the mind attends a moving object, or any ſtate of motion, till it cloſes with ſome fixed object. That denoted by "*from*" is, in its general nature, ſimilar to the proceeding of the mind when it conſiders a moving object, or any ſtate of motion, as forſaking ſome object whence it recedes; "*with*" directs to ſome object which may be conſidered of the ſpecies "*concomitant*," or "*adjunct*," with regard to ſome object or ſtate; "*in*" gives notice of a mode of attention ſimilar to that by which the mind ſpecifies an object, or ſtate, by ſomething which ſurrounds, or contains it. This way of reducing connections to ſorts by the ſeveral modes of attention which the mind exerts in apprehending and applying each ſort, is manifeſtly the utmoſt effort of the abſtractive power of the mind. For when we denote conceptions as of different ſorts, merely by the diverſities of proceeding by which we form theſe conceptions from premiſes ſet before us; it is clear, that no diſtinctions can be conceived of a more ſimple nature; ſeeing we are now arrived at the mere internal conſciouſneſs which the mind has of the ſeveral kinds of its own diſcurſive acts. Theſe diverſities of proceeding of the mind itſelf, in apprehending and applying the kinds of connexions and relations

tions which are denoted by the ſigns of caſes and prepoſitions, are a kind of characteriſtics by which theſe connexions and relations are reduced to claſſes or ſorts. For every connexion, or relation, is denoted by the ſame ſign, when the ſame kind of proceeding of the mind itſelf is uſed in applying ſuch connexion, or relation. Now I have ſhewed, in what is ſaid of the nature of ſpecies, that one and the ſame object may be expreſſed by different names of ſpecies, if ſuch object have the characters of different ſpecies in it. In like manner, the ſame connexion or relation may be denoted by different ſigns, if ſuch connexion or relation can be apprehended and applied by different modes of proceeding of the mind itſelf. But every kind of connexion or relation may be apprehended and applied by different modes of proceeding, if the premiſes or *data* are changed, by which ſuch connexion or relation is to be eſtimated.

Hence the ſituations of objects, when they require theſe particular modes of contemplation in order to turn the conceptions of them into thoſe of mere circumſtances, may uſually be conſidered as particular *ſtates of being* in which the objects are, when the conceptions of them are to be turned into thoſe of mere circumſtances; and if theſe ſtates are expreſſed by either the active or paſſive forms of tranſitive verbs, and the object which is to be conſidered as a mere circumſtance, is repreſented as in the ſtate of being which correſponds with that which is expreſſed, it is evident that the verb itſelf will direct the mind to apply the object denoted by the ſubſtantive which depends upon it, ſo as to underſtand and circumſtantiate the correſpondent ſtate by the object: and the ſtate, when ſo underſtood and circumſtantiated, will have a correſpondence with the verbal ſtate which is expreſſed, of the ſame kind with that which conſtitutes the relation that is between the objects that are now repreſented in theſe verbal ſtates. Hence, "*we reached* "*ſuch a place*," is of the ſame import in Engliſh with "*we* "*came to ſuch a place*;" "*we forſook ſuch a place*," with

" *we went from it*;" " *John accompanying James*," is equivalent to " *John being with James*;" " *a houſe which is ſurrounded* " *by a wood*," to " *a houſe which is in a wood*;" " *conteſts for* " *preferment*," to " *conteſts occaſioned by deſire of preferment*;" " *a number exceeding another*," to " *a number bigger than another*;" and ſo of innumerable other inſtances, in which a tranſitive verb may be ſubſtituted inſtead of a prepoſition, or ſign of a caſe. This ſhews clearly, that the ſame relation between objects may be expreſſed in language by different modes of eſtimation, if the premiſes are changed, by the help whereof the relations are to be eſtimated.

Theſe obſervations evidently prove, that although the ſigns of caſes and other prepoſitions are the notices of relations exiſting between objects and objects, or between verbal ſtates and objects; yet that each ſign or prepoſition only directs the hearer to apply his attention in a certain manner upon premiſes or *data* of certain kinds, in order to apprehend the relation exactly which is intended to be expreſſed; for if the premiſes are changed, the mode of operation muſt be changed, in order to eſtimate exactly the nature of the relation in queſtion: and when the mode of operation is to be changed, a different ſign or prepoſition muſt be uſed. Hence it comes to paſs, that one and the ſame complex object may frequently be expreſſed by applying the ſame prepoſitions to different words, or different prepoſitions to the ſame words. As for inſtance, " *the diſtance of London from York*— " *of York from London*—*from London to York*—*from York to* " *London*—*between London and York*—*between York and London*," are all expreſſions of one and the ſame diſtance, under different modes of eſtimation, which modes the prepoſitions give notice of, by changing with each different uſe of the premiſes upon which the mind applies its attention in carrying on the eſtimation.

Thus it appears that the ſigns of caſes and other prepoſitions are indeed the marks of relation, but that theſe relations are reduced

duced to ſorts in language, by conſidering each relation as of the ſame ſort which requires the ſame ſort of attention of the mind itſelf, to apprehend and apply it with the ſame ſort of premiſes. Hence it comes to paſs, that ſigns of caſes and prepoſitions bear in themſelves a leſs determinate ſignification than nouns and verbs do; for even noun adjectives include a conception in each, which may be denoted by a ſubſtantive, and which of conſequence may be ſeparately attended to in the mind; but the kind of relation which is given notice of by a ſign, cannot be ſo attended to; for ſome premiſes muſt be given, and the mind muſt exerciſe its diſcurſive judgment upon them, before ſuch a conception of the relation denoted by a particular ſign will ariſe, as can be diſtinguiſhed from the conception of ſome other relation. It is the buſineſs of grammar to determine, as preciſely as poſſible, the kinds of premiſes which admit of being circumſtantiated by ſubſtantives in each particular caſe. And I have attempted this in the following ſection, with regard to the Engliſh language in particular; for, with regard to language in general, little can be done in this part of grammar. The reaſon of this is, that different communities have not applied the ſame mode of eſtimation to the ſame kind of premiſes, in order to expreſs the ſame relations amongſt objects and ſtates themſelves. For, even in the uſe of the genitive caſe of one ſubſtantive in order to circumſtantiate another; in Hebrew (as I am told) it is not "*the cir-*" *cumſtance*" that is expreſſed by the genitive caſe, but "*the ob-*" *ject which is circumſtantiated*," which proceeding is the very contrary to that of the Greek, Latin, Engliſh, and, as I believe, of all the languages of Europe. Yet if the matter is cloſely attended to, the proceeding of the Hebrews will appear at leaſt as reaſonable as that of other nations; for in the Engliſh expreſſions, "*the head of a man—the ſhape of a triangle*;" the conceptions denoted by "*head*" and "*ſhape*," are really altered in the mind, in conſequence of the ſubſtantive which is made dependent upon each; whereas, the conceptions denoted by "*a* "*man—a triangle*" remain unaltered. When therefore the altered

tered conception is expreſſed by an alteration in the ſubſtantive, ſuch proceeding is by no means unreaſonable, although directly the reverſe of the proceeding made uſe of in the weſtern languages.

It appears from the foregoing account of the ſigns of caſes and prepoſitions, why mere arbitrary cuſtom has ſo much influence in the application of them in all languages. For a mere mode of attention of the mind itſelf is not eaſily diſtinguiſhed, or indeed is not eaſy to be diſtinguiſhed from every other mode; nor is it eaſy to aſcertain what premiſes are all of a ſort, ſo as all to require the ſame ſign to give notice of a certain relation as exiſting among ſuch premiſes. Hence the application of the oblique caſes and prepoſitions is ſo various in the Greek, as ſcarce to admit of being reduced to rule; and in Latin, the rules admit of very many exceptions more than are ſpecified in the grammars of that language. And the ſame defect muſt, in ſome degree, attend any ſet of rules for the conſtruction of the oblique caſes of ſubſtantives and of prepoſitions, in every language. Yet ſuch rules are of conſiderable uſe, eſpecially to children and foreigners, becauſe they not only bring a ſubject, in itſelf very extenſive and intricate, under a few general heads, but likewiſe enable the learner more eaſily to obſerve and remember the deviations from the more general modes of conſtruction. For this reaſon I have drawn up the following chapter concerning the conſtruction of Engliſh ſubſtantives, with thoſe ſigns before them, which anſwer nearly to the oblique caſes of the Latin ſubſtantives; and ſhall, in the practical grammar, inſert a ſeries of ſhort practical rules for the ſame purpoſe. If any one pleaſes to teach a child to apply theſe rules to the Engliſh, much in the ſame manner as the rules are applied to the Latin and Greek, ſuch child will not only write Engliſh more correctly than without the help of ſuch rules, but will likewiſe be brought much ſooner to apprehend and apply the rules of Latin and Greek, or of any other language, than by any other means.

SECTION

SECTION XV.

Of the caſes of ſubſtantives in particular.

Of the nominative caſe.

THE meaning of this caſe has been ſhewn in the account already given of ſubſtantives proper and appellative. For the noun in this caſe is conſidered as barely raiſing a conception of ſome object, ſingular or plural, in the mind of the hearer, and that by mere recollection. This is upon a ſuppoſition that the hearer knows the meaning of the ſubſtantive, before it is mentioned to him; for if he is not ſuppoſed to know it, the mentioning of the noun, only raiſes the conception of a particular ſound in his mind, or, if the noun be written or printed, of a certain viſible form, to which a conception is to be annexed, which ſhall recur to his mind by mere recollection, when he has once gained it, and fixed it in his mind. Hence the mentioning a noun in this caſe ſingly, conveys no information to the hearer; for he either knows the meaning of it, or he does not: if he does know it, the conception of the object which is annexed to the ſubſtantive, recurs to his mind by mere recollection: if he does not know the meaning of it, more words muſt be added, or pointing to, or ſhewing the object intended to be expreſſed, muſt be made uſe of, to convey the meaning of the noun to him. On this account, the mentioning of a ſingle ſubſtantive in this caſe, is never conceived to expreſs the whole intention of the ſpeaker; but ſomething muſt be declared concerning it, either by words or ſigns, before that intention is conceived to be ſignified to the hearer.

SECTION XVI.

Of the genitive caſe.

THE particle "*of*" is conſidered as the ſign of this caſe in Engliſh, when it is uſed to connect ſubſtantives of all kinds together, which have no verb between them. There is alſo another form of the genitive caſe of Engliſh ſubſtantives, in which an "*s*," with the mark of ellſion, is placed after the ſubſtantive. This form of the caſe is placed before the ſubſtantive on which it depends in conſtruction; but the form by "*of*" is placed after the ſubſtantive on which it depends; as, "*a man's houſe*," or, "*the houſe of a man.*"

It has been fully ſhewn, in the preceding chapter, that the ſign "*of*," when uſed to join ſubſtantives, ſupplies the place of a pair of correſponding ſtates of ſome one and the ſame tranſitive verb, and carries on the mind to join the two objects connected by it, in the ſame manner as theſe objects would be joined, if one of the participial correſponding ſtates were expreſſed, and the other ſupplied in the mind; and one of the objects denoted by theſe ſubſtantives were in the one ſtate, and the other object in the other. But when this ſign is applied, the verbal ſtates which form the connexion between the objects denoted by the ſubſtantives, muſt be ſo obvious, that the mind cannot only ſupply the ſtates themſelves, but likewiſe determine which object is in the active, and which in the correſponding paſſive ſtate.

As the connective ſtates themſelves are ſo exceeding various, the exiſtence of which between objects are nevertheleſs any of them denoted by one and the ſame ſign, it may be thought difficult to conceive how the ſign can direct the mind what particular ſtate to ſupply in each particular inſtance of ſubſtantives

 united

united by it. Now it is manifeſt, that the mind does this in conſequence of the ſame power of judgment by which it can unite the ſame two ſubſtantives, whenſoever there is occaſion ſo to do, by expreſſing the participle that is underſtood, if the ſign only be uſed. Thus, inſtead of ſaying "*a whole of ſo many* "*parts*," a man may, if he pleaſes, ſay, "*a whole containing ſo* "*many parts*;" and inſtead of ſaying, "*the ſhip of ſuch a man*, or "*ſuch a man's ſhip*," he may ſay, "*the ſhip poſſeſſed by ſuch a* "*man*;" and ſo of other inſtances. But, in reality, the mind does not ſtop to attend very particularly to the preciſe ſtate that forms the connexion referred to by the ſign. It is ſufficient for the purpoſes of language, that the mind perceives a connexion between two objects, ſimilar to that which is formed between ſome pair of verbal correſponding ſtates; for when that is perceived, the ſign may be conſiſtently applied. Seeing the referring the one ſubſtantive to the other by it, is not to aſcertain the intermediate verbal ſtate; but to aſcertain the object denoted by the ſubſtantive on which the ſign depends, and this by means of the other ſubſtantive that depends upon the ſign. In conſequence of this aſcertainment, the object denoted by the firſt ſubſtantive may be diſtinguiſhed from other objects equally capable of being denoted by the ſame ſubſtantive; and when this is effected, the purpoſe of applying the ſign with the ſubſtantive that depends upon it, is accompliſhed.

Thus, "*the foot of a man*" is the expreſſion of one ſort of foot, and "*the foot of a horſe*" is the expreſſion of another ſort of foot; "*the flock of ſuch a man*" is an expreſſion which diſtinguiſhes the flock ſpoke of from other objects, any of which may equally be called "*a flock.*" "*Mr. N—— of ſuch a place*" is, in like manner, an expreſſion which diſtinguiſhes the perſon ſpoke of, from any other who may happen to be called Mr. N——, and who does not live at the ſame place; and ſo of other inſtances.

It is true, the connecting ſtates may be preciſely attended to; as the foot, for inſtance, may be conſidered as "*a part conſti-* "*tuting*," and the man and the horſe, as "*wholes conſtituted*;" the flock may be alſo conſidered as "*the object poſſeſſed*," and the particular man as "*the object poſſeſſing*;" and Mr. N—— may be conſidered as "*an object inhabiting*," and the place as "*the object inhabited*;" and the ſpeaker may actually mention theſe verbal ſtates, if he pleaſes, and not uſe the ſign; but the mentioning of theſe ſtates will no ways promote the ſpecification of the object which the firſt ſubſtantive denotes, by means of the object denoted by the ſecond or dependent ſubſtantive, more than the uſe of the ſign does. And therefore it is to no purpoſe to mention the particular connective ſtate, when a mark or ſign of the general mode of reference, which the mind is making uſe of, will anſwer the ſame end.

There are indeed ſome inſtances of reference by this ſign, that bear an ambiguous meaning; and therefore in ſuch inſtances, it may be proper to uſe ſome verbal form, and not the ſign "*of*." This ambiguity ariſes from the ſign "*of*" being uſed to refer either an object which has an active ſtate in it, to an object which has in it the correſponding paſſive ſtate; or an object which has a paſſive ſtate in it, to an object which has in it the correſponding active ſtate; and from the nature of the conceptions annexed to many ſubſtantive names. For ſeveral of theſe may be conſidered as containing in them either active or paſſive ſtates; as, "*love—hate—fear—conqueſt—loſs*," and many more. Now if it happen, that theſe conceptions may be conſidered either as active or paſſive ſtates of objects of ſome one and the ſame ſpecies, the referring the ſubſtantive names of theſe conceptions to ſuch names of ſpecies by the ſign "*of*," will produce ambiguous expreſſions.

Thus, "*a man may love—hate—fear a man*;" and therefore the expreſſions, "*the love—hate—fear of a man*," are ambiguous;

guous; becauſe it cannot be determined whether "*the man*" is "*the object loving—hating—fearing*," or "*the object loved—hated* "*—feared.*" So a king may conquer a king; and therefore "*the* "*conqueſt of a king*" is an ambiguous expreſſion, ſeeing it cannot be determined whether the king mentioned is "*the object con-* "*quering*," or "*the object conquered.*" In like manner a woman may loſe a woman; and therefore "*the loſs of a woman*" is an ambiguous expreſſion: and ſo of very many other inſtances.

We have obſerved, that there are two forms of the genitive caſe in Engliſh; the one of which may be called the preceding, and this by "*of*," the ſucceeding form. The uſe of the preceding form, prevents the ambiguity, above ſpoke of, in many inſtances; thus, "*a man's love—hate—fear*" are moſt commonly expreſſions of theſe paſſions conſidered in the perſon "*loving—hating—fear-* "*ing.*" Nevertheleſs there are ſeveral inſtances in which the expreſſion by either form of the caſe is equally ambiguous; thus, "*ſuch a man's deliverance*," uſually means the ſtate of the man who is delivered; but ſometimes alſo the ſtate of the man who delivers; ſo "*a man's pardon*," or "*the pardon of a man*," may either of them equally mean the pardon of the man who gives, or of the man who receives it. As the ſign "*of*" is uſed, either to refer an object, which has an active ſtate in it, to that which has in it the paſſive correſponding ſtate, or an object which has a paſſive ſtate in it, to that which has the active correſponding ſtate in it; the ſubſtantives referred to each other by this ſign muſt, in very many inſtances, be convertible. For when we ſay "*a field of corn*," for inſtance, the field is conſidered as "*the* "*object producing*," and the corn as "*the object produced*;" and when we ſay "*the corn of a field*," the corn and the field are ſtill in the ſame ſtates; and the reference "*by—of*" proceeds upon the correlation formed by theſe ſtates, whether the object in the active or paſſive ſtate is firſt conſidered. But it frequently happens, that two ſubſtantives are conceived as in one kind of correlation, when they are taken in one order; and in another kind, when

when they are taken in the contrary order. Thus in the expreſſion, "*the builder of a houſe*," "*the builder*" is "*the object* "*building*," and "*the houſe*" is "*the object built*;" but in the expreſſion, "*the houſe of a builder*," "*the houſe*" is conſidered as "*the object poſſeſſed*," and "*builder*" as "*the object poſſeſſing*;" and ſo of many other inſtances.

In order to determine when the ſubſtantives, connected by this ſign, are convertible, and when not, the intent of the reference muſt be attended to. For if either ſubſtantive denote an object which is not obſerved to attend every object that may be denoted by the other, then either ſubſtantive will contract the extent of the ſignification of the other, by being made to depend upon each other by the ſign of this caſe; but if the one object is obſerved to attend every other object denoted by the other ſubſtantive, it will anſwer no purpoſe to make the name of the former object depend upon that of the latter, either by the means of the ſign "*of*," or by any other ſign. Thus we may ſay "*a houſe of* "*ſtone*," or "*the ſtone of a houſe*;" for a particular kind of houſe will be denoted by the firſt expreſſion, and a particular ſort or parcel of ſtone by the ſecond. We may alſo ſay "*the door or* "*windows of a houſe*," which will diſtinguiſh the door or windows ſpoke of from the door and windows of a ſhip's cabbin, and from other ſorts of doors and windows. But it is to no purpoſe to ſay "*a houſe of a door*," or *of windows*;" becauſe every houſe is ſuppoſed to have a door and windows in it.

It is uſually laid down as a rule for the conſtruction of ſubſtantives by this caſe, that they muſt ſignify different things or objects, which are united by the means of the genitive caſe; and it is true, that the ſubſtantives, joined by either form of the caſe, are much the moſt frequently the names of different objects. This comes to paſs from the nature of the pairs of correſponding ſtates, denoted by the correſpondent active and paſſive forms of the ſame verb; for one of theſe ſtates is much the moſt frequently obſerved

ſerved in one object, and the other ſtate in another object. But they may be both in one object, and frequently are ſo; and when this happens (as in the uſe of reciprocals) two names of the ſame object may be joined by the means of the genitive caſe. This appears in the expreſſions, "*an injurer—an extoller—a ſerver* "*—of himſelf:*" for in theſe inſtances, the ſame perſon is at once "*the object injuring—extolling—ſerving,*" and "*the object* "*injured—extolled—ſerved.*"

Hence, in ſome few inſtances, we find a name of ſpecies and a proper name, which are on many occaſions either of them applied to denote one and the ſame object, united by the ſign of this caſe; as, "*the city of London—of York,*" "*the town of Hull* "*—of Newcaſtle,*" "*the palace of Whitehall,*" &c.; but in this mode of conception, "*the city*" is conceived to be the whole limit, within which the buildings and ſtreets, called "*London*" and "*York,*" are comprehended, as "*the town*" is conceived to be the limit comprehending the building and ſtreets of "*Hull*" and "*Newcaſtle;*" and "*the palace*" is conceived to comprehend the courts, gardens, &c. belonging to the building called "*Whitehall:*" and in this mode of conception, "*the object com-* "*prehending*" is referred to "*the object comprehended*" by the ſign "*of,*" according to the general rule, although on other occaſions the words "*London—York—Hull—Newcaſtle,*" or other proper names, may be reſpectively applied to denote the whole limits of London, York, or any other city; or of Hull, Newcaſtle, or any other town; or of Whitehall, or any other palace. Cuſtom is divided, as to the application of the proper names of rivers by the ſign "*of*;" for we ſometimes ſay, "*the river of Thames* "*—of Severn,*" and ſometimes, "*the river Thames—Se-* "*vern,*" &c.: in the firſt manner of expreſſion, the river has been conceived to denote the bed or channel, and the proper names only the water or ſtream; ſo that the river is "*the object* "*containing,*" and the Thames, Severn, &c. "*the object con-* "*tained;*" and under this mode of conception, the ſign "*of*" is

is applied according to the general rule: but in the ſecond manner of expreſſion, both the word river, and the proper names, "*Thames—Severn*," are conceived to denote the whole of one and the ſame object, without any pair of correlative ſtates intervening, and conſequently the names are joined by mere appoſition, without the mediation of any ſign.

The other inſtances in which two names of one and the ſame object appear in conſtruction by the ſign "*of*," occur only in the ludicrous, or familiar ſtile: thus Mr. Pope ſays, "*allow* "*him but his play-thing of a pen.*" *i. e.* which is made of a pen; and ſo the expreſſions, "*a jewel of a man*," "*a brute of a fellow.*"

I have hitherto conſidered the ſign "*of*" as it is uſed in conſtruction with two ſubſtantives: but it is likewiſe uſed to connect ſubſtantives in dependence upon adjectives.

This application of the ſign depends upon the ſame principles, as the application of it depends, when uſed to connect ſubſtantives; for the reference by the ſign is occaſioned by a ſubſtantive contained in the adjective; thus, "*tall of ſtature—ſtu-* "*dious of elegance—fond of power*," are only "*tallneſs of ſtature* "*—ſtudy of elegance—fondneſs of power*" made adjectives; and ſo of many other inſtances of like conſtruction.

There are a kind of adjectives, called nouns partitive, to which the names of aggregate ſpecies, above ſpoke of, or the names of any ſpecies, or of individuals of ſpecies, if they are conceived to contain in them ſeveral portions, or ſubdiviſions, are referred, on many occaſions, by the ſign "*of:*" "*all—ſome—both—either* "*—neither—much—many—any—little—a little—few—a few*," &c. as likewiſe adjectives of the comparative and ſuperlative degree, are uſed with ſubſtantives in this kind of conſtruction. The relative pronouns, "*whoſoever—whichſoever—whatſoever*;" and the interrogative pronouns, "*who*" and "*which*," with "*whether*"

"*whether*" and "*ſuch*;" and ſeveral other words, which are uſually called indefinites in grammar, take this ſign before a ſubſtantive in dependence upon them.

As, "*all—ſome—any of this company*," "*fewer—more—the moſt of this company*," "*whoſoever of this company*," "*ſuch of "this company as can do ſo or ſo*," "*who of this company can do ſo "or ſo?*" &c.

This kind of conſtruction is only an expeditious manner of expreſſion, which takes for granted, that both the ſpeaker and hearer knows of what objects the aggregate is compoſed, that is mentioned by a noun depending on the ſign "*of*," and which leaves the mind to ſupply a ſubſtantive name of one of theſe objects. Thus, the firſt inſtance above is equivalent to "*all the per-"ſons—ſome perſons—any perſons of this company*;" and ſo of other inſtances.

The reaſon why theſe adjectives and pronouns can be thus applied, and not others, is that they expreſs certain circumſtances which may attend the individuals of any object that conſiſts of ſeveral individuals; and therefore the mind is left to ſupply the individuals, ſo as to ſuit any aggregate object that is mentioned with the ſign "*of*" before the name of it; for of whatſoever kind theſe individuals may be, the circumſtances denoted by the adjectives, or indefinites, above mentioned, may be applied to ſuch individuals. This comes to paſs from the nature of names of ſpecies, and of that of nouns of multitude; for were not one and the ſame name applicable to many individual objects, there could be no ſuch words as "*any—every—many—ſome*," &c. in language.

SECTION XVII.

Of the application of the ſign "of" *in conſtruction with verbs.*

AS every verb whatſoever denotes a ſtate which may communicate immediately with ſome object denoted by a ſubſtantive, and this by mere poſition of the verb in dependence upon the ſubſtantive; there is no occaſion to uſe any ſign or prepoſition to particularize the mode of attention or operation, by which the mind carries any verbal ſtate, either active or paſſive, into the name of an object with which either the active or paſſive verb immediately communicates. In like manner, when a verb tranſitive is expreſſed, there is no occaſion for any ſign or prepoſition in the Engliſh to direct the mind to underſtand the paſſive ſtate correſponding with that of the tranſitive verb, and to place an object denoted by a ſubſtantive in that ſtate; for the mere poſition of the ſubſtantive after the tranſitive verb is a direction to the mind to perform this operation, by the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of this language. But when this is done, the connexion can be carried no farther by the means of the correſponding pairs of ſtates contained in the ſignification of the verb itſelf; for theſe pairs of ſtates are already applied; the one being conſidered as in the object on the name of which the verb immediately depends, and the correſponding ſtate in the object the name of which depends immediately upon the verb. If the paſſive form of a verb tranſitive is uſed, and a noun ſubſtantive is placed in dependence on it by the ſign "*by*," the active correſponding ſtate is applied to the object denoted by ſuch ſubſtantive, and the connexion can be carried no farther by means of ſuch correſponding active ſtate. As for verbs neuter, they cannot be carried on to any object, by ſupplying a correſponding ſtate, and placing ſuch object in it; becauſe theſe pairs of ſtates

which

which are conceived to belong to verbs tranſitive, are not conceived to belong to verbs neuter.

Yet verbs tranſitive muſt be carried on in the application of language, to other objects beſides thoſe which have ſtates in them immediately correſponding with theſe verbs; and likewiſe verbs neuter muſt be carried on to objects in dependence upon them; becauſe the ſtates denoted by verbs neuter may be conſidered as affecting other objects beſides thoſe in which the ſtates themſelves are obſerved to have their exiſtence.

In order therefore to continue the connective power of the tranſitive verb beyond the object which immediately depends upon it, and likewiſe to add ſuch connective power to the verb neuter, it is manifeſt that additional connective circumſtances muſt be conveyed into ſuch verbs, and theſe of different ſorts, according as the nature or ſituation of the objects depending upon the ſame verb, are under different circumſtances of connexion with either of the correſponding ſtates of ſuch verb. Thus in the expreſſion, "*John borrowing money of James*," John is "*the object borrow-*"*ing*," and money is "*the object borrowed*;" and this connexion between "*John*" and "*the money*" is determined by the two ſimple correſponding ſtates, "*borrowing*" and "*borrowed.*" But if the connexion between "*the money*" and "*James*" be conſidered; as likewiſe the connexion between "*James*" and "*John*;" the money is "*the object borrowed of James*," and James is "*the* "*object borowed of by John*;" which is to ſay, that the ſtate, "*borrowed*," is conſidered as a ſtate of remotion or forſaking, and that James is the object whence this ſtate is eſtimated.

Almoſt all the verbs neuter in Engliſh admit of paſſive forms, when additional connective circumſtances are taken into them; as, "*to think of—to be thought of*," "*to ſtand in—to be ſtood* "*in*," &c.

The connective circumſtances which are to be thus united with verbs, are all given notice of by prepoſitions, and the prepoſition "*of*" is uſed in Engliſh to give notice of the exiſtence of certain ſorts of theſe circumſtances along with certain ſorts of verbal ſtates. There is no danger of ambiguity in applying the ſame ſign, which is uſed to connect ſubſtantives when under any kind of correlation, as a notice of the exiſtence of certain ſorts of connective ſtates only, when this ſign is placed in dependence upon verbs; for the different ſorts of conſtruction determine the different meaning of the ſign in the two different applications of it, in the ſame manner as ſeveral verbs and ſubſtantives, which are the very ſame words both as to ſpelling and ſound, have yet very different meanings, which can only be determined by the difference of conſtruction in which they are placed on different occaſions.

The mode of contemplation, or eſtimation, which is made the characteriſtic, attending upon all the connexions denoted by the ſign "*of*," when in conſtruction with verbs; is conceived to be that by which the mind carries on its attention from a verbal ſtate to an object *out of which* ſomething is deduced by that ſtate. Hence the following ſorts of verbs are found in conſtruction with ſubſtantives depending on them by this ſign.

1. Verbs of "*making—framing—compoſing*," and ſuch like, require the ſign "*of*" before the name of the material, out of which "*the making—framing*," &c. is conceived to deduce ſome other thing; as, "*made—framed—compoſed of timber—of* "*clay*," &c.

2. Verbs denoting the exertion of the intellectual or diſcurſive powers of the mind, ſuch as "*to think—to ſpeak—to hear* "*—to tell*," &c. require the ſign "*of*" before the name of the ſubject, out of which that which is "*thought—ſpoken*," &c. is deduced; as, "*to think ſo or ſo of ſuch an affair—to hear or tell* "*ſuch*

" *ſuch a ſtory of ſuch a man.*" This ſenſe of the ſign may be expreſſed by the word " *concerning.*"

3. Verbs of " *accuſing—condemning—convicting—convincing,*" &c. require this ſign before the name of the " *crime—fault—* " *error,*" &c. whence the " *accuſation—conviction,*" &c. is to be deduced.

4. Verbs of " *receiving—buying—borrowing—begging,*" or of any kind of getting which is not attended with compulſion or fraud, require the ſign " *of*" before the name of the object whence any thing is got by the means of theſe verbal ſtates; as, " *to take—win—earn—procure—ſuch a thing of ſuch a man.*"

5. But verbs of " *robbing—cheating,*" or of any kind of getting attended with compulſion or fraud, require the ſign " *of*" before the name of that which is got from the object which is robbed or defrauded; as, " *to rob—plunder—deprive—trick—a* " *perſon of ſuch a thing.*"

Only the verbs, " *to ſteal—to pilfer,*" and ſome few others, require the ſign " *from*" before the object whence any thing is got by ſtealing; as, " *to ſteal ſuch a thing from ſuch a perſon or* " *place.*"

6. Verbs of lineal deſcent require the ſign " *of*" before the name of the " *family, ſtock, houſe* or *lineage,*" whence, or out of which, the deſcent is conſidered as proceeding; as, " *to* " *come—to be derived of ſuch kindred—parents—race,*" &c.

The reciprocal pronouns, " *himſelf—herſelf—itſelf,*" frequently depend upon a verb by the ſign " *of.*" This conſtruction is uſed, when the power which occaſions the verbal ſtate is conceived to proceed from the object, on the name of which the verb depends, whilſt the effect or conſequence of the ſtate appears

pears in the ſame object; as, "*ſuch a man did or ſaid this or* "*that of himſelf*," *i. e.* of his own motion; "*the glaſs broke of* "*itſelf*," *i. e.* without the intervention of any other agent.

The ſtates, "*choice—neceſſity*," and ſome others, are placed after verbs by the ſign "*of*," to denote that the verbal ſtate is deduced from or out of theſe ſtates denoted by ſubſtantives; as, "*he does it of choice—of neceſſity*," &c.

The ſign "*of*" was much uſed formerly to refer the ſtate denoted by a verb paſſive, to the ſource or agent whence the ſtate proceeds; as, "*leſt a more honourable man than thou be bidden* "*of him*," New Teſtament. But the ſign "*by*" is now conſtantly uſed for this reference; ſo that the clauſe above in modern Engliſh would be, "*leſt a more honourable man than thou be* "*bidden by him*;" and ſo of other inſtances.

SECTION XVIII.

Of the dative caſe.

THE noun ſubſtantive, with the ſign "*to*" before it, is conſidered as of this caſe; and the general mode of conception denoted by the ſign, whether placed in dependence upon a ſubſtantive, adjective, or verb, is ſimilar to that by which the mind unites a moving object with the place, or other object whither the motion tends, and at which the moving object arrives.

States of approach, either of "*local motion*," or of "*the at-* "*tention*," or of "*direction*," are of conſequence the moſt general ſtates that require this ſign in dependence upon them. The ſtates of "*adding—giving—inclining—addreſſing—applying* "*—appro-*

" —*appropriating—comparing—proportioning*," &c. which are uſually called acquiſitive ſtates in grammar, are manifeſtly included in the former, and of conſequence are capable of being referred by the ſign " *to*," ſo as to be connected with the name of the object, which they oblige the attention to cloſe with in conſequence of applying them; as, " *to add to a ſtore—addition* " *to a ſtore*," " *to apply to ſuch a ſtudy—application to ſuch a ſtudy* " *—applicable to ſuch a ſtudy*," &c.

The expreſſions of ſuch ſtates as are mentioned above, whether by verbal, ſubſtantive, or adjective forms, equally admit of the ſign " *to*" after them; but the verbs, " *to advantage—to harm* " or *hurt—to injure—to benefit—to profit*," and ſome others, are conſidered as tranſitive ſtates of exertion, and conſequently theſe verbal forms take an accuſative caſe after them.

The ſubſtantives, " *advantage—diſadvantage—benefit—profit* " *—harm*," &c. may be uſed in conſtruction with a ſubſtantive, either in the genitive or dative caſe depending upon them; as, " *an advantage*" or " *diſadvantage of or to ſuch a man*;" but the adjectives which contain ſuch ſubſtantives in their ſignification, require a ſubſtantive in the dative caſe only; as, " *ad-* " *vantageous—diſadvantageous to ſuch a man*," or " *to ſuch a cauſe.*"

A kind of adverbial expreſſions are frequently formed by means of the prepoſition " *to*;" as, " *foot to foot—face to face*," " *an allowance to ſuch a ſum*," " *it muſt be owned to the honour—* " *diſgrace*, &c. *of ſuch a man*," " *a man knows—ſees*, &c. *to his* " *coſt—to the contrary*, &c. *there were to the number of ſo* " *many*," &c. Theſe are elliptical expreſſions, in which a verbal ſtate is underſtood which requires a reference by this ſign; as, " *foot oppoſed to foot*," " *an allowance amounting or extending* " *to ſuch a ſum*," " *tending or directing to the contrary*;" and ſo " *two—*or *ten—to one*," meaning " *two* or *ten*" oppoſed in a wager or compariſon to " *one.*"

SECTION XIX.

Of the accuſative caſe.

THE noun in this caſe is of the ſame grammatic form in Engliſh with the nominative; but the perſonal pronouns, "*I*—*thou*—*he*," &c. and the relative pronoun, "*who*," have particular forms for this caſe different from the nominative; as "*me*—*thee*—*him*—*whom*."

The noun in this caſe is diſtinguiſhed by this certain mark, viz. that the object denoted by it has always in it the participial ſtate that correſponds with the participial ſtate in "*ing*" of ſome verb tranſitive, on which the noun depends. This has been fully ſhewn already in what is ſaid of the nature of the ſigns of the caſes of nouns in general.

The Latin and Greek languages have particular grammatic forms for almoſt all nouns in this caſe; which forms give notice that the object denoted by the noun has the paſſive ſtate in it correſponding with the active ſtate of ſome verb tranſitive that is mentioned in the ſentence. This notice obliges the mind to look for ſuch verb, in order to take the ſtate correſponding with that contained in its ſignification, and to place the object denoted by the noun in this caſe, in ſuch correſponding ſtate.

The grammatic form of the caſe gives an opportunity, in theſe languages, of placing the noun under ſuch form, in any part of the ſentence; ſo that the noun in this caſe is often mentioned firſt, and the verb on which it depends concludes the period. But ſo long as ſuch verb remains unmentioned,

tioned, ſo long the operation which the ſign of the caſe directs, remains unperformed, and of conſequence the preciſe ſenſe of the ſign continues ſo long ſuſpended. It is therefore a defect of perſpicuity in theſe languages, that the noun in the accuſative caſe does not follow the verb, on which it depends, as cloſe as poſſible; for the very people who ſpoke the languages muſt have been obliged to put them in this order in their own minds, before they could comprehend any ſentence which was not very commonly and conſtantly uſed.

The ſame may likewiſe be obſerved concerning the placing the noun in the nominative caſe otherwiſe than before the verb that depends upon it; for till ſuch caſe is mentioned, the connective part of the ſignification of the verb which depends upon it, remains in ſuſpence.

Now ſurely it may juſtly be queſtioned, whether any acceſſion of harmony, or gracefulneſs of cadence, can make up for the defect of perſpicuity occaſioned in theſe languages, by placing the words, ſo far out of the order in which they muſt be placed in the mind in order to comprehend the meaning of them, as the words are placed in the moſt approved authors who have written in theſe languages.

Dr. Wallace will not allow that there are diverſity of caſes in Engliſh ſubſtantives. But this is only diſputing about the name: for the force of the caſes of the Greek and Latin ſubſtantives is, and muſt be, in every language whatſoever; and the proceedings of the mind, when it applies a ſubſtantive in different kinds of connexions, muſt be diſtinguiſhed into different ſorts for the purpoſes of teaching. Now although the ſign of the accuſative caſe in Engliſh is uſually mere poſition after a tranſitive verb; yet this poſition is a ſign to direct the mind to proceed in a particular manner with the words connected in ſuch poſition;

and the termination of this caſe in Latin and Greek is no more than a direction to the ſame effect.

SECTION XX.

Of the vocative caſe.

A NOUN, with the particle "*O!*" before it, is conſidered as of this caſe; or without the particle, if what is ſaid to be addreſſed to the object denoted by the noun. The demonſtrative circumſtance therefore attending the addreſſing of what is ſaid, being added to any name, proper or appellative, makes the object denoted by that name, capable of being expreſſed by the noun in this caſe.

The object thus diſtinguiſhed, is of itſelf a compleat object of the intellect; for the mind of the hearer can place it in the circumſtance of "*being ſpoken to*," by actually perceiving the demonſtrative act of the ſpeaker, and without any word being uſed on which the noun in this caſe muſt depend; and therefore an object, when expreſſed by a noun in this caſe, may alone be the ſubject of a ſentence; and is frequently ſo in commands and entreaties; as in the inſtances, "*John, go to ſuch a place—O! Sir*, "*do me this favour*," &c. Hence this caſe is in effect only a nominative caſe of the ſecond perſon, and is therefore uſually excluded out of the number of oblique caſes, which muſt be uſed in dependence on ſome noun or verb.

SECTION XXI.

Of the ablative caſe.

THE ſix prepoſitions, "*from—by—with—in—for* and "*than*," are uſually conſidered as ſigns of this caſe; nevertheleſs, "*than*" is a redditive conjunction rather than a prepoſition, as will appear when it is conſidered in particular.

"FROM."

This ſign denotes a mode of eſtimation, which in its general nature is ſimilar to that by which the mind refers a moving object to the place, or other object, whence the motion is directed.

The mode of attention denoted by this ſign is of conſequence the reverſe of that denoted by the ſign "*to*;" and therefore all kinds of ſtates which the mind can conſider, as forſaking one object and approaching another, may be referred to the object forſaken by the ſign "*from*," and to the object approached by the ſign "*to*;" and this, whether the ſtates be denoted by nouns or verbs; as, "*a journey from ſuch a place to ſuch a place*;" "*a continuance from ſuch a time to ſuch a time*," "*to continue from* "*ſuch a time to ſuch a time.*"

Such ſtates, as "*freedom—deliverance—exemption—abſtinence* "*—reſtraint*," &c. are uſually referred by this ſign to the objects whence theſe ſtates are conceived to remove or with-hold the objects in which the ſtates are obſerved; as, "*freedom from* "*labour—exemption from tribute*," &c. "*free from labour—* "*exempt from tribute*," "*to free men from labour—to exempt* "*them from tribute*," &c.

By an elliptical conſtruction, this ſign is placed before ſeveral adverbs and prepoſitions, which relate chiefly to place and time;

as, " *from above—from afar—from beneath—from below—from* " *behind—from before—from far—from high—from on high—from* " *without—from within—from amidſt—from among—from beyond* " *—from forth—from off—from out of—from under,*" and ſome others. That is to ſay, " *from ſome place above—from ſome time* " *or place before.*" &c.

" BY."

The principal uſe of this ſign has been already explained, viz. when placed after a verb of the paſſive form, to direct the mind to ſupply the active ſtate correſponding with the ſtate of the paſſive verb, and to place the object denoted by the ſubſtantive, which depends upon the ſign, in ſuch active correſponding ſtate.

Thus in the expreſſions, " *John ſtruck—injured—hated—by* " *James—by the multitude—by himſelf*;" " *James—the multitude* " *—or John himſelf*" is " *the object ſtriking—injuring—hating,*" or " *the ſtriker—injurer—hater,*" whilſt John is " *the object* " *ſtruck—injured—hated.*"

The ſign " *by*" is likewiſe uſed to refer verbal ſtates, either of the active or paſſive form, to the names of objects which are made uſe of in regulating or conducting the ſtates; as, " *to live—* " *act—proceed by ſuch a direction*;" " *to build by a plan—to judge* " *by circumſtances.*"

Hence many ſorts of nouns expreſſing the order, courſe, or method, uſed in regulating or conducting continued action, take this ſign before them; as, " *to advance by companies—by pairs—* " *by dozens*;" " *to ſell* or *buy by the ell—by the ounce*;" " *to travel* " *by ſea—by land—by night—by day*;" " *to ſit by one's ſelf.*"

The ſame noun is frequently twice repeated for this purpoſe, and the ſign " *by*" placed between the two nouns; as, " *to ex-* " *amine an object limb by limb—point by point*;" " *to conſider a book* " *page*

" *page by page—chapter by chapter;*" " *to ſearch a place houſe by* " *houſe;*" " *to pay ſums year by year,*" &c. Theſe are a kind of adverbial expreſſions of order.

In like manner the expreſſions, " *by ſuch a time—by the time* " *that ſuch a thing is done—by this,*" without the word " *time;*" and others of like conſtruction, are a kind of adverbs of time, denoting that the coming of the time ſpoken of, is when ſomething elſe happens that is mentioned in the ſentence.

The ſign "*by*" is alſo uſed in ſolemn forms of adjuration or earneſt entreaty, and is prefixed to the name of ſome object for which the perſon adjured or entreated is conceived to entertain the greateſt regard; as, " *I adjure thee by the living God;*" " *I* " *beſeech you by all that is dear to you,*" &c.

" WITH."

This ſign implies " *concomitancy;*" but, like all the other ſigns, leaves the mind to ſpecify what it implies in general, by attending to the nature of the ſtates and objects denoted by the verbs and nouns, with which it is placed in conſtruction.

All verbs active denoting ſuch ſtates as admit of an inſtrument, being uſed in effecting what is produced or accompliſhed by the ſtate, as likewiſe the paſſive forms correſpondent to ſuch verbs active, take the name of the inſtrument in dependence upon them by the ſign " *with;*" as, " *to work—to be wrought with a* " *tool,*" " *to write—to be written with a pen.*"

Some verbs neuter take the ſign " *with*" in the like conſtruction; as, " *to point with a rod—to look at an object with a tele-* " *ſcope:*" but much the greateſt number of verbs neuter, take the ſign " *by*" after them in this reference; as, " *to fall by the* " *ſword—to periſh by the hand of an enemy,*" &c.

States

States of "*contending—ſtriving—vying*," and ſuch like, whether expreſſed by nouns or verbs, are referred to the object which is the oppoſite, or antagoniſt, in the ſtate, by the ſign "*with*;" as, "*a ſtruggle—conteſt with ſuch a man*," "*to ſtruggle* "*—to contend with ſuch a man*," &c.

The ſtate of concomitancy which attends all ſituations of mutual intercourſe, is given notice of by this ſign after any expreſſion, whether noun or verb, of ſuch ſituation; as, "*converſa-* "*tion with ſuch a man*," "*to converſe—live—eat—drink with ſuch* "*people.*"

The ſtates of "*ſharing—partaking—dividing—mixing—* "*compounding*," and others of a like nature, take this ſign to connect the ſtate with one of the objects that is equally concerned with others in ſuch ſtates; as, "*to ſhare—partake of—mix ſuch* "*a thing with others*," &c.

Some particular quality or circumſtance conſidered as a concomitant of another ſtate, is frequently united with ſuch ſtate by the ſign "*with*;" as, "*to go with ſpeed—to labour with diligence.*"

The Engliſh adverbs which end in "*ly*," uſually expreſs the quality or circumſtance contained in their ſignification under the ſame connexion as that which is denoted by this ſign; thus, "*to go with ſpeed*" is of the ſame import with "*to go ſpeedily*," "*to labour with diligence*" with "*to labour diligently*;" and ſo of other inſtances.

The ſtates of "*being ſatisfied—diſſatisfied—pleaſed—diſpleaſed* "*—wearied—refreſhed—loaded—beſet*," and ſeveral others, are referred by the ſign "*with*" to the name of the object which is conceived to be a kind of adjunct to the ſtate; as, "*tired with* "*labour—pleaſed with trifles—beſet with danger.*"

"*With*"

"*With*" has alſo a ſignification denoting the objects upon or amongſt which ſome other object has an influence; as, "*to have* "*intereſt—credit—authority*, &c. *with ſuch a man—with ſuch a* "*company*."

"But intereſt is her name with men below." *Dryden.*

i. e. amongſt men below.

As "*with*" in all its ſenſes implies ſome kind of concomitancy, it is ſometimes uſed to expreſs ſuch a ſtate eſtimated by the life or duration of ſome particular object; as,

"With her they flouriſh'd, and with her they die." *Pope.*

Sometimes "*with*" is uſed to give notice, that as ſoon as one thing came to paſs, another alſo was done; as,

"With this he pointed to his face." *Dryden.*

i. e. as ſoon as this came to paſs he pointed, &c.

"IN."

The general mode of attention given notice of by this ſign, is ſimilar to that which is uſed when the ſituation of one object is determined by another that extends either on all ſides, or on ſeveral ſides of it.

As, "*a man in a houſe—a horſe in a field—this happened in* "*ſuch a month—year*," &c.

But we commonly ſay, "*on ſuch a day—and at ſuch a time.*"

All ſorts of ſtates which can be ſuppoſed to continue for a time, may be united by this ſign with the object which is conceived to have paſſed the beginning of ſuch time, and not to have come to the end of it at the time referred to, under the influence of theſe ſtates; as, "*to be in joy—ſorrow—proſperity—* "*adverſity*," &c. "*to have been in pain—ſickneſs—tranſport—in* "*arms—in a confederacy—in a conſpiracy*," &c.

Any "*object contained*" may be referred to "*the object containing*" by this ſign, as well as by the ſign "*of*;" for the ſtate of "*being* "*contained*" may be conſidered as one ſort of "*being encompaſſed.*" Hence the part is frequently referred to its whole, and the accident to its ſubject, by this ſign, as well as by "*of*;" as, "*a chap-* "*ter of* or *in ſuch a book*;" "*the ſpirit—virtue—ſenſe of* or *in ſuch* "*a man.*"

This ſign is frequently uſed in expreſſions of ſome rate or proportion, when that rate is conſidered as analogous to ſome two numbers or quantities, the leſs of which is contained in the bigger; as, "*five in the hundred—ſixpence in the pound.*"

Some expreſſions equivalent to adverbs are alſo formed by this ſign; as, "*in all likelihood—in reaſon—in all reaſon—in juſtice.*"

In ſolemn forms of denunciation, the name of the object on the power or influence whereof the effect of what is denounced is conceived to depend, has this ſign prefixed to it; as, "*in the name* "*of God let us do ſo or ſo.*"

"——In the power of us, the tribunes,
"We baniſh him." *Shakeſp. Coriolanus.*

"FOR."

This ſign directs to "*the final cauſe*," that is to ſay, to the object which rational agents conſider in ſuch a mode of eſtimation, that they are influenced to put themſelves or others into particular ſtates on account thereof. The ſame ſign likewiſe directs to any object, "*on account of which*," ſome object or ſtate appears to be ſuitable or unſuitable, ready or unready, &c. The name of any quality, ſtate, or circumſtance, on account of which objects become regarded or diſregarded, approved or cenſured, &c. likewiſe appears with the ſign "*for*" before it; and in general, whatſoever is conſidered as "*the reaſon why*" things are ſo or ſo, may

may be placed in dependence upon this ſign. Inſtances of the ſign applied in the firſt of the ſignifications above mentioned, appear in ſuch phraſes as the following; "*to work for hire—to* "*fight for honour—to ſerve for another—to go for ſuch a perſon* "*or thing—to ſtand for a price.*" &c.

In the ſecond ſignification, in ſuch phraſes as "*convenient—* "*inconvenient for the ſummer—for the winter—for the ſea,*" "*advantageous—diſadvantageous for ſuch a purpoſe—prepared—* "*unprepared for ſuch an event,*" &c.

In the third ſignification, in the phraſes, "*praiſed—admired* "*for goodneſs—gracefulneſs,*" &c.; "*contemned—deteſted for* "*cruelty,*" &c.; "*remembered—remarked for ſingularity,*" &c.

The fourth ſignification may be conſidered as including all the foregoing, and extending to many other inſtances. Thus the price of a thing may be conſidered as "*the reaſon why*" the thing is parted with, and the thing may be conſidered as "*the reaſon* "*why*" the price is given. Hence the expreſſions, "*to buy or ſell* "*ſuch a thing for ſo much—to pay ſo much for ſuch a thing,*" &c. Any thing laid by way of wager may alſo be conſidered as "*the* "*reaſon why*" that is inſiſted upon to be ſo or ſo, on which the wager is laid. Hence come the expreſſions, "*ſuch a thing is or* "*will be ſo and ſo for ſuch a ſum;*" as likewiſe expreſſions of the following form; "*for all his cunning he has been out-* "*witted—I cannot do it for my life.*"

"A paltry ring, whoſe poeſy was
"For all the world like Cutler's poetry." *Shakeſpear.*

i. e. though all his cunning has been at ſtake; though my life were at ſtake; as like as if all the world were at ſtake on the exactneſs of the likeneſs.

An object is frequently conſidered as of a particular ſpecies, and proceeded with in a particular manner on account of its

being of ſuch a ſpecies. The ſign "*for*" is prefixed to the name of the ſpecies, or ſometimes to the proper name of an object, having properties in it, "*on account of which*" an object denoted by another name is conceived or treated in a particular manner; as, "*I took you for ſuch a perſon—let him go for a rogue—he dies* "*for a deſerter.*"

The adverbial expreſſions, "*for me—as for you—as for ſuch* "*a perſon or thing;*" as likewiſe, "*for certain—for ſure—for* "*dead,*" &c. are formed on a mode of conception ſimilar to that on which the expreſſions laſt mentioned above are formed. For the perſon denoted by "*me—you,*" or the perſon or thing denoted by any other name, is conſidered in ſome particular reſpect when ſuch name is placed in this kind of conſtruction; and this reſpect is conſidered as the reaſon why the perſon or thing is proceeding, or treated in ſome particular manner. The ſtate, "*on account of which,*" ſome object is affected or regarded in a particular manner, is frequently underſtood, whilſt ſome noun ſubſtantive, with the ſign "*for*" before it, correſponds with what is underſtood; as, "*I am for you,*" *i. e.* ready or prepared for you; "*it is for kings—for miniſters to conſult the public good,*" *i. e.* to conſult the public good is "*fit—proper—right, for* "*kings,*" &c.; "*Jove was for Venus—Ariſtotle is for poetic* "*juſtice—he is all for ſuch a thing,*" *i. e.* diſpoſed in favour towards it.

An object which is the end or purpoſe of whatſoever is entered upon, may take the ſign "*for*" before it under ſuch conſideration. Hence the name of a place whither it is propoſed to go, frequently depends upon this ſign; as, "*we ſailed* "*for Genoa——,*" *Addiſon*; "*whither are you for?*" &c. The ſign "*for,*" when placed with names of time, bears a meaning different from that which it bears when placed with other kinds of nouns, ſeeing it has the ſignification of "*during,* "*or quite through,*" the period of time that is mentioned; as,

as, "*hired for life*—or *for the term of life*—*engaged for a year*—*borrowed for a month*," &c.

"THAN."

This particle is only uſed in expreſſions of compariſon in which there are two parts: being prefixed to that part of the expreſſion which contains in it the object or ſtate, with reſpect to which the exceſs or diminution is eſtimated; as, "*John is more or leſs ſkilful than James*—*I never was more or leſs pleaſed than at ſuch a time or place*—*he is wiſer than to do or ſay ſo.*"

In the firſt of theſe expreſſions it is manifeſt, that there are three affirmations; for it is aſſerted, that James has ſome degree of ſkill as well as John; and upon comparing the degrees of ſkill which each of them have, it is then aſſerted, that John's degree exceeds James's.

And ſo in the ſecond expreſſion it is aſſerted, that the perſon denoted by "*I*" was pleaſed in ſome degree at the particular time referred to; it is alſo aſſerted, that the ſame perſon has been pleaſed in other degrees at other times; and then it is aſſerted that none of theſe degrees were greater or leſs than the degree ſpecified by the particular time in which it was perceived.

There are three aſſertions alſo implied in the third inſtance. For it is ſuppoſed, that "*to do ſo*" ſhews want of wiſdom in a certain degree in any one who "*does ſo*;" then it is aſſerted, that the perſon denoted by "*he*" has wiſdom in a certain degree; and from theſe two degrees compared together, it is inferred, in the laſt place, that the degree of wiſdom which the perſon has, places him beyond the want of the degree firſt ſuppoſed.

There are ſeveral verbs which denote ſtates that are firſt conveyed to the mind in conſequence of a compariſon made between

two objects; ſome exceſs or defect of the one with regard to the other, conſidered as poſſeſſed or ſome way ſhewn, conſtituting the verbal ſtate. This appears in the verbs, "*to excell—to* "*outſtrip—to overtop—to underſell*," and ſeveral others. Theſe verbs may of conſequence connect two objects, ſo as to ſupply the place of the ſign "*than*" by the nature of the ſtates which they reſpectively denote; for the two objects, joined by ſuch a verbal ſtate, are, by ſuch junction, ſhewn each of them as in the ſtate, but in different degrees of it. Thus in the expreſſion, "*virtue excells riches*," the exceſs of the degree of worth obſerved in virtue above the degree of worth obſerved in riches, is attended to; and the ſtate of poſſeſſing ſuch exceſs, is denoted by a verb, and virtue is conſidered as in that verbal ſtate. And hence the expreſſion, "*virtue excells riches*," is equivalent to "*virtue is more excellent than riches*;" *i. e.* to the expreſſion, "*virtue has more excellence in it than riches have.*" Any other expreſſion, formed by one of the above-mentioned verbs, or by other verbs of a like ſignification, may be reſolved in the ſame manner.

When any clauſe, or ſentence, is expreſſed at large, in which the ſign "*than*" is concerned, there are always two verbal ſtates concerned; for it is the poſſeſſion or the exertion, of ſome power or quality by each of the objects compared, that gives occaſion to the compariſon; and this ſtate of poſſeſſion, or exertion, muſt always be denoted by a verb.

If one and the ſame form of the ſame verb (ſuppoſing it to be repeated in each of the members of the clauſe which are joined by "*than*") will expreſs the ſtate of each of the objects which are compared, there is no abſolute occaſion to mention the verb twice. But if one and the ſame form of the ſame verb will not expreſs the ſtate of each of the objects compared; either two different forms of the ſame verb muſt be mentioned, or two different verbs muſt be uſed in the compariſon. Thus the expreſſions, "*John*

"*is*

" *is wiſer—taller—richer than James:* or *leſs wiſe—leſs tall* " *—leſs rich than James*;" if ſet down at large, amount to the expreſſions, " *John is wiſer or leſs wiſe*, &c. *than James is.*" But there is not an abſolute neceſſity that the latter verb " *is*" ſhould be ſet down; becauſe it is taken for granted, that " *the preſent* " *ſtate of being*," both of James and John, is intended to be compared, and that with regard to the degree of wiſdom, &c. which each of them poſſeſſes. But if the ſtate of John is to be compared as it is at one time, with his ſtate as it is at another, or with the ſtate of any object as it is at another time, although it be with regard to the poſſeſſion or the exertion of ſome power or quality, which may be denoted by the ſame name as at different times in each of the objects; either two different forms of the ſame verb, or two different verbs muſt be uſed; as in the inſtances, " *John is more or leſs rich than he has been—than James* " *will be*;" " *John has done more good than you imagine.*"

For in theſe inſtances, the ſtates compared are conceived to exiſt at different times, and this difference of time muſt be expreſſed by different forms, either of the ſame or of different verbs.

If ſome circumſtance, attending two different verbal ſtates, is compared, it is manifeſt that two different verbs muſt be mentioned to denote theſe ſtates; as in the expreſſions, " *John reads* " *more than he underſtands—James writes more than John will* " *read*," &c.

Now in the firſt inſtance, where it is not abſolutely neceſſary that the verb ſhould be repeated, the Latins frequently place the name of the ſecond object in the compariſon in the ablative caſe, and the Greeks in the genitive; as, " *Johannes ſapientior eſt* " *Jacobo—Ιωαννης φρονιμωτερος εστιν Ιακωβου.*" As therefore the Engliſh particle " *than*" ſupplies the power of the reference by the ablative caſe in Latin, in this one inſtance, after words of the

comparative degree, it has been alſo conſidered as the ſign of the ablative caſe.

But it is plain, that "*than*" is in in its nature a redditive conjunction, giving notice of ſome ſecond ſentence expreſſing that, with which ſomething contained in a former ſentence is compared; and if both the ſentences are not expreſſed at length, directing the mind to ſupply them.

This ſhews, that the nature of the ſign of a caſe has been properly aſcertained in what has been ſaid of the ſigns of caſes in general; for it is the particular mode of eſtimation, in which the object "*James*" is to be taken, that is given notice of by the ſign of the ablative caſe in Latin, and by that of the genitive in Greek. But the circumſtance which is to be ſupplied by this mode of eſtimation, cannot be aſcertained, unleſs ſome quality, which may be expreſſed by an adjective, unites with ſome other object beſides James, and that in a different degree, and at the ſame time; and therefore it is to no purpoſe to uſe the mode of eſtimation where there are not materials given, proper to apply it upon.

When both the ſentences are expreſſed at length, containing two expreſſions of the two conceptions which are compared together, the Latins uſed "*quam*," and the Greeks "ἢ," to denote the reference of the one ſentence to the other: or if the names of the objects to be compared are both in the ſame caſe, and one of the ſentences is left to be ſupplied, the words "*quam*," and "ἢ," are alſo uſed to denote the reference; as,

"*Johannes eſt ſapientior quam Jacobus eſt*, or *quam Jacobus*.—
"Ιωαννης ἐστι φρονιμωτερος ἢ Ιακωβος ἐστι, or ἢ Ιακωβος."

I proceed to treat of the articles which are uſually treated of in the practical grammars of moſt languages before noun ſubſtantives; becauſe examples of the declenſions of ſubſtantives cannot

cannot conveniently be given without them. But as their nature and uſe cannot be underſtood, without ſome knowledge of the nature of ſpecies, and of appellative ſubſtantives, to which they properly belong, I have reſerved them for this place.

SECTION XXII.

Of the article.

AS every appellative ſubſtantive is a name applicable to all the individuals of a whole ſpecies, conſidered as one complex object; as alſo to each ſingle individual of the ſpecies; it has been found expedient in many languages to give notice when the appellative is applied in its leſs extenſive ſignifications; and this, by prefixing certain particles to it, denoting that its general ſignification is to be limited in a leſs or greater degree.

The particles which are uſed for this purpoſe in the Engliſh language are, "*a*" or "*an*" and "*the*," which, by the writers on grammar, are called articles.

"*A*" or "*an*" is called the indefinite article. They are both of the ſame ſignification, only differing in this, that "*a*" is prefixed to ſuch ſubſtantives as begin with a conſonant, "*an*" to ſuch as begin with a vowel, or an "*h*" ſounded ſoftly; as, "*a man—a horſe—an angel—an hour.*" "*The*" is called the definite article, and is equally applicable to appellatives that begin with a vowel or a conſonant; as, "*the man—the horſe—the angel—the hour.*"

As both the articles imply, that the ſpeaker intends to uſe the appellative ſubſtantive to which they are prefixed, with ſome degree of limitation: whenſoever ſuch ſubſtantive is uſed in its moſt extenſive ſignification, it is uſually applied without any

any article, either indefinite or definite, prefixed to it; as, "Man, when conſidered in himſelf, is a very wretched being." *Addiſon, Spectat.* 441.

i. e. mankind in general, when &c.

But it is to be obſerved, that the moſt extenſive ſignification of the names of many ſpecies, when theſe names are uſed without an article, is, by the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of this language, given notice of by placing the name of the ſpecies in the plural number.

The names of the ſeveral ſpecies of brute animals are thus uſed; as, "*horſes, oxen, ſheep are uſeful creatures.*" Alſo of trees, when not ſpoken of as cut for timber; as, "*oaks, elms, baſles,* "&c. *grow here.*" Alſo of plants which are named from their flowers; as, "*violets, primroſes, lilies, are here planted toge-* "*ther,*" *i. e.* the plants on which thoſe flowers grow. And of the plants which produce the ſeveral kinds of pulſe; as, "*beans,* "*peaſe, vetches, grow in this field.*"

Alſo the names of the works of art, if the names of their ſpecies have the plural number; as, "*towns, houſes, inſtruments,* "*and utenſils are great conveniencies of life.*"

On the contrary, proper names, when applied as ſuch, *i. e.* ſo as to denote particular individuals, admit of no farther limitation, and conſequently take no article before them.

Of the indefinite article in particular.

THE indefinite article gives notice that the ſubſtantive to which it is prefixed, denotes one object of its ſpecies conſidered as in ſome ſtate, ſituation, or circumſtance, in which other objects of the ſpecies are or may be equally concerned; as, "*a ſon* "*of James*" denotes that the ſpeaker means "*one ſon of James,*" but

but is ſenſible that there are, or may be, more ſons than one who ſtand in the ſame relation to James. So "*a man who came* "*to-day*," denotes only one man who came to-day; but gives notice, that there may be alſo other men who came to-day, beſides the man that is ſpoken of.

There are two principal caſes which occur in the uſe of this article.

For either the ſpecies may be aſcertained, to which the individual object belongs, to the name of which this article is prefixed, whilſt the object itſelf is not aſcertained.

Or an individual may be aſcertained, or ſome ſpecies in which it is found may be known, and the name of ſome other ſpecies, to which it equally belongs, not aſcertained.

1. In the firſt caſe the article may bear the ſenſe of "*every one*," or "*any one*," or "*ſome one*," or of "*one not particularly known* "*or obſerved*," according as the nature of the ſtate or condition is, in which the indefinite individual of the known ſpecies is conſidered.

If the ſtate or condition in which the indefinite individual is conſidered be ſuch as is common to all the individuals of the known ſpecies, they are of conſequence all of them in the ſame ſtate at the ſame time with any one individual of the ſpecies. Therefore in ſuch a caſe, any one may repreſent all or every one of the ſpecies; as in the following inſtance,

"Why ſhould a dog, a horſe, a rat, have life,
"And thou no breath at all?" *Shakeſp. Lear.*

i. e. every dog, every horſe, &c. or all dogs, all horſes, &c.

If the ſtate or condition in which the indefinite individual is, be ſuch as every individual of the ſpecies is capable of being in, but is not always or habitually in, then the indefinite individual may be "*any one*" object of the known ſpecies; as,

"——That a brother ſhould
"Be ſo perfidious!" *Shakeſp. Tempeſt.*

i. e. that any brother &c.

As every individual of the known ſpecies is ſuppoſed to be capable of being in the ſtate mentioned in this inſtance, whilſt no more than one is conceived to be actually in it: if we ſubſtitute in its place a ſtate of ſuch a nature as every individual is capable of being in, and more than one may actually be in, but either all of them or not: in this caſe, "*every*," or "*any*," may either of them be ſubſtituted for the indefinite article; as,

"A reader, who knows the ſtrength of the Engliſh tongue, will
"be amazed," &c. *Addiſon, Spectat. No.* 357.

i. e. every reader, or any reader.

For in this caſe, the mind is at liberty either to make the indefinite object ſtand for every object that is in the ſtate, or for any one that ſhall happen to be in it.

In this caſe, the definite article may be ſubſtituted for the indefinite; as, "*the reader who knows*," &c. The reaſon of this will be given in what is ſaid of the definite article.

If the ſtate is conceived to depend on ſome contingency, or on ſome determination which is not made, but is to be made, the indefinite individual is "*ſome one*" of the known ſpecies; as,

"Diogenes being in queſt of an honeſt man, ſought for him,
"when it was broad day, with a lanthorn and candle."
Spectat. No. 354.

i. e. in queſt of ſome one honeſt man.

If the indefinite individual is ſuppoſed to be determined, but the determinate object to be unknown to, or unobſerved by, thoſe who are converſing about it, any farther than to diſtinguiſh that it is one individual of the known ſpecies; no other word can be ſubſtituted inſtead of the indefinite article. But the ſenſe of it may be expreſſed by "*one of that ſpecies, each of which is* "*called a* ——," and then mentioning the name of the ſpecies; as, "He had ordered one of his ſervants, who was placed be- "hind a ſcreen, to write down their table-talk." *Spectat.* *i. e.* behind one of that ſpecies of things, each of which is called a ſcreen. So "*you ſent a man to me to-day*," *i. e.* one of that ſpecies, each one of which is called a man.

After the words, "*not—ſcarce—hardly*," and other diminutives, this article has the ſignification of "*one*;" as,

"When the butt is out, we will drink water.
"Not a drop before." *Shakeſp. Tempeſt.*

i. e. not one drop.

As alſo in all other expreſſions which ſhew that ſome other number of objects is equally capable, or equally likely to be in ſome ſtate, as only one and no more; as,

"We gave the children an apple or two a-piece."

i. e. one apple or two a-piece.

In all the uſes of the indefinite article which have been mentioned hitherto, the ſpecies of the indefinite object is aſcertained, but the individual object is not ſo.

2. On the contrary, it frequently happens that an individual object is known, whilſt ſome ſpecies, to which it belongs, is

not ſo to the hearer. The indefinite article is uſed in this caſe alſo, being placed before the name of the ſpecies to which the known individual is referred by the ſpeaker, to ſhew that it is one individual among others of that ſpecies; as when one perſon ſhews a thing to another and ſays, "*this is a grammar*," (for inſtance) *i. e.* this is one of the things which have in them that ſet of properties which conſtitute the characteriſtic of the ſpecies grammar.

When an indefinite individual is known to belong to one ſpecies, and is diſcovered by the ſpeaker to have likewiſe in it the ſet of properties which conſtitute the characteriſtic of another ſpecies; the ſpeaker mentions the object by the name of the known ſpecies firſt, and then refers it to the other ſpecies to which he perceives it belongs; prefixing this article to the name of both the ſpecies; as, "*a man is a reaſonable animal.*" Now the ſtate denoted by "*reaſonable animal*" being common to all the individuals of the ſpecies "*man*," all the individuals of the ſpecies are in the ſtate at the ſame time. Therefore, by the firſt inſtance of the former caſe, "*every*" may be here ſubſtituted for the indefinite article ſeeing. Every man is a reaſonable animal; that is, every man is one individual of that ſpecies, each one of which is called "*a reaſonable animal.*"

As this article, in all its acceptations, denotes that the mind conſiders one individual object, but conſiders it as ſomeways equally concerned with others of the ſame ſpecies, it is manifeſt that it cannot be applied to names of the plural number.

Of the definite article in particular.

THE definite article is uſed to give notice that the appellative to which it is prefixed, denotes an object conſidered as in ſome ſtate, ſituation, or circumſtance, by which it is, or may be diſtinguiſhed

ſtinguiſhed from every other object that is denoted by the name of the ſame ſpecies.

An object may be diſtinguiſhed on ſeveral accounts, ſo as to require that this article ſhall be prefixed to the appellative by which it is denoted.

For the diſtinction may ariſe from the manner in which the ſpeaker conceives the object, and chuſes to expreſs it.

Or from ſome fixed relation which it bears to ſome certain object, or to ſome ſpecies of objects.

Or from ſome previous knowledge which the hearer is known, or ſuppoſed, to have of it.

As the mind is at liberty to conſider a whole ſpecies as one complex object, this article is often applied to give notice that the name of the ſpecies denotes ſuch complex object; as,

" The woman is the glory of the man."

i. e. the ſpecies, " *woman is the glory of the ſpecies—man.*"

" The horſe is a noble animal."

i. e. the ſpecies, " *horſe,*" is one of the ſorts contained in the ſpecies, " *noble animal.*"

Seeing " *the glory of the man*" denotes a ſtate common to all women; and " *noble animal*" denotes a ſtate common to all horſes: the indefinite article may be ſubſtituted for the definite article thus applied, by the firſt inſtance given above of the uſe of the indefinite article; as,

" A woman is the glory of a man."

" A horſe is a noble animal."

Or the appellative, in its moſt general ſignification, may be ſubſtituted inſtead of the definite expreſſion; as,

" Woman

" Woman is the glory of man."

Or,

" Women are the glory of men."

" Horſes are noble animals."

If the ſtate is not ſuch as is common to all the individuals of the known ſpecies, but is yet ſuch a ſtate as is, or may be, common to many of them: the mind may conſider all to whom it is common as one definite object, and expreſs it accordingly; as,

" The man who ſays the world was made by chance, is void " of obſervation and judgment."

But in this caſe, either the indefinite article, or the words " *every*" or " *any*," may be ſubſtituted inſtead of the definite article; for this is the ſame caſe with that of the ſecond inſtance of the ſecond caſe of the uſe of the indefinite article; as,

" A man, or any, or every man who ſays" &c.

When the diſtinction of the definite object ariſes from ſome fixed relation which it bears to ſome certain object, or ſort of objects; if the definite object is of the ſingular number, the whole expreſſion will be of the nature of a proper name; as,

" The ſtatue at Charing-Croſs."

" The doctrine of the apoſtles."

If the definite object is of the plural number, it will be one certain ſet contained in the ſpecies, to the name of which the definitive article is prefixed; as,

" The monuments in Weſtminſter abbey."

" The ſayings of the ſeven wiſe men."

When the object is defined by ſome previous knowledge, which the hearer is known, or ſuppoſed, to have of it; this knowledge may ariſe from various circumſtances.

For

For the object may have been preſent to the ſpeaker's ſenſes, or may have been particularly deſcribed to him at ſome particular time, or in ſome particular place. Or ſome known intention may be entertained concerning it; as,

" The horſe which you ſaw in Smithfield—were told of yeſter-
" day—intend to go to ſee to-morrow."

Or it may be ſuch, that the hearer may be ſuppoſed to know it to be the only one, or the only ſet, of its kind; as,

" The king—the duke—the prophets—the apoſtles," meaning
" the preſent king of England—the Duke of Cumberland—the
" prophets of the Old Teſtament—the apoſtles of the New,"
&c.

Ot it may be an object of the ſuperlative degree, of which there can be but one individual, or one ſet, in a ſpecies; as,

" He is the greateſt king in Europe—they were the beſt men of
" the age."

The ſuperlative by "*moſt*" is often uſed with the indefinite article; as, "*a moſt excellent judge*," &c. When the ſuperlative is thus uſed, it means only a very great degree of exceſs, and not the greateſt degree of all. The object may alſo have been mentioned before in the diſcourſe (as is the caſe of the words, "*the object*," in this ſentence) which may give the previous knowledge.

Or, laſtly, the cuſtom of the language may prefix this article to words of certain grammatical forms, to give notice of a particular kind of conception which the words of thoſe forms do not ſo fully denote, when uſed without the article.

This is the uſe which this article is put to, when it ſtands before participles, to diſtinguiſh their objective from their contributive capacity; as, "*the going—the having ſtood*," &c. For an account of theſe capacities of the participles, conſult the account which is given of the verb.

A Spe-

A Speculative Grammar.

BOOK II.

SECTION I.

Of the noun adjective.

NOUN adjectives are the names of abſtract conceptions, ſimilar to thoſe which are denoted by ſubſtantives; only theſe adjective names give expreſs notice, that no principle of ſeparate exiſtence is to be attended to, in whatſoever is denoted by any of them.

As the nature of this part of ſpeech has been explained, in a great meaſure, in what is ſaid of the noun and verb in general, little more remains to be done concerning it, except to ſhew how the mind proceeds in applying an adjective conception, ſo as to incorporate it with ſome other conception, on the name, or expreſſion whereof the adjective depends.

Now it is evident that an adjective never requires the ſign of an oblique caſe, or other prepoſition, to ſhew the nature of its dependence on the word, or expreſſion, with which it unites. The reaſon of this is, that an adjective always expreſſes the conception of a mere circumſtance conſidered as incapable of exiſting

otherwiſe than in union with the being of ſome object, or ſtate, which muſt be expreſſed by ſome objective word different from the adjective. There is therefore no occaſion to give notice, by any ſign, when an adjective denotes a mere circumſtance of ſome capital object, or verbal ſtate; becauſe, when uſed in its adjective capacity, it never denotes any thing but ſuch a circumſtance.

Hence it comes to paſs, that an adjective may, on very many occaſions, be ſubſtituted for ſome oblique caſe of a ſubſtantive, which ſubſtantive contains in its ſignification the object from which the adjective conception is taken, or into which the adjective conception may be reſolved. Thus for inſtance,
" *A horſe of ſpeed—ſtrength—ſpirit,*" is equivalent to
" *A ſpeedy—ſtrong—ſpirited horſe.*"
" *A diſpoſition to goodneſs,*" to " *a good diſpoſition.*"
" *The æra from Chriſt,*" to " *the Chriſtian æra.*"
" *Revels by night,*" to " *nightly revels.*"
" *Operation with an inſtrument,*" to " *inſtrumental operation.*"
" *A man in drink,*" to " *a drunken man.*"
" *A horſe for ſervice,*" to " *a ſerviceable horſe,*" &c. &c.

If therefore a noun ſubſtantive in an oblique caſe may be properly called a noun; an adjective may be called a noun with equal propriety. And it has been doubtleſs from conſidering adjectives in ſome ſuch manner as this above, that the antient grammarians have conceived them to be a kind of nouns, and have included them and ſubſtantives in the ſame part of ſpeech.

Many grammarians ſeem to have entertained an opinion, that an adjective and a participle might be properly conſidered as of one and the ſame part of ſpeech. But the participle is as properly a verb, as any other verbal form is; for it expreſſes a ſtate which depends on an inconſtant principle of exiſtence. Whereas,

an adjective gives expreſs notice, that no principle of exiſtence is to be attended to in that which is denoted by it. The participle alſo unites with the object, or ſtate, on which it depends, without requiring any intermediate ſtate or circumſtance to be ſupplied in the mind; as for inſtance, if the object, "*a man*," or any "*other object*," have the participles, "*ſeeing—moving—reſting*," &c. made dependent on its name; ſuch man, or other object, becomes of the ſpecies, "*ſeer—mover—reſter*," &c. that is to ſay; the participial ſtates coaleſce ſo intimately with the object which is in the ſtates, that the mind of man cannot conceive any intermediate ſtate, or circumſtance, as the means of coaleſcence: and therefore ſubſtantive names of ſpecies are formed directly from the verbal ſtates, and every object which is in one of theſe ſtates paſſes into a correſponding ſpecies, and may be called by the name of ſuch ſpecies, if ſuch name be in the language; as, "*ſeer—mover—reſter*," in the examples above. But nothing of this kind enſues when an adjective, or the oblique caſe of a ſubſtantive, is made dependent on another ſubſtantive, or on a verb. For when this is done, ſome connective ſtate or circumſtance is always to be ſupplied in the mind as the means of coaleſcence. Thus,

"*A horſe of ſpeed*," or "*a ſpeedy horſe*," are expreſſions equivalent to "*a horſe* having *ſpeed*;" "*a diſpoſition to goodneſs*," to "*a diſpoſition* inclining *to goodneſs*;" "*the æra from Chriſt*," to "*the æra* computed *from Chriſt*;" "*revels by night*," to "*revels* carried on *by night*;" "*inſtrumental operation*," to "*operation* performed with *an inſtrument*;" "*a drunken man*," to "*a man* often diſordered by being *in drink*;" "*a horſe for ſervice*," to "*a horſe* proper *for ſervice*;" and ſo of all other inſtances of conſtruction by adjectives, or by the oblique caſes of ſubſtantives.

It follows from theſe obſervations, that the kind of connexion which is between an object, and the ſtate denoted by a participle depending upon the name of ſuch object, cannot be expreſſed

by an adjective; but that many of the connexions denoted by a ſubſtantive in ſome oblique caſe, may be expreſſed by an adjective; ſo that adjectives and participles are eſſentially different from each other, although they have ſo near a reſemblance in their grammatic forms, eſpecially in the Latin and Greek; for in theſe languages they are varied in grammatic gender, number, and caſe, as adjectives are varied.

It is manifeſt that the judgment muſt be exerted before any adjective can be joined conſiſtently with the word on which it depends; for every adjective cannot coaleſce with every ſubſtantive; nor can any rules be given to ſhew what ſubſtantives, or verbs, a particular adjective may depend upon.

The reaſon or judgment, therefore, of the ſpeaker muſt ſolely determine this; as indeed it muſt determine, on every addition which is made to a connected ſeries of words, whether ſuch addition is conſiſtent, or not conſiſtent, with the reſt. But this one direction may be given concerning the uſe of adjectives, viz. that no adjective can be placed conſiſtently in dependence upon a ſubſtantive, which takes its characteriſtic from the quality which the adjective denotes: nor with a ſubſtantive which takes its characteriſtic from the very contrary of ſuch quality. Thus the expreſſions, "*good goodneſs*—*wicked wicked-*" *neſs*," are abſurd; becauſe the object, "*goodneſs*," takes its character of diſtinction from the quality, "*good*," and *wickedneſs*," from the quality, "*wicked*;" ſo that it is mere waſte of words to repreſent the former as "*good*," and the latter as "*wicked*." And on the other hand, "*wicked goodneſs*—*good wickedneſs*," are abſurd expreſſions; becauſe the quality "*wicked*" cannot unite with its contrary, nor the quality "*good*" with its contrary.

This ſhews that the conception denoted by one and the ſame adjective is modified in the mind, ſo as to ſuit the nature of every different object, or ſtate, upon the name of which ſuch adjective

tive is made to depend. Thus in the expreſſions, "*a good man*—"*a good horſe*—*a good houſe*—*a good voyage*—*a good diſh of meat*," "the quality denoted by "*good*" is as different as the nature of the objects to which the ſame adjective is applied. But every adjective may depend conſiſtently upon the ſubſtantive, "*thing*," becauſe this ſubſtantive may be applied as a name to any object whatſoever, and ſome object or other will admit of any conceivable quality to be united with it. This clearly ſhews why the conception, denoted by an adjective, cannot be of itſelf the object of the mind's contemplation. For as ſuch conception repreſents nothing which is conceived to have any principle of exiſtence in it, the conception denoted by the ſame adjective muſt be varied, upon every application of it, ſo as to repreſent a quality that is capable of uniting with each object, or ſtate, on the name of which the adjective depends, agreeably to the nature of ſuch object, or ſtate.

Adjectives are ſeldom (if ever) uſed in immediate dependence upon tranſitive verbs; becauſe adjectives expreſs qualities which unite in the "*being*" of objects, as the characters of inferior ſorts of a ſpecies; (as, "*good man*—*tall man*—*lame man*," are a kind of names of ſo many inferior ſorts of the ſpecies, "*man*;") and ſuch qualities cannot be conſidered as the modifications of tranſitive ſtates, but of the ſame "*being*," by which theſe ſtates themſelves exiſt. Hence the forms of the verb "*to be*" take all ſorts of adjectives in dependence upon them; as, "*to be good*—"*to have been great*—*being prudent*—*having been prudent*," &c.

I have hitherto conſidered the word on which an adjective depends, without any regard to the dependence which ſuch word may have upon other words; nevertheleſs, the word on which an adjective depends, may itſelf, together with its adjective, have every kind of dependence upon ſome other words, which it might have had if the adjective had not been joined with it. For the quality denoted by an adjective, when united with a ſubſtantive,

ſubſtantive, muſt be ſuch as the nature of the object denoted by the ſubſtantive admits of being united in its exiſtence. So that the complex object, denoted by the ſubſtantive and adjective taken together, becomes of the nature of an object denoted by a ſingle ſubſtantive as its name. Therefore every complex conception ſo denoted, may be conſidered as that of a mere circumſtance of ſome other object, or verbal ſtate; juſt as it might be if it were denoted by one noun ſubſtantive: and therefore the ſame ſigns which give notice when ſingle ſubſtantives are to be conſidered as denoting mere circumſtances, may alſo give notice when a ſubſtantive, with an adjective depending upon it, denotes a mere circumſtance. If an adjective depends upon a verb, the adjective conception ſtill adapts itſelf to the nature of the ſtate with which the quality unites that is denoted by the adjective; and therefore the ſtate denoted by a verb with an adjective depending upon it, retains its communicable nature: and of conſequence unites with objects in the ſame manner as it would have done if it could have been expreſſed by a ſingle verb.

Hence it evidently follows, that grammatic diſtinctions of caſe, gender, and number, in adjectives, are no ways neceſſary to aſcertain the nature of the qualities which adjectives denote. For no object or ſtate can be conceived to admit of qualities that are inconſiſtent with its nature: ſo that of whatſoever number or gender any object is in itſelf, of the ſame it muſt continue, whatſoever other qualities are aſcribed to it that are conſiſtent with its nature. Such expreſſions as "*a female male*—*a ſingle* "*men*," may indeed be put together, but the contradictory nature of the parts of theſe expreſſions appears at firſt ſight. And thoſe objects, from whence the abſtract conceptions denoted by adjectives are uſually derived, continue in themſelves of the ſame gender and number, whatſoever be the gender or number of the object to which the adjective conceptions are applied. Thus in the expreſſions, "*a Britiſh king*—*a Britiſh queen*— "*the Britiſh empire*," the object, "*Britain*," from whence "*Britiſh*"

"*Britiſh*" is derived, continues always of the neuter gender: and in the expreſſions, "*Britiſh kings—Britiſh queens*," the object, "*Britain*," is ſtill of the ſingular number. As to Caſe, I have ſhewn above, that whatſoever unites with the nature and being itſelf of any object, makes the whole one complex object; ſo that one part thereof cannot ſtand in one kind of connexion, and another part in another, with any third object, or with any verbal ſtate. And therefore there is no need for a particular direction added to an adjective, to ſhew that it ſtands in the ſame relation to ſome word, as the ſubſtantive or verb does, on which the adjective depends. Therefore the grammatic variations of caſe, gender, and number, add nothing to the ſignification of adjectives; and for this reaſon, the Engliſh adjectives have no ſuch grammatic variations.

This want of variation in the adjectives of this language makes it neceſſary to place every adjective as cloſe as poſſible, either before, or behind the ſubſtantive on which it depends, or, if it depends upon a verb, as cloſe behind ſuch verb as poſſible. For were it otherwiſe, when more ſubſtantives than one are in a ſentence, or more verbs than one, it might not be eaſy, or perhaps not poſſible, to determine which ſubſtantive or verb the adjective ſhould be immediately joined with; and, if ſeveral adjectives and ſeveral ſubſtantives are in a ſentence, the ambiguity would be ſtill greater. Whereas, in the Latin and Greek, the termination of an adjective compared with the terminations of the ſubſtantives in the ſentence, uſually ſhews with which it is to be united. This gives an opportunity in theſe languages for a greater diverſity of order in placing words in ſeries, than the Engliſh will admit of. But when all is done, the mind muſt conſider the adjective and its ſubſtantive in one view, before it can apprehend the complex object which is denoted by them both together; and therefore it may juſtly be queſtioned, whether placing the one ſo far from the other, as they are frequently placed in Latin and Greek, does not ſometimes occaſion obſcurity.

As

As to retaining diverſity of termination in adjectives, and yet not uſing that diverſity to promote variety in placing them in ſentences; it is as great an imperfection in language as can well be imagined. For the variety of termination of gender in adjectives, gives occaſion to conſider all objects which are of no ſex in themſelves, as denoted by ſubſtantive names of ſome grammatic gender. And as this gender has nothing anſwerable to it in objects of no ſex, nothing but arbitrary cuſtom can be referred to, in order to determine of what grammatic gender each ſubſtantive is which denotes objects of no ſex. Had cuſtom been regulated by reaſon, the names of all objects of no ſex would have been of the neuter gender. But in all languages which have marks of grammatic gender in their nouns: ſome nouns are maſculine, and others feminine, which yet equally denote objects of no ſex. And this creates great perplexity to learners, in adjuſting the grammatic terminations of adjectives properly to the terminations of the ſubſtantives on which theſe adjectives depend. Yet theſe grammatic genders of ſubſtantives and adjectives, are retained in almoſt every language of Europe, except the Engliſh, whilſt the adjectives in each language are placed as near to their ſubſtantives as they are in Engliſh; and this proceding is evidently a very great blemiſh in every language which makes uſe of it; becauſe it occaſions much trouble, and is attended with no real advantage.

SECTION II.

Of the degrees of compariſon in adjectives.

AS the objects contained in the ſignification of adjectives (*i. e.* of the ſubſtantive names into which adjectives may be reſolved) are only uſed to place the qualities, and properties of theſe objects in whole ſets before the mind; whilſt the grammatic form of an adjective gives notice to the mind to apply its judgment ſo upon an object which contains theſe qualities, and properties,

properties, as by the means of it, and ſome other object, to form the conception of an object more particularly aſcertained by the means of theſe qualities and properties; it is manifeſt, that there is a neceſſity of giving notice of the quantity or degree in which theſe qualities are conſidered as united in the object intended to be aſcertained. For the ſame ſorts of objects, which are obſerved to contain the properties or qualities that are denoted by abſtract names, are obſerved to contain theſe properties and qualities in different proportions or degrees. The grammatic forms, which are uſually called the degrees of compariſon of adjectives, are introduced into language, to give notice when qualities, expreſſed by adjectives, are obſerved to be united with another object in greater or leſs proportions.

Theſe proportions are determined by compariſon with other objects; the uſual proportion in which the qualities are obſerved to be united with the objects of the ſort or ſpecies mentioned by a ſubſtantive, being made the ſtandard of compariſon.

This uſual proportion is conceived to be expreſſed, when the adjective is united with a ſubſtantive, without any change in the grammatic form.

When a greater proportion or degree of the qualities contained in the ſignification of an adjective is conceived to be united with another object; the termination of the adjective is altered into "*er*," or "*more*" is prefixed to it. Thus, "*fair*" becomes "*fairer*," or "*more fair*."

When a ſtill greater degree of the qualities, above mentioned, is conceived to be united with another object, the termination of the adjective is altered into "*eſt*," or *moſt*" is prefixed to it; as, "*faireſt*," or "*moſt fair*."

The effect of the comparative, or ſuperlative, form of an adjective (for ſo the grammarians have called the forms laſt mentioned) may be a compariſon of diminution, as well as of increaſe.

But this is determined by the ſignification of the adjective itſelf, and not by the grammatical forms of compariſon. Thus we may equally vary the adjective "*great*," or the adjective "*ſmall*," by theſe forms; as, "*great—greater—greateſt*," "*ſmall—ſmaller—ſmalleſt*," "*abundant—more abundant—moſt abundant*," "*ſcarce—more ſcarce—moſt ſcarce.*" If the uſual proportion or degree in which the qualities are obſerved in the objects of a ſpecies, is not made the ſtandard of compariſon; a particular object muſt be fixed upon, and the degree, in which that object has the qualities in queſtion united with it, muſt be made the ſtandard. The particle "*than*" denotes the object which has in it the degree whence the proportion denoted by an adjective in the comparative degree is eſtimated; as, "*a man taller—ſhorter—thinner*, &c. *than James*," *i. e.* who exceeds James in the degree of tallneſs—ſhortneſs—thinneſs, obſerved in him.

If the ſuperlative degree is not eſtimated from the uſual degree in which the qualities are obſerved in another object, two or more objects muſt be uſed by way of ſtandard in the compariſon. For the proportion intended to be expreſſed muſt, at the leaſt, be bigger than either of ſome two proportions, or leſs than either of ſome two proportions, before it can be determined to go beyond, or come ſhort of, the firſt degree of exceſs or diminution; becauſe that firſt degree is one degree above or below the degree which is made the ſtandard of this compariſon. The particle "*of*" denotes the objects, ſome of which have the degrees whence the ſuperlative is eſtimated; as, "*the talleſt—ſhorteſt—thinneſt man of the three*," or "*of the company*," &c.

In

In this manner of expreſſion, all the objects compared together are conſidered as conſtituting an aggregate object; as, "*the* "*three—the company*," in the inſtances here given. And then one of the conſtituent objects is conſidered as diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, by having a greater degree of ſome quality than any other of them. Two objects may be conſidered as conſtituting an aggregate object, as well as more than two; and one of theſe objects may be diſtinguiſhed from the other, by having a greater degree of ſome quality than the other has. Therefore the adjective, in the comparative degree, may be uſed in conſtruction with "*of*," when the two objects compared are conſidered in the manner above mentioned; as, "*the taller—ſhorter—thinner man* "*of the two*," "*the larger of the pair*," &c.

The grammarians have included the adjective itſelf, without any variation of its final ſyllable, or any particle prefixed, in the degrees of compariſon; and have conſidered it as of a degree which they call the poſitive. In this view, therefore, there are three degrees of compariſon in adjectives; the poſitive, the comparative, and the ſuperlative.

There are a few adjectives in the Engliſh language which do not form the degrees of compariſon by changing the laſt ſyllable of the poſitive into "*er*" and "*eſt*;" as, "*good—better—beſt*," "*bad—worſe—worſt*."

Theſe will be particularly ſet down in the practical part of this book.

A Speculative Grammar.

BOOK III.

SECTION I.

Of the pronoun.

THE pronouns are all of them either the ſubſtantive or adjective names of objects of certain ſpecies, diſtinguiſhed by characteriſtics of ſo extenſive a nature, as to comprehend all objects whatſoever as individuals thereof; and theſe characteriſtics are principally certain circumſtances which ariſe in the uſe of language itſelf.

Pronouns are uſually divided into the five following claſſes: perſonal—poſſeſſive—relative—interrogative—and demonſtrative.

Of the pronouns perſonal.

THESE are the ſubſtantive names of objects of three different ſpecies, called by the grammarians the firſt, ſecond, and third perſon.

The circumſtance of "*a ſpeaker mentioning himſelf in what he "ſays, as diſtinguiſhed by the act of ſpeaking,*" is the characteriſtic

of the firſt perſonal ſpecies. And every ſingular object of this ſpecies is denoted by the name "*I*;" every plural object by "*we*."

The circumſtance of "*an object being mentioned as diſtin-*" *guiſhed by words addreſſed to that object*," is the characteriſtic of the ſecond perſonal ſpecies. And every ſingular object of this ſpecies is named "*thou*;" every plural object, and every object conſidered as a plural object, "*ye*" or "*you*."

All objects which are neither conſidered as ſpeaking and mentioning themſelves in what they ſay, nor as diſtinguiſhed by being mentioned in words particularly addreſſed to them, are of the third perſonal ſpecies.

The objects of this ſpecies are diſtinguiſhed into three ſubordinate ſorts, from the additional conſideration of ſex. But this diſtinction only extends, in the Engliſh language, to objects of this ſpecies which are of the ſingular number. Every ſingle male object of this ſpecies, is named "*he*;" every ſingle female object "*ſhe*;" and every ſingle object of no ſex, or of which the ſex is not conſidered, is named "*it*." But plural objects of this ſpecies are equally named "*they*," in Engliſh, without any regard to diſtinction of ſex.

Theſe pronouns have not uſually been conſidered in the light in which they are here placed. And the reaſon ſeems to be; that the pronouns of the firſt, and ſecond perſon, have not been attended to, abſtractedly from the demonſtrative circumſtances which uſually accompany them. For when words are actually ſpoke, the perſon or perſons to whom they are addreſſed, uſually ſee the ſpeaker; and by that means know more of that ſpeaker, than the pronoun "*I*" expreſſes. And the ſpeaker, by ſeeing thoſe whom he ſpeaks to, and frequeutly by being acquainted perſonally with them, knows more of them than the pronoun "*ye*" or "*you*" expreſſes. But let books or writings be pub-

liſhed

liſhed without the authors names, or without being addreſſed to ſome particular perſon; and it will eaſily appear, that the pronouns "*I*" and "*you*," if uſed in the books, are names of ſpecies; ſeeing the one may denote any perſon who can be ſuppoſed to have written any part of what is publiſhed, and the other any one who is ſuppoſed to read it. As to the pronouns of the third perſon; they are ſo manifeſtly the names of three ſorts of objects of one and the ſame ſpecies, that it is not neceſſary to add any thing as a proof that they are ſo.

Indeed all the pronouns are names of objects belonging to ſpecies ſo very extenſive, that when ſome demonſtrative circumſtance does not attend the uſe of them, it muſt be ſupplied, in order to aſcertain more particularly the nature and properties of the object denoted by one of them. It is manifeſt, that one principal reaſon why a man ſigns his name to a letter, is to ſupply this circumſtance to the pronoun "*I*," when uſed in the letter.

The direction of the letter ſupplies the ſame circumſtance to the pronoun "*you*," when uſed in the letter: and with regard to the pronouns of the third perſon; they are conſtantly referred to another name, or expreſſion, of the object denoted by one of them, in order to aſcertain that object more particularly than they themſelves do aſcertain it. This name, or expreſſion, is called the antecedent to the pronoun; becauſe it uſually goes before the pronoun, in connected diſcourſe.

Whenſoever the object addreſſing, and the object addreſſed, in any diſcourſe, are not actually preſent with each other when the diſcourſe is made; or if the ſpeaker is not conceived to deliver his thoughts in his own words, but to repeat the very words of another perſon; or if the converſation is ſuppoſed to be carried on by way of dialogue, and is written down in order to be conveyed to thoſe who were not actually preſent at the dialogue: in all theſe caſes, the antecedents to the pronouns of the firſt and

ſecond

ſecond perſon muſt be ſupplied, by mentioning the names of the perſon addreſſing, and of the perſon addreſſed, ſomewhere in the diſcourſe, or at the beginning of what each ſpeaker ſays. And hence it is manifeſt, that theſe pronouns are referred to particular antecedents, either by our actually ſeeing theſe antecedents, or by being told who they are, when we are not conceived to be actually preſent at the diſcourſe when the original ſpeaker made and addreſſed it. I dwell the longer on theſe particulars, becauſe the perſonal pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon, have uſually been conſidered (at leaſt by the writers of Latin grammar) as not requiring to be referred to antecedents. And as the perſonal pronoun of the third perſon always requires to be referred to an antecedent, and the relative pronoun does the ſame; theſe grammarians have placed the perſonal pronouns of the third perſon, in the ſame claſs with the relative pronoun. Hence they have called the pronouns, which anſwer to "*he—ſhe*" and "*it*," relative pronouns, and have claſſed them with the pronouns which anſwer to "*who—which*" and "*that*," and have conſidered the whole claſs as pronouns of a like nature ſo far as regards the antecedent. This is a very conſiderable overſight; for the connexion of a perſonal pronoun with its antecedent, is very different from that of a relative pronoun, as will fully appear in the account of each in this book.

Although the circumſtance, of the ſpeaker and hearer being preſent with each other, when the words are ſpoke in which the one calls himſelf "*I*," whilſt he calls the other "*thou*" or "*you*," is thought ſufficient to aſcertain the individual objects denoted by them in all common inſtances: this aſcertainment has not been thought ſufficient on occaſions where the utmoſt preciſion is required. Hence in ſolemn contracts, oaths, &c. it has been judged expedient to direct that the name of the perſon ſpeaking, and that of the perſon ſpoken to, when the contract is made with a perſon preſent, ſhall be added to the pronouns of the perſons which they reſpectively ſupport. Thus the form

of

of contract in the office of matrimony, is, "*I, N——, take thee,* "*M——,*" although both the contracting parties are preſent, and ſee, and hear each other ſpeak. And the preſcribed forms of oaths uſually begin with, "*I, ſuch a one, do ſwear.*" In like manner, on all common occaſions, it is thought ſufficient to mention the object intended to be denoted by a pronoun of the third perſon, by another name, before it is mentioned by its pronominal name, and to leave the mind of the hearer, or reader, to refer the perſonal pronoun to its antecedent already mentioned; and thence to determine the particular object, or ſort of object, of which the pronoun is the name. Thus in the following ſentences.

"The Engliſh grammar ought to be attended to; it is neceſſary "to a perfect underſtanding of the language." "*Engliſh gram-* "*mar*" is the name of the ſame object which "*it*" is the name of; only "*Engliſh grammar*" expreſſes it as it is one ſort of the ſpecies grammar, and "*it*" expreſſes it as it is an object of the third perſonal ſpecies, and of that ſort of the ſpecies which is diſtinguiſhed by containing objects of no ſex: and the mind, by cuſtom, readily refers the pronoun to its antecedent. But in affairs of conſequence, ſuch as deeds for the conveyance of property; after the principal perſons and things concerned, are ſpecified by names, or deſcriptions, or both; it is uſual, upon mentioning them again, to add their names after the pronouns perſonal which denote them; as, "*I, the ſaid N——,* "*——you, the ſaid A. B.—him, the ſaid C. D.—part of them,* "*the ſaid lands and tenements,*" &c. This proceeding is manifeſtly made uſe of, to prevent the ambiguity which might ariſe from the indefinite ſignification of the perſonal pronouns: when conſidered in themſelves. For the ſignification of one of theſe pronouns, if the pronoun is conſidered in itſelf, is far from being preciſe, on two accounts. Firſt, becauſe all ſorts of objects may be in the ſituation repreſented by the pronoun; ſeeing even beaſts and inanimate things are frequently repreſented as ſpeaking

and ſpoken to, in all works of genius, ſuch as fables, poetry, and oratory: and when thus repreſented, theſe objects become of the firſt and ſecond perſons. But ſecondly, the ſtates which are the characteriſtics of the perſonal ſpecies, are not ſuch as the ſame individual objects are conſtantly or habitually in. Therefore the ſame objects are continually ſhifting from one of theſe ſpecies to another, according to the different ſituations in which they happen to be when words are actually ſpoke. For the ſame object which was of the firſt perſon in one ſentence, or period, may become of the ſecond, or third, in another ſentence, or period, if the ſpeaker be changed. Hence it becomes neceſſary to date letters and writings, which are to be read, perhaps, a long time after the point of time when they were written. For the date determines the point of time when each object bears the perſonage in which it is repreſented by the perſonal pronoun that is applied to it as a name. There are other reaſons which require a date to be put to many kinds of writings; and theſe reaſons will be given when the definitive verb is treated of in particular.

It may not be improper to obſerve, on this occaſion, how inconvenient it would be, to make ſuch marks of diſtinction as are not conſtant and habitual, the characters of ſpecies. For ſuch a proceeding would make it neceſſary to refer every name of ſpecies to an antecedent, as a pronoun is referred; and would require the time to be aſcertained, when every object is of the ſpecies by the name of which ſuch object is called.

I have hitherto conſidered the ſpeaker as delivering his own ſenſe, in his own words. But the ſpeaker may expreſs the ſenſe of another: and this is uſually done to ſome perſons to whom the original ſpeaker did not expreſs what another ſpeaker delivers to them. When this caſe happens (as it always does in verbal meſſages) the ſecond ſpeaker may either conſider himſelf as of the firſt perſon, and the perſon to whom he carries the meſſage as of the ſecond, and adapt the ſenſe of the original ſpeaker to theſe perſons, as is uſually

uſually done in the languages of Europe: or he may retain the very words of the original ſpeaker; as was done in the antient languages of the Eaſt; and as perhaps is done in the Eaſtern nations to this day. Thus, for inſtance, if a perſon ſays to his ſervant, "*Go tell Mr. N—— I ſhould be glad to ſee him to-day.*" the ſervant will naturally go to Mr. N—— and ſay, "*I am ſent* "*to tell you, that my maſter would be glad to ſee you to-day.*" In which expreſſion, the ſervant, who was of the ſecond perſon when the meſſage was given him, becomes of the firſt; Mr. N——, who was of the third, becomes of the ſecond; and the maſter, who was of the firſt, becomes of the third perſon: and yet the ſenſe of the meſſage remains the ſame, becauſe the circumſtances of delivering it are altered. But in the Eaſtern way, the ſervant would ſay, "*My maſter ſendeth me to* "*ſay, that he ſaith thus of Mr. N——, I ſhould be glad to ſee* "*him to-day.*" There are many inſtances of this manner of delivering the ſenſe of others in the Scriptures: and this is one reaſon, among others, of the different caſt which the Engliſh has, into which the Scriptures are tranſlated, from the Engliſh which is ſpoke or written upon other occaſions.

The pronouns perſonal are noun ſubſtantives; for they are the names of objects themſelves of three different ſpecies, and do not give notice that the objects denoted by them are conſidered as mere circumſtances to be united with ſome other object, or ſtate, in order to aſcertain ſuch object, or ſtate. Yet they may be applied to the names or expreſſions of other objects, or ſtates, for this purpoſe; and conſequently they take the ſame ſigns of caſes in order to effect it, which other noun ſubſtantives do.

But the form of their declenſion differs in Engliſh from that of the uſual noun ſubſtantive. For all of them, except "*it*," have an accuſative caſe different from the nominative: and the accuſative form is uſed with the ſigns "*of—to*," &c. to form the oblique caſes; as, "*I—of me—to me—me—O me—from me*," &c.

The form of declenſion of the perſonal pronouns is ſet down at Section VIII. of the practical part of this book.

It may not be improper to obſerve, before we diſmiſs this ſubject, that the *perſons* take their name from a Latin word, ſignifying the maſks which actors anciently wore upon the ſtage. One of theſe maſks was painted for each character, and whoſoever performed the character, took the maſk, and the name of the character, together: ſo that the ſame man had as many names as he had maſks. And, in like manner, one and the ſame man bears the names of "*I—thou—he*," according to the different character, or perſon, which he bears in any ſentence.

SECTION II.

Of the pronouns poſſeſſive.

THESE are adjective names derived from the perſonal pronouns; and conſequently contain in their ſignification abſtract conceptions, derived from the ſame objects which the perſonal pronoun denotes, from whence each poſſeſſive pronoun is derived. Hence theſe muſt be referred to antecedents, to aſcertain the particular object denoted by the objective, or ſubſtantive part, of the ſignification of each, in the ſame manner that the perſonal pronouns are.

Theſe pronouns, being adjectives, are not declined; but ſeveral of them have a double form; as, "*my—mine*," "*thy—thine*," "*our—ours*," "*your—yours*," "*her—hers*," "*their—theirs*." The firſt of theſe forms is uſed, when the ſubſtantive, with which one of them is connected, is mentioned in the member of the ſentence, in which the pronoun ſtands; as, "*this is my book*." The ſecond form is uſed, when the name of the object, with which the pronoun is to be connected, does not ſtand in

in the ſame member of the ſentence with it, but is to be underſtood in that member; as, "*this book is mine*," i. e. "*my book*."

Theſe pronouns have been conſidered by ſome writers on Engliſh grammar, not as adjectives derived from the pronouns perſonal, but as other forms of the genitive caſe of theſe pronouns. But they are adjectives for the ſame reaſon that "*meus*" "*—tuus—ſuus—noſter* and *veſter*" are adjectives in Latin. It is true, the Engliſh pronouns have no variation of what is called gender and number in the Latin; but this variation of gender and number in the Latin pronouns, makes no alteration in the ſex, or number of the object, which is repreſented by one of them. Thus, when a man ſays "*mea uxor*," the object repreſented by "*mea*," is himſelf, and conſequently is of the maſculine gender; and if any one ſays to a woman, "*tuus maritus*," the object repreſented by "*tuus*" is herſelf, and therefore is of the feminine gender. Or if a man ſays, "*oves meæ*," the object repreſented by "*meæ*" is himſelf, and conſequently is of the ſingular number, and maſculine gender; although the ſheep, expreſſed by "*oves*," are of the feminine gender, and plural number; and ſo of other inſtances.

This is another proof that the termination of adjectives being made to vary, according to the different gender and number of the ſubſtantive with which they are connected, adds nothing to the ſignification of the adjective; but is made uſe of merely to aſcertain the particular ſubſtantive with which the adjective is to be connected, when placed at a diſtance from it. And the ſame may be ſaid of the variation of caſe in adjectives. Theſe variations of gender, number, and caſe, in the Latin and Greek, are, of conſequence, notices or declarations concerning words themſelves, merely to aſſiſt the mind to diſtinguiſh the order in which the words are to be taken. But the Engliſh, by obſerving a certain order in placing dependent words in ſeries, is delivered from the neceſſity of other grammatical marks, or notices, to ſupply the want of obſerving a certain order.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Of the relative pronoun.

THE ſimple pronouns of this claſs are "*who*—*which* and "*that*." The compound pronouns which partake of the nature of relatives, are "*what*—*whoſoever*—*whichſoever*—"*whatſoever*."

There are alſo ſeveral words, uſually ranked amongſt adverbs, which include the power of a relative pronoun in their ſignification; as, "*when*—*why*—*wherefore*—*how*—*where*—*whither*—"*whence*—*while*—*whether*—*till*, or *untill*."

For "*when*" is equivalent to "*ſome point of time at which*;" "*why* or *wherefore*," to "*ſome reaſon for which*;" "*how*," to "*ſome manner in which*;" "*where*," to "*ſome place at which*;" "*whither*, to "*ſome place to which*;" "*whence*," to "*ſome* "*place from which*;" "*while*," to "*ſome time during which*;" "*whether*," to "*which of two*;" "*till* or *untill*," to "*during* "*ſome time, at the end of which.*"

The relative pronoun is the name of an object, as a perſonal pronoun is: but when an object is named by a relative pronoun, notice is given, "that the pronoun both expreſſes the object, and "likewiſe ſhews, that the clauſe in which ſuch object is con-"cerned, is not to be conſidered either as expreſſing compleat "truth or falſhood, or a compleat conception of the intellect; "but as an expreſſion of imperfect ſenſe, till it is united with "ſome name or expreſſion of the ſame object which the relative "repreſents."

It is the grammatic form of the clauſe in which a relative is concerned, that requires pronouns of a particular kind to give notice when the clauſe is applied in the manner above mentioned: for the form of this clauſe is that of a compleat ſentence. Now the form of a compleat ſentence is neceſſary in language to expreſs truth or falſhood; but is not neceſſary to expreſs either a conception which is merely that of a compleat object of the intellect, or a conception which muſt be made dependent on ſome other conception, and united with it, in order to become that of a compleat object of the intellect.

Yet the conception denoted by words in the form of a compleat ſentence may be conſidered merely as that of an object denoted by a noun ſubſtantive; and it is frequently convenient to conſider the conception, as that of ſuch an object. But when this is done, ſome notice muſt be given of it; for without ſuch notice, the grammatic form in which the words are drawn up, would lead the hearer or reader to conſider them, as a ſeparate expreſſion, of compleat truth or falſhood. This notice is uſually given in Engliſh by prefixing the particle "*that*" to a ſentence, when the meaning of it is to be conſidered as of the ſame nature, or order, with the conception denoted by a noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe.

Thus, in the expreſſion "*that a peace is concluded is now paſt "doubt,*" "*a peace is concluded*" is a compleat ſentence; but here it is uſed as a noun ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe, on which the verb "*is*" depends. Notice of this is given by the particle "*that,*" prefixed to the ſentence "*a peace is concluded;*" and it will appear, when we treat of this particle as a conjunction, that any ſentence may be made to ſupply what is equivalent to a noun ſubſtantive in almoſt any caſe, by prefixing this particle to the ſentence. Thus a ſentence of compleat truth or falſhood is reduced one degree lower, viz. to a level with the expreſſion of a mere object of the intellect, as denoted by a noun ſubſtantive.

tive. But it is of the utmoſt convenience in language to reduce a compleat ſentence lower ſtill, viz. to a level with the expreſſion of a conception denoted by a noun adjective: or dependent participle; and the relative pronouns are introduced into language to give notice when a ſpeaker or writer is proceeding in this manner.

The grammatic form of a compleat ſentence is therefore ſeen in every relative clauſe: but the conception denoted by ſuch clauſe cannot be conſidered in itſelf; but muſt be united with ſome name or expreſſion of the object which the relative repreſents. This name, or expreſſion, may either be a ſingle ſubſtantive, or a ſingle verb of the infinitive mood, or a ſingle participle uſed as a ſubſtantive, or it may be any ſeries of words which expreſs compleat ſenſe; and this name, or expreſſion, is called in grammar, the antecedent to the relative; becauſe it moſt commonly goes before a relative clauſe in the connected conſtruction of language.

If this antecedent is an object conſidered as endowed with the powers of ſpeech and intelligence, it is repreſented by the relative "*who*."

If it is an object not conſidered as endowed with ſuch powers, it is repreſented by the relative "*which*."

Either ſort of objects may be repreſented by the relative "*that*."

The objects repreſented by "*who*," are uſually called "*perſons*;" and thoſe by "*which*," "*things*." But in all the Engliſh writers, which flouriſhed above a hundred years ago, "*which*" is applied both to perſons and things.

If a relative clauſe were contained all in one word, as an adjective and a participle is, the judgment would be exerciſed in the application of ſuch a clauſe, in the very ſame manner in which it is exerciſed in the application of an adjective, or participle. For the ſame relative clauſe may be applied conſiſtently to ſome antecedents, but not to others; and the verbal ſtate, with all that depends upon it, muſt be conſidered as of different kinds, in order to ſuit different antecedents. Thus the relative clauſe "*which runs*," may be conſiſtently applied to any object that is capable of running, but not to other objects. And if it be applied to objects which are capable of running, but in different manners; the manner or kind of running which is to be underſtood upon each application of the clauſe, muſt be determined ſo as to ſuit the nature of each antecedent object: as in the expreſſions, "*a horſe which runs—water which runs—time which runs*," three different kinds of running muſt be underſtood.

But as relative clauſes do not conſiſt each of one ſingle word; they are conceived to be formed by the ſpeaker, ſo as to ſuit each particular antecedent to which they are at any time applied. This cannot be done, unleſs the antecedent itſelf be in the mind of a ſpeaker who forms a relative clauſe concerning it: and if this antecedent be placed in a clauſe inſtead of a relative, ſuch clauſe becomes a compleat ſentence of truth or falſhood. Thus, if the antecedents, "*a horſe—water—time*," be placed in the clauſe "*which runs*" inſtead of the relative "*which*," the three ſentences, "*a horſe runs—water runs—time runs*," will be formed.

As by this ſubſtitution, any relative clauſe will become a compleat ſentence; ſo, on the contrary, any compleat ſentence may be turned into a relative clauſe, by ſubſtituting a relative inſtead of ſome ſubſtantive, or verb in the infinitive mood, or ſome ſeries of connected words which are found in the ſentence, and which denote a compleat conception of the intellect. Such ſub-

ſtantive, verb, or ſeries of words, may ſtand in various connexions with other words in the ſentence; and if the relative is ſubſtituted, it muſt ſtand in the ſame connexion as the object does which is denoted by the words for which the relative is ſubſtituted. Theſe connexions are denoted by ſigns of caſes and other prepoſitions; and therefore a relative pronoun takes all ſorts of ſigns of caſes and prepoſitionswith it. But when a ſentence is turned into a relative clauſe, it is neceſſary to give immediate notice that it is ſo; and therefore the relative is placed either the firſt word of its clauſe, or as near the firſt as may be. Yet the word, or expreſſion, in the original ſentence which the relative repreſents, often ſtands in the middle, or in the laſt part of the ſentence; and when this happens, although the relative retains the caſe of the word, or expreſſion, which it repreſents, it does not retain the place of ſuch word.

This may be exemplified by the following ſentence; "*a lady* "*ſitting on a ſeat in the garden, views the flowers with attention.*"

This ſentence may be turned into five different relative clauſes. For "*who*" may be ſubſtituted inſtead of "*a lady,*" "*on which*" inſtead of "*on a ſeat,*" "*in which*" inſtead of "*in the garden,*" "*which*" inſtead of "*the flowers,*" and "*with which*" inſtead of "*with attention.*" If the noun inſtead of which any of theſe ſubſtitutions is made, be taken as the antecedent to the relative, and the clauſe be made dependent upon the noun, and if we form five different expreſſions by proceeding in this manner; all the expreſſions will be conſiſtent ſenſe, and will ſtand as follows.

"*A lady—who, ſitting on a ſeat in the garden, views the flowers* "*with attention.*"

"*A ſeat—on which a lady ſitting in the garden, views the flowers* "*with attention.*"

"*The garden—in which a lady ſitting on a ſeat, views the flowers* "*with attention.*"

" *The flowers—which a lady, ſitting on the ſeat in a garden, views* " *with attention.*"

" *The attention—with which a lady, ſitting on a ſeat in the gar-* " *den, views the flowers.*"

Theſe examples fully ſhew, how the relatives remove from the place of the word of the original ſentence, in order to ſtand as cloſe as poſſible to that word conſidered as the antecedent to the relative, when the ſentence is turned into a relative clauſe depending on ſuch antecedent.

In the conſtruction of the Engliſh language, the ſign or preposition which goes before the word that is repreſented by a relative, is not conſtantly prefixed to the relative; but is often left in the place where it ſhould have ſtood, if the word itſelf had been uſed, and the ſentence had not been turned into a relative clauſe.

Thus the ſecond inſtance above may be thus expreſſed; " *a ſeat—which a lady ſitting on in the garden,*" &c. inſtead of " *a ſeat on which.*" For the original words were " *a lady ſitting* " *on a ſeat,*" &c. So the laſt inſtance may be placed thus:

" *The attention—which a lady, ſitting on a ſeat in the garden,* " *views the flowers with.*" For the original words were—— " *views the flowers with attention.*"

The conſtruction of the relative is a moſt difficult part of the ſyntax of all languages. But the difficulty may be in a great meaſure removed, by ſhewing ſentences reduced to relative clauſes, and that by a different reduction of the ſame ſentence in the manner exemplified above.

I have hitherto conſidered the antecedent to the relative, as a word detached from all other words, except the relative clauſe

which depends on it; but it is never ſo in connected ſpeech: for ſuch a clauſe, united with its antecedent, only expreſſes conſiſtent ſenſe, and not compleat truth or falſhood. Nevertheleſs, the expreſſion of truth or falſhood is the only purpoſe of connected ſpeech; and every compleat ſentence is ſuch an expreſſion. The antecedent therefore of every relative is concerned with other words beſides the relative clauſe; which words are required to form a ſentence, into which the antecedent, together with its dependent clauſe, is taken.

Now whatſoever connexion the antecedent has with theſe other words; that connexion the relative clauſe partakes of by the means of its antecedent. This connexion may happen to be that of any caſe, or that denoted by any prepoſition. Therefore any relative clauſe, which on ſome occaſion unites with its antecedent when in one ſuch connexion, may on another occaſion unite with it when in another. So that if the clauſe "*who is* "*good*" (for inſtance) can be conſiſtently united with "*a man*," it may be ſo united with "*of a man—to a man—above a man*," &c.; as therefore "*a man who is good*" is a conſiſtent expreſſion, "*of a man who is good—to a man who is good—above a man who* "*is good*" are conſiſtent expreſſions; being much of the ſame import with "*a good man—of a good man—to a good man—above* "*a good man.*" Hence a relative clauſe unites with the ſentence into which it is taken as a conſtituent part thereof, in the ſame manner that an adjective or participle does. But a ſentence in which a pronoun perſonal is concerned does not unite with the ſentence in which the antecedent appears. For the pronoun perſonal has no regard to the connexions which its antecedent has in that antecedent's own ſentence, and is therefore no part of that ſentence. To ſhew this by examples; let the ſentence, "*I am* "*writing this book*," be turned into a relative clauſe, by ſubſtituting "*which*" inſtead of "*this book*;" then, by the obſervations already made concerning the poſition of the relative, the form of the clauſe will be "*which I am writing.*" Let this

clauſe be made dependent on the antecedent, "*this book*," in the following ſentences. "*Grammar is the ſubject of this book*—"*a title is put to this book*—*a friend ſhall peruſe this book*—"*a practical grammar may be deduced from this book.*" Then the compound ſentences will be, "*grammar is the ſubject of this book* "*which I am writing*—*a title is put to this book which I am* "*writing*—*a friend ſhall peruſe this book which I am writing*— "*a practical grammar may be deduced from this book which I am* "*writing.*" It is now apparent, that "*of this book which I am* "*writing*—*to this book which I am writing*—*this book which I am* "*writing*—*from this book which I am writing*," are in effect expreſſions of one and the ſame object in different connexions denoted by "*of*—*to*," &c.

Let now the ſentence, "*I am writing this book*," be turned into the ſentence, "*I am writing it*," by ſubſtituting the perſonal pronoun "*it*," inſtead of "*this book*;" and let this ſentence be ſhewn as related to each of the former, by referring the pronoun "*it*" to the antecedent, "*this book*," in each of them. Then the ſentences will ſtand as follows. "*Grammar is the* "*ſubject of this book. I am writing it*—*a title is put to this book.* "*I am writing it*—*a friend ſhall peruſe this book. I am writing* "*it*—*a practical grammar may be deduced from this book. I am* "*writing it.*"

Here it is apparent that the ſigns of "*of*—*to*," &c. which affect the antecedent, "*this book*," no ways affect the pronoun "*it*," nor the clauſe in which this pronoun ſtands; but that if the antecedent itſelf be known, the full import of the ſentence, "*I am writing it*," is alſo known. As therefore the pronoun "*it*" is not affected by the connexions of the antecedent with the words of that antecedent's ſentence, the pronoun's ſentence is no conſtituent part of the antecedent's ſentence.

But

But pronouns poſſeſſive unite with the ſubſtantives on which they depend, ſo as to partake of all the connexions of theſe ſubſtantives; and therefore they are frequently equivalent to ſome whole relative clauſe. Thus, "*the horſe which belongs to you*," is equivalent to "*your horſe*;" "*the religion which they profeſs*," is equivalent to "*their religion*;" "*the picture which is drawn to reſemble him*," to "*his picture*;" and ſo of many other inſtances. And in like manner, "*of—to—with the horſe which belongs to you*," are equivalent to "*of—to—with your horſe*."

But the pronoun poſſeſſive can never depend upon its ſubſtantive, as a relative depends upon its antecedent: becauſe the ſubſtantive, to which a pronoun poſſeſſive is applied, is never another name of the ſame object with that which the pronoun contains in its ſignification; whereas the relative pronoun and its antecedent are always two names of the ſame object. Now the perſonal pronouns, "*you—they—him*," in the relative clauſes, "*which belongs to you—which they profeſs—which is drawn to reſemble him*," are the names of the ſame objects with thoſe which the poſſeſſive pronouns, "*your—their—his*," contain in their ſignification, whilſt the object repreſented by "*which*" is not contained in their ſignification; and yet the relative clauſes, when applied to their antecedents, are equivalent in ſenſe to the poſſeſſive pronouns applied to the ſame antecedents. Therefore it is clear, that a relative pronoun repreſents the object denoted by it, only till its clauſe is formed, and the object is aſcertained, with which the conception expreſſed by the clauſe is to coaleſce: but that when the mind forms the coaleſcence, the object with which that coaleſcence is made is not conceived to be denoted twice over, *i. e.* once by the antecedent, and once by the relative: but by the antecedent only. So that ſuch object as it is denoted by the relative vaniſhes out of the conception which is expreſſed by a relative clauſe in actual union with its antecedent.

Hence

Hence it evidently follows, that the relative repreſents an object as ſupported by a principle of exiſtence, which the mind can deſtroy, or transfer, at its pleaſure. And hence it comes to paſs, that every clauſe in which ſuch an object is concerned, does not expreſs a conception which can be contemplated in itſelf, when the principle by which the relative object exiſts is conceived to be deſtroyed or transferred: but that the conception may be contemplated in itſelf, if the relative object be repreſented in the clauſe, either by a ſubſtantive name, or by an expreſſion equivalent to ſuch name, *i. e.* by an infinitive verb, or a pronoun perſonal. For then the principle by which the object exiſts, is neither deſtroyed, nor transferred.

If the principle by which a relative object exiſts is conceived to be deſtroyed, the relative clauſe becomes of the nature of a noun adjective. If this principle be conceived as only transferred, the clauſe becomes of the nature of a dependent participle.

Thus, "*a man who is good—a horſe which is ſwift,*" are expreſſions nearly equivalent to "*a good man—a ſwift horſe;*" and "*a man who ſpeaks—a horſe which runs,*" are nearly equivalent to "*a man ſpeaking—a horſe running.*"

The coincidence of the power of a relative clauſe with that of a noun adjective, ſhews evidently, that the nature of an adjective is rightly determined in what has been laid down concerning it. And the coincidence of ſuch a clauſe with a dependent participle, will confirm the account which has been given of the manner in which a verb unites, both with an object on which it immediately depends, and with an object which immediately depends upon it.

For this purpoſe let the ſentence, "*ſcholars write books,*" be turned into a relative clauſe, by ſubſtituting "*who*" inſtead of

of "*ſcholars*," and let this clauſe be referred to "*ſcholars*" as its antecedent. The expreſſion will then become, "*ſcholars* "*who write books*," and this expreſſion is nearly equivalent to "*ſcholars writing books.*" Therefore the relative only repreſents its object till "*writing*," the participial ſtate of the verb "*writes*," is taken into that object, and by the means thereof is transferred into the antecedent, "*ſcholars*;" that is to ſay, till the ſcholars are repreſented as of the ſpecies, "*writers.*" If therefore the participial ſtate be itſelf mentioned, there is no occaſion for the relative.

Let the ſame ſentence now be turned into a relative clauſe, by ſubſtituting "*which*" inſtead of "*books*," and let this clauſe be referred to the antecedent, "*books.*" The expreſſion will then become "*books which ſcholars write*," and this is nearly equivalent to "*books written by ſcholars:*" this ſhews that the ſtate, "*written*," which correſponds with the ſtate, "*writing*," was in the books as repreſented in the original ſentence, "*ſcholars* "*write books*;" and that the relative, "*which*," only repreſents the books till the paſſive ſtate is received into it, and transferred to the antecedent. But if the paſſive participial ſtate, "*written*," be directly mentioned, there is no occaſion for the relative.

If we now take the ſentences, "*ſcholars write in books*— "*ſcholars write quite through books*," and turn them into relative clauſes, by ſubſtituting "*which*" inſtead of "*books*," and refer theſe clauſes to the antecedent, "*books*;" the expreſſions will become "*books which ſcholars write in—books which ſcholars write* "*quite through*;" and theſe are nearly equivalent to "*books written* "*in by ſcholars—books written quite through by ſcholars.*" It is therefore manifeſt, that the paſſive ſtates, "*written in—written* "*quite through*," are the ſtates in which the object, "*books*," are repreſented in the ſentences, "*ſcholars write in books—ſcho-* "*lars write books quite through.*" If therefore, the ſtates are directly mentioned, there is no occaſion for the relative. If

If a paſſive verb appears in a ſentence having a ſubſtantive depending upon it by the means of the prepoſition "*by*," and ſuch ſentence be turned into a relative clauſe, by a relative ſubſtituted inſtead of the ſubſtantive, and made to depend upon the ſubſtantive as its antecedent; the active participle correſponding with the paſſive verb may be ſubſtituted in the clauſe, and the relative quite removed. Thus the ſentence, "*books are written by ſcholars*," by the ſubſtitution and proceeding above mentioned, will become, "*ſcholars by whom books are written*;" and this expreſſion is nearly equivalent to "*ſcholars who write books*," and this to "*ſcholars writing books.*"

If the expreſſion which is to be repreſented by the relative (when a ſentence is to be turned into a relative clauſe) is neither that on which the verb immediately depends, nor is dependent on the verb merely by the ſign of ſome caſe, or ſome prepoſition, the relative and its verb cannot be changed into a participle: for neither the active nor paſſive participial ſtate of the verb is now in the object denoted by the relative, but in ſome other object which muſt come between the relative and the verb. If therefore the antecedent ſhould take the place of the relative (as it does when the verb is turned into a participle and the relative is removed) the participle would not be conſidered as united with the antecedent, but with the object named between the antecedent and it; and therefore the expreſſion would not partake of all the connexions of ſuch antecedent, which nevertheleſs every expreſſion muſt do, which can be equivalent to a relative clauſe.

Thus if the ſentence, "*ſcholars write books for poſterity*," be changed into a relative clauſe, and united with the antecedent, "*poſterity*," the expreſſion will become, "*poſterity for which ſcholars write books*;" and here the relative cannot be removed by changing the verb "*write*" into the paſſive participle "*written*;" and the nominative, "*ſcholars*," into the ablative, "*by ſcholars.*" But the ſentence, "*ſcholars write for poſterity*,"

may be changed into "*poſterity for which ſcholars write,*" and this into "*poſterity written for by ſcholars;*" becauſe in the original ſentence, "*poſterity*" depends immediately on the compound verb "*write for,*" and therefore has the paſſive ſtate "*written for*" in it. And "*ſcholars*" have the active ſtate "*writing for*" in them, either when placed before the verb "*write for,*" or after the paſſive participle "*written for,*" with the ſign "*by.*"

Therefore, when the object repreſented by a relative, is neither that on which the verb of its clauſe immediately depends, nor that immediately depending on the verb by the ſign of ſome caſe, or by the means of a prepoſition, ſuch relative clauſe is equivalent to an adjective. But if the object repreſented by the relative is, either that on which the verb of its clauſe immediately depends, or that depending upon the verb by the means of a ſign of a caſe, or other prepoſition; ſuch relative clauſe is equivalent to a participle.

The particular object denoted by a pronoun of the firſt or ſecond perſon, is frequently aſcertained by the demonſtrative act of ſpeaking, or being ſpoke to; as has been already obſerved. And if a viſible or ſenſible object be preſent when it is mentioned by a pronoun of the third perſon, ſuch object may be aſcertained by the demonſtrative action of pointing to it, or preſenting it, or by looking ſtedfaſtly at it, or by ſome other demonſtrative ſign. But although the object itſelf, which is the antecedent to a relative pronoun, may on ſome occaſions be aſcertained by a demonſtrative action, the connexion in which ſuch object ſtands with what is denoted by other words in its own ſentence, cannot be aſcertained by any ſuch action. We have ſhewn, that the relative pronoun extends its ſignification, ſo as to partake of theſe connexions of its antecedent; and therefore it is ſeldom conſidered ſingly and in itſelf, as the name of any object. Hence Father Buffier has called the relative an incompleat pronoun, and the perſonal and demonſtrative pronouns compleat ones; becauſe, ſays

ſays he, theſe frequently ſtand alone for the names of objects, which the relative pronouns do not. Buffier gives no reaſon why this happens in language, which reaſon is manifeſtly that given above.

Nevertheleſs, the relative is frequently ſo ſituated in an expreſſion, that its antecedent is underſtood of courſe. For the verb, and other words connected with it, may bear ſuch a ſignification, as can only be applied to ſome one object, or ſort of objects. Thus, "*I know who has been here*," is of the ſame import as "*I know him or her who has been here:*" "*who reaſons wiſely* "*is not therefore wiſe*," is of the ſame import as "*he or ſhe who* "*reaſons wiſely*," &c. Therefore the relative, in ſuch applications of it, may be conſidered as equivalent to a relative and perſonal pronoun both in one, and the relative clauſe may be conſidered as containing compleat ſenſe in itſelf.

"*What*" is equivalent to "*this which*," or "*that which*," and therefore the clauſe depending on it, is very frequently an expreſſion of ſenſe in itſelf; the demonſtrative pronouns "*this*" and "*that*" ſupplying the place of an antecedent to the relative: as in the expreſſions, "*what you ſay is right—I hear what you* "*ſay—they approve of what you propoſe—he is averſe to what his* "*friends adviſe*," &c.

It is plain from theſe inſtances, that "*what*" uſually contains the demonſtrative pronoun "*that*" in one caſe, and the relative "*which*" in another. Thus, "*that which you ſay is right*," is equivalent to "*what you ſay is right*," and "*that*" is the nominative, and "*which*" the accuſative caſe. So, "*he is averſe to* "*that which his friends adviſe*," is equivalent to, "*he is averſe to* "*what his friends adviſe*;" and "*to that*" is of the dative, and "*which*" is of the accuſative caſe; and ſo of other inſtances. If "*what*" is uſed, and the caſe of "*which*" included in its meaning is neither the nominative nor the accuſative, the ſign of ſuch caſe follows the verb in the clauſe like an adverb; as,

"*what you heard of*" is equivalent to "*that of which you heard*;" and ſo of other inſtances, in which the ſign of any other oblique caſe or other prepoſition is uſed with "*what*."

SECTION IV.

Of the interrogative pronoun.

THE pronouns, "*who—which* and *what*," which have been conſidered as relatives, are alſo uſed in aſking queſtions; and when ſo uſed, the writers on grammar have diſtinguiſhed them by the name of interrogative pronouns.

Every queſtion that is aſked by the help of one of theſe pronouns conſiſts in effect of two compleat ſentences, in each of which one and the ſame object is concerned. The one of theſe ſentences ſhews what the queſtion is about; and the other ſignifies the deſire, or intention of the ſpeaker, to receive information concerning that which the queſtion is about; that is to ſay, one of the ſentences is merely demonſtrative, and the other is merely interrogative.

Whatſoever the queſtion is about, muſt be ſo made known to the perſon of whom the queſtion is aſked, as that ſuch perſon can diſtinguiſh it from all other conceptions. For otherwiſe the perſon, of whom the queſtion is aſked, could not know what the thing is, concerning which an anſwer is expected from him. The determination of this muſt of conſequence make the moſt conſiderable part of every queſtion; and therefore the ſubſtance of the ſentence which aſcertains it, actually appears in every queſtion; but the ſentence which expreſſes the ſpeaker's intention to receive information concerning that which is the object of the queſtion, is partly or intirely ſupplied by the particular form of conſtruction in which the words of the queſtion are placed.

The

The ſimpleſt kind of queſtion is concerning an object that is actually preſent, and perceived both by the ſpeaker and hearer, when the queſtion is aſked. Suppoſe that ſuch object is a particular man pointed to by the perſon who aſks the queſtion; and the words of the queſtion will be, "*who is that man?*" The ſenſe of theſe words, if ſet down at length, amounts to that of the two following compleat ſentences: "*I would receive information concerning a particular man—the particular man is that man.*"

If theſe ſentences are reduced to the firſt, by ſubſtituting the relative "*who*" in the ſecond ſentence, inſtead of "*the particular man*" concerned in both the ſentences; the compound ſentence will be, "*I would receive information concerning a particular man, who is that man?*" So that the words of the queſtion itſelf, "*who is that man?*" are only the ſentence which determines what the queſtion is about reduced to a relative clauſe depending upon the antecedent, "*a particular man,*" in the interrogative ſentence which is underſtood of courſe, as a ſentence of the ſame nature is concerned in every queſtion.

When the object that the queſtion is about is not a perſon, but a thing, "*what*" is uſed to repreſent it in the queſtion; as, "*what ſtands there?*" which is equivalent to "*that which ſtands there;*" and being compleated, amounts to; "*I would receive information concerning that which ſtands there.*" So that in this kind of queſtion, "*that*" is part of the predicate of the interrogative ſentence; and the other words of the queſtion, are the demonſtrative ſentence turned into a relative clauſe, and made to depend upon "*that,*" which itſelf depends on in the other words of the interrogative ſentence.

If the object that the queſtion is about, is known by the ſpeaker to be amongſt ſome certain number, company, or other aggregate, of objects; but is not diſtinguiſhed from the other

objects of ſuch number, &c. "*which*" is uſed to repreſent it in the queſtion, whether it be a perſon or thing; as, "*which of* "*this company can do ſo or ſo?*" that is at length, "*I would* "*learn to diſtinguiſh ſome certain perſon or perſons of this company* "*—the certain perſon can do ſo or ſo;*" which two ſentences being reduced to the firſt, by the ſubſtitution of the relative pronoun in the ſecond ſentence, will form the following complex ſentence, "*I would learn to diſtinguiſh which perſon of this company* "*can do ſo or ſo.*" Here again it appears, that part of the predicate of the interrogative ſentence is taken into the words of the queſtion.

The object that is common to the interrogative and demonſtrative ſentence, which is the object that the queſtion is about; is in the ſubject of the demonſtrative ſentence in all the examples given above. But it is very frequently in the predicate of that ſentence; and when it is ſo, an alteration enſues in the placing of the words of the queſtion: whereas, no alteration enſues when the common object is the ſubject of the demonſtrative ſentence.

Thus, "*I would know what you are doing,*" if reduced to the ordinary form of a queſtion, becomes "*what are you doing?*" for here the interrogative ſentence is, "*I would know a certain* "*thing;*" and the demonſtrative ſentence is, "*you are doing the* "*thing,*" in which ſentence the common object, "*the thing,*" makes part of the predicate. Subſtitute "*that*" for "*a certain* "*thing*" in the interrogative ſentence, and "*which*" for the ſame thing in the demonſtrative ſentence; and compound them into one; and the compound ſentence will be, "*I would know that* "*which you are doing;*" but "*that which you are doing,*" or "*what you are doing,*" may be conſidered as a clauſe of abſolute ſenſe in itſelf; as has been obſerved in what is ſaid of "*what,*" conſidered as a relative pronoun. Whereas, if it be uſed as a queſtion, "*that*" muſt depend upon the verb "*would know,*" or

or on ſome other word of the interrogative ſentence. And therefore to ſhew that ſome word of the queſtion has ſuch dependence, the order of poſition is changed in the words in which it is made; by placing the nominative caſe after the verb, whenſoever the object which the queſtion is about, is in the predicate of the demonſtrative ſentence; as, "*when will you come?*" is equivalent to, "*I would know the time at which you will come;*" and this ſentence is compoſed of the two ſentences, "*I would know a certain time—you will come at that certain time,*" and the common object; "*the certain time*" is in the predicate of the demonſtrative ſentence.

The interrogative clauſe is prevented from bearing an ambiguous meaning by this tranſpoſition of the nominative caſe and the verb. And in the inſtances where this tranſpoſition does not take place, the ambiguity is prevented, partly by the tone of voice in which the queſtion is aſked, and partly by the clauſe which is ſometimes uſed interrogatively, being connected with other words when it is not ſo uſed, in ſuch a manner, as to ſhew that it does not depend on ſome ſuch ſentence underſtood, as interrogative clauſes formed by theſe pronouns always depend upon. Thus, "*who does ſo?*" is a queſtion; but "*who does ſo is unknown to me,*" or "*I know not who does ſo,*" are neither of them queſtions, but compleat ſentences, in which the pronoun "*who*" is uſed merely as a relative pronoun, with its antecedent underſtood.

To diſpatch the ſubject of queſtions in language all in one place, it is only neceſſary to obſerve, that when a queſtion is not aſked by the means of an interrogative pronoun, or an interrogative adverb; ſuch as "*where—how—when,*" &c. a ſuppoſition is made by the ſpeaker concerning that which the queſtion is about, and the ſpeaker ſignifies his deſire to be informed, whether that ſuppoſition is right or not; which ſignification is made by placing the nominative caſe after the verb. Thus, "*is Mr. N——*

" *here?*" is equivalent to the expreſſion, " *I would know whether* " *the ſuppoſition expreſſed in the words*, Mr. N—— is here, *be* " *true or not?*" and ſo of any other inſtance of a queſtion which is not aſked by an interrogative pronoun, or by ſome adverb which has the force of ſuch a pronoun in it; ſuch as, " *when*— " *where*—*how*—*why*," &c. above mentioned.

When a queſtion is aſked in the latter manner, that is to ſay, by way of ſuppoſition: the anſwer may be given to it by " *yes*" or " *no.*"

" *Yes*" ſhews that the affirmative of the ſuppoſition is true; " *no*" that the negative is true.

When a queſtion is aſked by one of the interrogative pronouns, " *yes*" and " *no*" are neither of them ſufficient to give an anſwer to it. For he who aſks a queſtion by one of theſe pronouns, would know the name of the object about which the queſtion is aſked, which is the antecedent to the pronoun; or ſuch circumſtances as, being taken together, may ſupply the place of ſuch antecedent. The name therefore, or the circumſtances, which are to ſupply the place of the antecedent, muſt be mentioned by the perſon who gives the anſwer; and that in ſuch a caſe or mood, or other form of conſtruction, that being placed in the words of the queſtion inſtead of the interrogative pronoun, the whole ſhall become a compleat ſentence. Thus,

If the queſtion be, " *who is that man?*" the anſwer will be " *Mr. N——;*" which being ſubſtituted inſtead of " *who*" in the queſtion, the expreſſion will be, " *Mr. N—— is that man.*" If the queſtion be aſked again, " *who is Mr. N——?*" the anſwer may be, " *a gentleman of ſuch a place;*" ſubſtitute this expreſſion inſtead of " *who*" in the predicate of the ſentence formed by the words of the queſtion together with it, and the reſult will be, " *Mr. N—— is a gentleman of ſuch a place.*"

Again, Let

Let the queſtion be, "*what are you doing?*" the anſwer may be, "*writing.*" This word being ſubſtituted inſtead of "*what*" in the queſtion, and the words being reduced to proper order; the expreſſion will be, "*you are doing writing,*" or ſimply "*you are writing;*" for writing is only a name for a particular kind of "*doing.*"

The like method may be taken with any other queſtion which is aſked by an interrogative pronoun; and the reſult will always be, the reducing the words of the queſtion to a compleat ſentence containing a declaration of that, which if the perſon who aſked the queſtion had known, the queſtion needed not have been aſked.

SECTION V.

Of the demonſtrative pronouns.

THESE are, "*this—that—other—another—the ſame.*" As it is not poſſible to form names for every kind of object which may preſent itſelf, ſo as to diſtinguiſh ſuch object by its peculiar properties, theſe pronouns are introduced into language to be uſed by way of aſcertainment of any object, viz. "*this*" and "*that*" to be applied to any object which can be pointed out or preſented to particular obſervation; as likewiſe to any object which has been already mentioned in the diſcourſe, or which is farther intended to be ſpecified, ſo as to be diſtinguiſhed from all other objects: "*other*" to be applied to any object which is perceived to be different from ſome object already mentioned, or intended to be mentioned by a name of the ſame ſpecies: "*the ſame*" to give notice, that the object continues unvaried that is mentioned more than once by a name, or by a relative pronoun.

Theſe pronouns are frequently applied without the ſubſtantive name of the object to which they relate; ſome demonſtrative circumſtance ſupplying what is equivalent to a ſubſtantive name. And therefore they are conſidered as ſubſtantives, and are declined as ſuch; "*this*—*that*—*other*," through both the numbers; "*another*," through the ſingular; and "*the ſame*" is applied to repreſent either ſingular or plural objects.

But notwithſtanding this, they are all of them the adjective names of ſpecies; and as ſuch, may be applied in coaleſcence with all kinds of ſubſtantives.

Every ſingle object diſtinguiſhed by being pointed to, and being near the perſon pointing; may have "*this*" united with its name. Or it may be called "*this*," and the name may be left to be underſtood. Alſo any ſingle object, which has been mentioned not long before in what is ſaid, may be diſtinguiſhed in like manner by "*this*," when it is mentioned again. Or ſomething which the ſpeaker is going to ſpeak of immediately, may be introduced by "*this*;" as, "*this which I am going to ſay.*"

"*That*" is applied to ſingle objects ſomewhat diſtant when pointed out; or to thoſe which have been mentioned at ſome diſtance from the place, in the diſcourſe where they are mentioned again; or to what the ſpeaker propoſes to mention at ſome diſtance from his preſent words. And in ſuch application, it may be united with ſome name, or the name may be left to be underſtood.

The application of "*other*" ſuppoſes that an object capable of being called by the ſame name of ſpecies, is concerned in the expreſſion in which it is uſed; but gives notice at the ſame time, that although ſuch object is capable of being denoted by the ſame general name or expreſſion with that which "*other*" repreſents, or with the name or expreſſion of which it is connected, the objects are nevertheleſs different from each other in themſelves, having

having a ſeparate being, either within or without the mind, or both.

"*Another*" is only the ſingular of "*others.*"

"*The ſame*" is the converſe of "*others,*" and ſhews, that although ſeveral different objects may be expreſſed by the name which expreſſes the object that it denotes, yet that difference is not perceived in the object in queſtion, but the individuals referred to are no way different from thoſe denoted again by the ſame name or expreſſion in what is ſaid. If names could be found expreſſive of every individual object and ſtate, there would be no occaſion for theſe pronouns in language. For proper names do not admit of them in connexion, unleſs it be ſuppoſed that ſeveral objects are called by the ſame proper name.

It is therefore the nature of names of ſpecies, and not that of the individual objects ſignified by theſe names, which requires theſe pronouns to be introduced into language. And the ſame obſervation may be made concerning the words, "*all—many—every—any—ſome—ſuch,*" and ſeveral others.

The form of declenſion of the demonſtrative pronouns appears at Section XII. of the practical part of this book.

A Speculative Grammar.

BOOK IV.

SECTION I.

Of the verb.

VERBS denote ſtates of being as diſtinguiſhed in the mind by marks or characters, which may be conceived as evidences of a principle of exiſtence: but not of ſuch a principle as is conſtantly in each ſtate, or peculiar to each period, into which the ſtate may be diſtinguiſhed.

In the account which has been already given of the general nature of the conceptions denoted by nouns and verbs, I have ſhewed, that the capital property in which the conception denoted by a verb differs from that denoted by a noun, either ſubſtantive or adjective, is the occaſional or communicable principle of exiſtence which is taken notice of in every verbal ſtate. I have likewiſe ſhewed why this property gives occaſion to the ſeveral grammatic forms, in which the verbs of the Engliſh language differ from the forms of nouns. The power and uſe of each of theſe grammatic forms muſt now be particularly accounted for, and therefore I ſhall proceed to conſider what,

I think,

I think, may be called the different characters or capacities of the verb: and ſhall explain the import of the grammatic forms, under which it appears in each character.

Theſe characters or offices may be reduced to three, which I ſhall call "THE OBJECTIVE—THE COALESCENT" and "THE "DEFINITIVE," and ſhall give an account of in their order.

SECTION II.

Of the verb objective.

THE verb appears in this character, when it is uſed as a name of ſpecies expreſſing the ſtate denoted by it, merely as that ſtate is a compleat object of the intellect. In this uſe of the verb, the conception denoted by it is applied in the ſame manner, as a conception denoted by a noun ſubſtantive. And therefore ſuch conception may either be the object on which ſome other verb immediately depends, or that immediately depending on ſome other verb: or it may be taken, in any mode of eſtimation, along with another object, in which an object denoted by a noun ſubſtantive can be taken.

Hence the verb in this character may be either uſed as a nominative caſe, on which a definite verb depends; or as the accuſative, depending on a verb tranſitive; or with the ſigns of any of the oblique caſes; or with other prepoſitions, to ſhew the mode of eſtimation, in which the mind is applying the ſtate denoted by it.

The forms of the verb, as they appear in the infinitive mood, expreſs the verbal ſtate under this objective mode of conception. But the Engliſh forms of this mood cannot conveniently take the ſigns of oblique caſes, and other prepoſitions, before them; becauſe

becauſe the particle "*to*" is the ſign of the infinitive mood of a verb, as well as of the dative caſe of a ſubſtantive in Engliſh. And therefore, although Spencer uſes the expreſſion, "*Could* "*ſave the ſon of Thetis from to die*," meaning "*from death*," or "*from dying*; yet the expreſſion, "*to to die*," inſtead of "*to death*," or "*to dying*," would manifeſtly be neither clear in its meaning, nor agreeable to pronounce. And ſo, "*of to die* "*—in to die—with to die*," would be inconvenient forms of expreſſion.

Hence the participles are uſed objectively in Engliſh, and admit of the ſign of any caſe before them, or take any other propoſition before them, as noun ſubſtantives do: as, "*deceiving* "*—of—to—in—by deceiving*," "*having deceived—of—to—in* "*—by having deceived*," &c. So that theſe participial names of ſtates may either appear as a ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe on which a definitive verb depends; or in any oblique caſe depending upon a ſubſtantive, adjective, or verb. Indeed theſe participial names ſeldom appear in the vocative caſe; becauſe the ſtate denoted by a verb is ſeldom or never the object to which a ſpeaker addreſſes his diſcourſe. Nor do theſe participial names uſually appear in the plural number; becauſe the ſpecies of objects denoted by them, are ſeldom conceived as conſiſting of whole claſſes of ſeparate individuals, as the ſpecies of external and ſenſible objects uſually are. The verb in this character repreſents the ſtate denoted by it, by three forms which have relation to three modes, in which the mind conceives periods of time, viz. "*as remembered—as actually perceived*" and "*as barely* "*foreſeen.*" For time paſt is the object of memory only, time preſent of actual perception only, and time to come of foreſight only. Hence, according to this way of eſtimation, one of the three forms of the infinitive mood repreſents a ſtate, ſo far as it is paſt and over, another as in continuance, and another as unbegun. Thus, "*to have been*," repreſents the ſtate of being denoted by it, ſo far as it is merely remembered;

"*to*

"*to be*" repreſents the ſtate as it is the object of actual perception, and "*to be about to be*" repreſents it as foreſeen; and the three participles, "*having been—being—about to be,*" expreſs "*being*" under the ſame diſtinctions. Now a verbal ſtate may be in any one of theſe ſituations at any individual point of time. For ſuch ſtate may be conſidered as "*partly or intirely over,*" or "*as actually in being,*" or "*as unbegun*" yeſterday, or to-morrow, or at any period of time which the mind pitches upon. Becauſe the principle by which a verbal ſtate exiſts, may be conſidered as communicated to a period which is only remembered, or to a period which is actually perceived, or to a period which is only propoſed, or foreſeen, at any point of time. And it is frequently neceſſary in language to repreſent verbal ſtates as objects merely remembered, or actually perceived, or merely foreſeen, without regard to the preciſe point of time, when a particular ſtate is in one of theſe ſituations. And hence the objective forms of verbs take no notice of any preciſe point of time, when the ſtate expreſſed by one of them is to be conſidered as in the ſituation in which the verbal form repreſents it.

SECTION III.

Of the verb coaleſcent.

WHEN the verb is applied in this character or capacity, it is conceived that the ſtate denoted by it forms the characteriſtic of ſome ſpecies of objects; and that the name, or at leaſt ſome part of the expreſſion on which the verb in this capacity immediately depends, denotes an object which, for a time, is of the ſpecies whereof the verbal ſtate is the characteriſtic. The grammatic forms of the verb in this capacity, are the participles above mentioned. But when they expreſs a verbal ſtate thus applied, they are placed in immediate appoſi-

tion

tion after the expreſſion of the objective conception, which they ſo affect as to convey their characteriſtic ſtate into it. Thus, "*a man ſpeaking—thinking—approving*," denotes the man to be conſidered as of the ſpecies "*ſpeaker—thinker—approver*;" "*a thing contained—atchieved—performed*," is of the ſpecies "*content—atchievement—performance*;" and ſo of any other inſtance of the application of a coaleſcent participle, when names can be found in the language expreſſing ſpecies by verbal characters.

The objective conception, which is repreſented as of ſome ſpecies whereof a ſtate denoted by a participle is the characteriſtic, may, when conſidered as of ſuch ſpecies, be uſed to circumſtantiate ſome other objective conception, which is not conſidered as of the verbal ſpecies, whereof the characteriſtic is denoted by the coaleſcent participle. When the objective conception is thus applied, the verbal characteriſtic does not ſo affect the whole expreſſion, as that the conception denoted by it becomes an object of the verbal ſpecies; but it affects ſome objective conception only, which is contained in a part of the expreſſion on which the coaleſcent participle immediately depends. Thus in the expreſſions, "*the eye of a man ſhooting—an expence to a man tra-*" "*velling*," only "*the man*" is of the ſpecies "*ſhooter*" and "*traveller*." And being conſidered as firſt of one of theſe ſpecies, and then of another; he is uſed to circumſtantiate the objects "*eye*" and "*expence*." The object therefore, which a participle coaleſcent repreſents as of a certain verbal ſpecies, may be applied in any mode of eſtimation to circumſtantiate other objects. And, of conſequence, the name of the object on which ſuch participle depends, may be of any oblique caſe, or may take any prepoſition before it, to denote the mode of eſtimation in which it is applied to circumſtantiate the object on the expreſſion of which it depends, by the means of the ſign of the oblique caſe or other prepoſition.

An adjective may, in like manner, be joined with a ſubſtantive which is in any oblique caſe, or in dependence upon any prepoſition; and this agreement has occaſioned the participle coaleſcent to be conſidered as an adjective differing in nothing from the adjectives derived from ſubſtantives, except its reference to time. But, as has been already obſerved, the mode of coaleſcence by which a participle unites with the object, on the expreſſion of which it depends, is more ſimple than that by which an adjective unites with the object on the expreſſion of which it depends. In the union of a participle coaleſcent, there is no intervening ſtate to be underſtood: but in the union of an adjective, ſome ſtate muſt be underſtood, in order to form the coaleſcence. For the ſubſtantive contained in the ſignification of an adjective, can ſeldom or never be conſidered as the characteriſtic of a ſpecies, as a participial ſtate may be; and therefore the mind is under a neceſſity of having recourſe to ſome mode of eſtimation ſimilar to ſome of thoſe which are denoted by prepoſitions, to form the connexion between an adjective and the ſubſtantive on which it depends: and uſually other intervening ſtates muſt be underſtood. Thus, "*a deceitful man*" is equivalent to "*a man of deceit*," and either of the expreſſions is equivalent to "*a man practiſing*, or *who practiſes deceit*;" ſo that "*the man*" is "*the practitioner*," and "*deceit*" is "*that* "*which is practiſed.*" That is to ſay, a pair of correlative participial ſtates muſt be underſtood, or a mode of eſtimation muſt be applied, which is equivalent to the underſtanding of ſuch pair of ſtates, before the connexion between "*deceit*" and "*the* "*man*," as it is expreſſed by the adjective, can be apprehended. Whereas, when a coaleſcent participle depends upon a ſubſtantive, nothing is to be underſtood: but the verbal ſtate ſo communicates its eſſential principle, as to be taken immediately along with the object denoted by the ſubſtantive; that object being conſidered as of a ſpecies of which the ſtate is the characteriſtic.

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The participles in Greek and Latin are always coaleſcent, and are conceived to communicate with the gender, number, and caſe, of the object with which they coaleſce: and therefore, in theſe languages, they are declined with variety of terminations, to expreſs the circumſtances of gender, number, and caſe, as taken into them from the objects on which they depend. But as participles are uſed objectively in Engliſh, they are of conſequence all of the neuter gender, ſeeing the ſtates denoted by them are neither male nor female. And, as theſe ſtates are ſeldom conſidered as conſiſting of ſeveral individuals, the Engliſh participles have ſeldom a plural number. As to caſe, the Engliſh objective participle may take the ſign of any caſe before it, as any ſubſtantive may do. But the coaleſcent participle never takes the ſign of any caſe before it: ſeeing it unites with the object on which it depends, ſo as to form one complex object, and of courſe it is conceived to partake of all the connexions of the object on which it depends.

When a coaleſcent participle depends upon the name, or expreſſion of an object; the whole conception of the object in the participial ſtate, becomes that of an object "*of memory*, *of actual* "*perception*, or *of foreſight*," according as the participle is of the paſt, preſent, or future tenſe. Thus, "*a man having ſpoke*," expreſſes an object of memory; "*a man ſpeaking*," an object of actual perception; "*a man about to ſpeak*," an object of foreſight; and ſo of other inſtances. Now a man may be conſidered as in any of theſe ſituations yeſterday, or to-morrow, or at any particular point of time; and therefore the coaleſcent verb, like the definitive, may be referred, in any of its forms, to any point of time, paſt, preſent, or to come.

SECTION IV.

Of the verb definitive.

THE verb appears in its definitive capacity in all the forms of its inflexion, except thoſe of the infinitive mood, and the participles; which have been already ſhewn to contain it in its objective and coaleſcent capacities. When the verb appears in this character, it ſhews "that the expreſſion of the objective "conception on which it depends is ſtopped, as to any farther "compoſition; and that the object denoted by the whole of ſuch "expreſſion, becomes an object of the ſpecies whereof the parti-"cipial ſtate contained in the ſignification of the verb, is the cha-"racteriſtic." Thus in the expreſſions, "*a man ſees—hears—*"*thinks*," "*the man*" is of the ſpecies" "*ſeer—hearer—thinker*;" and the participial ſtates, "*ſeeing—hearing—thinking*," contained in the ſeveral verbs, make him ſo. In theſe expreſſions, the object on which the verbs depend is expreſſed by the ſingle name, "*a man*;" and the definitive forms of the verbs, "*ſees—*"*hears—thinks*," give notice that all farther compoſition of the expreſſion of that object is ſtopped. But in the expreſſion; "*a man of quick perception ſees—hears—thinks*," "*the man of* "*quick perception*" is "*the ſeer—hearer—thinker*;" and the definitive forms of the verbs give notice that the expreſſion of the object on which they depend, is not intended to be compounded farther. The ſeries of words, by which an objective conception is expreſſed, may be extended to any length, and varied innumerable ways before a definitive verb is made to depend upon the expreſſion of ſuch conception: but as ſoon as ſuch a verb is applied to the ſeries, the compoſition of it can be carried no farther; and the whole object is ſo affected by the verbal ſtate, as to become an object of the ſpecies of which that ſtate is the characteriſtic or diſtinguiſhing property.

The

The giving notice " that the compoſition of the expreſſion is " cloſed, on which the verb depends; and that the whole concep- " tion, denoted by the expreſſion, is ſo affected by the ſtate con- " tained in the ſignification of the verb, as to become a ſingular " or plural object of the ſpecies whereof that ſtate is the charac- " teriſtic," is peculiar to the definitive form of the verb: no other kind of word in language giving the like notice.

The act of affirmation conſiſts in giving this notice; and where it is not given, there can be no compleat ſentence. For a ſentence, as has been already obſerved, conſiſts of two parts, called by the logicians the ſubject, and the predicate. The ſubject is always the expreſſion of a conception which the mind can make the ſingle or eſpecial object of its contemplation: and therefore any ſingle ſubſtantive, or any ſingle objective verb, may be the ſubject of a ſentence. But any ſeries of words containing compleat ſenſe, may likewiſe be conſidered as a compound name of what the mind makes the eſpecial object of its contemplation: and therefore any ſuch ſeries of words may likewiſe be the ſubject of a ſentence. Hence it never can be known whether the ſpeaker propoſes to uſe a ſingle objective name, or a ſeries of words forming an expreſſion equivalent to a ſingle objective name, to expreſs the ſubject about which he propoſes to ſpeak; till himſelf gives notice of his intention: and if he uſes a ſeries of words to expreſs ſuch ſubject; it is impoſſible to know how far he will carry ſuch ſeries, till himſelf gives notice that he has ſtopped the compoſition of it.

It is manifeſt, that the predicate of every ſentence begins at the definitive verb itſelf. For the grammatic form of the verb, conſidered independently of the reſt of its ſignification, amounts to a declaration concerning the expreſſion of the ſubject of the ſentence, that the farther compoſition of ſuch expreſſion is ſtopped, and that the participial ſtate contained in the ſignification of the verb, affects the whole object which is the ſubject of the ſentence;

tence; whether that object be expreſſed by one word, or by a ſeries of words.

I have already ſhewed, that a verb may have other words made to depend upon it by various modes of proceeding. The definitive verb, and all that depends upon it, ſo as to affect the ſtate denoted by it, is the predicate of every ſentence. There is no kind of grammatical form annexed to any ſort of words, in order to give notice how far the compoſition of the predicate of a ſentence is carried. Such predicate may conſiſt of a definitive verb only: but it more frequently conſiſts of a ſeries of words, which taken together, ſhew the ſtate contained in the definitive verb, as circumſtantiated in ſome certain manner. The judgment alone determines when the ſeries ceaſes to circumſtantiate the ſtate of the verb on which it depends; and when it does ſo ceaſe, the ſentence is at an end. A new ſentence may then begin, and notice may be given by another definitive verb of that which is the ſubject of this ſentence; and the judgment again determines how far the expreſſion is carried, which is attributed to this latter ſubject as the predicate thereof.

This proceeding manifeſtly takes its riſe from the limited powers of the mind of man. For the mind not being able to comprehend any very complex object all at once, by making it the ſubject of its contemplation; has recourſe to the expedient of attending to ſuch object by piece-meal; firſt making one part of it the ſubject of its eſpecial contemplation, and then another part; and declaring as it goes on what are the powers, properties, and ſituations, of ſo much of the object under conſideration, as it makes the ſubject of its eſpecial attention in each particular ſentence.

It is the nature of words, and not that of the things ſignified by them, which occaſions the uſe of the grammatic definitive forms of verbs. For if every conception which the mind makes

the ſubject of its eſpecial contemplation, could be denoted by a ſingle name; there would be no neceſſity to uſe a whole ſeries of words on any occaſion, as the ſubject of a ſentence. And if no compoſition were ever uſed in the expreſſing of objective conceptions, there would be no need to ſhew, by any grammatical form, that the compoſition is ſtopped. The grammatical definitive forms of the verb, therefore, only ſhew the intention of the ſpeaker with regard to the compoſition of his expreſſion; and if that can be ſhewn by any other means than the uſe of ſuch forms, the infinitive mood of verbs, or the participles, may be made to anſwer all the purpoſes of a verb. This will appear moſt evidently, if we take any ſeries of words in which there are ſeveral participles affecting all that part of the ſeries which goes before each of them: for any of theſe participles may be turned into its correſponding definitive verb, and the ſenſe of all the ſentences, ſo formed, will be the ſame. Thus the following ſeries, "*a lady ſitting in the garden viewing the flowers,*" may be turned into the two ſentences, "*a lady is ſitting in the garden viewing the flowers—a lady ſitting in the garden is viewing the flowers,*" which are exactly equivalent to each other. For indeed the whole conception is in the mind of the ſpeaker at once as the firſt ſeries expreſſes it. But for the convenience of the hearer, the ſpeaker may direct the part preceding either of the participles to be made the eſpecial object of his attention, and ſubjoin the reſt to ſuch part, when made ſuch eſpecial object. And this is done by uſing firſt the definitive verb which correſponds to one of the participles, and then that which correſponds to the other. But ſeveral participles cannot conveniently be uſed ſo as to affect every part of long ſerieſes of words immediately; and therefore every ſeries of words in which ſeveral participles appear, cannot be changed into ſeveral equivalent ſentences in the manner ſhewn above. Thus, "*a lady ſitting in the garden viewing the flowers preſenting various colours,*" cannot be turned into the ſentence, "*a lady ſitting, &c. is preſenting various colours.*" For the flowers only, are "*the preſenters,*" and not "*the lady ſitting,*" &c.

It

It has been laid down as a principle in grammar, of late years, that the eſſence of the verb conſiſts in affirmation, and that affirmation is a particular act of the judgment, which the mind paſſes upon the object which is the ſubject of ſuch act of judgment. In conſequence of this principle, the verb in its definitive capacity only, has been conſidered and called a verb; whilſt in its objective capacity, it has been ranked amongſt noun ſubſtantives; and in its coaleſcent capacity, amongſt noun adjectives. This proceeding is a ſhort way of getting quit of the difficulty of ſhewing explicitly wherein the ſignification of a verb definitive differs from the ſignification of the verb objective, and coaleſcent; and that of all of them from the ſignification of a noun ſubſtantive, or of a noun adjective.

But in the act of connecting ſpeech, ſo as to expreſs conſiſtent ſenſe, the mind paſſes a judgment on every objective conception, whether it be denoted by a ſingle ſubſtantive, or contained in the ſignification of an adjective, or of a verb. It is by repeated acts of judgment, that the mind is enabled to pitch upon the proper modes of eſtimation by which theſe objective conceptions may be united, ſo as to form together ſome more complex conception without inconſiſtency. Hence no greater exertion of the judgment is required in uniting a definite verb conſiſtently with the expreſſion of an object, than there is in uniting a coaleſcent participle with the ſame expreſſion of the ſame object. This fully appears from the example given above. It is not indeed abſolutely neceſſary that "*the hearer*" ſhould exert his judgment on what is ſaid in a ſentence, until a definitive verb is applied; becauſe the expreſſion of the object of eſpecial attention, about which the ſentence is ſpoke, is not compleated, and may be varied innumerable ways; if the ſpeaker does not give notice, that he will make no farther additions to it. But "*the ſpeaker*" muſt neceſſarily exerciſe his judgment at the addition of every new appendage to the expreſſion of the object about which he propoſes to ſpeak, if he intends that the ſenſe of the

expreſſion

expreſſion ſhall be comprehended by the hearer. Indeed, if he propoſes that the ſound, or viſible appearance only, of one and more words, ſhall be the object which he makes the ſubject of a ſentence; ſuch a proceeding does not require the judgment to be exerciſed as it is in forming expreſſions of ſenſe. Yet one word, or a ſeries of words, thus conſidered, may be the ſubject of truth or falſhood: for it may be ſaid of ſuch a ſubject, that it is "*an expreſſion.*" But if the verb "*is,*" or any other definitive verb, be placed after a ſubject conſiſting of one or more words, the ſound or viſible appearance whereof is only attended to; ſuch a ſubject cannot be farther compounded. And it is manifeſtly the notice of this circumſtance, which conſtitutes the affirmation, and not the act of judgment of the ſpeaker conſidered as beginning to be applied when the verb is pronounced. For if the verb "*being*" were applied inſtead of "*is,*" or a participle of ſome other verb inſtead of the definitive form; the judgment muſt be equally exerted. As if we were to ſay, "*ſuch or ſuch words* "*being an expreſſion,*" only the compoſition of the ſeries is not now ſtopped; and therefore the ſeries does not contain an affirmation.

The uſe of the verbs called imperſonals, may ſeem not to agree with this account of the power of the definitive verb: for imperſonal verbs are ſuppoſed not to depend on any ſubject. Thus the Latin verbs, "*pluit—tonat,*" which we expreſs by, "*it rains—it thunders,*" are uſed without any ſubject expreſſed in words. But the ſubject, to which they are applied, is conceived always to be the ſame, and known both to the ſpeaker and hearer: whether it be "*the heaven*" or "*the air,*" or whatſoever object it be, which is conſidered as, "*raining*" or "*thun-* "*dering*;" and this previous knowledge is equivalent to ſome demonſtrative circumſtance which might ſupply the object that is repreſented by "*it,*" in Engliſh; or by the forms of the third perſon in the verbs, "*pluit—tonat,*" in Latin. For if the verb, "*currit,*" for inſtance, (which may be tranſlated, "*he runs—ſhe* "*runs* or *it runs,*" in the preſent uſe of the Latin language) had

never been applied but to one certain object; there would be no occaſion to mention the name of the object that is repreſented, as running by the verb "*currit*." But as it is now applied, if a ſpeaker ſhould ſay, "*he runs*," in Engliſh, or "*currit*," in Latin, and add no more words, the hearer would not conceive the ſpeaker's meaning, unleſs he actually pointed to ſome "*horſe*," or other object in the act of "*running*."

The uſe of the relative pronoun confirms the account which is given above of the nature of affirmation: for this pronoun does not deſtroy the connective or coaleſcent power of the verb; but its definitive power only. That is to ſay, a relative clauſe does not give notice that the compoſition of the expreſſion in which it is concerned, is ſtopped: and therefore a relative clauſe taken together with its antecedent, or frequently with the clauſe in which the antecedent ſtands, contains no affirmation; although it contains a definitive verb. Yet the ſame judgment is paſſed when a definitive verb is uſed in dependence upon an object denoted by a relative pronoun, as would be if the object were denoted by any other name.

This may be ſtill farther confirmed by making any compleat ſentence dependent on a relative adverb, ſuch as, "*when—why* "*how—where*:" for the ſenſe of the ſentence ſo depending, may be expreſſed by words which have no definitive verb in them. Thus let the ſentence, "*he comes*," be made to depend on the words, "*to know when—why—how—where*," and the expreſſions ariſing from this proceeding, will be "*to know when—how—why* "*where he comes*;" and theſe expreſſions are equivalent to the following, "*to know the time—the reaſon—the manner—the place* "*of his coming*." Hence it is clear, that theſe adverbs reduce the force of the compleat ſentence, "*he comes*," to that of a noun ſubſtantive in the genitive caſe, with a pronoun poſſeſſive, or adjective, depending upon it. So that relative adverbs, as well as relative pronouns, in effect, deſtroy the definitive power of the verb, in the

the clauſe that depends upon them. And the reaſon why they do ſo manifeſtly is, becauſe they give notice, that the clauſe in which one of them is concerned, is not ſtopped as to farther compoſition, and that the participial ſtate of the definitive verb does not affect all the words on which the verb depends. Hence ſuch a clauſe is not an affirmation, although it may contain an affirmation in it.

From all theſe obſervations laid down together, the preciſe difference of ſignification may be determined, between a coaleſcent participle, and a definitive verb, viz. the participle may depend upon the expreſſion of an object which may be employed to circumſtantiate another object, whilſt yet that other object is not ſo affected by the participial ſtate, as to become an object of the ſpecies whereof that ſtate is the characteriſtic; as in the expreſſion, "*an attention to a man reading*," only the man is of the ſpecies "*reader*;" and ſo of other inſtances of the like conſtruction. Or the participle may depend upon a complex object, and may be circumſtantiated by other words, that do not convey their ſignification through the participial ſtate, into the whole object on which the participle depends; as in the expreſſion, "*a taſte for pleaſures* "*procured by expence of time and money thrown away upon them*;" "*pleaſures*" only are "*the object procured*," and "*the expence of* "*time and money*" is "*that which is thrown away*," whilſt "*taſte*" is neither "*the object procured*," nor "*that thrown away*." But when a verb definitive is applied; the participial ſtate contained in it, and the words that modify it, affects the whole ſubject on the expreſſion of which it depends; and ſo fixes it in that ſtate, that it cannot be farther compounded, or varied, but by varying the definitive verb into its correſpondent participle, or by removing the verb out of the ſentence.

What is here ſaid of the participle may be equally applied to the relative clauſe, in every inſtance in which a participle can be ſubſtituted inſtead of a relative clauſe. And I have already ſhewn the inſtances in which ſuch ſubſtitution can be made.

It follows, from the account which is given above of the power and uſe of the definitive grammatic forms of verbs, that no verb of ſuch forms can be conſiſtently applied in dependence upon any word which muſt itſelf be made dependent on ſome other word that is not mentioned. For the definitive form of a verb gives notice, that the compoſition of the expreſſion on which it depends is compleated; and the word on which the verb is ſuppoſed to depend in this inſtance, gives notice by its grammatic form, that it muſt be taken in dependence upon ſome other word, which by the ſuppoſition is not mentioned. The declaration or notice of the definitive form of the verb would therefore, in ſuch an application of it, be of a meaning inconſiſtent with that of the dependent grammatic form of the word, on which it would depend, and of conſequence the whole expreſſion would be abſurd.

What is ſaid of a ſingle word of a dependent form, may equally be applied to a ſeries of words dependent on ſuch a word. For the compoſition of the expreſſion is incompleat till the word is known, on which the ſeries muſt depend; and therefore till ſuch word is known, no definitive verbal form can be conſiſtently applied to the ſeries.

Hence ſingle ſubſtantives of oblique caſes, adjectives, relative pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepoſitions, can none of them alone be the ſubject of a ſentence; nor can any ſeries of words depending on any of them be ſuch ſubject, if the word or expreſſion is not added, on which theſe parts of ſpeech muſt depend. And hence there muſt be a nominative caſe of a noun ſubſtantive, or an objective verb, or ſome expreſſion which is equivalent to one of theſe, in the ſubject of every ſentence; for otherwiſe the compoſition cannot be compleat.

I except in what is ſaid above, that inſtance in which words are applied merely to repreſent the ſound annexed to them, or the viſible form preſented to the eye by them; for in this application

cation of words, any ſingle word, or any ſeries of words, may be the ſubject of a ſentence, and the ſenſe of ſuch ſeries may be either conſiſtent or not.

The definitive verb has relation to time, as diſtinguiſhed into paſt, preſent, and to come, and this preſent time is always the time of ſpeaking. For the manner of eſtimating the diſtinctions of time to which the definitive forms of verbs relate, ſuppoſes the preſent to be determined by the act of ſpeaking, and the paſt, and future, to be eſtimated from the preſent ſo determined. Hence this "*preſent*" is continually ſhifting. For no two words can be ſpoke by one ſpeaker in the ſame inſtant of time. Yet the preſent forms or tenſes of any definitive verb, equally relate to *any time in which theſe tenſes are actually ſpoke*, and the paſt tenſes equally relate to *time preceding*, and the future tenſes to *time ſucceeding any time in which theſe tenſes are actually ſpoke*. So that the act of pronouncing a definitive verb is a demonſtrative circumſtance, which aſcertains the period of time to which the ſtate denoted by the verb is to be referred. If therefore the perſon to whom a ſentence is addreſſed does not actually hear the ſentence ſpoke, he cannot know the time to which the definitive verb relates that is uſed in ſuch ſentence, till he is told the point of time when the ſentence was delivered. Hence it becomes neceſſary to date letters, and deeds, and many other writings, in order to let the reader know the point of time that is the preſent, by which the paſt and future is eſtimated in each letter, deed, or other writing. For if this is not done, the periods cannot be determined, to which the preſent, paſt, and future forms of the definitive verbs refer, which are uſed in ſuch letter, deed, &c. yet till theſe periods are known, it may not be poſſible to apprehend the full import of many of the ſentences; becauſe the ſame objects which were in certain ſtates of being, when a letter, or other writing, was written concerning them, may not be in theſe verbal ſtates when the letter, or writing, is read. But the date enables the reader to conſider

the letter, or writing, as words actually ſpoke at the time which the date expreſſes; and therefore ſuch date ſupplies the place of a demonſtrative circumſtance with regard to time, juſt as the name at the bottom of a letter ſupplies the place of a demonſtrative circumſtance, aſcertaining the meaning of the pronoun of the firſt perſon; and as the direction of the letter ſupplies another demonſtrative circumſtance, aſcertaining the meaning of the pronoun of the ſecond perſon; if theſe pronouns are uſed in the letter. For the preſent tenſes of definitive verbs (if conſidered in themſelves) expreſs the ſtates denoted by them, as exiſting at any time in which theſe tenſes are actually ſpoke; and the paſt tenſes as before, and the future tenſes as after, any time in which theſe tenſes are actually ſpoke. But the act of ſpeaking, or the date, fixes the general meaning of the tenſes; by ſhewing what point, or part, of time is to be conſidered as the individual preſent point, or part, by which the preſent, paſt, and future, is eſtimated, to which the tenſes of the definitive verbs relate in the ſentence in queſtion. That is to ſay, the act of ſpeaking determines this point of time in words actually ſpoke, and the date determines it in the letter, or other writing, to which the date is put; for the date is the preſent time written down. And ſo the pronoun "*I*" is the name of "*of any perſon who ſpeaks and* "*names himſelf*;" and "*thou*," or "*you*," is "*the name of any* "*perſon ſpoken to.*" But if words are actually ſpoken by perſons who are preſent with each other; the act of ſpeaking, and addreſſing what is ſpoke, fixes the general meaning of theſe pronouns to a particular ſpeaker and hearer. And if this meaning is not thus fixed, it muſt be fixed by other means, *i. e.* by writing down the name of the perſon ſpeaking, and of the perſon ſpoken to. I ſhould proceed to conſider what the grammarians call the voices of the verb; but in order to explain theſe voices, it is neceſſary to conſider the nature of thoſe ſtates which admit of verbs of different voices, and to ſhew why ſome ſorts of verbs do not admit thereof.

SECTION

SECTION V.

Of the different ſorts of verbs.

IT is neceſſary for the purpoſes of teaching, that verbs ſhould be diſtinguiſhed into ſorts, denoted hy different names; and that the diſtinctions of theſe ſorts ſhould be taken, both from the manner in which they are placed in conſtruction, and from the manner in which their grammatic forms are compoſed.

Of verbs as diſtinguiſhed into ſorts by the manner in which they are placed in conſtruction.

VERBS diſtinguiſhed by this manner of conſidering them, are reduced to two ſorts, *the tranſitive*, and *the intranſitive*, or *neuter*, as they are ſometimes called.

Verbs tranſitive denote ſuch ſtates as are eaſily diſtinguiſhable in their ſource, from another ſtate, derived from the ſame ſource, in ſuch a manner, that either ſtate ſuppoſes the other, and correſponds with it. Theſe ſtates I have called correſpondent ſtates in a former part of this treatiſe, and have ſhewn that the expreſſions of them are the correſpondent active and paſſive forms of the ſame verb. One of theſe ſtates is uſually obſerved in one object, and its correſponding ſtate in another object; and if the verbal name of either of the ſtates is mentioned, the conception of the ſtate correſpondent to it readily occurs to the mind; becauſe both the ſtates are moſt conſtantly obſerved to exiſt together, although the one of them moſt commonly has its exiſtence in one object, and the other in another. Or if both the ſtates happen to be obſerved in one and the ſame object, ſuch object appears in two capacities, being at once the ſource of the one ſtate; and the object in which the correſponding ſtate is obſerved.

ſerved. Much the greateſt number of verbs denote theſe tranſitive ſtates; as they are the principal means by which the mind is enabled to paſs on from an object, the conception of which is compleatly formed and expreſſed, to ſome other object, the conception whereof is alſo compleatly formed, and is to be expreſſed. Thoſe ſtates which are the reſult of ſome ſpontaneous exertion of power, are uſually expreſſed by what are called the active forms of ſome tranſitive verb. The ſtates, which are the correſpondents to the former, are expreſſed by what are called the paſſive forms of the ſame verb. And theſe ſtates are conceived to be the reſult of the reception of ſome effect produced by their correſponding active ſtates. Thus, "*to ſee—to hear—to read—to* "*make*," are active forms of ſo many tranſitive verbs. "*To be* "*ſeen—to be heard—to be read—to be made*," are the correſpondent paſſive forms of the ſame verbs; and ſo of other inſtances.

But there are many verbs in which it is not eaſy to diſtinguiſh the ſtate as it is in exertion, from the ſtate as it is in the reception of the effect produced by ſuch exertion; as the ſtates, "*to* "*grow—to wither—to reſt—to exiſt*," &c. Theſe verbs, therefore, are not reſolvable into correſpondent expreſſions of pairs of correſpondent ſtates, the one of which may be conſidered in one object, and the other in another; or the one of which may be firſt applied to an object, and the other to the ſame object. Whereas, both theſe proceedings may take place in the application of the pairs of correſpondent ſtates, denoted by the correſpondent active and paſſive forms of a verb tranſitive. For as "*a man*," for inſtance, may ſee or hear ſome other object, ſo he may ſee or hear himſelf; that is to ſay, he may both be the object ſeeing and hearing, and the object ſeen and heard.

The verbs which are not eaſily reſolvable, or which are not uſually reſolved into pairs of expreſſions of correſpondent ſtates, are verbs intranſitive, or verbs neuter; being conſidered, when denoted

denoted by the latter name, as verbs which denote neither action nor ſuffering, or ſtates which are intermediate between both.

The verb "*to be*" is manifeſtly a verb neuter; but it differs from all other verbs in this very conſiderable circumſtance, viz. that it admits of every noun ſubſtantive to depend upon it in immediate appoſition: whilſt by ſuch appoſition, a connexion is denoted between the ſtate ſignified by it, and the object ſignified by the ſubſtantive on which it depends; yet no new ſtate is conſidered as in the ſubſtantive; ſo that the object denoted by ſuch ſubſtantive, becomes of no verbal ſpecies, except that of "*a be-*" "*ing*," by any of the forms of this verb depending immediately on it; and it is known, that every object is of the ſpecies "*being*," whether a verb is made dependent on its name, or not. It is the nature of ſubſtantive names, and chiefly of the names of ſpecies, which gives occaſion to this kind of conſtruction. For although no ſpecies is the ſame with any other ſpecies, nor any individual the ſame with any other individual; yet one and the ſame object may ſo communicate with ſeveral ſpecies, as to have the properties in it, at one and the ſame time, which conſtitute the characteriſtics of the ſeveral ſpecies. And how many ſoever the characteriſtics are, which one and the ſame object has in it, by ſo many names of ſpecies that object may be called. An individual object may be firſt named by a proper name, or by any name of ſpecies by which it can be called, if that name of ſpecies be properly circumſtantiated (and there are words in language which may be ſo applied, as to circumſtantiate a name of ſpecies to any degree of preciſion:) and if the ſpeaker intends to ſhew what other name of ſpecies, or what proper name, is equally applicable to the object which he has mentioned by ſome name, ſo as to have raiſed the conception of it in the mind of the hearer; he interpoſes ſome form of the verb "*to be*" between the names; as, "*ſuch a man is a merchant—being a merchant—who is a* "*merchant.*" This verb therefore does not carry on the mind from the ſubſtantive name of one object to the ſubſtantive name

of another, as the verb tranſitive moſt commonly does; but from one name of an object to another name of the ſame object. Now every object in language is conſidered as "*being*" that which is denoted by every name that the ſpeaker has occaſion to give the object; and therefore its *verbal being* is conſidered as occaſionally taking into it the characteriſtic of every ſpecies, by the name of which the object can be denoted.

This "*being*" is therefore occaſional and communicable, and is ſo expreſſed by the verb "*to be:*" of conſequence it muſt be conſidered with reſpect to time paſt, preſent, or to come: for an object may have the characteriſtics of ſeveral ſpecies in it at one time, and not at another. Hence the temporary forms of the verb "*to* "*be*" refer to the time when the characteriſtic of the ſpecies, the name of which depends upon the verb, is obſerved in the object, the name of which the verb depends upon; as in the expreſſions, "*ſuch a man is—was—will be—who is—who was—* "*who will be—being—having been—going to be a merchant.*"

The name by which an object is firſt mentioned, is always ſuppoſed to be a name applicable to it at the time of ſpeaking: and if both the names by which an object is expreſſed be ſuch as are always applicable to it, the forms of the verb which relate to the preſent time are uſed, in connecting the names; and the mind is left to determine from the nature of the ſpecies denoted by the name depending on the verb, that the connexion denoted by it is not temporary, but perpetual. Thus the expreſſion, "*a horſe is an animal,*" ſhews that the characteriſtic of the ſpecies "*animal,*" is obſerved in any or every horſe at all times, although the form of the verb "*is,*" if taken in its ſtricteſt ſenſe, only relates to the time of ſpeaking.

All general truths are expreſſed in like manner by verbs which relate to the preſent time, that is, to the time of ſpeaking, if taken in their ſtricteſt ſenſe. But the nature of the objects joined

joined by the verbs, ſhew when they are intended to ſignify perpetuity of ſtate.

This mode of communication amongſt objects may be called the deſcriptive mode, as has already been obſerved; for it ſerves to ſhew what objects are: and is the original verbal mode to which all the others are referred; and therefore all adjectives, participles, and prepoſitions, may be placed as well as ſubſtantives in dependence upon the verb "*to be*," and when ſo placed, the connective part of their ſignification unites with, and gives farther modifications to this deſcriptive mode of communication.

The ſtates denoted by the ſeveral forms of the verb "*to be*," frequently take names of parts of time, or names of meaſures, and ſometimes names of other kinds after them in immediate appoſition; and connect theſe names with other names on which the verbal forms depend; although theſe other names are not the names of the ſame parts of time, or of the ſame meaſures, &c. But in this kind of conſtruction, the names which follow the verb are uſed as ſo many adverbs: for a particular mode of eſtimation muſt be uſed in applying the time, or the meaſure, &c. to the object on which the verb depends; and not the general, or deſcriptive mode, by which two names of the ſame object are united by the forms of the verb. Thus,

When it is ſaid, "*ſuch a thing was laſt year*," the meaning is, "*during laſt year*," or "*in the laſt year*;" or "*ſuch a meaſure is three feet*," the meaning is, "*containing three feet*," or "*of three feet*;" and ſo of other inſtances. For the meaning of the two names united by the verb, prevents ambiguity; although no mark is ſet down of the complex mode of eſtimation, by which the latter is applied to the verbal ſtate; and through that to the object on which the verb depends.

The verb "*to exiſt*," although nearly of the ſame ſignification with the verb "*to be*," when the two verbs are conſidered in themſelves; is not uſed to carry on the mind from an object expreſſed by one name, to the ſame object as expreſſed by another name. For this verb is appropriated to ſignify ſuch "*being*," as thoſe objects are poſſeſſed of, which have the principle by which they exiſt within themſelves, independent of any mode of conception of the mind of man. The verb "*to be*" is ſometimes applied in the ſame ſenſe in which the verb "*to exiſt*" is applied; as when it is ſaid, "*God is.*"

The effect of a ſtate denoted by a verb neuter is frequently found to have a ſubſtantive name; and ſuch a ſubſtantive may uſually be placed after its correſpondent verb in a tranſitive conſtruction, although other ſubſtantives cannot be ſo placed. Thus, "*to live—to die—to fly—to ſleep*," are verbs neuter; and the ſubſtantives, "*a life—a death—a flight—a ſleep*," are the names of ſtates which are the effects or conſequences of their reſpective verbal ſtates, above mentioned. And therefore, "*to live a life—to die a death—to fly a flight—to ſleep a ſleep*," are expreſſions commonly uſed, although other ſubſtantives cannot be uſed in dependence upon theſe verbs by the ſame mode of eſtimation.

SECTION VI.

Of verbs as diſtinguiſhed into ſorts by the different manners in which their grammatic forms are compoſed.

THIS method of diſtinguiſhing verbs into ſorts, has produced the ſeveral ſets of forms which the grammarians call "*the voices*" of the verb; which voices are conſidered but as two in the Latin, and are called "*the active*" and the "*paſſive voice*;"

"*voice*;" but in the Greek they are conſidered as three, and are called "*the active—the paſſive*, and *the middle voice*."

It has been obſerved by other writers on the Engliſh grammar, that this threefold diſtinction of voice agrees very well with the grammatic forms of the Engliſh verb: and this diſtinction has been followed, in a grammatic treatiſe, publiſhed not long ago, concerning this part of ſpeech, as it appears in the Engliſh language. I ſhall therefore obſerve this diſtinction in what follows: for it is leſs troubleſome to learners, to conſider the verb as of a middle voice, than to conſider every tenſe of the active voice under a double form, which yet muſt be done, if a middle voice is not admitted. When this voice is admitted, the preſent tenſe, and firſt preterite of the indicative mood, muſt ſtill be conſidered under a double form.

Of the active voice of verbs.

THE ſet of forms which compoſe this voice are called "*active*;" becauſe it is obſerved, that far the greateſt number of verbal ſtates expreſſed by any of them, are the reſult of the exertion of ſome effort, which may be conſidered as action, if the word be taken in its moſt extenſive ſenſe. The verb "*to call*" appears in the forms of this voice, at Section XXI. of the practical part of this book.

Of the paſſive voice.

THE greateſt number of verbs, when varied according to the forms of this voice, expreſs ſtates which are not conceived to be the reſult of any effort exerted; but of the reception of the effect of ſome exertion of effort; and theſe ſtates may be conſidered as ſo many ſtates of "*paſſion*" or "*ſuffering*" in the largeſt acceptation of theſe words. The verb "*to call*" appears in this voice, at the ſection above mentioned.

Of

Of the middle voice.

VERBS of the forms of this voice moſt commonly denote ſtates of the ſame nature with thoſe which the active forms of the ſame verbs denote; but on ſome occaſions alſo the ſame ſtates, which the paſſive forms of the ſame verbs denote, though leſs frequently; as in the expreſſions, "*the houſe* "*is building*—*the deeds were drawing*," &c. The grammatic forms of the voice are alſo compoſed by means of the ſeveral forms of the verb "*to be*," as the paſſive voice is; but inſtead of the paſſive, or paſt participle, which is uſed in compoſing the forms of the paſſive voice; the active or preſent participle (which in Engliſh always ends in "*ing*") is uſed in compoſing the forms of the middle voice. So that the verb in this voice, whether conſidered in its ſignification, or in its grammatic forms, partakes of the nature, both of the active, and paſſive verb. The verb "*to call*" appears in this voice, at the ſection above mentioned,

SECTION VII.

Of the conjugation of verbs.

THE ſeries of ſtated forms, by which one and the ſame verb is varied through the ſeveral voices, in order to expreſs, firſt, and principally, the verbal ſtate under the threefold diſtinction of being the object of actual perception, or of memory, or of foreſight, and then to expreſs the ſtate in each of theſe circumſtances as alſo under other modifications by forms of the verb itſelf, is called the conjugation of the verb.

The forms of every ſuch ſeries are diſtinguiſhed into ſeveral claſſes, each whereof is called a mood, and each of theſe moods is

is again ſubdiſtinguiſhed into claſſes of forms, called tenſes; which tenſes are each of them diſtinguiſhed into forms, called the perſons of the verb; and theſe perſons are of two numbers; except the tenſes of the infinitive mood, and the participles, which have not the diſtinction of perſon and number.

The moods, tenſes, numbers, and perſons, are called by the ſame names in each of the voices; and if the method is well obſerved in a few verbs, by which the tenſes of each mood, and the numbers, and perſons of each tenſe, are formed; it will not be difficult to vary other verbs through the ſame moods and tenſes of each of the voices, by uſing ſome verb, the variations of which are known, as a pattern to vary other verbs by. Several of theſe patterns (or paradigms, as they are called in grammar) are ſet down at length, in what is ſaid of the conjugation of the verb in the practical part of this book.

The variation of the forms of the Engliſh verb conſiſts partly in the alteration of the ſyllables of the verb itſelf; and partly in prefixing certain ſigns to ſeveral of the tenſes; which ſigns are many of them alſo the names of verbal ſtates, and when not uſed with a verbal expreſſion depending on them, have the compleat ſignification of ſo many verbs.

The nature of theſe ſigns will be conſidered, when we come to ſpeak of the tenſes in particular: but as to the placing them properly in the moods and tenſes to which they reſpectively belong, there is no difficulty; for they are placed alike in the ſame moods, tenſes, and perſons, of all verbs in the ſame voices; ſo that if they are duly obſerved and remembered, through the ſeveral voices of any one verb, they may be readily applied through the voices of any other verb.

But the variation of the ſyllables of ſeveral Engliſh verbs is not eaſily reducible to any certain patterns.

There are but three forms of the Engliſh verb, together with the participle in "*ing*," neceſſary to be attended to, in order to compoſe all the other forms properly, of any of the voices. Theſe forms have been called, the roots of the verb; and they appear in the firſt perſons of the three firſt tenſes of the indicative mood active, if conſidered without the pronoun perſonal and the ſign of the third tenſe. Thus the three forms, "*I name—I named* "*—I have named*," if conſidered without the pronoun "*I*," and the laſt of them alſo without the ſign "*have*," become "*name—named—named*," which are the roots of the verb, from one or other of which all the other forms may be compoſed, by placing the ſigns properly with them.

There are about four thouſand five hundred verbs in the Engliſh language; and of theſe, four thouſand three hundred, at the leaſt, are obſerved to form theſe roots after one and the ſame manner, viz. by the addition of the ſyllable "*ed*" to the firſt root: for in all theſe verbs, the ſecond and third roots are alike. But of the remaining two hundred verbs, ſome are obſerved to have all the three roots alike, and ſome few the firſt and third, others the ſecond and third alike, but not ending in "*ed*," whilſt the reſt have all the three roots different from each other.

Now although two hundred verbs are but a very ſmall number in compariſon of the reſt, which form their roots in a manner ſo very eaſy and regular: yet it is obſerved, that many of theſe two hundred are of the moſt frequent uſe in the language; ſo that it is of as much conſequence to reduce the formation of their roots to ſome rules, as it is to ſhew the rule by which the roots of all the reſt of the verbs are formed.

It has been propoſed, that four conjugations ſhall be eſtabliſhed in the Engliſh; and that all the verbs, in which the three roots are the ſame, ſhall be conſidered as of the firſt conjugation: thoſe in which the firſt and third root is the ſame, as of the ſecond conjugation: thoſe in which the ſecond and third are the ſame, as of the third conjugation: thoſe in which all the three roots are different, as of the fourth conjugation *. But the diſtinctions above mentioned do not ſeem to be of ſufficient conſequence to eſtabliſh different conjugations upon. For the principal uſe of a diſtinction of conjugation is, to direct the learner how to deduce all the forms of the verb from one or two principal forms, which are ſuppoſed to be known: yet although it is known, that an Engliſh verb is of one of the claſſes which are conſidered as of the ſecond, or third, or fourth conjugation; and the firſt root of the verb is alſo known: the learner will not, from ſuch knowledge, be able to form the other two roots. And beſides, ſeveral verbs, whereof the ſecond and third roots do not end in "*ed*," although they are both alike, will be reduced to the third conjugation, along with the great number of verbs of which the ſecond and third roots always end in "*ed*."

Thus, the verb "*to ſtand*" will be of the ſame conjugation with the verb "*to call*," or with the verb "*to labour*," although the firſt verb makes "*I ſtand—I ſtood—I have ſtood*," in its three capital tenſes, whilſt the others make, "*I call—I called—I have called*," "*I labour—I laboured—I have laboured*," in the ſame three tenſes. And it is manifeſt, that the formation of theſe tenſes of the firſt verb, is made by a different rule from that which is obſerved in the formation of the ſame tenſes in the two laſt verbs.

It appears therefore the moſt ſuitable to the Engliſh language, to eſtabliſh but one regular conjugation for its verbs; in which conjugation, the ſecond and third root of the verb always ends in "*ed*," or, what is to the ſame effect, the firſt and ſecond pre-

* See Dr. Ward's Four Eſſays on the Engliſh language.

terites of the indicative mood, always end in "*ed*," in the firſt perſon ſingular; and to conſider all the verbs which do not agree with this conjugation as irregular.

The irregular verbs may be reduced to claſſes, each claſs conſiſting of ſuch verbs as derive their ſecond and third roots from the firſt, or their third roots from the firſt or ſecond, nearly by the ſame kind of variation; and this proceeding will reduce the Engliſh verbs to rule, ſo far as they are capable of ſuch reduction. This will be much more for the benefit of learners, eſpecially of foreigners, who have principally an occaſion for ſuch a help to the memory; and therefore this proceeding will be made uſe of in the practical part of this book.

SECTION VIII.

Of the moods of verbs in general.

THESE are different manners of forming expreſſions of a verbal ſtate conſidered under its three capital diſtinctions, of being the object of actual perception, or of memory, or of foreſight, for the ſake of adding other circumſtances to each of theſe diſtinctions, by forms of the verb itſelf.

The ſimpleſt of all the moods is the infinitive, in which I alſo comprehend the participles. For the forms of this mood repreſent a verbal ſtate under the threefold diſtinction above mentioned, and no other. The firſt, or preſent tenſe of the mood, and the participle preſent, either of them expreſſes a verbal ſtate, as it is, or may be, the object of actual perception; the ſecond, or preter-tenſe, and the participle paſt, expreſs a ſtate as it is, or may be, the object of memory; and the future tenſe, as well as the future participle, expreſs a ſtate as it is, or may be, the object of foreſight.

The

The other moods (which I ſhall call the definitive moods) may conveniently enough be reduced to four; the eſtabliſhed names of which are, the indicative, the imperative, the potential, and the ſubjunctive.

I include in the potential mood, thoſe forms of the verb which have been conſidered as forming certain moods, called the elective, the determinative, the obligative, and the compulſive moods; that is to ſay, thoſe tenſes of the verb which have the ſigns "*may*—*might*—*would*—*ſhould* and *muſt*," as well as thoſe which have the ſigns "*can* and *could* *." For the ſtates denoted by the former ſigns, have a relation to power conſidered either as permiſſive, ſpontaneous, or obligative. And as the diſtinction of moods in verbs is chiefly eſtabliſhed for the convenience of reducing the ſeveral forms of verbs to certain claſſes in teaching, in order to aſſiſt the learner's memory; theſe claſſes ſhould be reduced to as few as may be conſiſtent with perſpicuity; leſt inſtead of aſſiſting the memory, the too great number, and the too great ſubtlety of the diſtinctions, ſhould perplex it.

SECTION IX.

Of the moods of verbs in particular.

I BEGIN what I propoſe to ſay of each mood in particular, with an account of the infinitive mood, as it is the moſt ſimple of them all.

The forms of this mood are called tenſes, as the forms of all the other moods are. But theſe forms do not relate to time eſtimated by the time of ſpeaking, as the tenſes of the other moods do. There is a definitive verb in every ſentence, which determines whether the time, to which the ſentence relates, is the time of ſpeaking, or ſome point, or period, preceding, or ſucceed-

* See Mr. White's Eſſay on the Engliſh verb.

ing the time of ſpeaking. And the ſituation of the verbal ſtate may be that denoted by any of the tenſes of the infinitive mood, at the time, or before the time, or after the time of ſpeaking. For a ſtate may be conſidered as in continuance, or as capable of being the object of actual perception, or ſo far as it is over, and conſequently a mere object of the memory, or as propoſed or foreſeen, and conſequently as a mere object of future exiſtence, at any time, paſt, preſent, or to come. And the being in one of theſe circumſtances, without determining the time when, is the ſituation under which verbal ſtates are repreſented by the forms of the infinitive mood, and by the participles; as has been already obſerved.

Thus, "*to propoſe ſuch a thing—to have propoſed it—to be* "*about to propoſe it—is—was*—or *will be—conſidered as a proof* "*of diſcernment*," are all ſentences which may be uſed on ſome occaſions with propriety. So that either the paſt, preſent, or future tenſe of the infinitive mood may be referred to the time of ſpeaking, or to time preceding, or ſucceeding that time, as it is here referred to the forms "*is—was*, and *will be*," or as it may be, to the forms of any other definitive verb.

The participles, whether uſed adjectively, or in coaleſcence, expreſs verbal ſtates under the ſame diſtinctions, not referring to one time more than another.

SECTION X.

Of the definitive moods of verbs in general.

THE verb in every form of each of theſe moods, gives notice that the compoſition of the expreſſion of the object, or ſubject, to which any of theſe forms is applied, is ſtopped; and that the whole object, the compoſition of the expreſſion whereof

whereof is ſo ſtopped, is of a certain verbal ſpecies, the characteriſtic of which is the ſtate contained in the ſignification of the verb.

Every verb in theſe moods, of conſequence, contains in it a declaration concerning ſome ſubject; and therefore no verb in any of theſe moods can be uſed, without having relation to ſuch ſubject, either expreſſed, or underſtood. So that no definitive verb is compleat ſenſe in itſelf; but requires a ſubject to be applied to, in order to make it ſuch ſenſe. There are three inſtances in which this ſubject is almoſt conſtantly underſtood; as the ſubject is always the ſpeaker himſelf. Theſe inſtances are, "*a queſtion*—*a command*, and *a wiſh*."

We have ſhewn already, that a queſtion always depends upon the words, "*I would know*, or *I would be told*," or upon ſome ſentence of the ſame import. And it is equally manifeſt, that a command always depends upon the words, "*I direct*—*I ordain* "—*I command*," or on ſome ſentence of the like import; for if the expreſſion, "*do this*," be compleated, it will amount to the following ſentence, "*I direct that you do this*;" and ſo of any other command. As to a wiſh, it is a declaration that the coming to paſs of ſuch or ſuch things would give the perſon who wiſhes pleaſure. Hence a wiſh expreſſed by "*may* or *might*," is nothing more than a declaration, that the perſon who ſpeaks would receive pleaſure, if what he repreſents as capable of being, actually were. Thus, "*may you ſucceed*," is equivalent to the ſentence, "*I am deſirous*, or *I am anxious that this repreſentation of you as* "*ſucceeding ſhould not be attended with any contradiction or hin-* "*drance*;" and ſo of any other wiſh.

Therefore all the forms of all the definitive moods are declarations made concerning ſubjects, the compoſition of the expreſſions whereof is compleatly aſcertained. But as in every queſtion, command, or wiſh, the ſubject is always the ſpeaker himſelf,

ſelf, it is underſtood of courſe; and nothing is actually expreſſed, but what the queſtion, or command, or wiſh, is about; only notice is given to underſtand the ſentence which immediately relates to the ſpeaker, by placing the nominative caſe after the verb, or ſign of the verb, in that part of the ſentence which is expreſſed, and which ſhews that which the queſtion, or command, or wiſh, is about.

SECTION XI.

Of the definitive moods in particular, and firſt of the indicative mood.

THIS mood conſiſts of ſix forms, or tenſes, ſo eſtabliſhed, that two of them relate to time preſent, two to time paſt, and two to time to come, the preſent time, by which the time paſt, and to come, is eſtimated, being conſidered as the time of ſpeaking, unleſs notice is given to the contrary. One of each of theſe pairs of tenſes, in the active voice, repreſents the verbal ſtate as not compleated, and the other tenſe of each pair, as compleated in ſome degree, or as intirely compleated and over.

In the middle, and paſſive voice, the verbal word which is added to the ſeveral forms or tenſes of the verb "*to be*," always repreſents the verbal ſtate denoted by it as the object of actual perception; but two of the tenſes of the verb "*to be*" in this mood, relate to time preſent, two to time paſt, and two to time to come: and one tenſe of each pair expreſſes "*being*," ſo far as it is paſt and over at the time to which it relates; and by this means the verbal ſtate expreſſed by the participial forms as the object of perception, is ſhewn to have its "*being*" paſt or over, in time paſt, preſent, or to come; which way of repreſenting its "*being*" as paſt, is of the ſame effect with repreſenting it as over by another different verbal word; as is done in the ſecond preterite,

preterite, the pluperfect, and ſecond future of the active voice. Thus, "*I have given—I had given—I ſhall have given*," are expreſſions nearly equivalent to, "*I have been giving—I had been* "*giving—I ſhall have been giving.*" This will be more particularly ſhewn, when we come to ſpeak of the tenſes ſeparately.

Of the imperative mood.

THIS mood, as is already ſhewn, is only a ſet of forms eſtabliſhed to expreſs what the ſpeaker enjoins, or directs, in an expeditious manner; by giving notice to the hearer to underſtand the ſentence which ſhould expreſs the ſpeaker's intention to direct or enjoin, whilſt he only declares what the direction or injunction is about.

An entreaty, or prayer, is expreſſed by the forms of this mood, as well as a command. For an entreaty agrees with a command in this, that both equally ſignify what the ſpeaker would have to be, or to be done, or to be granted. But the perſons to whom commands are given, are ſuppoſed to be ſuch as the ſpeaker can compel, or oblige to fulfill his injunctions; whereas, the perſons to whom entreaties are uſed, are ſuppoſed to be ſuch as the ſpeaker cannot compel, or oblige "*to be*" or "*do*," what he ſignifies he would have "*to be*" or "*to be* "*done.*"

A mere queſtion may be put into the form of this mood; as in the expreſſion, "*tell me who that gentleman is*;" for inded a queſtion is, in its nature, either a command, or an entreaty, to give an anſwer to it.

Of the potential mood.

THE import of the ſigns of this mood will confirm the account which is given above of the nature of verbal ſtates; for it is apparent, that the ſigns "*ſhall—will*" (from which "*ſhould*" and "*would*"

" *would*" are derived) " *can—may*" and " *muſt*," each of them denotes a ſtate which may be expreſſed by words that have no verb in them. As for inſtance, " *ſhall*" denotes any ſtate which is analogous to a ſtate of compulſion; " *will*," any ſtate analogous to a ſtate of volition; " *can*," any ſtate analogous to a ſtate of ability; " *may*," any ſtate analogous to a ſtate of freedom from contradiction; " *muſt*," any ſtate analogous to a ſtate of inevitable neceſſity. But when theſe ſtates are expreſſed by ſubſtantives alone, or by ſubſtantives with other words depending on them, the principle by which the ſtates exiſt cannot be communicated to them occaſionally, and with-held occaſionally. Whereas, the principle by which they exiſt, when they are expreſſed by theſe verbal forms, " *ſhall—will—can—may*" and " *muſt*," may be deſtroyed at pleaſure by the negative " *not*;" as, " *ſhall not—will not—cannot—may not—muſt not*:" and likewiſe may be reſtored at pleaſure; as, " *you ſhall not, you ſhall—you will not, you will*;" and ſo of other inſtances. The ſtates denoted by theſe ſigns are likewiſe characteriſtics of ſpecies. For any object with " *ſhall*" depending upon its name, is in a ſituation analogous to that of " *an object compelled*;" any object with " *will*," to that of " *an object willing*," or " *intending*;" any object with " *can*," to that of " *an object enabled*;" any object with " *may*," to that of " *an object freed from contradiction*;" any object with " *muſt*," to that of " *an object neceſſitated*." The ſtates denoted by theſe ſigns, as likewiſe by " *could—might—ſhould—would*," are all definitive, *i. e.* they all give notice, that compoſition of the expreſſion on which any of them depends is compleated, and that the ſtate denoted by the ſign, affects the whole object that is denoted by the expreſſion, which is compleated as to its compoſition, and on which the ſign depends. Theſe ſigns are therefore real definitive verbs, but are conſidered only as ſigns, becauſe they are ſeldom uſed alone, but with another verbal form depending on them. The verbal forms which depend upon theſe ſigns, are the preſent and paſt tenſes of the infinitive mood, without the ſign " *to*;" and when theſe forms are uſed in depen-

dence on the ſigns "*can—may*," &c. they denote ſtates merely as imagined, or foreſeen, or remembered, or ſome way collected by induction from the ſtates which are denoted by the ſigns, or from other circumſtances. Thus in the expreſſion, "*I can read*," the ſtate of ability denoted by "*can*," is a ſtate actually exiſting at the time in which the words are ſpoke; but the ſtate of "*reading*" is not in actual exiſtence, although it may be brought into immediate exiſtence, if the perſon denoted by "*I*" exerts his ability, by performing the act of reading. And in the expreſſion, "*the letters may be come*," "*the letters being come*," is only an imagined preſent ſtate. And "*may*" ſhews, that nothing is perceived which contradicts the reality of what is only imagined. In the expreſſion, "*you may go*," it is manifeſt that "*your going*" is a conſequence of the ſtate of freedom from contradiction that is granted to "*you*" by the word "*may*;" ſo that the ſtate "*go*" is a kind of future ſtate, or a conſequence foreſeen, of the ſtate of freedom from contradiction that is granted. But as this conſequence will moſt probably immediately enſue upon the leave granted, it is conſidered as an object of actual perception, as much as the ſtate denoted by "*may*," on which it depends. If a ſtate, conſidered as paſt, depends upon "*may*," it is uſually an imagined ſtate, and not one actually remembered; as when it is ſaid, "*ſuch a thing may have been*," the thing is imagined as exiſting in time paſt, and it is aſſerted that what is imagined, is not attended with any contradictory circumſtance. So if a verb of the preſent form of the infinitive mood depends upon "*muſt*," the ſtate denoted by it is either imagined, and ſuch circumſtances are perceived to attend it, as induce a neceſſity of looking upon what is imagined as a certainty: or the ſtate is a conſequence inevitable of ſome reaſon given, or to be given; or of ſomething underſtood, though not mentioned. Thus in the expreſſion, "*they muſt be at their journey's end by this time.*" Their ſtate of being is only imaginary in the ſpeaker; but he has ſuch reaſons for what he only imagines, that the imagined conſequence appears to him as neceſſarily true. So in the expreſſion,

" *you muſt go*," " *your going*," is repreſented as unavoidable, but as a ſtate foreſeen, and not actually preſent. If a verb of the paſt form depends upon " *muſt*," the ſtate denoted by it is imagined as having exiſted in time paſt; and ſome reaſons expreſſed, or underſtood, make what is only imagined, appear neceſſarily true; as in the expreſſion, " *things muſt have miſcarried.*"

The ſtates, " *ſhould—would—could—might*," in ſome applications of them, expreſs the ſtates denoted by " *ſhall—will—*" *can—may*," as merely remembered; and in other applications they expreſs imagined ſtates which depend upon them as leſs certain, or leſs probable than thoſe ſtates are repreſented, when they depend upon the ſigns, " *ſhall—will—can—may.*" The ſigns, " *ſhould—would*," &c. are uſed in the former ſenſe in ſuch expreſſions as the following; " *he ſaid that he ſhould—would* " *—could—might do this or that.*" For the words which he really ſpoke were, " *I ſhall—will—can—may do this or that.*" But as what is ſaid, is conſidered as merely remembered ſome time after he ſaid it, the ſtates which he denoted by the preſent forms, " *ſhall—will—can—may*," are now conſidered as paſt, and therefore are now denoted by " *ſhould—would—could—*" *might.*" So in the expreſſions, " *this might be done formerly;* " *but muſt not be done now—I could do this yeſterday, but cannot* " *now—they would do thus in ſpite of what I could ſay.*" The ſtates denoted by " *might—could*, and *would*," are the ſtates " *may—can—will*," conſidered as paſt, or as merely remembered at the time of ſpeaking. Theſe ſigns are uſed in the latter ſenſe in ſuch expreſſions as, " *they ſhould—would—could—*" *might be at ſuch a place*;" for " *their being at ſuch a place*," is only an imagined ſtate, conſidered as leſs certain, or probable than it would be, if it were ſaid, " *they ſhall—will—can—may* " *be at at ſuch a place.*" When the paſt form of the infinitive mood depends on theſe ſigns, the ſtate expreſſed is uſually altogether imaginary, and never has an actual exiſtence; for if I ſay, " *he could—might—would—ſhould have done this or that*," I

in effect ſay that it is not really done. Thus much may be ſufficient to ſhew the general nature of this mood: I have ſaid more of it than of the other moods, becauſe the imaginary nature of the dependent ſtates concerned in it, and the very extenſive nature of the ſtates denoted by its ſigns, occaſion the forms of which it conſiſts, to be applied in a great variety of meanings, and oftentimes in a very indefinite meaning.

Of the ſubjunctive mood.

THIS mood has little or no variation of perſon; and the forms of the firſt perſons of its tenſes are not much different from the correſpondent tenſes of the indicative mood, except in the verb "*to be*," which has in its preſent tenſe "*I be*," and in its firſt preterite "*I were*." This mood is now little uſed, the indicative being ſubſtituted in its place: yet the beſt Engliſh writers have uſually ſubjoined the forms of it to expreſſions depending on the words, "*before*—*ere*— (uſed as a kind of conjunctions) *except*—*howſoever* or *however*—*if*—*leſt*—*ſo*—*though* or "*although*—*till* or *until*—*unleſs*—*whether*—*whoſoever* or *whoever* "—*whatſoever* or *whatever*;" ſo that the mood muſt be retained in the form of conjugation, though its tenſes are no way different in ſignification from the correſponding tenſes of the indicative mood.

SECTION XII.

Of the tenſes of verbs.

THESE have been explained, in a great meaſure, in what is ſaid of the nature of the verb in general, and of the ſeveral moods in particular to which the tenſes belong. Indeed nothing more remains to be ſaid concerning the tenſes of the infinitive mood, and the participles.

The tenſes of the other moods may be much illuſtrated, by reſolving the tenſes of the indicative mood of any ſimple verb (ſuch as the verb "*to have*") by the tenſes of the verb "*to be*," in the manner following.

The firſt perſon of the tenſes themſelves.		The tenſes reſolved.
Preſent	*I have*	*I am having*
Firſt preterite	*I had*	*I was having*
Firſt future	*I ſhall have*	*I ſhall be having*
Second preterite	*I have had*	*I am having had*
Pluperfect	*I had had*	*I was having had*
Second future	*I ſhall have had*	*I ſhall be having had*

The three laſt tenſes may likewiſe be reſolved in the following manner.

Second preterite	*I have had*	*I have been having*
Pluperfect	*I had had*	*I had been having*
Second future	*I ſhall have had*	*I ſhall have been having*

By obſerving theſe tenſes thus reſolved, it appears that the preſent repreſents the ſtate "*having*" as an object of actual perception, or as in continuance, at the preſent time (*i. e.* at the time in which the words "*I have*" are ſpoke) and that the power of the definitive verb "*am*," included in "*have*," repreſents the ſpeaker as in being at that time.

The firſt preterite as reſolved into "*I was having*," repreſents the ſtate of "*having*" as an object of actual perception in time paſt, which time is denoted by the definitive verb "*was*," repreſenting the ſpeaker as in being at that time. But the word "*had*" may be likewiſe conſidered as denoting the ſtate of "*having*" as a mere object not of actual perception at the time of ſpeaking. Hence this tenſe has an indefinite meaning. For it may either denote a ſtate as in continuance at ſome

ſome time paſt, or as finiſhed and over at the time preſent, or as not actually perceived at any time.

The firſt future repreſents the ſtate of "*having*," as an object of actual perception at ſome time not come when the words of the tenſe are ſpoke.

The other three tenſes may each of them be reſolved two ways; that is to ſay, by conſidering either the ſtate "*having had*" as an object of mere memory, *i. e.* as paſt and over, and by referring this ſtate to time preſent by "*I am*," to time paſt by "*I was*," and to time to come by "*I ſhall be:*" or by conſidering the ſtate "*having*" as in continuance, and referring it to time ended at preſent by "*I have been*," or to time ended at ſome time paſt by "*I had been*," or to time conſidered as ended at ſome future period, by "*I ſhall have been.*"

Which way ſoever theſe three tenſes are reſolved, the firſt of them, or preterperfect tenſe, or ſecond preterite (for it is called by both theſe names) has relation to preſent time: and therefore it is never uſed to refer a ſtate to any period of time that is quite over when the tenſe is ſpoke; as for inſtance, we do not ſay "*they* have *had ſucceſs laſt year—a month ago—yeſterday*," &c. becauſe "*laſt year—a month ago—yeſterday*," are periods of time quite ended when the words are ſpoke. But the firſt preterite, as being an indefinite tenſe, is uſed on ſuch occaſions; as in the expreſſions, "*they had ſucceſs laſt year—a month* "*ago—yeſterday*," &c. and we ſay, "*they have had ſucceſs—* "*this year—this month—to-day*," &c. becauſe theſe periods of time are preſent when the words are ſpoke.

There are two forms of each of the Engliſh future tenſes; the one form by "*will*," and the other by "*ſhall*."

"*Will*"

"*Will*" denotes a future ſtate, which ſome perſon determines concerning himſelf; but a ſtate which he only foreſees, believes, hopes, fears, ſuppoſes, or is told concerning other perſons or objects.

"*Shall*" denotes a future ſtate which ſome perſon only foreſees, believes, hopes, fears, ſuppoſes, or is told, concerning himſelf; but a ſtate which he determines concerning other perſons or objects.

In ſentences uſed on common occaſions, if no mention is made of the perſon who determines the future ſtate, or of him who foreſees, believes, &c. ſuch ſtate; this perſon is underſtood to be the ſame who ſpeaks each ſentence, and who of conſequence himſelf, ſingly, or united with others, bears the firſt perſon. Therefore the ſentences, "*I—we will go,*" "*you—he—they* "*ſhall ſtay,*" are equivalent to, "*I—we who ſpeak determine to* "*go,*" "*I—we who ſpeak determine that you—he—they ſtay.*"

But the ſentences, "*I—we ſhall go,*" "*you—he—they will* "*ſtay,*" are equivalent to, "*I—we who ſpeak foreſee, hope, fear, &c. our going,*" and "*your—his—their ſtaying.*"

In poetic or ſublime language, the words, "*it is irrevocably* "*determined,*" or ſome words of the like import, are frequently left to be underſtood from the nature of the ſtile and ſubject. Thus, in the Pſalms, "*they* (*i. e.* the heavens and the earth) *ſhall* "*periſh, but thou* (*i. e.* O God) *ſhalt endure;*" that is to ſay, "*it is irrevocably determined that they ſhall periſh,*" &c.

In compound ſentences, if the words, "*it is determined—or-* "*dained—decreed—reſolved,*" or other words of like import, be actually mentioned in connexion with a ſentence containing a future ſtate, the form by "*ſhall*" is always uſed; as, "*it is determined—ordained, &c. that I—you—he—we—they ſhall ſucceed.*"

In

In compound ſentences, if a perſon is repreſented as determining or fixing his own future ſtate, "*will*" is uſed; if the future ſtate of other perſons or objects, "*ſhall*" is uſed.

As, "*I determine that I will go—that you—he—they ſhall ſtay,*" "*John determines—reſolves that he will go—that you—James,* "*or any other perſon, ſhall ſtay.*"

If in ſuch ſentences a perſon is repreſented as foreſeeing, believing, fearing, hoping, ſuppoſing, his own future ſtate; or declaring what he is told of it, "*ſhall*" is uſed; if as foreſeeing, believing, &c. or as declaring what he is told of the future ſtate of others, "*will*" is uſed; as, "*I foreſee—fear—hope—am told,* "*&c. that I ſhall go—that you—he—they will ſtay,*" "*John* "*foreſees—fears—hopes—is told, &c. that he ſhall go—that you* "*—James, or any other perſon or object, but himſelf and I will ſtay.*"

Hence theſe rules follow for the conſiſtent application of "*will* and *ſhall*."

1. If the perſon who is repreſented as declaring a future ſtate, or as having his thoughts declared, is both himſelf in the ſtate, and likewiſe determines it; or if he is neither himſelf in the ſtate, nor determines it, "*will*" is uſed.

As, "*I will go—you ſay you will ſtay—John determines—re-*"*ſolves he will return.*" Here "*I—you* and *John,*" each declares a ſtate which himſelf is in, and alſo determines.

"*The ſtone will fall—John ſays that James will be undone,* or "*John believes—hopes—is told, &c. that James will be undone,*" Here "*I,*" who make the declaration concerning the ſtone, am neither in the ſtate, "*will fall,*" nor determine it; and John, who is repreſented as making the declaration, or having his thoughts declared concerning James, is neither in the ſtate "*will be undone,*" nor determines it.

2. If

2. If the perſon who is repreſented as making a declaration, or as having his thoughts declared, concerning a future ſtate, is either himſelf in it, but does not determine it, or is not himſelf in it, but does determine it, "*ſhall*" is uſed.

As, "*I ſhall go—you ſay that you ſhall ſtay—John fears that "he ſhall be undone.*"

Here "*I—you* and *John*," are each in the future ſtates which themſelves are repreſented as declaring, or as thoſe whoſe thoughts are declared; but they do not themſelves determine the ſtates, but ſome other perſon, or the courſe of things does it.

"*You ſhall go—you ſay that he ſhall ſtay—John determines that "James ſhall be undone.*"

Here "*I*," who make the declaration concerning "*you*," am not in the ſtate "*ſhall go*," but I determine it; "*you*," who make the declaration concerning "*him*," are not in the ſtate "*ſhall ſtay*;" but you determine it; and "*John*," whoſe determination is declared concerning "*James*," is not in the ſtate "*ſhall be undone*," but he determines it.

Theſe rules account for the change of ſigns, when two perſons repeat the ſame thing with regard to future ſtates. Thus my friend comes to me, and ſays, "*you will be puniſhed:*" if I tell this to another perſon, I do it in theſe words, "*my friend tells me that I "ſhall be puniſhed.*" The reaſon of this is, that my friend is not himſelf in the future ſtate of puniſhment, but I am, and we neither of us determine it; therefore he expreſſes a future ſtate, which he is neither in, nor determines by "*will*;" but I am in it, and do not determine it, therefore I expreſs it by "*ſhall.*" Had the magiſtrate, who determines the ſtate, declared it to me, the words would have been, "*you ſhall be puniſhed*;" becauſe he determines the ſtate, and is not in it. If I tell theſe words again, I ſtill ſay, "*the magiſtrate "tells me that I ſhall be puniſhed*;" for I am in the ſtate as I was before, and do not determine it any more than I did before.

"*Would*

"*Would* and *ſhould*" are applied on the ſame principles with "*will* and *ſhall*," only in compound ſentences they depend on the firſt preterite or pluperfect; as, "*I ſaid I would—you—be* "*ſhould go*," "*he had foreſeen that he ſhould—they would go*;" and ſo of other inſtances.

It is manifeſt, that in the tenſes of the indicative mood, the verbal ſtate is always conſidered as in actual continuance at ſome time, paſt, preſent, or to come, or as actually paſt and over at ſome time, paſt, preſent, or to come.

So that the ſtate conſidered as merely "*about to be*," or as any other ways barely contingent, is not taken notice of in the tenſes of this mode. Nor does this mood expreſs the ſtate as under an inevitable neceſſity of exiſtence at any time; and yet it is frequently required to conſider, and to expreſs a verbal ſtate as in theſe ſituations.

The forms of the imperative and potential mood, are introduced as ſupplements to the indicative, being intended to expreſs verbal ſtates, either as in contingent ſituations, or as in a ſituation of inevitable neceſſity.

I have hitherto conſidered the tenſes of the indicative mood as they are applied to real ſtates. For when they are uſed to expreſs ſtates conſidered as merely imagined, or ſuppoſed, the preſent tenſe expreſſes a ſtate as probably exiſting at the time of ſpeaking, and the firſt preterite a ſtate as not probably exiſting at that time, although it is then ſuppoſed. Thus, "*if he does this or* "*that, he is to be blamed*," ſhews that the ſuppoſition "*he does this* "*or that*" may probably be true; but "*if he did this or that,* "*he would be blamed*," ſhews, that "*his doing this or that*" is probably not a true ſuppoſition. And, as the firſt preterite is an indefinite tenſe, the ſuppoſition may relate to paſt, preſent, or future time. The ſecond preterite, in ſuppoſitions, expreſſes a ſtate

that has probably been; as, "*if he has done ſo, I commend him,*" ſhews, that he probably has done ſo. But the pluperfect expreſſes a ſtate that probably has not been; as, "*if he had done ſo, I ſhould commend him,*" ſhews, that he very probably has not done ſo. It is true, that the indefinite ſtates, "*would be blamed —ſhould commend him,*" contribute much to ſhew the uncertainty of the premiſed ſuppoſitions on which they depend. But ſtill the tenſes, or forms, "*he did—he had done,*" muſt be in themſelves of an indefinite ſignification; for otherwiſe no conſequences that follow from them could make them ſo.

Of the tenſes of the imperative mood.

THERE uſually appears but one tenſe in this mood, which is called the preſent tenſe, although the verbal ſtate to which the tenſe relates, in almoſt all commands and entreaties, exiſts in time poſterior to that in which the command is given, or the entreaty made. For what is commanded, or entreated, is uſually to be effected after the command is given, or the entreaty is uſed; yet a command may be given concerning a ſtate in actual exiſtence; as when one perſon bids another keep in the ſame poſture in which he is; and ſo of other inſtances. Alſo a ſuppoſition may be made concerning the ſtate of an object at ſome time paſt; and the ſpeaker may enjoin or entreat thoſe to whom he ſpeaks, to look upon the ſuppoſition as true, or to take it for granted. And this ſometimes occaſions a verb of a paſt tenſe to appear in the imperative form; as in the expreſſion, "*let him have been perverſe, let him have been indiſcreet, ſtill he deſerves pardon,*" *i. e.* let it be taken for granted, that he has been perverſe, &c.

In all commands or entreaties, the ſtate commanded, or entreated, muſt be contingent; *i. e.* capable of being, or not being, as the command or entreaty expreſſes it. For it is to no purpoſe to uſe commands or entreaties concerning ſtates which are not capable of being, or not being, as the commands or entreaties expreſs them, and that at the pleaſure of the object entreated or commanded.

Of

Of the tenſes of the potential mood.

I HAVE, in a great meaſure, ſhewn the general nature of the ſeveral ſtates denoted by the ſigns of the tenſes of this mood, in the account which is given of the mood.

It is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh particularly in the uſe of this mood, when the forms of it are applied to expreſs real ſtates, and when only imaginary ones. For as the tenſes of the indicative mood, when applied to the latter purpoſe, do not preſerve the preciſe diſtinctions of time paſt, preſent, and to come, as eſtimated by the time of ſpeaking, ſo neither do the tenſes of this mood, when applied for the like purpoſe.

"*Shall*" and "*will*" muſt be conſidered as ſigns of the preſent tenſe of this mood, as well as of the future of the indicative. For when it is ſaid, "*you ſhall be as you are—you will be as* "*you are*," the ſtate denoted by "*ſhall*" is manifeſtly a preſent ſtate of compulſion; and that denoted by "*will*," a preſent ſtate of volition; and ſo of many other inſtances of the uſe of "*ſhall*" and "*will*." The ſigns, "*can—may—ſhall—will—muſt*," when they ſignify real ſtates, and have the preſent form of the infinitive mood after them, all relate to the time beginning with the preſent; as, "*I can—may—ſhall—will—muſt do this or that—* "*this inſtant—to-morrow—next year*," &c. The ſame ſigns with the paſt form of the infinitive mood, relate to time ending before, or with the preſent; as, "*he cannot—may not—ſhall not* "*—will not—muſt not have done this or that, though you ſay he has.*"

The ſigns "*could—might—ſhould—would*," with the preſent of the infinitive mood, repreſent the depending ſtate as in continuance, whenſoever the ſtates denoted by "*could—might—* "*ſhould—would*," have the ſame effect with the ſtates denoted by "*can—may—ſhall—will*." Therefore theſe forms relate to any time, paſt, preſent, or to come. To the paſt, as, "*they could* "*—might—would do this yeſterday, but can—may—will not do it*

"*now*;" and when ſpeaking of a paſt ſtate, we ſay, "*he ordered that* "*all things ſhould be ſo or ſo*;" though his order really was, "*all things* "*ſhall be ſo or ſo.*" As to the preſent and future, theſe forms are continually referred to them; as, "*he could—might—ſhould—* "*would do this or that—this inſtant—to-morrow—next year,*" &c.

As to theſe forms, when uſed with the paſt of the infinitive mood, they repreſent the depending ſtate as over, whenſoever the ſtates denoted by "*could—might—ſhould—would,*" have the ſame effect with thoſe denoted by "*can—may—ſhall—will*;" as, "*I could—might—ſhould—would have done this or that* "*laſt year—now—next year.*" Hence all the tenſes in which the ſtate of the infinitive verb depends on "*could—might,*" &c. are indefinite tenſes, as the firſt preterite, and pluperfect, of the indicative mood are.

Of the tenſes of the ſubjunctive mood.

I HAVE hitherto chiefly conſidered the definitive forms of verbs, as they may be uſed in ſentences, each of which has no more than one definitive verb in it. But definitive clauſes are continually inſerted into other ſentences as dependent members thereof, by being turned in relative clauſes, in the manner already deſcribed. And definitive ſentences are likewiſe continually made to expreſs mere circumſtances modifying other ſentences, by being placed in dependence on conjunctions, or other words which have the force of a relative pronoun, or of a conjunction in them: ſuch as, "*before—except—leſt—however,*" &c. It has been already obſerved, that the forms of the ſubjunctive mood are never uſed but in dependence on ſuch words, and therefore a verb in this mood is never the principal verb of a ſentence, as a verb in the indicative, imperative, and potential mood, may be. Therefore the forms of the ſubjunctive mood are conſtantly uſed to expreſs ſtates as merely imagined, or conceptions ſome way leſs aſcertained than thoſe are, which are either the reſult of actual perception, or of memory, or of determined

termined purpoſe, or actual obligation. But the indefinite tenſes of the indicative and potential moods, are likewiſe capable of being uſed for the ſame purpoſes; and as the tenſes of theſe moods relate to the ſame times to which the tenſes of the ſubjunctive mood relate, this laſt mood is not of abſolute neceſſity. The whole plan of the Engliſh language is formed with a conſtant view to ſimplicity; for few or no varieties are admitted into it merely for the ſake of diverſity of cadence, when the preciſion of ſenſe is no ways promoted by ſuch diverſity. Hence the ſubjunctive mood never was much uſed in Engliſh, and ſeems to be growing more and more into diſuſe, the indicative being ſubſtituted for it.

All the indefinite tenſes of all the moods are peculiarly proper for ſuppoſitions; and, when they are ſo uſed, the nominative caſe is often ſet after the verb, or the ſign, and "*if*" is omitted; as, "*did he conſider—had he conſidered—could he—might he—* "*ſhould he—would he conſider his own good, he could not do or have* "*done this or that,*" i. e. "*if he conſidered—if he had conſidered,*" &c. Theſe forms of conſtruction are likewiſe uſed in queſtions, as has been already obſerved, when ſuch queſtions are made by way of ſuppoſition: only when a queſtion is aſked in this manner, the perſon who aſks it would be told whether the affirmative, or negative of the ſuppoſition, is true; and this part of the ſpeaker's meaning is ſhewn by joining no clauſe to the ſuppoſition, by which a queſtion is aſked. Thus, "*did he conſider his own* "*good?*" may be a queſtion; and the anſwer to it may be "*yes*" or "*no.*" But when ſuppoſitions are either made by "*if,*" or by placing the nominative caſe after the verb, or ſign of the verb, ſome ſentence is always connected with them; ſuch as, "*he* "*could not do this or that,*" in the example above. For why ſhould ſuppoſitions be made, but to ſhew what follows from, or is ſome way connected with them, ſeeing a mere ſuppoſition gives no information? If therefore the ſpeaker can ſhew what is connected with his ſuppoſition, he does it by an additional ſentence:

if

if not, it is a notice that he expects the hearer will do it, by adding "*yes*," or "*no*," or "*I do not know*," or ſome ſuch expreſſion, by way of anſwer. A wiſh, when expreſſed by "*may*," with the nominative caſe after it, is likewiſe a ſuppoſition, which would pleaſe the ſpeaker if it were a reality; and therefore it admits of the ſame form of conſtruction that the ſuppoſition of a queſtion does. But it is ſhewn to require no anſwer by ſome demonſtrative circumſtance; as the tone of voice in which it is uttered: or by ſome circumſtances, either actually expreſſed as attending the wiſh, or left to be ſupplied by what is ſaid or done before the wiſh is expreſſed.

Thus much may be ſufficient for explaining the general nature and uſe of the tenſes of the ſeveral moods: ſome particularities of conſtruction, in which they are applied in the Engliſh, will be taken notice of in the practical part of this work.

SECTION XIII.

Of the perſons of verbs.

THE diſtinctions upon which the different perſons of verbs are founded, ariſe ſolely from the uſe of language itſelf, and relate to the diſtinctions of the ſeveral ſpecies denoted by the perſonal pronouns, as theſe diſtinctions are in the objects on which the verbs depend. And as in Engliſh the perſonal pronoun is almoſt conſtantly applied to the names of objects of the firſt and ſecond perſon, both ſingular and plural, whilſt objects of the third perſon are applied in both numbers without the perſonal pronoun: there is no abſolute neceſſity for a variation in the perſonal forms of the verb itſelf. Hence the ſubjunctive mood in the Engliſh has little or no variation of this kind. But as it is convenient to have the object which is the principal in the ſubject of what is ſaid, aſcertained as preciſely as poſſible; the other definitive moods have a diſtinction of perſons in the

ſingular number; ſo that it may be known from the termination of the verb alone in theſe moods, what perſon the ſingular object bears to which the verb is applied. By this means the diſtinction between ſingle objects engaged in the diſcourſe as ſpeaking, and ſpoken to, is more effectually kept up, in the ſubjects of ſentences, and of relative clauſes, than if the verb had not this diſtinction of perſons; and both theſe perſonages are kept diſtinct from objects which are only brought into the diſcourſe, as the materials thereof, and not as bearing perſonages in the diſcourſe itſelf: conſequently, the diſcourſe is more determinate than it would be, without ſuch diverſity of termination in the perſons of the definitive verb. But if objects, between which the diſcourſe is carried on, be of the plural number, their perſons are only diſtinguiſhed in this language by the perſonal pronouns, "*we*" and "*ye*" or "*you*," being added, the firſt to the name of the plural object ſpeaking, and the ſecond to the name of the plural object ſpoken to, and not by the termination of the perſons of the verb in the plural number.

SECTION XIV.

Of the verbs which are uſed as ſigns of the tenſes of other verbs.

THESE make ſo very conſiderable a part of all the compound tenſes of the Engliſh verb, that the uſe and import of them muſt be particularly accounted for in a treatiſe of this kind.

Theſe verbs are uſually called auxiliar verbs, and ſome of them (as I think) are uſed in the conjugating of verbs in all the languages of Europe; at leaſt verbs equivalent to "*have—had*" and "*having*," are uſed as auxiliars in the French language: and M. Du Marſais, a moſt able grammarian, is of opinion, that they have been introduced into that language from a corruption of

of the Latin. " For, ſays he, the following phraſes tranſlated " literally, will ſhew the verbs " *have*" and " *had*" applied ex- " actly as theſe auxiliars are in French."

" Quæ nos noſtramque adoleſcentiam habent deſpicatam ;" *Who us and our youth have deſpiſed.*

" Cæſar præmiſit equitatum omnem quem ex omni provinciâ " coactum habebat ;" *Cæſar ſent before, all the horſe which he had gathered from the whole province.*

Now the firſt of theſe expreſſions really ſignifies, " *who hold us* " *and our youth in contempt* ;" and the ſecond, " *Cæſar ſent all* " *the horſe gathered from the whole province which he had,*" *i. e.* which horſe he had.

The verbs " *habent*" and "*habebant*" are uſed in their proper ſignification of "*holding*" or " *having,*" in theſe inſtances ; and " *us and our youth*" are " *the objects held,*" in the firſt inſtance ; and " *the horſe gathered from the whole province*" is " *the object* " *had, or poſſeſſed,*" in the ſecond. In proceſs of time, as M. Du Marſais thinks, the notion of " *having,*" or *poſſeſſing,*" was transferred by an abuſe, or metaphor, to ſuch ſtates denoted by verbs, as are compleated or paſt ; ſo that a perſon was conſidered as " *having*" any ſtate which he had actually paſſed through, in the ſame manner as he poſſeſſes his watch, or any thing elſe which is ſecured to him as his property.

Now it ſeems to be evident, that the notion of being ſecured to an object, in the nature of a fixed poſſeſſion, firſt occaſioned the verbs " *have—had*" and " *having*" to be applied, as ſigns, to paſt verbal ſtates. For no part of theſe ſtates can be conceived as ſecured to any object, till that object has actually paſſed through ſuch part : becauſe theſe ſtates are occaſional, and whatſoever part or period of ſuch a ſtate is not actually concluded, is unſecure. Whereas, ſuch parts or periods as are come to an

end in any object, are experienced fully, or "*had*" by ſuch object.

But it is very probable that this application of the forms above mentioned of the verbs "*to have*," did not come into the French language from a corruption of the Latin. At leaſt it is clear, that it did not come into the Engliſh language from that ſource; but from the form of conjugation of the Saxon verb, which form, the conjugation of the Engliſh verb imitates in all its parts. Now the Saxon, for any thing that appears to the contrary, is as old as the Latin; and is much more ſimple in its conſtruction. Hence, when the northern nations ſpread themſelves over Europe, and the ſimplicity of the formation of the parts of their language came to be perceived; it is no wonder that this formation ſhould be adopted, inſtead of the complex formation of the tenſes of the Latin verb, which is ſo various, as well as that of the caſes of nouns, that it may be juſtly matter of ſurpriſe, how ſuch a language could ever be generally ſpoke by any people, who had not made the ſpeaking of it ſome part of the courſe of ſcience in which every youth was to be inſtructed.

As the formers of the Saxon language applied by an eaſy metaphor the preſent tenſe of the verb "*habban, to have,*" in order to denote a verbal ſtate finiſhed at the preſent time, and the firſt preterite of the ſame verb, to denote a verbal ſtate finiſhed at ſome time paſt; by the like kind of metaphor, they proceed to apply the ſame two tenſes of the verbs "*ſceoldan, to owe,* or *to ſtand obliged*;" "*willan, to will,* or *reſolve*;" and "*magan, to be able,*" to expreſs future ſtates conſidered either as under ſome preſent obligation to come to paſs in time to come, or as the reſult of the preſent determination, or of the preſent ability of ſome agent; as is done by our auxiliary verbs, "*ſhall—will—may,*" which anſwer to the preſent tenſes of the verbs above mentioned: or if they choſe to expreſs future ſtates as leſs certain of coming to paſs, they uſed the preterimperfect tenſes, or firſt preterites, as they are now uſually called, of the ſame verbs, which anſwer to our auxiliary verbs, "*ſhould—*

" *would—might.*" The proſecution of analogy has extended the application of theſe ſigns to objects which cannot be in the ſtate denoted by the literal meaning of each; as when we ſay, " *the work ſhall ſtop—a ſtone will fall—iron may break,*" we do not mean, that the work is under an obligation to ſtop, of the ſame nature with that in which a debtor ſtands to his creditor; or that the ſtone is determined to fall, as a man determines his will, or forms a reſolution; or that the iron is in a ſtate of ability to break, as a man, or a living creature, has the ability to do, or not to do, a thing at pleaſure. Nevertheleſs, there is an analogy between the ſtates " *of obligation*" and " *of* " *reſolution*" and " *of capacity*" in men; and the ſtates in which " *the work—the ſtone*" and " *the iron*" are. And this analogy is ſufficient to warrant the application of the ſigns in the large extent of acceptation in which they are here uſed. Indeed the termination of a particular tenſe in the Latin, and Greek, is taken in the ſame latitude of ſignification, and oftentimes in a greater than that in which the ſign of the ſame tenſe is taken in Engliſh: only the termination of a Latin or Greek tenſe has no ſignification in itſelf. Whereas, the literal ſignification of the ſigns of the Engliſh tenſes, has a remote analogy to what each of theſe ſigns ſignifies, when uſed in the compound tenſes of other verbs; and this analogy contributes to the eaſe of learning how to uſe them with propriety. It is true, the uſe of the auxiliar verbs prevents the Engliſh verb from having that variety of cadence which the Latin and Greek verbs have. But it promotes the perſpicuity and eaſe of applying the language, which is the principal point that the formers of it ſeem to have attended to; as being indeed the principal excellence of any language.

The ſigns " *do*" and " *did*" manifeſtly denote the exertion of the effort, by which action is produced at ſome time, preſent or paſt. But, by analogy, they are alſo prefixed to verbal ſtates which require no exertion of effort; as, " *I do reſemble—thou* " *didſt ſuffer,*" &c.

"*Let*" ſuppoſes the perſon or object to which a command is given, to with-hold ſome other object from being in the ſtate which the perſon who commands, requires. But it is applied alſo by analogy to various inſtances, where no with-holding is actually obſerved; as in the expreſſions, "*let the medicine be compounded of* "*ſuch and ſuch ingredients—let care be taken of ſuch and ſuch things.*"

The ſign "*to*" is not a verb; yet it appears with the Saxon verb in the infinitive mood, but (as I think) only when it is uſed like a noun ſubſtantive in ſome oblique caſe. The reaſon of making the ſame particle which is the ſign of the dative caſe of a ſubſtantive, alſo the ſign of the infinitive mood of the verb, ſeems to be, the very frequent application of the verb in this mood, to denote a ſtate which is the object whither ſome other verbal ſtate is to be purſued in the mind; as alſo whither ſome ſtate denoted by a ſubſtantive, is to be purſued. This notice, as has already been obſerved, is given by the ſign of the dative caſe; and the infinitive mood of a verb, in ſome applications of it, is in a ſituation ſo very ſimilar to that of a ſubſtantive in this caſe, that it cannot be known from a ſubſtantive, till other words are added to the ſeries. Thus in the expreſſions, "*a diſpoſition* "*to ſtudy—to incline to ſtudy,*" it cannot be certainly known, whether "*to ſtudy*" is a noun ſubſtantive of the dative caſe, or a verb of the infinitive mood. But in the expreſſions, "*a diſpoſition* "*to ſtudy the mathematics—to incline to ſtudy the claſſics,*" it quickly appears, that "*to ſtudy*" is a verb of the infinitive mood.

The verb "*to be,*" which is applied in all its moods and tenſes in the formation of the middle, and paſſive voices of the Engliſh verb, may be conſidered as an auxiliar in theſe voices, and particularly in the paſſive voice. Seeing, in that voice, it not only gives notice of the ſituation of the ſtate denoted by the participle joined with it, as to that ſtate being in continuance, or not compleated, or as partly or intirely compleated and over; whilſt in the definitive moods it refers the ſtate thus circumſtantiated, to time paſt, preſent, or to come: but it likewiſe ſhews, in far the greateſt

number of Engliſh verbs, that the ſtate denoted by the participle, is that which correſponds with the ſtate denoted by the participle in "*ing*" of the ſame verb. Whereas, a verbal word, which is the very ſame with the paſſive participle, when not uſed with ſome form of the verb "*to be*," denotes, in theſe verbs, not a ſtate which correſponds with the participial ſtate in "*ing*," but a ſtate which actually contains the participial ſtate in "*ing*," in it. Thus, "*I ſtruck*," is equivalent to "*I was ſtriking*;" but "*I am ſtruck*," is equivalent to "*I am the recipient of the effect* "*of ſtriking*;" and ſo of all the other paſt tenſes of the active voice of very many verbs, if compared with the paſt tenſes of the paſſive voice of the ſame verbs. So that the uſe of the forms of the verbs "*to be*," in the formation of the paſſive verb, aſcertains the very nature of the ſtate denoted by the verbal word or participle, which is uſed with theſe forms, in compleating much the greateſt number of paſſive verbs, in their ſeveral moods and tenſes.

Hence it comes to paſs, that in far the greateſt number of Engliſh verbs, the ſame participial form of the verb may be uſed in expreſſing either of the correſponding ſtates (that is, either the active or the paſſive ſtate) in all the paſt tenſes; by forbearing to uſe the auxiliar forms of the verb "*to be*," when an active ſenſe is intended; and by uſing theſe auxiliars, when a paſſive ſenſe is intended. Thus, "*I have loved—I had loved—I ſhall have loved* "*—I may have loved*," are active expreſſions; and "*I have* been "*loved—I had* been *loved—I ſhall have* been *loved—I may have* "been *loved*," are the correſpondent paſſive expreſſions.

There is nothing to be added concerning the uſe of the ſigns in the middle voice; ſeeing they are the very ſame with the ſigns in the paſſive voice.

As to the manner of forming the Engliſh verb; that is to ſay, the method by which the roots are diſcovered when one or more of them is known: and when theſe roots are found, how to compoſe the tenſes of the ſeveral moods from them; this relates intirely to the practical part of grammar, and is accordingly treated of in the practical part of this book. A Spe-

A Speculative Grammar.

BOOK V.

SECTION I.

Of the adverb.

THIS part of ſpeech uſually denotes a conception which may be expreſſed by an oblique caſe of a noun ſubſtantive: but when ſuch conception is expreſſed by an adverb, notice is given, that the conception is intended to modify ſome quality denoted by an adjective, or ſome ſtate denoted by a verb which is placed in conſtruction with the adverb; whilſt the conception itſelf, denoted by the adverb, is not uſually intended to be modified by any ſubſtantive in an oblique caſe, or any adjective, participle, or relative clauſe, being made to depend upon the adverb.

It is obvious to perceive, that the ſenſe of an adverb may be expreſſed by ſome of the forms of a ſubſtantive in the ablative caſe, in almoſt any ſentence. Thus, "*very good*" is in effect "*good in verity*," or "*in reality*;" "*to act wiſely—to act with wiſdom*;" "*to go haſtily—to go in haſte*," &c.

But if the conception, uſually expreſſed by an adverb, is at any time expreſſed by the caſe of a ſubſtantive of an equivalent ſignifi-

ſignification; that conception may, if the ſpeaker pleaſes, be farther modified by ſome connective word made to depend on the ſubſtantive; as appears in the expreſſions, "*good in perfect* "*reality*—*to act with infinite wiſdom*—*to go in haſte continually* "*increaſing*." Theſe modifications by other dependent words, can very ſeldom be applied when an adverb is made uſe of; and therefore this circumſtance depending merely on the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of a particular language, together with the grammatical form of the adverb, are the only particulars which diſtinguiſh moſt of the adverbs from an oblique caſe of a noun ſubſtantive, or from a prepoſition with a ſubſtantive depending upon it; but ſeveral kinds of words, ſuch as "*yes* and *no*," and the relative words, "*how*— "*why*," &c. are commonly ranked amongſt adverbs; as likewiſe all ſorts of words which fall under no other part of ſpeech. A noun ſubſtantive often takes "*more*" and "*moſt*," which are the marks of the comparative and ſuperlative degrees of compariſon, in conſtruction with it; and the adverb does the ſame; as, "*wiſely* "*—more wiſely—moſt wiſely.*"

It has been obſerved already, that the import of an adjective may very frequently be expreſſed by a noun ſubſtantive in an oblique caſe. When this happens, and ſuch an adjective is placed in conſtruction without any word depending upon it to modify its ſignification, ſuch adjective may be conſidered as approaching to the nature of an adverb. Thus, "*he told me true*," is equivalent to "*he told me truely*;" and inſtances are continually occurring of the like kind of conſtruction.

The names of parts of time, are almoſt conſtantly applied in the conſtruction of the Engliſh language, as adverbs; although without an adverbial termination, or the ſign of an oblique caſe, or other particle, prefixed. Thus we ſay, "*I have been reading* "*all this day*," in which expreſſion, the object "*this day*" has not the paſſive ſtate in it correſpondent with the active ſtate "*reading*;" as, "*this book*" (for inſtance) has in the expreſſion, "*I have*

"*I have been reading all this book*;" ſo that "*all this day*" is an adverbial expreſſion, requiring ſome prepoſition, ſuch as "*during*," or "*through*," to make the ſenſe compleat. In like manner, in the expreſſion, "*I was laſt year at ſuch a place*;" "*laſt year*" is not another name of the perſon denoted by "*I*," ſo as to ſhew in what ſpecies of objects the perſon "*was*;" but one of the prepoſitions "*in*," or "*during*," muſt be underſtood to make the ſenſe compleat.

There is no danger of ambiguity in omitting the ſign of a caſe, or other prepoſition, in this particular inſtance of conſtruction of the names of parts of time; becauſe when objects, which are not parts of time, are referred to them; it eaſily appears, that the reference is not made, in order to aſcertain the ſpecies of "*that which is—was*," or "*will be*;" but the period of duration, "*when*" ſuch or ſuch an object "*is—was*," or "*will be*."

It eaſily appears from theſe obſervations, that the ſame uſe of the judgment muſt be made in applying an adverb conſiſtently to an adjective, or a verb, which is made, in applying an oblique caſe, or an adjective, conſiſtently to a ſubſtantive, or to a verb; the principles of application being exactly the ſame in all the inſtances: and when theſe parts of ſpeech are applied conſiſtently to each other; there is the ſame degree of judgment required in the hearer, or reader, to determine the nature of the coaleſcence, when the adverb is applied, as when an oblique caſe, or an adjective is applied. Thus, the object "*fury*" is equally concerned in the conceptions denoted by the expreſſions "*to fight* "*furiouſly*" and "*to look furiouſly*;" but the "*fury of fighting*" is of one kind, and the "*fury of looking*" is of another; and the manner in which "*fury*" attends "*fighting*" is different from the manner in which it attends "*looking*." And the judgment of the hearer or reader of the words above mentioned, muſt determine theſe circumſtances, from the nature of the ſtates "*to fight*" and "*to look*," to which the ſame adverb "*furiouſly*" is applied, in both the expreſſions. As

As adverbs are applied with adjectives, which are coaleſcent parts of ſpeech, in order to aſcertain more fully the nature of the coaleſcence which is to be attended to in particular inſtances of the application of adjectives: for the ſame reaſon, one adverb may be applied to another adverb, in order to aſcertain more fully the degree of the coaleſcent object intended to be denoted by both the adverbs taken together; as in the expreſſions, "*a thing* "*very much awry—to do quite wrong*," &c.

There are ſome adverbs in almoſt every language which do not appear to be derived from any ſubſtantive or adjective, in the language. "*Anon—ago—quite—now*," and ſome few more are ſuch adverbs in the Engliſh language, which may be called primitive, or original adverbs. But far the greateſt number of them are derived from ſubſtantives or adjectives; and very many of the adverbs, in Engliſh, are formed immediately from an adjective, by adding the ſyllable "*ly*" to it; as, "*wiſe—wiſely*," "*fooliſh* "*—fooliſhly*," &c.

SECTION II.

Of the conjunction.

THE conjunctions are either notices of ſuch ſituations and circumſtances amongſt expreſſions of conceptions concerned in ſentences, as would require ſome one or more words to be repeated in a ſentence, in order to expreſs the ſentence at large: or they are additional notices, either of certain modes of thought, by which one ſentence expreſſed at large, is formed, ſo as to have dependence upon another ſentence likewiſe expreſſed at large; or of the purpoſe for which one ſuch ſentence is placed in dependence upon another, or of other circumſtances of connexion, which cannot be taken notice of in the ſentences themſelves.

When conjunctions are uſed with the firſt of the intentions aforeſaid, they are conſidered as joining words together: when with the latter intention, as joining ſentences together. *Of*

Of conjunctions in general, as uſed to join words together.

In the uſe of language, it is frequently required to reduce to one ſentence ſeveral ſerieſes of words, each of which has ſome one and the ſame word or expreſſion in it. This common word or expreſſion, either circumſtantiates, or is circumſtantiated by, every word, in each of the ſerieſes which are to be united; for otherwiſe, the ſerieſes would not each conſiſt of words in continued connexion; but the ſeveral ſerieſes do not circumſtantiate one another. Nevertheleſs, when ſeveral ſerieſes are reduced to one, there may be no neceſſity to mention the word, or expreſſion, which is common to them all, more than once; provided that certain notices be given, that the reſt of the words of the ſeveral ſerieſes are not to be conſidered as circumſtantiating one another, but as they all circumſtantiate, or are circumſtantiated by, one and the ſame common expreſſion. The conjunction "*and*" is one of the moſt general of theſe notices: and may be uſed in giving inſtances of the reduction of different ſerieſes of words to one ſeries, in the manner above mentioned. Thus, in the three ſentences, "*a man of prudent foreſight is to* "*be eſteemed—a man well diſpoſed is to be eſteemed—a man who* "*exerts himſelf for the good of others is to be eſteemed.*" The words, "*a man,*" and "*is to be eſteemed,*" are common to each ſentence, and the ſentences may be all reduced to one, in which theſe words are but once mentioned: but then notice muſt be given, that in the compound ſentence, the expreſſions, "*of pru-* "*dent foreſight—well diſpoſed—who exerts himſelf for the good of* "*others,*" are not to be conſidered as circumſtantiating one another, but as firſt one, and then another, circumſtantiating the common object "*a man,*" and the common expreſſion, "*is to* "*be eſteemed,* is then to be applied to the object, "*a man,*" ſo circumſtantiated. This is done by placing the conjunction "*and*" before the expreſſions which do not circumſtantiate the expreſſion which they follow; as appears in the ſentence,

" *man of prudent foreſight and well diſpoſed and who exerts himſelf*
" *for the good of others, is to be eſteemed.*"

The conjunction therefore in this kind of conſtruction, is a notice, or declaration, that the ſpeaker is ſparing himſelf the repetition of ſome common word, or expreſſion; and a direction to the hearer, to ſupply it as often as the conjunction is uſed.

But beſides the notice to ſupply the common word, or expreſſion, as often as a direction is given to do it, (which notice is common to every conjunction that is uſed to connect words;) it is neceſſary, that other directions ſhould be given by each conjunction. For the conceptions formed, and denoted by uniting the ſeveral different expreſſions with the common expreſſion, as often as a conjunction is uſed to direct ſuch union, may be either all of them neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe, or any one of them taken at pleaſure may be ſufficient for that purpoſe, or only ſome one or more of them may ſuit that purpoſe; or it may happen, that not any of them taken at pleaſure, nor any particular one or more of them, will ſuit the purpoſe of the ſentence, if it be taken affirmatively; or it may be, that ſome of them are ſo different from the reſt, as to appear like exceptions to what it might be reaſonably expected would be joined with them. Theſe notices are therefore united with ſeveral ſorts of conjunctions, which are uſed to connect words; and the difference of the notice is the characteriſtic by which the ſort is determined to which a particular conjunction is to be referred.

When the conjunction "*and*" is placed between the ſeveral parts of a compound ſeries, in order to refer theſe parts, firſt one, and then another, to ſome common expreſſion; all the conceptions which are expreſſed by all the references, are equally neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. Thus in the expreſſions, " *the God of wiſdom and goodneſs and mercy—the wiſe and good*

" *and merciful God*;" the three conceptions denoted by, " *the* " *God of wiſdom—the God of goodneſs—the God of mercy*;" " *the* " *wiſe God—the good God—the merciful God*," are all equally neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe; and ſo of other inſtances of the uſe of this conjunction.

When the conjunction " *either*" is placed before the firſt part of a ſeries, and the conjunction " *or*" before the other parts of it, in order to refer theſe parts, one after another, to ſome common expreſſion; any of the conceptions expreſſed by the references, or elſe ſome one or more of them, will ſuit the ſpeaker's purpoſe. Thus in the expreſſion, " *a man either of wiſdom, or* " *juſtice, or honour, would have avoided this fault*," any one of the conceptions denoted by, " *a man of wiſdom—a man of juſtice* " *—a man of honour*," will equally anſwer the ſpeaker's intent. But in the expreſſion, " *either James, or John, or Peter, told me* " *this*;" only ſome one of the three perſons muſt be pitched upon, to make the ſentence true, although it is not known, or not determined, which particular perſon is to be pitched upon.

When " *neither*" is prefixed to a part of a ſeries, and " *nor*" to the other parts which are to be referred, one after another, to ſome common expreſſion; it is a notice, that not any one of the conceptions expreſſed by ſuch references are in the ſtates in which the ſentence repreſents them, if ſuch ſentence be taken affirmatively. Thus in the expreſſion, " *neither James, nor John, nor* " *Peter, told me this*," it is aſſerted that none of the three ſentences, " *James told me this—John told me this—Peter told me this*," are true.

When the conjunction " *but*" appears before a part of a ſeries, directing that part to be referred to ſome expreſſion to which other parts of the ſeries are alſo to be referred: it is a notice that the conception expreſſed by ſuch reference, is ſo different

from ſome conception expreſſed by a reference of ſome other part of the ſame ſeries to the common expreſſion, as to be a kind of exception to what might have been expected. Thus in the expreſſions, "*a man of parts, but of no induſtry*;" "*James uſed* "*pains and application, but without ſucceſs.*" It is a kind of exception to what might be expected in the man's character, to deny him induſtry, after having repreſented him as a man of parts: and it is an exception to what might reaſonably be expected, to repreſent the uſing pains and application, as not attended with ſucceſs. There are but few conjunctions, beſides theſe above deſcribed, which are uſed in a conſtruction which is conſidered as only joining words together.

Of the conjunctions in general as uſed to join ſentences together.

The conjunctions uſed for this purpoſe, are equivalent to additional affirmations, declaring ſeveral manners by which the conceptions expreſſed at full length in ſentences become dependent one upon another. For that which is contained in one ſentence may be as the ſentence repreſents it, only upon a ſuppoſition, that what is contained in another ſentence, is as that ſentence repreſents it. Or what is contained in one ſentence may be ſo, in conſequence of what is contained in another ſentence, being certainly as the ſentence expreſſes it. Or the truth of one ſentence may be an exception to the truth of another: or the truth of one ſentence may ſeem to oppoſe, or withſtand, the truth of another, whilſt yet it really does not oppoſe ſuch truth. Or ſeveral other kinds of dependences may exiſt between ſentences, which dependences muſt either be given notice of by ſentences uſed on purpoſe to declare them as often as they occur, or by introducing certain words as marks to ſupply their place.

It will evidently appear that the conjunctions are ſuch marks, if any two ſentences, joined by a conjunction, are conſidered as the parts of another ſentence, in which the force of the conjunction

is expreſſed by a circumlocution. Thus the two ſentences, "*I will come, if you will meet me*," are as much as to ſay, that what is contained in the words, "*you will meet me*," is a ſuppoſition, and that what is contained in the words, "*I will come*," is true or falſe, according as the ſuppoſition is true or falſe. And the two ſentences, "*I will come, becauſe you will meet me*," are as much as to ſay, that what is contained in the words, "*you will meet me*," is conſidered as a cauſe; and that what is contained in the words, "*I will come*," is conſidered as the certain effect of that cauſe, and ſo of other inſtances.

It is not neceſſary, that the conjunctions ſhould have different forms referring to different times, as verbs have; becauſe the dependences, which they affirm between one ſentence and another, are always conſidered as exiſting between the ſentences at the times to which themſelves refer; for the declarations of the conjunctions are declarations concerning the ſentences themſelves.

The grammarians have reduced the principal of the conjunctions to ſorts diſtinguiſhed by particular names. And as the number of conjunctions is not very large, it may be proper to give an account of each of them under the name of the particular claſs to which it belongs.

Of the conjunctions copulative.

Theſe are, *and—alſo—as well as—likewiſe.*

It has been already ſhewn, that when "*and*" is conſidered as coupling words together, it gives notice that all the conceptions which are expreſſed by the references of ſeveral parts of a ſeries to ſome common expreſſion, are neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. Hence whenſoever it happens, that the ſeries of which the parts are united by this conjunction, is conſidered as the

the ſubject of a ſentence, and the common expreſſion as the predicate, ſuch common expreſſion is conſidered as modifying the whole ſeries at once. If therefore the parts of the ſeries conſiſt of expreſſions which, taken ſeparately, denote ſo many conceptions which the mind can make ſo many ſeparate objects of its contemplation, the whole ſeries together is conſidered as denoting one plural object, and the definitive verb, which is the common expreſſion that circumſtantiates every part of the ſeries, inſtead of being uſed in the ſingular number, (as it muſt be, if conſidered as firſt circumſtantiating one part of the ſeries, and then another,) is uſed in the plural number, and conſidered as applied to the whole ſeries at once. Thus inſtead of ſaying, "*John is ſtand-*" *ing and James is ſtanding*," we ſay, "*John and James are* "*ſtanding*," and ſo of other inſtances.

When a ſeries of ſeveral expreſſions is referred by this conjunction to ſome common expreſſion, it is uſual to prefix the conjunction only to the laſt expreſſion of the ſeries. So inſtead of ſaying, "*John and James and George ſtanding in ſuch a place*," we ſay, "*John, James, and George ſtanding in ſuch a place*;" and inſtead of ſaying, "*the nation being diſappointed and diſſa-*" *tisfied and tumultuous*," we ſay, "*the nation being diſappointed,* "*diſſatisfied, and tumultuous*;" and ſo of other inſtances.

"*Alſo* and *likewiſe*" are uſed with "*and*" in joining the parts of a ſeries, when theſe parts are not to be conſidered altogether as the expreſſion of one complex conception to be carried all at once to the common expreſſion. So that theſe conjunctions give notice, that the ſeveral parts of the ſeries to which they are prefixed, are to be carried ſeparately to the common expreſſion, and that all the conceptions expreſſed by the ſeveral references, are equally neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. Thus in the expreſſion, "*John, and likewiſe James, and George* "*alſo, perceives this*;" the form of the verb "*perceives*," ſhews that "*John and James and George*" are not conſidered as one plural

plural object; but that the ſeveral conceptions expreſſed by "*John perceives this—James perceives this—George perceives this,*" are all equally neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe.

"*As well as,*" is of the ſame meaning as, "*and alſo,* or *and* "*likewiſe.*"

When, in a ſeries of compleat ſentences, theſe ſentences are united by the conjunction "*and,*" notice is given, that the ſenſe of all the ſentences conſidered together in one view, is neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. When, in a ſeries, ſuch ſentences are united by "*and alſo—and likewiſe,*" or by "*alſo—likewiſe—* "*as well as,*" notice is given, that the reſult of each of the ſentences taken one after another, is neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe.

"*Neither* and *nor*" are uſually conſidered as copulative conjunctions, relating only to negative ſentences. They are indeed negatives to, "*and alſo—and likewiſe—as well as,*" or to "*and,*" when it is conſidered as requiring firſt one part of a ſeries, and then another, to be carried to a common expreſſion. But they are not negatives to "*and,*" when it is conſidered as uniting the ſeveral parts of a ſeries into the expreſſion of one plural object. Thus in the expreſſion, "*neither James, nor John, nor George,* "*thinks as you do,*" the verb "*thinks*" is of the ſingular number; and this ſhews, that "*James—John* and *George*" are not all conſidered as one plural object, not thinking in a certain manner; but that firſt the one, and then the other, and then the third, is repreſented as not thinking in that manner.

Conjunctions disjunctive.

Either—or.

When the parts of a ſeries of words are directed by theſe conjunctions to be referred to ſome common expreſſion; the references muſt be made, firſt one, and then another, to the common expreſſion, and the judgment of the hearer muſt determine whether the ſpeaker intends to repreſent any one of the conceptions, expreſſed by any one of the references, as ſufficient for his purpoſe, or only ſome one or more of them, without aſcertaining which. And when two, or more, compleat ſentences are joined by the ſame conjunctions; the judgment muſt determine whether the ſpeaker intends to repreſent any one of the ſentences as ſufficient for his purpoſe, or only ſome one or more of them; without ſpecifying which. Thus in the expreſſions,

" *Perhaps either you or John or James will go—either you may* " *ſend—or I may write—or he may ſpeak for ſuch things;*" any of the conceptions denoted by, " *you will go—John will go—* " *James will go,*" in the firſt inſtance; or by " *you may ſend—* " *I may write—he may ſpeak,*" in the ſecond, will anſwer the ſpeaker's intention in theſe inſtances. But in the expreſſions,

" *Either you or James muſt go—James either did ſo, or ſaid he* " *did ſo,*" only one of the perſons denoted by " *you* and *James,*" are repreſented as under a neceſſity of going; and only one of the ſentences, " *James did ſo—he ſaid he did ſo,*" are repreſented as true, but without determining which.

As it is not determined which of the expreſſions make for the ſpeaker's purpoſe in which theſe conjunctions are concerned, whilſt either any of them taken at pleaſure, or ſome one or more of them, do make for ſuch purpoſe; the hearer or reader is obliged to keep them all in his mind; and hence the grammarians

marians have uſually conſidered them as joining the words, but disjoining the ſenſe; which is not a very clear account of their ſignification.

Diſcretive conjunctions.

But—except—ſaving.

WHATSOEVER expreſſion depends upon the conjunction "*but*," whether it be a part of a ſeries that is to be united with ſome expreſſion, which is alſo to be taken in common with other parts of the ſeries; or whether it be a ſentence expreſſed at length; ſuch expreſſion or ſentence, contains ſomething that is contrary to what either the ſpeaker or ſome other perſon is conceived to expect or conclude from the appearances that attend the diſcourſe. Thus in the expreſſions, "*we went but to ſuch a* "*place—this is but neceſſary—I do not fear but the buſineſs is done*," it is inſinuated, that ſome perſon expected that the perſons denoted by "*we*," would have gone farther than ſuch a place—and that it is imagined, ſomething leſs than what is denoted by "*this*," would have been ſufficient—and that the buſineſs was not "*done*."

In the expreſſions, "*we went, but you reſolved to ſtay—ſeveral* "*meſſengers are come, but they have brought no news*," the reſolution to ſtay of the perſon denoted by "*you*," is repreſented as contrary to what the perſons denoted by "*we*" might have expected: and the ſeveral meſſengers coming without news, as contrary to what both the ſpeaker and hearer might have expected.

When a number of objects are repreſented in ſome certain ſtate, in which it is reaſonable to conclude other objects are, and yet theſe objects are not in ſuch ſtate, either "*but*, or *except*," may be uſed, to direct to the name of ſuch other objects; as, "*all but, or except, you, have been at the court to day—no horſes* "*but, or except, black ones, are in the paſture.*"

When a train of thought has been interrupted, and the ſpeaker reſumes the train ſooner than he imagines it is expected, notice is given of the reſumption by "*but*;" as, "*but to return*—" "*but to proceed.*"

"*Whereas*, or *whilſt*, or *yet*," may be uſed inſtead of "*but*," when it joins full ſententences together, but has the appearance from circumſtances of ſome degree of contrariety; as

"*I ſit—but—or whereas—or whilſt—or yet, you ſtand.*"

Conditional conjunctions.

If—if ſo be—provided—unleſs.

"*If*, or *if ſo be*," prefixed to a ſentence, gives notice that the ſentence contains a ſuppoſition on which another ſentence ſo depends, that it is true or falſe, according as the ſuppoſition is true or falſe; as, "*we ſhall ſucceed if you will aſſiſt us*;" that is, let it be taken for granted that the ſentence, "*you will aſſiſt us*," is true; and the ſentence, "*we ſhall ſucceed*," is true: but the ſentence, "*you will aſſiſt us*," is only a ſuppoſition.

"*If ſo be* and *provided*" have the ſame meaning as "*if*;" but the word "*that*" is uſually interpoſed between "*if ſo be*, or *pro-* "*vided*," and the ſentence which depends upon either of them; for a reaſon which will appear, when we ſpeak of the word "*that*" in particular, as a conjunction.

"*Unleſs*" is the negative to "*if*," ſignifying "*if not*;" as, "*I ſhall ſucceed, unleſs you oppoſe me*," is of the ſame import as, "*I ſhall ſucceed, if you do not oppoſe me.*" Hence if a negative ſentence is joined with another ſentence by "*unleſs*," the negative ſentence may be turned into an affirmative one, and "*unleſs*" may be turned into "*if*," and the ſenſe of the ſentences will be but little altered; for the two negatives will by this means be taken

taken away, which before only deſtroyed the effect of each other. Thus, "*I ſhall not ſucceed, unleſs you aſſiſt me*," is of almoſt the ſame import with "*I ſhall ſucceed, if you aſſiſt me.*"

The verb "*ſuppoſe*," or the participle "*ſuppoſing*," may, the one or other of them, be ſubſtituted for "*if*," on almoſt any occaſion, and "*ſuppoſe not*," or "*ſuppoſing not*," for "*unleſs*;" as, "*I ſhall ſucceed, if*, or *ſuppoſing*, or *upon the ſuppoſition that*, "*you will aſſiſt me.*"

"*I ſhall miſcarry, unleſs you will aſſiſt me*, or *ſuppoſing you* "*will not aſſiſt me*, or *upon the ſuppoſition that you will not* "*aſſiſt me.*"

The reaſon why this ſubſtitution can be made, is very evident from what is ſaid above of the conjunctions under conſideration.

Adverſative, or conceſſive, conjunctions.

Though—although—notwithſtanding.

THESE conjunctions give notice, that a ſentence depending upon one of them expreſſes ſomething which may be taken for granted, and that if it be taken for granted, it has the appearance "*of being adverſe to*, or *of withſtanding*," ſomething contained in another ſentence, whilſt yet it does not prevent the other ſentence from being true; as,

"*I ſhall ſucceed—though—although—or notwithſtanding you* "*oppoſe me.*"

"*Though* and *although*" always connect compleat ſentences together, but "*notwithſtanding*" frequently connects a ſingle word, or an expreſſion which is not a ſentence, with a compleat ſentence; "as, "*I ſhall ſucceed, notwithſtanding all this*;" i. e.

" *all this being allowed will not prevent or withſtand my ſucceſs,*" or will not prevent the ſentence, " *I ſhall ſucceed,*" from being true.

Redditive conjunctions.

Yet—ſtill—neverthleſs.

THESE conjunctions ſhew, that a ſentence which depends upon one of them is no leſs true, or that which it expreſſes no leſs certain, on account of what is expreſſed in another ſentence which appears to oppoſe ſuch truth or certainty; as, " *I ſit—yet* " *—ſtill—neverthleſs you ſtand.*"

The appearance of oppoſition to what might reaſonably be expected, makes the conjunction " *but*" applicable as a redditive conjunction, when the ſentence with which the redditive ſentence correſponds, does not depend upon an adverſative conjunction. Yet the ſentence with which the redditive ſentence correſponds, moſt commonly does depend upon an adverſative conjunction; as, " *although you are come, yet—ſtill—neverthleſs I* " *muſt go,*" which ſentence may be expreſſed by, " *you are* " *come—but—yet*—or *ſtill I muſt go*;" ſo that " *but*" in reality ſupplies the place of an adverſative conjunction, or of both the adverſative and the redditive together, when it is uſed alone to connect two ſentences; as, " *you are come, but I muſt go.*"

The reaſon of this is manifeſt; for the connection between the adverſative and redditive conjunction is ſo very obvious, that the latter of them in effect ſuppoſes the other. For if one ſentence is introduced by " *notwithſtanding,*" and another ſentence is made dependent upon that ſentence by " *neverthleſs*;" the latter only ſhews, that the ſentence which depends upon it is " *no ways leſs true,*" which need not be ſhewn if there were nothing united with it that makes it have the appearance of being

being leſs true. When "*notwithſtanding*" introduces that which makes the other ſentence have ſuch appearance, it is a direct declaration, that what depends upon it has ſuch effect upon the other ſentence. But the mind can eaſily determine what it is that has ſuch effect, without ſuch particular notice; and therefore the adverſative conjunction is frequently uſed without the redditive, or the redditive without the adverſative; and when ſo uſed, they may be conſidered as diſcretive conjunctions. Thus,

"*Notwithſtanding that I ſhall oppoſe him, he will ſucceed—I ſhall oppoſe him, nevertheleſs he will ſucceed—I ſhall oppoſe him, but*, or *yet, he will ſucceed—notwithſtanding that I ſhall oppoſe him, nevertheleſs he will ſucceed*," are all ſentences of nearly the ſame import; the reaſon whereof is given in what is ſaid above.

Cauſal conjunctions.

For—becauſe—ſeeing—for as much as, and *ſince—ſo—then—whereas*, in ſome applications of them.

THESE ſhew that the ſpeaker is proceeding to give a reaſon for what is ſaid; or that what is already ſaid is a reaſon for what is farther intended to be ſaid. And as this proceeding ſo continually occurs in the uſe of language, it is no wonder to find ſo many different words applied to give notice of it.

When "*whereas*" is applied for this purpoſe, it always gives notice, that the ſentence to which it is prefixed, expreſſes the reaſon of ſomething which is to follow that ſentence; as, "*where-as you have done your work, you muſt be paid.*" "*So* and *then*," when applied for this purpoſe, are always prefixed to a ſentence which gives ſomething going before as a reaſon for what follows; as, "*you have done your work, ſo*, or *then, you muſt be paid.*"

The

The others are prefixed to ſentences which give the reaſon either of what goes before, or follows after; but "*for*" moſt commonly to words, or ſentences, which give the reaſon of what goes before.

It is manifeſt, that "*for*," in this application of it, has the ſame ſignification as it has when uſed as a ſign of the ablative caſe; ſeeing it directs in both inſtances to that, on account of which ſomething appears to be ſo or ſo.

"*Becauſe*" is equivalent to "*by the cauſe*," and therefore it frequently takes a genitive caſe after it by the ſign "*of*," according to the uſual conſtruction of ſubſtantives; as, "*religion is "evil ſpoken of, becauſe of the vices of its profeſſors.*"

Illative conjunctions.

Therefore—wherefore and *now—then*, in ſome applications of them.

THESE ſhew that the ſpeaker is proceding to draw a conſequence from ſomething premiſed. "*Therefore*" being equivalent to "*for this reaſon*, or *for that reaſon*," "*wherefore*" to "*for which reaſon*," and "*now* and *then*" being transferred from their general ſignification of time, to ſignify the time when the mind conceives the deductions to ſucceed each other, which it is making from premiſes laid down.

"*Therefore* and *wherefore*" are applied to the expreſſions of deductions made from premiſes which are conſidered as certain. "*Now*" to introduce additional helps to the deduction, and "*then*" is uſually applied to deductions made from premiſes which are but ſuppoſitions; as, "*you will go, therefore we muſt "part—wherefore we muſt part;*" "*now, beſides the reaſons al-"ready given, theſe may be added;*" "*if you will go, then we muſt "part.*"

Exceptive

Exceptive conjunctions.

Unleſs—otherwiſe.

THE meaning of "*unleſs*" has been already ſhewn to be equivalent to "*if not*;" "*otherwiſe*" is equivalent to "*if not ſo*;" and therefore it follows a ſentence expreſſing things in ſome certain ſtate, and precedes a ſentence declaring how things will be, upon a ſuppoſition that they are in any other ſtate than that in which the firſt ſentence repreſents them; as, "*you have done "your buſineſs, otherwiſe you would be working at it*," or "*if not "ſo, you would be working at it.*"

Now things muſt be, either as they are repreſented, or in ſome other manner. If they are as the firſt ſentence repreſents them, that ſentence is true. If in any other manner, the ſentence depending upon "*otherwiſe*" is conceived to be true. So that one of the ſentences, joined by "*otherwiſe*," is looked upon as true, and either of the ſentences may happen to be the true one. Therefore the conjunction "*or*" may be uſed inſtead of "*otherwiſe*," in conſequence of the ſignification which it bears, when uſed to give notice that ſome one expreſſion out of ſeveral is true, without determining which; as "*you have done your buſineſs, or we ſhall aſſiſt you.*"

If the ſentence which follows "*otherwiſe*" be placed the firſt, in another expreſſion; and that which goes before "*otherwiſe*" be made to depend upon it; the conjunction "*unleſs*," or the words "*if* and *not*" muſt now be uſed to expreſs the dependence of the one ſentence upon the other. Thus, if the latter of the two ſentences above be placed firſt, and the other be made to depend upon it ſo as to expreſs the ſame ſenſe as they do in the ſituation above, the expreſſion will become, "*we ſhall aſſiſt you, "unleſs you have done your buſineſs*," or "*if you have not done your "buſineſs.*" The reaſon of this is manifeſt; for in either way of conſtruction the words "*we ſhall aſſiſt you*" are repreſented as true, only upon a ſuppoſition that your buſineſs is otherwiſe than done.

If

If two ſentences are of ſuch a nature, that if the converſe of either be ſuppoſed true, the truth of the other ſentence follows of courſe, either "*otherwiſe*," or "*unleſs*," may be uſed to connect the ſentences. Thus, "*I ſhall ſucceed, otherwiſe I am miſtaken*," and "*I ſhall ſucceed, unleſs I am miſtaken*," are expreſſions much of the ſame import. For, if it be ſuppoſed that I ſhall not ſucceed; the ſentence, "*I am miſtaken*," is true; which is upon the ſuppoſition expreſſed by "*otherwiſe*." And if it be ſuppoſed that I am not miſtaken, the ſentence, "*I ſhall ſucceed*," is true, which is upon the ſuppoſition expreſſed by "*unleſs*."

But if the two ſentences are not of the nature above mentioned, "*unleſs*" cannot be ſubſtituted inſtead of "*otherwiſe*." Thus in the expreſſion, "*I muſt do this, otherwiſe my friends will be diſpleaſed*," "*otherwiſe*" cannot be changed into "*unleſs*." For although the ſentence, "*my friends will be diſpleaſed*," is true, upon a ſuppoſition that I do not comply with my obligation to do this; it does not follow that the ſentence, "*I muſt do this*," is true, upon a ſuppoſition that my friends will not be diſpleaſed; which is the ſituation that "*unleſs*" would repreſent them in.

Of the reſtrictive conjunctions.

As—ſo.

THESE particles are uſed to give notice when the mind makes uſe of the perception of ſameneſs, or of that of ſimilarity approaching to ſameneſs, in ſhewing how far, or in what reſpect, things are attended to. For a conception may be raiſed in the mind, which is intended to be conſidered only as it is of a particular ſpecies, or ſo far as it is under the ſame circumſtances in which it is repreſented, and no farther: or the ſituation of an object at one time, may be ſo very ſimilar to the ſituation in which it is at another, as to be conſidered exactly of the ſame nature: or the ſituation of one object may be ſo very ſimilar to the

the ſituation of another, that the ſimilarity may be conſidered as a kind of ſameneſs; and expreſſions may be referred to one another under theſe modes of perception or conception.

When any object is particularly aſcertained in an expreſſion, and it is intended that ſuch object ſhall be conſidered in that ſame aſcertainment, and not as it may be conſidered, when not ſo aſcertained, "*as*" is prefixed to the expreſſion to give notice of this proceeding. Thus, "*as thou art a man, I dare—as ſuch a* "*man is a ſcholar, he is to be eſteemed—as to the means by which* "*Auguſtus gained his power, he is to be blamed; but as to the* "*manner in which he uſed it, he is to be commended,*" are all inſtances of objects conſidered as particularly circumſtanced in particular clauſes, whilſt "*as*" uſed before theſe clauſes gives notice, that the circumſtances muſt be kept exactly as they are, in order to make the clauſes true. Thus the perſon denoted by "*thou*" may be conſidered as of ſome other ſpecies beſides the ſpecies "*man,*" and then the affirmation "*I dare*" may not be true. For it may be added, "*as thou art a prince, I fear thee.*" And ſo Auguſtus is repreſented in two ſituations, the firſt of which muſt be kept exactly as it is, in order to make the affirmation, "*he is* "*to be blamed,*" true: and the ſecond muſt be kept exactly as it is, in order to make the affirmation, "*he is to be commended,*" true. Such expreſſions as, "*mad as I was—the landlord in his* "*ſhirt as he was,*" are formed upon the ſame mode of conception with thoſe above: for the word "*as*" gives notice, that the madneſs ſpoke of muſt be conſidered as it was circumſtanced at the time referred to, and under no other circumſtances; and that the landlord muſt be conſidered exactly in the ſituation in which he is repreſented at the time referred to, and in no ſituation however little varied from it.

If the inſtance of ſameneſs, or ſimilarity approaching to ſameneſs, be ſuch, that it is obſerved in the ſame object at different times, or in different objects at the ſame time, or at diffe-

rent times; two expreſſions are joined by "*as*," which expreſſions ſhew the objects and the times; but the preciſe particular in which ſimilarity is obſerved, is left to be determined by the judgment. Thus in the expreſſions, "*when I am as I have been*—"*I am as thou art, my people as thy people*—*James will do it as John* "*bid him*," many particulars may be taken, the ſameneſs whereof may anſwer to that denoted by "*as*;" and if theſe particulars are firſt mentioned by names, united with the firſt part of the expreſſion, and the particulars are again expreſſed by a relative pronoun, and that pronoun is united with the ſecond part of the expreſſion in the ſame mode of connexion in which the name that the relative repreſents is united with the firſt part; the reſult will be, an expreſſion more preciſe than that by "*as*," but of the ſame import, ſo far as it extends. Thus the firſt expreſſion may mean, "*when I am in the ſame ſituation in which I have been*," or "*in the ſame diſpoſition in which*," &c. and the third may mean, "*James will do it in the ſame manner*," or "*in the ſame order in* "*which*," or perhaps "*with the ſame inſtrument with which*," or "*in the ſame time in which*," or "*at the ſame place at which* "*John bid him.*"

The ſameneſs of time in which two different circumſtances are obſerved to exiſt, is frequently ſignified by "*as.*" Thus, "*it whiſtled as it flew*," is equivalent to, "*it whiſtled during the* "*time during which it flew.*"

From this extenſive ſignification of "*as*" it comes to paſs, that it is applied to denote the manner or order of a proceeding which is to be determined by choice, or by ſome contingency. This appears in the expreſſions, "*do as you pleaſe*—*let it fall out* "*as it will*," *i. e.* in any manner in which you pleaſe, &c.

The ſameneſs which is obſerved in the correſpondence between definitions, general rules, directions, &c. and the particular inſtances included in them, is given notice of by "*as.*"

Inſtances

Inſtances of this conſtruction occur continually in this book.

When an object is conſidered in ſome ſituation which admits of degrees, it is frequently neceſſary not only to repreſent another object in the ſame general ſituation, but likewiſe in the ſame degree. This frequently happens in the application of adjectives, and adverbs: for, as what is denoted by them may be conſidered as united in greater or leſs degrees with other objects, ſeveral objects may have what is denoted by one of them, and yet may not be capable of being conſidered as in the ſame ſituation in that reſpect, unleſs *the degree* is the ſame in which what is denoted by one of them, either attends the ſame object at different times, or different objects at the ſame time.

Thus a man may be ſtudious at one time, and ſtudious at another; and yet he may not be capable of being conſidered in the ſame ſituation, with regard to ſtudiouſneſs, at both the times referred to, unleſs the degree of ſtudiouſneſs be conſidered as the ſame at both the times. The circumſtance of degree attending the ſignification of adjectives and adverbs, frequently requires the particle "*as*" to be twice repeated, in order to aſcertain the ſameneſs of ſituation to which ſuch adjective or adverb refers. Thus, "*John is as ſtudious as he was*," is equivalent to "*John* "*is ſtudious in the ſame degree in which he was ſtudious*;" and "*this is done as eaſily as that*," is equivalent to "*this is done* "*with the ſame degree of eaſe with which that is done.*"

The degree of what is ſignified by two different adjectives may be conſidered as equal in that to which the adjectives or adverbs are applied, as well as the degree of what is ſignified by one adjective in two applications of it. The adjective "*ſtudious*" is applied to "*John*" at two different times, and the adverb "*eaſily*" is applied to two inſtances of "*doing*," in the examples given above; but different adjectives may be uſed, and the one may be conſidered as applied to "*John*" at one time, and the other at

another; and yet the degree of what is ſignified by each, may be the ſame. Thus, "*John is as ſtudious as he was negligent*," is equivalent to "*John is ſtudious in the ſame degree in which he was* "*negligent*," and different adverbs may be applied, the one to "*doing this*," and the other to "*doing that*;" and yet the degree of what is ſignified by each may remain the ſame. Thus, "*this is done as wiſely as that is done fooliſhly*," is equivalent to "*this is done with a degree of wiſdom the ſame with the degree of* "*folly with which that is done.*"

A clauſe depending upon "*ſuch*" is frequently aſcertained by a clauſe depending upon "*as.*" In this application of theſe particles, "*ſuch*" gives notice that what is expreſſed by the clauſe depending upon it, muſt be conſidered no farther than its ſignification is ſimilar to that of the clauſe depending upon "*as.*" Thus, "*ſuch precepts as tend to make men good*," is an expreſſion of a ſort of precepts, limited by the additional characteriſtic of "*tendency to make men good*," added to the characteriſtic of the general ſpecies, *precept*, and any other inſtance of the application of theſe particles in correſpondence with each other, may be explained on the ſame principles.

"*So*" is uſed to expreſs any circumſtance which either can be ſhewn by a demonſtrative action, or can be collected from ſome expreſſion, either going before, or following, the clauſe in which it appears. When it expreſſes what is actually preſented by a demonſtrative action, it is a notice that the demonſtrative action is ſo ſimilar to that which is intended to be repreſented by it, that they approach to ſameneſs; as when a perſon ſays, "*I will do ſo*," and ſhews how he will do. When "*ſo*" repreſents what may be collected from ſome expreſſion actually made uſe of, it frequently is equivalent to the actual repetition of ſuch expreſſion. Thus in the expreſſions, "*John is a good* "*man, and James is ſo too—you enjoy good health, and ſo may* "*others*," the word "*ſo*" in the firſt inſtance, ſupplies the words, "*a good man*;" and in the ſecond inſtance it ſupplies the words, "*enjoy good health.*"

When

When "*ſo*" expreſſes what is only of the ſame general nature with that which is expreſſed by other words, and not ſo nearly the ſame, as that the repetition of the ſame words muſt be made uſe of to repreſent it to the mind; it is moſt frequently applied with a clauſe which correſponds with another clauſe that has "*as*" before it. Thus, "*I find things ſo as you told me*, or "*as you told me things would be, ſo I find them—as three is to* "*four, ſo is ſix to eight*," *i.e.* in the ſame ſituation—in the ſame proportion. "*So may you ſucceed as you perform your promiſe*— "*as you muſt take this method, ſo I muſt take the other*," *i. e.* may the degree of certainty of your ſucceſs be the ſame with that of your performing your promiſe. I muſt take this method for the ſame reaſon that you muſt take the other.

When "*ſo*" expreſſes ſome circumſtance which muſt be collected from conſequences or effects, "*that*" uſually follows it, being prefixed to the clauſe which expreſſes the conſequence or effect, whence that which is denoted by "*ſo*" is to be collected. Thus, "*he behaved himſelf ſo that he became generally eſteemed*," is equivalent to "*—in ſuch a manner as produced the conſequence of* "*his becoming generally eſteemed.*" Sometimes "*as*" is prefixed to "*that*;" as; "*he behaved himſelf ſo as that he became generally* "*eſteemed.*" If the clauſe which expreſſes the conſequence, whence what is denoted by "*ſo*" is to be eſtimated, be not a compleat ſentence, "*as*" is uſed, and not "*that*," for a reaſon which will appear when we conſider "*that*," as it is a conjunction. Thus, "*he behaved himſelf ſo as to become generally eſteemed.*" For, "*to become generally eſteemed*," is not a compleat ſentence; but, "*he became generally eſteemed*," which depends upon "*that*" in the former inſtance, is ſuch a ſentence.

When "*ſo*" is uſed with an adjective or adverb; it may relate to the individual degree of that which is denoted by the adjective or adverb, ſo as to repreſent the attention as fixed upon ſuch degree as is applied in any certain inſtance, and on no other

degree. This appears in the expreſſions, "*why is his chariot ſo* "*long in coming?—I did not think it could be done ſo eaſily*," &c. The ſenſe of theſe expreſſions may be aſcertained more preciſely, by referring them to a clauſe by "*as*," ſo that the clauſe ſhall expreſs the preciſe time, or other particulars, along with which the degree ſpoke of is obſerved; as thus, "*why is his chariot* "*ſo long in coming as it is now?—I did not think it could be done ſo* "*eaſily as it has been done in this inſtance.*" And as the ſame time, or the ſame inſtance, may be returned by a clauſe depending upon "*as*;" ſo a different time, or a different inſtance, may be made to depend upon "*as*," in which the ſame degree referred to by "*ſo*" is obſerved in the application of an adjective or adverb; as, "*he* "*is not now ſo ſtudious as he has been—this is not done ſo well as* "*that.*"

"*So*" is commonly uſed, when the ſame degree of what is denoted by an adjective or adverb is denied in one clauſe, and affirmed in another. For when the ſame degree is affirmed in both the clauſes, "*as*" is twice repeated; as, "*he is now as ſtu-* "*dious as he has been*," &c.

Of the particle "that," *when uſed as a conjunction.*

THIS particle has already appeared both as a relative, and as a demonſtrative pronoun. But it muſt be farther conſidered in a capacity which is of the ſame general nature with that of a conjunction; ſeeing, in this capacity, it is a notice, that ſome compleat ſentence depending upon it is to be applied in a manner, the notice of which manner cannot be given in the ſentence itſelf. The manner of connexion denoted by "*that*" is, that the ſentence depending upon it is to be conſidered, all of it together, as the expreſſion of one objective conception connected with other words, on the ſame principles as any conception may be, which is denoted by a ſingle noun ſubſtantive. Thus in the expreſſion, "*that any man ſhould be regardleſs of his own welfare is* "*wonder-*

"*wonderful*," the ſentence "*any man ſhould be regardleſs of his own* "*welfare*," is equivalent to a noun ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe on which the verb "*is*" depends. But in the expreſſion, "*to ſuppoſe that any man ſhould be regardleſs of his own welfare*," the ſame ſentence, "*any man ſhould be regardleſs of his own welfare*," is equivalent to a noun ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe depending upon the verb tranſitive, "*to ſuppoſe*," *i. e.* the ſenſe of the ſentence, "*any man ſhould be*," &c. is the thing ſuppoſed. In the expreſſion, "*your parents have a great deſire that you ſhould* "*be a ſcholar*," "*you ſhould be a ſcholar*," is equivalent to a ſubſtantive in the genitive caſe; for theſe words expreſs the thing "*of which*" the parents are deſirous. In the expreſſion, "*your parents have an inclination that you ſhould be a ſcholar*," the ſentence "*you ſhould be a ſcholar*," expreſſes the thing "*to which*" the parents have an inclination; and therefore is equivalent to a ſubſtantive in the dative caſe. And inſtances may be eaſily produced in which the ſentence depending upon "*that*" is equivalent to a noun ſubſtantive in the modes of connexion that are denoted by ſeveral prepoſitions.

A prepoſition is ſometimes expreſſed before a ſentence in this kind of conſtruction, as, "*he is diſpleaſed in that*, or *for that* "*you have proceeded indiſcreetly*;" but the kind of connexion in which the conception denoted by the ſentence depending upon "*that*" is to be taken, is more uſually left to be underſtood, or ſupplied, by the mind itſelf.

I have uſually called the particle "*that*" in this particular application of it "*a ſentential demonſtrative*" in teaching; in order to diſtinguiſh it, in this capacity, from its capacity as a demonſtrative pronoun, to repreſent any thing that can be pointed to, or any thing that is mentioned in another clauſe.

It has been obſerved by writers on ſpeculative grammar, that the relative pronoun is frequently equivalent to a perſonal pronoun

noun and a conjunction; as for inſtance, the expreſſions, "*Mr. N—— came yeſterday, and he goes away to-day*, or *but* "*he goes away to-day*," are, either of them, nearly of the ſame import with, "*Mr. N—— who came yeſterday, goes away* "*to-day*;" and "*ſome people will not ſtick at any thing, if they* "*can get money by it*," is nearly equivalent to "*ſome people will* "*not ſtick at any thing by which they can get money*;" likewiſe, "*ſuch a man has bought a Latin book, notwithſtanding he cannot* "*read it*," is nearly equivalent to "*ſuch a man has bought a Latin* "*book which he cannot read.*"

When "*as*" correſponds with "*ſuch*," it is frequently equivalent to "*who* or *which.*" Thus in the expreſſion, "*the* "*thoughts of ſuch men as ſtrive to deceive, are evil*;" "*as*" is a kind of relative pronoun, and ſupplies the place of the nominative caſe to the verb "*ſtrive*;" and the ſentence may be turned into the ſentence, "*the thoughts of men, who ſtrive to deceive,* "*are evil.*"

The reaſon of this coincidence is manifeſt, from the account which has been given of the nature of the relative pronoun, and of the nature of a conjunction: for the uſe of a relative pronoun reduces two compleat ſentences to one; and the uſe of a conjunction reduces two compleat ſentences to ſuch a connexion with each other, that the one of them cannot be taken without the other, if the intention of the ſpeaker in joining them together be obſerved. The intent of joining two ſentences in dependence upon each other, is more particularly declared by a conjunction, than the reaſon is declared why two ſentences are reduced to one, when a relative pronoun is employed in ſuch reduction. But when two ſentences are reduced to one by a relative pronoun, it is always done in conſequence of one and the ſame object being concerned in both the ſentences. And this ſameneſs of the object, eaſily enables the mind to perceive why two ſentences are reduced to one in which it is concerned.

Whereas,

Whereas, when the conjunctions are uſed, there is frequently no one and the ſame object concerned in the two ſentences connected by one of them; and therefore they expreſs directly, either the manner in which the ſentences are to be taken in connexion, or the reaſon why they are to be ſo taken, or ſome other purpoſe which requires the notice that is given by a particular conjunction.

Every one who is converſant in the antient Latin writers muſt have obſerved the particular caſt that is given by them to many ſentences, in conſequence of their uſing a relative inſtead of a perſonal pronoun and a conjunction, or ſome other connective word. Thus in Nepos, "*Servum ad regem miſit ut ei nunciaret "ſuis verbis, adverſarios ejus in fugâ eſſe, qui ſi deceſſiſſent majore "cum labore bellum confecturum, quos ſi ſtatim aggrederetur, brevi "univerſos oppreſſurum.*" "He (*i.e.* Miltiades) ſent a ſervant "to tell the king from him, that his enemies were flying, *and* "if *they* ſhould depart, that he muſt be at more pains to finiſh "the war; *but* if he attacked *them* immediately, he would "ſubdue them all together in a ſhort time." Here it is manifeſt, that "*qui*" is equivalent to "*and they*," and "*quos*" to "*but them*;" and ſo of innumerable inſtances which may be found in any Latin claſſic author.

The relative pronoun is alſo frequently uſed in Latin, to form a ſentence which is equivalent in ſenſe to an Engliſh infinitive verb with ſome words in dependence upon it. Thus in Terence, "*Adeon' videmur vobis eſſe idonei in quibus ſic illudatis?*" "Do we "ſeem to you ſo very proper to be thus played upon?" "*in qui-"bus ſic illudatis*" is equivalent to the Engliſh expreſſion, "*to be "thus played upon.*" Here the relative clauſe, "*in quibus*," &c. expreſſes "*the purpoſe for which*" we ſeem proper; and "*to be "thus played upon*" does the ſame in Engliſh, although the ſign "*for*" is not expreſſed.

It is frequently neceſſary to expreſs by a ſeries of words "*the purpoſe for which*" ſome one is ſent, appointed, com-

miſſioned, &c. and this ſeries is often equivalent to a ſentence. In ſuch inſtances, the Latins uſually turn the ſentence into a relative clauſe, and the Engliſh uſually apply an objective verb with ſome words depending upon it. Thus, "*miſit Gongylum* "*qui literas regi redderet*" is in Engliſh, "he ſent Gongylus "to deliver a letter to the king," where "*qui literas*," &c. is of the ſame import as "*to deliver a letter*," &c.

All this ſhews with undeniable evidence, as I think, that the nature of the relative pronoun and that of a definitive verb, as likewiſe that of the objective verb and of the cauſal conjunction, has been properly determined. For the reaſon plainly appears in what is ſaid of theſe parts of ſpeech, why a relative clauſe may have the effect of a ſentence depending upon a conjunction, and why an objective verb, with all that depends upon it, may be uſed as one noun ſubſtantive in an oblique caſe; as likewiſe that "*for*," when applied as a conjunction, has the ſame effect as when it is applied as the ſign of the ablative caſe. The ſign "*for*" is not indeed directly expreſſed before the objective verb, "*to deliver*;" but I ſhall ſhew in a following ſection, that the objective verb is uſed both in Greek, Latin, and Engliſh, ſo as to be equivalent to a ſubſtantive in almoſt any caſe; although no ſign of a particular caſe is given to it.

SECTION III.

Of the prepoſition.

THE general nature of this part of ſpeech has been already explained, in a great meaſure, in what is ſaid of the ſigns of the caſes of ſubſtantives; for all theſe ſigns, except "*than*," are prepoſitions, differing in nothing from the reſt, but their capacity of being applied in a greater variety of inſtances than the other prepoſitions.

It

It is obvious to perceive, that they are all expreſſions of "*relation*," but the difficulty is to determine, how ſuch various kinds of relations amongſt objects themſelves, can be expreſſed by one and the ſame prepoſition without confuſion: and why one and the ſame relation may be expreſſed, on many occaſions, by the help of different ſigns or prepoſitions. Thus in an inſtance already given, "*the diſtance of London from York—from London* "*to York—between London and York*," are manifeſtly three expreſſions of one and the ſame diſtance. This diverſity of expreſſion clearly ariſes from three different modes of eſtimating one and the ſame quantity. For in the firſt inſtance, "*the di-* "*ſtance*" is conſidered as if it were in the ſtate "*ſeparating*," and "*London*" as if it were in the ſtate "*ſeparated*," although theſe ſtates are not directly mentioned; and "*York*" is the "*object whence*" the mind proceeds in eſtimating that which ſeparates the two places. But in the expreſſion, "*from London* "*to York*," London is "*the object whence*" the mind proceeds; and York is "*the object whither*" it carries its eſtimation: where-as, in the expreſſion "*between London and York*," "*London and* "*York*," both together, are conſidered as one plural object, and the diſtance as included or bounded at each extremity by one of the conſtituent objects which together compoſe the complex object, "*London and York:*" for this manner of eſtimation is exactly the ſame with that which is uſed when we ſay, "*the diſtance* "*between the two towns—hills—rivers*," &c. only, in theſe laſt expreſſions, plural names can be found to denote the objects which limit the diſtance that is eſtimated. If the ſpeaker chuſes actually to mention the ſtates "*ſeparating*, or *ſeparated*," and to conſider the diſtance as "*the object ſeparating*," and "*London* "*and York*" as "*a complex object ſeparated*;" the expreſſions, "*the diſtance ſeparating London and York*, or *by which London* "*and York are ſeparated*," will be equivalent to any of the former. In theſe laſt expreſſions, the mind has recourſe to a fiction of its own; for the abſtract object, "*diſtance*" is conſidered as exerting the act of "*ſeparating*," and "*London and York*" are conſi-

dered as the recipients of the effect of the act which is exerted; and this fictitious ſtate gives occaſion to different modes of eſtimation from any of the former, in connecting the ſeveral parts of the conception which is expreſſed; and therefore different ſigns of connexion are uſed in theſe expreſſions from the ſigns which are uſed in any of the former; whilſt yet the reſult of all the expreſſions amounts to the ſame thing. This is no more than comes to paſs in eſtimating all kind of quantity, ſo as to expreſs the reſult of the proceſs in algebraic ſpecies: for we are uſually at liberty to proceed ſeveral different ways; and yet, if the reaſoning is juſt, we ſhall always come at laſt to an expreſſion, which, though different in form, is in effect the ſame with that which is the reſult of any other way of proceeding, in which the reaſoning is alſo juſt. And to carry on the reſemblance farther, a fictitious quantity is always introduced merely to aſſiſt the mind in regiſtering the ſteps of the proceſs; and this quantity is frequently placed in a fictitious ſtate, till the reſult of the operation ariſes, in which whatſoever was fictitious is aſcertained. This proceeding in algebra is made uſe of merely to aid the limited powers of the mind of man, and the like kind of proceeding in language is made uſe of on the very ſame account. For it will appear from the following liſt of the Engliſh prepoſitions, that all of them, except "*of*—*by*—*for* and *than*," denote the ſeveral relations of place, or ſituation, or of the direction of objects in motion, or of ſtates which may be varied by motion: and it is evident, that abſtract objects can really have no ſuch relations to each other; becauſe they are incapable of external place, or local motion. But the mind perceives, that abſtract objects have connexions with each other, which require nearly the ſame modes of eſtimation which the relations of local ſituation do; and therefore, in language, whatſoever connexion is conceived to require the ſame mode of attention in order to eſtimate it, is denoted by one and the ſame ſign, and the preciſe nature of the connexion, as it is in itſelf, is left to be determined by the judgment, from the nature of the conceptions which are united by the ſign.

As

As the relations of place, ſituation, and direction of objects in motion, or of ſtates which may be varied by motion, are of the moſt frequent occurrence; and as the difference of one from another is moſt obvious; particular prepoſitions have been adapted, in almoſt all languages, to each of the moſt remarkable of theſe relations. And as almoſt all of them are perceived to exiſt amongſt objects at reſt, as well as amongſt objects when ſome of them are in motion, whilſt yet few external objects are obſerved to exiſt conſtantly in one and the ſame ſtate, either of reſt or motion; theſe ſtates are taken into the ſignification of few or no names of external objects; but are denoted by adjectives, verbs, and adverbs, to be occaſionally united with the ſubſtantive names of theſe objects; or if a verb is uſed objectively, the ſtate denoted by it is conſidered as capable of every modification, which an object in that verbal ſtate would be capable of. For as a man, or other object, may be repreſented as "*moving to—from—with—near—in—around—above—under*" ſome other object: ſo the ſtate "*to move*" may be carried in the mind "*to—from—with*," &c. ſome object, although this ſtate cannot exiſt as an object in itſelf, except in the mind of man.

Hence the prepoſitions denoting relations of place are ſeen in dependence both upon expreſſions of objects, which conſiſt of ſubſtantives alone, and of ſubſtantives with adjectives, participles, and adverbs, depending on them; and likewiſe of objective verbs alone, and of objective verbs with adjectives or adverbs depending upon them; and this in the ſubjects of ſentences. For as to the predicates of ſentences, when they conſiſt of ſeveral ſubſtantives in dependence upon one and the ſame verb, it is evident that ſome ſign of an oblique caſe, or other prepoſition, is neceſſary, on almoſt all occaſions, to ſhew how each ſubſtantive is made to expreſs a mere circumſtance of the ſtate denoted by the verb.

I have already ſhewn at large the ſeveral modes of eſtimation, to which the relations are reduced that are denoted by "*the ſign*

"*of*

"*of the accuſative caſe*," as likewiſe by "*of—by—for* and *than*," which are not particularly applicable to relations of place.

The reſt of the Engliſh prepoſitions are as follow.

Afore—before.
Againſt.
Beſide—beſides.
Near—nigh—by.
With.
Toward—towards—to—unto—into.
At.
In—within.
Between—betwixt.
Among—amongſt.
Amidſt.
About—around.
Through or thorough—throughout.
Out of—without.
After—behind.
Beyond.
Off—from.
Above—over.
On—upon.
Below—beneath—underneath.
Up.
Down.

Now the relations of place which are denoted by theſe prepoſitions are ſo obvious to obſervation, that it is quite impertinent to attempt to deſcribe them in words. For every one who has the uſe of eyes, muſt have perceived how objects are ſituated with relation to each other, when the names of the objects are united by the ſeveral prepoſitions; or, if the name of an object is made dependent on a verb by one of them, how the ſtate is related to the object which has the prepoſition before its name; as, "*to ſtand before—againſt—beſide—in—out of—behind—beyond—on the houſe*," are expreſſions of "*ſtanding*," ſo aſcertained in poſition with regard to the houſe, that every one as readily apprehends the ſtate under theſe modifications, as he does the ſtate denoted by the verb "*ſtanding*," uſed alone. Yet each of the prepoſitions directs the mind to apply the ſtate to the houſe under a different mode of eſtimation; and as theſe modes have no names, every one muſt conſider how he applies his attention in eſtimating each of the relations that are between the ſtate and the houſe. It is manifeſt, that in theſe expreſſions the houſe is conſidered in a different manner upon the application of every

prepoſition; for the attention proceeds from the fore part, to a cloſer approach to ſome part of it, thence to ſome ſide of it, thence to the interior parts, thence to the outward parts, thence to the back parts, thence to ſome diſtance from it on the contrary part to that on which ſome other object is placed, and thence to the top of it. So that we are led, in a kind of ideal view, to firſt one part of the houſe, and then another, by the prepoſitions, " *before—againſt—beſide—in—out of—behind—beyond* " *—on.*" The effect of other prepoſitions, with other objects or ſtates in different local poſitions, might eaſily be exemplified in the ſame manner, were it of any real uſe.

As to the application of prepoſitions to objects or ſtates, which are in themſelves incapable of local ſituation; there is no method to be taken, but ſetting down the principal applications of each prepoſition which uſe has eſtabliſhed in any particular language. For (as has been already obſerved) different nations have not applied the ſame modes of eſtimation to the ſame relations. I might therefore proceed with all the prepoſitions, in the ſame manner as I have proceeded with thoſe which anſwer to the ſigns of the Latin caſes; but this would be quite unneceſſary for the purpoſes of ſpeculative grammar. Therefore this is referred to the ſection of the practical grammar, in which rules are laid down for the conſtruction of Engliſh prepoſitions.

By the cuſtom of the Engliſh language, thoſe pronouns which have an accuſative form different from the nominative, are placed after both verbs tranſitive and prepoſitions in the accuſative form, and not in the nominative; as, " *to ſee me and him,*" not " *to ſee I* " *and he;*" " *between—around us and them,*" not " *we and they.*" But this change of form adds nothing to the ſignification of the expreſſion; for " *it—which* and *that*" have no accuſative different from the nominative, any more than the ſubſtantives of the language have; and yet, without variety of termination, they may be taken in any mode of eſtimation which is denoted by a ſign or prepoſition, as well as thoſe pronouns can be, which have an accuſative different from the nominative. Any

Any of the relations which are denoted by prepoſitions may be expreſſed by ſubſtantive names; as for inſtance, that denoted by "*before*" may be expreſſed by "*priority*," that denoted by "*againſt*" by "*oppoſition*," "*near*" by "*vicinity*," "*between*" by "*interpoſition*," "*among*" by "*intermixture*;" and ſo of any of the reſt, for which ſubſtantive names have been formed. But the ſubſtantive conception of no one of theſe relations can be formed by abſtraction from one object only: for there muſt be two objects at leaſt, or a verbal ſtate and an object, concerned in every relation before the mind can form any conception of it. When therefore the names of two objects, or a verbal ſtate and the name of an object, are joined by a particular prepoſition; the two objects, or the ſtate and the object, are ſo ſituated with regard to each other, that the conception of the relation which is denoted by the prepoſition might, by one who knew it not, be gained from the ſituation, if the objects, or the ſtate and the object, were preſent to the ſenſes. But the uſe of language ſuppoſes, that the conception of every ſuch relation is gained by the previous obſervation of every one who uſes words conſiſtently; and therefore the prepoſitions, when they join two words, direct the mind to perform an operation, which is the converſe of the abſtract operation that is uſed when a relation is ſo conceived as to be denoted by a ſubſtantive name. For in the expreſſions, "*a man before another—to walk before a man*," the relation of "*priority*," as denoted by "*before*," is not to be ſeparately attended to, but is to be made uſe of in order to place the two men in a certain ſituation with regard to each other, and likewiſe the ſtate "*to walk*" in a certain ſituation with regard to the man; and ſo of any other prepoſition. Hence many of the relations denoted by prepoſitions, have adjective names; as, "*prior*" "*—poſterior—interior—exterior—ulterior*;" and when theſe adjectives are made dependent on a ſubſtantive or verb, they ſhew the object denoted by the ſubſtantive, and the ſtate denoted by the verb as in a certain ſituation with regard to ſome other object which is not directly expreſſed in the adjective, but which

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is either ſuppoſed to be known, or muſt be mentioned by ſome other words; as, "*the interior part of the houſe*," &c.

As the relation denoted by a prepoſition may be expreſſed by a ſingle ſubſtantive name, if the mind pleaſes to conſider it as an abſtract object, ſo it may be "*taken into*" the object that is denoted by a ſingle ſubſtantive, or into the coaleſcent conception denoted by a ſingle adjective or adverb, or into the ſtate denoted by a ſingle verb, ſo as to become a conſtituent part of the conception that is denoted by any of theſe ſorts of words. For the mind can compound as many of its conceptions as it pleaſes into the ſignification of a ſingle word. If the ſignification of a prepoſition is taken into a ſubſtantive, the conception which is denoted by ſuch ſubſtantive, will not coaleſce with that which is denoted by another ſubſtantive; as for inſtance, "*pre-eminence—prevalence*," although each has the force of the prepoſition "*above*" in it, will neither of them ſo unite with another ſubſtantive, as in the expreſſion "*eminence above others*," "*eminence*" unites with "*others*" by means of "*above*." If the ſignification of a prepoſition is taken into an adjective, the adjective will coaleſce with one ſubſtantive; as, "*a pre-eminent ſtation*;" but it will not unite two ſubſtantives ſo together as "*above*" does. And ſo the adverb "*previouſly*" will unite with a verb; but will not unite another word with the verb. But a prepoſition, when united with a verb intranſitive, frequently has the effect of a ſeparate prepoſition; as, "*to precede*" is of the ſame import as "*to go before*," "*to ſucceed*" as "*to come behind*;" and ſo of other inſtances. Hence, "*a man preceding or ſucceeding another*," are expreſſions much of the ſame import with, "*a man coming before or behind another*." The reaſon of this manifeſtly is, becauſe the ſtates "*preceded—ſucceeded*," in which the man denoted by "*another*" is repreſented, have the ſame kind of correſpondence with the ſtates "*preceding—ſucceeding*," in which the firſt man is repreſented, as the terms of thoſe relations have, which are denoted by "*before—behind*," only the correſpon-

dences of the verbal ſtates are conceived to be eſtimated by a different kind of proceeding from thoſe which are uſed when the prepoſitions are mentioned.

The prepoſitions which are uſed in inſeparable compoſition with Engliſh words, are much the moſt frequently not the original Engliſh or Saxon prepoſitions, which are ſet down in the foregoing liſt; but the French, Latin, and Greek prepoſitions; ſuch as, "*em—ſur—ab—ad—ante—circum—in—inter—poſt—* "*ſuper—trans*," "*anti—apo—dia—meta—peri—pros—ſyn*," &c.; for moſt of our compound words have been borrowed from theſe languages. This gives as great a variety to the firſt ſyllables in Engliſh words, as probably is in the words of any language whatſoever.

The original Engliſh prepoſitions frequently depend upon intranſitive verbs, and eſpecially on paſſive verbs, ſo as to make a part of the verb itſelf; as in the expreſſions, "*to be heard of—to be* "*heard from*," "*to be talked to—to be talked with*," "*to be bar-* "*gained for*." This occaſions a kind of conſtruction in the Engliſh language, which I have not obſerved in any other; as in the inſtances, "*Mr. N—— has been heard of—heard from*," "*talked to by ſeveral people*," "*the goods are bargained for by* "*Mr. N——*." Here the ſubſtantive which ſhould be the nominative caſe to the verb, is conſidered as known of courſe from the nature of the verb; and the ſubſtantives which ſhould depend on the prepoſitions, "*of—from—to—with—for*," become of the nominative caſe on which the verb, when thus compounded, is made to depend. For the four firſt of the inſtances above, are manifeſtly equivalent to "*ſomething has been heard of Mr. N——*, "*has been heard from Mr. N——, has been talked to Mr. N——*, "*has been talked with Mr. N——, by ſeveral people*;" and the laſt inſtance is equivalent to "*a bargain is made for the goods by* "*Mr. N——*." So that this mode of conſtruction is uſed merely to ſave words, and is not liable to ambiguity if uſed with care.

SECTION IV.

Of the interjection.

THIS part of ſpeech uſually expreſſes ſome ſudden emotion of the mind, or the perception of pleaſure or pain in an unuſual degree; and this frequently by a ſound formed by the organs of ſpeech, in conſequence of a poſition of theſe organs which is occaſioned by the emotion itſelf, without the ſpeaker's previous intent.

Thus laughter, in almoſt all languages, is expreſſed by "*ha ha he*," ſorrow by "*ah ah*," or "*oh oh*," or at leaſt by ſounds reſembling thoſe which the Engliſh annex to theſe interjections.

Sometimes words of this part of ſpeech are uſed to ſignify the intention of a ſpeaker, when he is too far diſtant from the hearer to hold continued converſation with him; as in "*hola*—" "*ſo ho*," &c.

But as this part of ſpeech is only uſed in ſituations in which the ſpeaker is not at leiſure, or has not the opportunity, to form connected expreſſion; it is conſidered, as thrown into ſentences, and not as placed in continued connexion with them. Therefore little more is required towards explaining the nature of interjections, than to give a liſt of them, and to ſpecify the emotions, or ſtarts of intention, which are denoted by each. But this relates to practical grammar, and therefore ſuch a liſt is given in the practical part of this work.

HAVING thus gone over the parts of ſpeech in order, and having ſhewn, as I hope, with inconteſtible evidence, the principal

properties of each; I ſhall cloſe this part of the work with placing the ſeveral kinds of connexion of the conceptions of the mind of man as denoted by words in one view.

It is clear, that theſe connexions do not ariſe immediately from the nature of external things, but from the kinds of conceptions which the mind forms of things; becauſe qualities, ſtates, and relations, which cannot exiſt ſeparately, are denoted by ſeparate words. Therefore the conceptions denoted by ſeveral words muſt be capable of uniting into one conception, whenſoever there is occaſion for ſuch union. But ſeveral ſorts of conceptions may be formed by abſtraction from one and the ſame object, and yet each one of theſe conceptions may be ſuch as repreſents the object as having a ſeparate and incommunicable principle of exiſtence, and if ſo, all the names of ſuch conceptions will be noun ſubſtantives. Yet theſe conceptions muſt be capable of communicating with each other; becauſe they are all applicable to one and the ſame object. What is ſaid of the conceptions annexed to ſubſtantive names of ſpecies, ſhews ſufficiently how one and the ſame object becomes an individual of many ſpecies; and likewiſe why it is at ſometimes an individual of certain ſpecies, and at other times not. For the characteriſtics of many ſpecies are not fixed and inherent in the individuals, but may be acquired at one time, and loſt at another: as for inſtance, a man may be "*a huſband*" now, and then "*a widower*," and then "*a huſband*" again. Therefore the ſeveral names of one and the ſame object muſt be capable of connexion, by the means of ſome word which will ſhew whether the conceptions denoted by them both, are applicable to that object now, or were ſo formerly, or will be ſo hereafter. Such a connexion is expreſſed by interpoſing ſome form of the verb "*to be*" between two ſubſtantives; for by the reference of the infinitive and participial forms of the verb "*to memory—to actual perception*, and *to foreſight*," and of the definitive forms to time, as diſtinguiſhed into "*paſt*, *preſent*, "and *to come*," by the demonſtrative act of ſpeaking, we are led

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on to any period of time when two names are equally applicable to one and the ſame object. This is manifeſtly the ſimpleſt of the manners in which the conceptions, denoted by two ſubſtantives, can communicate with each other; and therefore a mere expreſſion of "*being*," in which both the conceptions coaleſce, is uſed to ſhew their coaleſcence; as, "*Mr. N—— being—— having been—being about to be a widower.*"

In the inſtance above, only one "*being*" is concerned, in which the conceptions denoted by two ſubſtantives unite. But there are frequent occaſions in language to unite two or more ſeparate beings, either actual or ideal, into one complex object. If theſe beings are all of one ſpecies, they may be expreſſed as united into one complex object, by uſing a plural name of the ſpecies to which they belong; as, "*men—horſes—virtues—vices.*" If they are not all of a ſpecies, ſeveral ſubſtantives muſt be united by the conjunction "*and*;" as, "*Mr. N—— and Mrs. B——*," "*virtue and vice.*"

Theſe two modes of communication, as to grammatical expreſſion, are more ſimple than the firſt: but as ſeveral diſtinct beings are concerned in each complex conception expreſſed by either of them, the number is increaſed; which does not happen in the firſt mode of communication, and therefore it is more ſimple in itſelf than either of theſe.

The next mode of communication is that between the conception denoted by a ſubſtantive and a verb placed in immediate dependence upon it. By this mode, the object and ſtate become ſo intimately united, that the conception of both together may be expreſſed by one ſubſtantive name, as, "*one thinking*" may be called "*a thinker*," "*one ſpeaking*" "*a ſpeaker*;" and ſo of other inſtances.

The next mode is that between a verb tranſitive and a ſubſtantive depending immediately upon it. For the correſponding paſſive ſtate is ſo eaſily ſupplied, and the object denoted by the

ſubſtantive

ſubſtantive is ſo readily placed in it, that it is conſidered as a mere circumſtance of the ſtate which is mentioned; as, "*to* "*tell a tale*" is conſidered in language merely as one ſort of "*telling*," and "*to tell a lie*" as another kind of "*telling*," although the "*tale*" and the "*lie*" are not in the ſtate "*telling*," but in the ſtate "*told*."

If we conſider theſe two laſt modes of communication as reduced to one, by interpoſing a tranſitive verb between two ſubſtantives; we ſhall have a mode of communication, to which, or to its converſe by the paſſive verb, all the remaining modes may be reduced. For that between a ſubſtantive and an adjective is at leaſt as complex as this mode; as, "*a roomy houſe*" is equivalent to "*a houſe* having *room*;" and ſo of other inſtances. All the modes of communication denoted by the prepoſitions (except that which "*by*" denotes after a paſſive verb) are of the ſame complex nature; as has been fully ſhewn in the ſection concerning the ſigns of caſes. And as the adverb is equivalent to the oblique caſe of a ſubſtantive, its communication with the word on which it depends is of the ſame nature with that denoted by the ſign of a caſe, or other prepoſition. Therefore the applying words in connexion by adjectives, or prepoſitions, or adverbs, is exactly of the ſame difficulty, as connecting words by the means of a tranſitive verb; and as the conſiſtent application of a tranſitive verb is almoſt one of the firſt exertions of the diſcurſive powers of a child, the conſiſtent application of the other connective parts of ſpeech, in all common inſtances, eaſily follows, when the application of the verb is once learnt.

The connexions by conjunctions different from "*and*," and by the relative pronoun, are a kind of ſupplements to theſe above mentioned; and the moſt of them ariſe from the nature of ſentences, and not from the conceptions denoted by ſingle words. Theſe connexions have been ſo largely inſiſted upon, under their proper heads, that it is unneceſſary to add more concerning them in this place.

A Spe-

A Speculative Grammar.

BOOK VI.

SECTION I.

Of the power of uſe or cuſtom in language.

BEFORE I proceed to ſpeak of words in connected conſtruction, in order to account for that particular plan of conſtruction which is obſerved in Engliſh, it is neceſſary to premiſe ſome obſervations concerning the original and extent of the power of uſe or cuſtom in the application of language. For if that is true which is laid down, as a certain principle, by ſome writers on grammar, viz. that whatſoever is authorized by uſe and cuſtom, is therefore right in language; it is then evident, that the only province of a grammarian is, to examine what is of the moſt eſtabliſhed uſe in the language of which he treats; and to give himſelf no trouble as to ſpeculative reflexions on the general nature of ſuch language. This opinion concerning the authority of cuſtom cannot be right with regard to all the properties of language, becauſe ſome of theſe properties are eſſential to the nature of language itſelf. As for inſtance, the words of every language muſt of neceſſity, ſome of them be made to ſignify objects themſelves; and others, the occaſional ſtates of being in which theſe objects are obſerved; and others, the modes of operation of the mind itſelf, by which it unites the ſeveral parts

parts of a conception, as they are denoted by ſeveral words, into one complex conception; which muſt repreſent either ſome object, or ſome ſtate of being, or ſome object in ſome ſtate of being. Therefore the reaſon of man has ſhewn the neceſſity of introducing different ſorts of words into every language, to be applied in connected ſeries, in different manners, and for different purpoſes. Words of the ſame meaning and uſe are indeed different from one another, as to ſound, in every different language; and no reaſon can be given why different ſounds were firſt applied by different nations to ſignify one and the ſame ſort of objects, or of ſtates of being, or of modes of contemplation of the mind itſelf. But when the ſorts of words are once formed in a language, they cannot be joined in connected ſeries with convenience, except in certain orders; becauſe the organs of ſpeech are not capable of pronouncing ſome ſounds immediately before or after ſome other ſounds, without difficulty. Every ſpeaker is quickly ſenſible of this; and therefore the moſt common appearances and occurrences, are expreſſed in every language by words ſo placed in ſeries, that the words will eaſily go off the tongue of the ſpeaker, if he has been previouſly accuſtomed to pronounce the capital, or leading words concerned in each ſeries. The general plan of conſtruction, in every language, has manifeſtly been formed from theſe expreſſions. For the moſt ordinary appearances and events muſt have expreſſions adapted to each, in every language, in the very firſt application of it; becauſe the ordinary and neceſſary affairs of life cannot be carried on in concert without ſuch expreſſions. Yet no plan of language has been formed, or ever can be formed, at random; but ſo as to ſuit the diſcurſive powers of the mind of man. The firſt effect of theſe powers is, the perceiving that different particulars which are not conſtantly obſerved to exiſt all together, cannot with any convenience be included in the conception denoted by any one ſingle word. For the ſame word muſt always ſignify the ſame conception, or the ſame operation of the mind; or ſuch word will have an indeterminate meaning.

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If therefore ſeveral particulars, which ſeldom exiſt together, ſhould be included in the ſignification of any one word, ſuch word could be ſeldom uſed, becauſe the conception denoted by it would ſeldom occur to the mind. Hence no one word can be made, with any convenience, to ſignify all that is at once before the mind of a ſpeaker, even upon the ſimpleſt occaſions. For the mind of man ſeldom contemplates any object under ſuch circumſtances as are never changed. And if circumſtances are changed, the expreſſion muſt be likewiſe changed, or it will not convey to the hearer the conception which the ſpeaker has in his mind. On this account it is, that the capital object in every ſeries of connected words, muſt be expreſſed no farther, by its name, than as it may be diſtinguiſhed by characters which exiſt together in ſuch object, whilſt the circumſtances which either may or may not be taken along with it, muſt be denoted by coaleſcent words to be occaſionally united with the name.

It appears from hence, that the proceeding by which ſeparate words are applied to expreſs only parts of what is before the mind at once, is the artificial proceeding in language; and that the putting a ſeries of theſe words together to expreſs any common occurrence, is the natural conſequence of attending to ſuch occurrence, as the conception of it is all at once in the mind. Hence it comes to paſs, that children, and perſons utterly illiterate, can put words together conſiſtently, to expreſs any ordinary occurrence; and this without any explicit knowledge of the general plan of conſtruction of the language in which they ſpeak. Yet even this application of any language to common occurrences, was not firſt made at random, but by a reaſonable adjuſtment of means to ends. For the words of every language, when reduced to connected ſeries expreſſing truth or falſhood, are put into the form of compleat ſentences: and nothing but reaſon could have ſuggeſted this proceeding. This appears, in ſome degree, in what is already ſaid of the definitive verb,

and will be made more apparent in the next chapter.

What has been hitherto obſerved, chiefly relates to the common colloquial language of any community of people; but there is ſeldom any regular grammar compoſed of any language in which there are no books. Hence written language becomes the main object of grammar, and cuſtom has much leſs power over ſuch language, than over the common language of converſation. If converſation is held with illiterate perſons, it muſt be carried on in ſuch words, and ſuch forms of conſtruction, as theſe perſons are accuſtomed to; otherwiſe it will not be underſtood. But when an author ſits down to write, he muſt adapt his ſtile to his ſubject, and this ſubject may be of a kind that has never been treated of in the language in which he writes. Here then he is at liberty to exert his genius upon the language itſelf in which he compoſes. And, provided he does not quite loſe ſight of the accuſtomed plan of conſtruction, he may model his expreſſions into various forms that never have been uſed before; and every original genius has conſtantly done thus in poetry, oratory, hiſtory, and in every work of imagination. It is true, that original writers ſeldom ſit down to conſider the abſtract nature of the language in which they write: but form ſtriking conceptions in their own minds, and adjuſt their expreſſions to theſe conceptions. So that the received forms of conſtruction in the language in which they write, ſupply them, not with fixed patterns, from which they muſt never depart; but with rough materials, which they mold and faſhion ſo as to fit them to their conceptions of excellence in the language in which they write. Thus it is, that patterns of ſtile become eſtabliſhed in all languages, and not by the mere caprice of arbitrary faſhion. Many attempts in every language are uſually made, before the plan of conſtruction is brought to ſuch a degree of perfection as the language is capable of reaching. And poſterity eaſily perceives, that the language uſed in one age by the writers of a nation, is better than that which is uſed by thoſe of

of another age. As for inſtance, all agree that the language of Virgil is better than that of Ennius; and very few but acknowledge the ſtile of Terence to be better than that of Plautus. Yet there is no doubt, but that each of theſe writers followed the cuſtom of ſpeaking that was generally uſed in the age when each of them lived, and that each adapted the cuſtom to his ſubject in many inſtances.

If therefore cuſtom were the only teſt of what is right or wrong in language, the ſtile of all theſe authors would be equally good. But it is clear, that poſterity has little regard to cuſtom, in judging of the excellence of a writer's ſtile; but determines that to be moſt excellent, which conveys the thoughts of the writer in the moſt clear and forcible manner to the mind of the reader.

It is indeed very difficult to ſhew from the nature of the Latin language, conſidered abſtractedly, why the ſtile of one of theſe authors is better than that of another: and the ſame obtains with regard to different writers in all other languages. But it is moſt evident, that the cuſtom of the age in which each author lived, is very little concerned in the determination; for it is that internal perception of the mind of man, which is uſually called taſte, that determines upon all points of the like kind with this under conſideration; and when once the taſte of different ages and nations has pronounced certain modes of compoſition to be excellent, there is no appeal from it. Now what we call "*taſte*," is nothing elſe but "an exertion of the intellectual powers of man "in ſuch inſtances as are ſo nearly connected with the nature of a "ſenſitive and rational being, that the perception of what is the "moſt agreeable or diſagreeable to ſuch nature, requires no me-"dium of proof to the mind of any perſon who has employed his "attention ſteadily on many inſtances ſimilar to any one of thoſe "which happens to be at any time under conſideration." For previous uſe, and cuſtom, and inſtruction, enable every ſuch

perſon to compare objects, in themſelves of a very complex nature, with the patterns of excellence of which he has formed conceptions in his own mind: and this at once, without proceeding ſtep by ſtep in the compariſon. If the perſon's ſkill ſtops here, ſuch perſon is a nice judge of excellence and defects in performances of art and genius, when theſe performances are actually accompliſhed and preſented to obſervation. But the minds of men of deep ſpeculation ſeldom ſtop here; for they are naturally led on to diſcover why one inſtance of performance is more excellent than another. And this puts them upon analyſing thoſe complex conceptions which taſte makes uſe of as ſtandards; and the reſult of this analyſis produces ſcience: for the moſt ſimple and general principles, to which the ſubject under conſideration can be reduced, are diſcovered by this proceeding. And thus it is that, in all inſtances, the common conceptions of the mind of man are improved by men of genius and obſervation, into taſte more and more refined; and that taſte itſelf is advanced into ſcience by men of abſtract ſpeculation. The conſequences of ſcience in any ſubject are general rules, which extend to the main and leading principles of the ſubject to which they relate. But if the ſubject is not merely abſtract and ſcientific, but is to be actually applied in a very great variety of inſtances of uſe and practice, no general rules will extend to all the inſtances of application; for general rules have little regard to convenience of practice in particular inſtances. Hence in the actual application, even of arithmetic, to the ordinary affairs of commerce, moſt people depart from the general rules, and uſe thoſe which the teachers of the art have called rules of practice: becauſe they are better accommodated for diſpatch in practice, than the general rules of proportion are. And if this comes to paſs in the application of numbers in the common affairs of life, there is much greater reaſon to expect an event of the ſame kind in the application of words, which extends to a far greater variety of inſtances than the application of numbers does. Now it is poſſible, that a man may learn, by

by mere ſtrength of mind, aſſiſted by uſe and cuſtom, to apply numbers readily and ſurely to ſuch affairs as he is engaged in; and it is likewiſe poſſible to teach children to apply the rules of arithmetic, without ſhewing them the reaſon of any of theſe rules. And this way of teaching arithmetic is undoubtedly the beſt ſuited to the capacities of children. But ſurely the teacher himſelf ought to underſtand the ſcientific principles upon which the application proceeds, and ought likewiſe to inſtruct his pupils in theſe principles, as ſoon as their minds become ſufficiently enlarged to comprehend them. And ſo in language, uſe and cuſtom may enable any perſon to apply it pertinently; and children may be taught to make uſe of rules, the reaſon of which is not ſhewn them. But the teacher ought to underſtand, both the general principles which obtain in the application of all languages, and likewiſe thoſe which obtain in the particular language that he teaches, and which give that particular caſt, or turn of conſtruction, which is peculiar to ſuch language. And it is evidently the duty of every teacher to communicate thoſe principles to his ſcholars, as ſoon as they are capable of comprehending them: becauſe this knowledge will ſave the ſcholars much labour in their future ſtudies, in any language. It is the province of ſpeculative grammar to conſider, both language in general, and likewiſe each language in particular, ſo as to diſcover the principles upon which the application proceeds: not pretending to account for each particular mode of expreſſion; but for the properties of conſtruction which are obſerved in all languages, and for the peculiar turn and genius of any language that is to be eſpecially explained. The following ſection will ſhew how the principles, already laid down in the foregoing parts of this work, may be applied in inveſtigations of the nature above mentioned, both with regard to language in general, and to the Engliſh language in particular.

SECTION

SECTION II.

Of words in connected conſtruction.

WHAT has hitherto been ſaid of each of the parts of ſpeech, conſidered ſeparately, is only preparatory to this part of grammar. For the meaning of words, as reduced to ſeveral claſſes, is conſidered by grammarians with no other intent but to enable themſelves and others, who do conſider them in this manner, to apply them with more certainty in connected ſeries, expreſſing the various conceptions of the mind of man.

In this part of grammar, the firſt thing required is, to ſhew why almoſt every expreſſion in any language, muſt take the form of a compleat ſentence, before it can be conceived to anſwer the intention of any rational ſpeaker.

This ariſes from the great inconvenience which would enſue from uniting the force of a definitive verb with almoſt any expreſſion in language, except of perſon and number. For, by what has been obſerved of the power of the definitive forms of the verb, it plainly appears, that the expreſſion to which a definitive verb is ſubjoined, can neither itſelf be farther compounded, by interpoſing additional words between it and the verb, nor by making it dependent on ſome other word by the ſign of a caſe, or other prepoſition. For the compoſition of every expreſſion on which a definitive verb depends, muſt be abſolutely compleated, before ſuch verb can be applied to it in conſiſtent conſtruction; and this, becauſe the definitive form itſelf of the verb (conſidered independently of the reſt of its meaning) gives notice, that the compoſition of the expreſſion on which it depends is compleated, and that the verbal *ſtate of being* contained in the reſt of the ſignification of the predicate of the ſentence, affects

the whole conception denoted by the ſubject of the ſentence, whether ſuch ſubject be expreſſed by one word or more.

The circumſtances of perſon and number, may be united with *ſtates of being* in the ſignification of ſuch verbal forms as are never intended to be applied in language, but in dependence upon ſome ſubject. For the principal object in that which is denoted by the ſubject of every ſentence, muſt be in one of the ſituations which are the characteriſtics of the three perſonal ſpecies; *i. e.* it muſt either be "*ſpeaking*," or "*ſpoken to*," or "*neither ſpeaking nor ſpoken to*;" and it muſt likewiſe be of one of the numbers. And therefore, to give notice of theſe circumſtances as obſerved in ſome object which is likewiſe conſidered as in ſome verbal ſtate of being, nothing more is neceſſary than to give each verb three different forms in each number of each tenſe, and to make one of the forms in each number ſignify the verbal ſtate as united with ſome object conſidered as "*naming itſelf*," another of the forms as united with the object "*to which that which is ſaid is addreſſed*," and another of the forms as with an object "*in neither of the above-mentioned circumſtances.*"

Single verbs of definitive forms thus conſtituted, will each of them have the effect of a ſentence on ſeveral occaſions. But this effect does not enſue from the ſingle verbs, but from the demonſtrative circumſtances which may attend the act of pronouncing any one of them ſingle. For the hearer is conceived to know the meaning of every ſingle word which the ſpeaker makes uſe of, before the word is mentioned; and therefore no ſingle word, if conſidered in itſelf, gives the hearer any new information. But the demonſtrative circumſtances attending the act of mentioning a ſingle definitive verb, may ſo far aid the ſignification of the verb, as to give new information to the hearer. For ſome object of a certain perſon and number is to be repreſented as in the ſtate denoted by a verb of a definitive form,

form, either at, or before, or after, the time of ſpeaking; and the act of ſpeaking, or mentioning ſuch verb, is a demonſtrative circumſtance, which at once determines the object itſelf of the firſt or ſecond perſon that is repreſented in the ſtate denoted by the verb (ſuppoſing the ſpeaker and hearer are preſent with each other when the words are ſpoke) and likewiſe a point or period of time; and the ſtate is conſidered as co-exiſtent with, or as preceding, or ſucceeding ſuch point or period. And if the ſpeaker can point out a particular object, neither ſpeaking nor ſpoken to, when he uſes a definitive verb of the third perſon, the hearer will conceive that the ſpeaker's intention is to repreſent the object pointed out, as in the verbal ſtate, at, or before, or after, the particular time of ſpeaking, according to the tenſe of the verb which he makes uſe of; and by the help of ſuch aſcertainment, one ſingle verb may frequently expreſs a ſpeaker's whole intention. As if a man ſays, "*audio, I hear,*" or "*erras, you miſtake,*" (and the perſons concerned in the diſcourſe are preſent with each other at the time of ſpeaking) or "*audiebam, I heard—audiam,* "*I ſhall hear—errabas, you were miſtaken—errabis, you will be* "*miſtaken;*" or if a man points to a perſon and ſays, "*errat—* "*errabat,* or *errabit, he is—was,* or *will be miſtaken:*" the circumſtances attending the diſcourſe enable the hearer to comprehend particulars, which the words themſelves do not contain in their ſignification. For the verbs "*audio—audiebam—audiam,*" denote "*any ſpeaker whatſoever*" conſidering himſelf as hearing: the firſt at, the ſecond before, and the third after, "*any point* "*of time whatſoever*" in which the words are ſpoke; and ſo "*erras—errabas—errabis*" denote "*any object ſpoken to,*" as "*being miſtaken*" at, or before, or after, "*any point of time* "*whatſoever,*" in which theſe words are addreſſed; and "*errat* "*—errabat—errabit,*" if conſidered in themſelves, denote "*any* "*object neither ſpeaking nor ſpoken to,*" as being miſtaken "*at,* or "*before,* or *after, any point of time,*" in which the words are actually mentioned.

Knowledge

Knowledge taken for granted by the ſpeaker as in the hearer, may have the ſame effect as the demonſtrative circumſtances above-mentioned; and ſuch knowledge is taken for granted, in the uſe of the Latin impersonal verbs; ſuch as, "*pudet—tædet—tonat* "*—pluit*:" for "*pudet*" may be tranſlated, "*ſhame torments*," and "*tædet*," "*wearineſs torments*." Now "*ſhame* and *wearineſs*" always "*torment*," and this the ſpeaker and hearer both know; but they do not always torment the ſame perſon: and therefore the ſpeaker is conceived to repreſent them as tormenting himſelf at the time of ſpeaking, if he mentions the words "*pudet—tædet*," and adds nothing more; ſo that the Latin word "*me*" is always underſtood in this application of the words. As to the words "*tonat, it thunders—pluit, it rains*," it is conceived that the hearer knows the object which is conceived to exert the acts of "*thundering* and *raining*," and that this object (be it the clouds or the air, or whatſoever elſe) is not always in the ſtate "*thunder-*"*ing* or *raining*." When therefore a ſpeaker uſes one of theſe verbs, he repreſents the known object as in the ſtate denoted by the verb at the particular time of ſpeaking the word; and this circumſtance of the time, may not be known to the hearer, till the word is mentioned, ſo as to determine the point of time ſpoken of to be the ſame with that in which it is mentioned. But many circumſtances, which are either given or ſuppoſed to be known, may enable a ſpeaker to declare either truth or falſhood by words which are not reduced to the form of a ſentence, and which have even no verb whatſoever in them. Thus if a ſpeaker ſhould point to a houſe, and ſay "*that tree*," the expreſſion would contain a manifeſt falſhood: or if any one ſhould cry out "*fire!*" when nothing was in danger by fire, the perſon who cried out would be conceived to be a liar. For the act of pointing, in the firſt inſtance, and the tone of voice in the ſecond, amount to declarations, by the eſtabliſhed cuſtoms obſerved in the uſe of language.

In the inſtances above mentioned, only one ſpeaker is ſuppoſed. But if we conceive two ſpeakers to be concerned in a diſcourſe, the one may ſupply the other with ſuch materials to proceed upon, as ſhall enable this other to expreſs his whole intention, on ſome occaſions, by a ſingle word which is not a verb. One inſtance of this kind always happens when the ſpeaker propoſes a queſtion by way of ſuppoſition, and only requires to know whether the affirmative or negative of the ſuppoſition is true: for the anſwer by "*yes*," ſhews the affirmative to be true; that by "*no*," the negative. This has been already obſerved, when we ſpoke of the nature of ſuch queſtions as can be anſwered by "*yes* or *no*."

The courſe of any tranſaction may likewiſe ſupply many circumſtances which the ſpeaker may take for granted, or known, by every one concerned in, or preſent at the tranſaction; and by the help of this previous knowledge ſuppoſed in thoſe who hear him ſpeak, he may expreſs his full intention by words not reduced to the form of a ſentence. Thus when Richard, in Shakeſpear, cries "*my kingdom for a horſe!*" the poet takes it for granted, that every hearer muſt have learned from the courſe of the repreſentation, that Richard has loſt his horſe in battle; and that his extreme want of another is declared in the words above.

But the inſtances in which demonſtrative circumſtances, or previous knowledge, can be applied as ſupplements to what is expreſſed by words, are but few, in compariſon of the great variety of inſtances in which thoſe circumſtances cannot be ſo ſupplied. And in all theſe latter inſtances, every ſeries of connected words muſt be reduced to the form of a compleat ſentence, before ſuch ſeries can be conceived to convey the full intention of any rational ſpeaker. For if it is inconvenient to conſider the force of a definitive verb, as inſeparably united with what is denoted by any ſingle ſubſtantive, or other objective word; it would be much

much more ſo, to conſider the force of ſuch a verb, as inſeparably united with what is denoted by a ſeries of words; becauſe ſuch ſeries, on this ſuppoſition, could neither be enlarged by any word interpoſed between it and the verb, nor could it be diminiſhed by taking a word, or more, from it; nor yet could it be made dependent on any other word by the ſign of a caſe, or other prepoſition: for all theſe proceedings would contradict the notice which is given by the form itſelf of the verb, independent of the reſt of its ſignification; viz. "that the compoſition of the expreſſion on which the verb depends, is compleated; and that the verbal ſtate affects the whole object, which is denoted by the expreſſion that is ſhewn as compleated in its compoſition."

I have obſerved in what is ſaid of the verb definitive, that if ſingle words could be made, which ſhould be the names of whatſoever the mind of man conſiders, as it does the object which is denoted by any one noun ſubſtantive, there would be no occaſion for the definitive forms of verbs. But it is not poſſible that ſingle words can be made to anſwer every ſuch purpoſe: for the conceptions annexed to ſingle ſubſtantives, or to ſingle objective verbs, muſt not include in them any particulars which are not conſtantly obſerved to exiſt together: ſeeing theſe conceptions muſt always be ſimilar which are denoted by any one and the ſame name; otherwiſe the mind could not recall a certain conception upon the mention of a certain name. Yet the mind frequently does conſider an object, or ſtate, containing various circumſtances, which do not always exiſt together, in the ſame manner as it does an object that is denoted by a ſingle ſubſtantive; and when the mind does ſo, the expreſſion of the object, or ſtate, muſt conſiſt of ſeveral words put together occaſionally, to expreſs theſe circumſtances as taken along with ſome capital, or principal object, or ſtate: and theſe circumſtances may be more or fewer, according as it ſuits the ſpeaker's convenience to take more or fewer of them together with ſome capital object;

or ſtate, on any particular occaſion. Therefore the liberty of adding more and more words to the name of every object, muſt be left unreſtrained; and of conſequence the definitive verb muſt be kept ſeparate from other words: for by doing ſo, a ſpeaker may proceed till he has compleated the compoſition of the expreſſion of ſuch a conception as he thinks proper merely to raiſe in the mind of the hearer, without repreſenting the object of ſuch conception as in any fixed ſtate of being, till he adds the definitive verb. When this conception is raiſed in the mind of the hearer, it is of the ſame nature as the conception denoted by any ſingle noun ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe; for the verbal ſtate affects it all, as if it were expreſſed by one ſingle name. Therefore the ſubject of every ſentence is formed, either by mentioning a ſingle ſubſtantive, or a ſingle objective word, when one ſuch word can be found to ſuit the ſpeaker's purpoſe: or when one word cannot be found to ſuit his purpoſe, by mentioning a ſeries of words expreſſing a conception which will ſuit his purpoſe; by conſidering this ſeries as if it were a ſingle noun ſubſtantive; and by giving notice by a definitive verb, when either one word is uſed without any compoſition, or if compoſition is uſed, when it is ſufficiently compleated for the ſpeaker's purpoſe.

The definitive forms of the verb "*to be*," if placed in dependence upon a ſingle name, or upon a ſeries of words, will any of them give notice that the compoſition of the expreſſion, on which the verb depends, is ſtopped; and that the conception denoted by the expreſſion, exiſts in the ſpeaker's mind, either by actual perception, or by memory, or by foreſight; according as the form of the verb is of a preſent, paſt, or future tenſe. But every hearer knows, that almoſt any conception of the mind of man may be conſidered by any ſpeaker, at any time, in any one of theſe ſituations. Therefore ſuch expreſſions as, "*a man is—was—will be*," "*the large poſſeſſions of rich men are*
"*—were—will be*," although they have the form of compleat ſentences,

ſentences, yet will ſeldom be conceived to expreſs the full intention of any rational ſpeaker. Hence the verb "*to be*" muſt be capable of admitting expreſſions of all kinds to depend upon it, in order to modify it ſo as to expreſs every ſtate of communicable being, which the mind of man can form a conception of; for ſome of theſe ſtates, thus modified, may communicate with ſome conception of the mind of man which can be expreſſed by ſome objective word, or by ſome ſeries of words. Hence every kind of word which can be uſed as dependent on the principal word of the ſubject of a ſentence, may be uſed in dependence upon the verb "*to be*," or on ſome verb which modifies the verb "*to be*," and which is the principal word of the predicate of a ſentence; and every predicate may be made more and more complex at pleaſure; and this by the very ſame kinds of proceeding, by which the ſubject of every ſentence may be made more and more complex at pleaſure, till the compoſition of ſuch ſubject is ſtopped by ſome definitive verb. And as the ſubject of every ſentence is either actually one ſingle noun ſubſtantive, or a ſeries of words conſidered as one ſubſtantive; ſo the predicate of every ſentence is either one ſingle verb, or a ſeries of words conſidered as one verb. And thus the whole application of language, however diverſified in appearance, is reduced to this ſimple proceeding, viz. of finding ſingle names ſuited to our preſent purpoſe, or of making ſerieſes of words to be conſidered as ſingle names; and of finding ſingle verbs ſuited to our preſent purpoſe, or of making ſerieſes of words to be conſidered as ſingle verbs repreſenting the objects denoted by the expreſſions on which they depend, as in certain ſtates of being, ſuch as the ſpeaker has occaſion to repreſent theſe objects in.

It is manifeſt from hence, that all the connective parts of ſpeech are no more than auxiliaries to the ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe, and to the definitive verb. For the conceptions denoted by every ſeries of words reduced to a ſentence in which theſe connective parts of ſpeech are concerned, are of a ſimilar nature.

nature to thoſe denoted by ſome one ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe, and by ſome one definitive verb repreſenting the occaſional ſtate of being of the object on the expreſſion of which ſuch verb depends.

It is likewiſe manifeſt, that the connective part of the ſignification of all words whatſoever, as likewiſe of all the ſigns uſed to connect words in language, are no more than kinds of notices to the mind to contemplate the conceptions denoted by the connected words under certain modes of eſtimation, which are the converſes of the abſtractive modes of operation by which the conceptions annexed to ſubſtantives and objective verbs, were firſt ſeparated from each other. For every compleat ſeries of connected words expreſſes a complex conception, conſiſting of the ſeveral conceptions denoted by one or more ſubſtantives, and one or more objective verbs, reduced all into one again. Only for the convenience of the hearer principally, one part of every ſuch ſeries is repreſented as intended merely to raiſe the conception of a certain object in his mind, and the other part to declare ſome ſtate of being in which ſuch object is obſerved, or remembered, or foreſeen, or ſuppoſed, by the ſpeaker. If the matter, concerning which any one propoſes to ſpeak, is of ſuch a nature, that it cannot all be expreſſed in one ſentence; it is as much for the convenience of the ſpeaker, as for that of the hearer, to conſider it by piece-meal; and when this is done, firſt one part of it is expreſſed as an object of eſpecial attention, in the ſubject of one ſentence, and then another part as ſuch an object, in the ſubject of another ſentence, and ſo forward till the whole matter is exhauſted. And by the predicate annexed to each of the ſubjects, the ſtates of being are aſcertained, in which the objects denoted by each of the ſubjects, are occaſionally conſidered: and thus the mind of any man is enabled both to regiſter its own proceedings within itſelf, by the aſſiſtance of words; and likewiſe to direct the mind of any other man to follow the ſame proceedings ſtep by ſtep; and this operation produces that effect which is called, "*under-*

"*underſtanding what a ſpeaker or writer means.*" Hence the reaſon appears why the moſt effectual way of underſtanding any writer is to endeavour, as far as poſſible, to put ourſelves in his place, ſo as to follow his train of thought, ſtep by ſtep: for till we do thus, we do not fully apprehend his meaning. If this proceeding were conſciencioufly obſerved in the interpretation of the laws, both of God and man, how many diſputes would be avoided! But from the nature of words, and eſpecially of the connective part of their ſignification, they may eaſily be interpreted different ways, if the interpreter is determined to force them to his own ſenſe, and not to follow that of the writer; yet every ſuch proceeding is directly contrary to ſincerity.

The reaſon being thus ſhewn, why words take the form of a compleat ſentence in connected ſpeech, it is neceſſary in the next place to conſider the order in which words are to be placed in the compoſition of ſentences. For the very ſame words may be placed in various orders; and yet every order may not be equally convenient, either for clearneſs of conception, or eaſe of pronunciation.

As to clearneſs of conception, it is manifeſt that no method can be taken more effectual to promote it, than to place the capital word of the ſubject of every ſentence either the firſt, or as near the firſt as may be; and to place every word which immediately modifies another, either immediately before or after the word which it modifies, and to proceed in this manner till the ſubject of the ſentence is compleated; and when this is done, to give immediate notice of it, by placing the definitive verb after the ſubject: and if the verb is to be modified by ſeveral dependent words, to place each word immediately depending upon the word which it modifies, or as near it as poſſible, and to proceed in this manner till the ſentence is concluded.

The Engliſh conſtruction, and, as I believe, that of moſt of the preſent languages of Europe, proceeds upon this plan. But the Latins and Greeks were not ſatisfied with this ſimplicity: for in their languages, the words of the ſubject and predicate of a ſentence, are almoſt conſtantly intermixed; and the definitive verb very frequently ſtands the laſt word in the ſentence. But in order that words thus placed ſhould be intelligible, there was a neceſſity to introduce into theſe languages certain marks, to ſhew which words are immediately dependent on each other, although they do not ſtand cloſe by each other. It is for this purpoſe, and this only, that the terminations of adjectives, pronouns poſſeſſive, relative, and demonſtrative, are made to vary; as likewiſe the participles; ſo as to anſwer the grammatic gender, number and caſe, of the ſubſtantive on which one of them happens to depend; and the diſtinction of termination in the perſons and numbers of the definitive verbs ariſes from the ſame ſource. This agreement of termination is called "*Concord*," in grammar; and by this contrivance, the ſame words of any ſentence may be mixed in various orders, and yet may continue intelligible in any of theſe orders; becauſe the correſpondent terminations ſhew which words are to be taken in immediate dependence on each other. Hence enſue, in theſe languages, the rules which are laid down concerning the three concords; and which have no other foundation nor uſe but the above-mentioned, viz. that of ſhewing the words which are to be taken in immediate dependence on each other. This variety of correſpondent terminations creates a correſpondence of cadence in the Greek and Latin, which cannot be in any language of a conſtruction like that of the Engliſh; and therefore, as to accordance of correſponding ſounds, theſe antient languages have an advantage over the European languages in uſe at preſent. But the perſpicuity ariſing from the order of conſtruction, is quite loſt in the Greek and Latin; and this ſeems to be the principal reaſon of their being fallen into diſuſe as living languages: for even the modern Greek has loſt the antient plan of conſtruction, although the antient

words are very many of them retained with little alteration.

The rule of the firſt concord directs, that the termination of the definitive verb ſhall agree with the number and perſon of the capital object which is in the ſubject of the ſentence, on which the definitive verb depends. This capital object is uſually expreſſed by a ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe; but it may be expreſſed by an objective verb, or even by a ſentence on ſome occaſions. Whatſoever the expreſſion is by which this capital object is denoted, it muſt frequently happen that many additional words muſt depend upon it, in order to expreſs various circumſtances occaſionally taken along with it in the ſubjects of many ſentences. Hence the definitive verb muſt, on many occaſions, neceſſarily ſtand at a diſtance from the capital word of the ſubject which it defines. On this account the Engliſh language retains diſtinction of perſon in the ſingular terminations of ſeveral of the forms of its definitive verbs: for by means of theſe terminations it is known of what perſon the capital word of the ſubject is which is defined by the verb. But the plural terminations are alike in all the perſons, and the ſame with the termination of the firſt perſon ſingular in almoſt all the tenſes of all verbs, except ſome of the tenſes of the verb "*to be.*" For as a plural object denoted by ſeveral names joined by the conjunction "*and*" may conſiſt of objects of all the three perſons, no termination of the verb can take notice of all the perſons of objects ſo conſtituted; and therefore the ſame plural termination of the Engliſh verb is made, with great propriety, to relate equally to objects of any of the perſons. In conſequence of this proceeding, the obſervation of the firſt concord is attended in Engliſh with very little difficulty.

The rule of the ſecond concord in Latin and Greek, directs that the termination of the adjective ſhall be varied ſo as to ſuit with the grammatic gender, number, and caſe, of the ſub-

ſtantive on which it depends. Now the adjective always unites with its ſubſtantive, or with any other objective expreſſion on which it depends, ſo as to form with it an expreſſion of one objective conception; there is therefore no occaſion to expreſs the gender, or number, of the object of this conception twice over, once by the ſubſtantive, and again by the adjective; nor is there any occaſion to expreſs the mode twice over in which this object communicates with what is denoted by ſome other word: for the caſe of the ſubſtantive on which the adjective depends does this ſufficiently. But if the adjective is not placed immediately either before or after its ſubſtantive, or other objective word on which it depends; ſome grammatic marks muſt be introduced to direct the hearer, or reader, to the word with which the adjective is to be taken in immediate connexion. Now in Engliſh, the adjective is placed as near as poſſible either before or behind its ſubſtantive; and this poſition makes this concord utterly unneceſſary in the conſtruction of the Engliſh language. And this ſimple and obvious way of proceeding likewiſe makes it utterly unneceſſary, in Engliſh, to conſider objects of no ſex as denoted by names of any grammatic gender. And hence all the perplexity occaſioned by the grammatic genders of ſubſtantives which denote objects of no ſex, is utterly removed from the Engliſh.

The rule of the third concord in Latin and Greek directs, that the relative ſhall agree with its antecedent in gender, number, and perſon. This rule extends in Engliſh to all the pronouns; for it includes the poſſeſſive pronouns, which are made in Latin and Greek to agree in grammatic gender, number, and caſe, with theſe properties of the ſubſtantives to which they are applied. The relatives in Engliſh have no grammatic number: for as they can ſeldom be uſed without their antecedents, theſe antecedents ſufficiently ſhew the number of the object which the relative repreſents. If therefore it be remembered that "*who*" is applied to perſons, and "*which*" to things, this concord is

eaſily obſerved in Engliſh, ſo far as the relative pronoun is concerned. And as to the application of the poſſeſſive pronouns; the ſex, number, and perſon, of the object contained in the ſignification of one of them, are as eaſily perceived, as they are, when the ſame object is denoted by a perſonal pronoun. So that the obſervation of concord in the conſtruction of pronouns requires very few directions in the Engliſh language.

The determination of the caſe of a relative pronoun, is not a proceeding of the ſame nature with that of adjuſting the concords. For the relative always ſtands in the ſame mode of communication with the words of its own clauſe, as its antecedent would do, if it were placed in the clauſe inſtead of the relative, and the clauſe were reduced to a compleat ſentence by ſuch ſubſtitution. As this has been made fully evident, in what has been ſaid of the relative pronoun in particular, there is no need to repeat it here.

As to the conſtruction of words in dependence upon ſubſtantives, adjectives, and verbs; the principle is exactly the ſame upon which the Engliſh language proceeds with regard to them all. Only when a verbal tranſitive ſtate is not mentioned which joins the objects denoted by two ſubſtantives, the prepoſition "*of*" is uſed, if the ſtate can eaſily be underſtood. If ſuch ſtate cannot be eaſily underſtood, ſome tranſitive verb muſt itſelf be mentioned, or ſome prepoſition different from "*of*."

When "*of*" follows a verb in Engliſh, it has uſually the ſignification of "*out of*" or "*concerning*," as has been already obſerved, in what is ſaid of the ſigns of the caſes of ſubſtantives.

There is no need to conſider the conſtruction of ſingle ſubſtantives in dependence on other words more particularly in this place. Nor is it neceſſary to add any thing here concerning the conſtruction of adjectives, pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, or

prepoſitions. For the nature of their connexions with other words has been ſhewn, when each of them was treated of in particular. So that there remains nothing farther to be done, with regard to any of theſe parts of ſpeech, but to lay down practical rules for the application of each, according to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of the Engliſh language. And this muſt, of conſequence, be referred to the practical part of this work.

But it is neceſſary to make ſome obſervations on the Engliſh conſtruction of infinitive verbs and participles, when uſed ſingle, or in conjunction with other words, ſo as to anſwer the effect of one noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe: and likewiſe when they are uſed with other words, ſo as, together with them, to anſwer the effect of a whole ſentence taken into ſome other ſentence as a conſtituent part thereof. And for the illuſtration of my ſubject, it will be proper to compare the Engliſh forms with the correſponding forms in Latin and Greek.

When infinitive verbs or participles are uſed ſingly as ſo many noun ſubſtantives, they are applied in the manner which conſtitutes what I have called, in the foregoing treatiſe, the objective character of the verb. I have obſerved, that participles in Greek and Latin are not uſed in this objective character. But that the Greek uſes the infinitive forms commonly with an article prefixed in ſome caſe, to ſhew when the verb is applied objectively, and frequently with a prepoſition prefixed to the article. Thus what is expreſſed in Engliſh by "*ſpeaking*—*of ſpeaking*—*to ſpeaking*—*in ſpeaking*" may be expreſſed in Greek by το λεγειν—τε λεγειν—τῳ λεγειν—προς το λεγειν—εν τῳ λεγειν: whereas the participle λεγων is coaleſcent, *i. e.* it does not merely expreſs the ſtate "*ſpeaking*," but gives notice that ſome object, expreſſed, or underſtood, is in the ſtate. So that ὁ λεγων ſignifies "*one ſpeaking*," or "*a ſpeaker*;" and ſo of other inſtances of the application of the Greek participles.

The

The Latin participles are likewiſe coaleſcent, ſo that "*lo-* "*quens*" or "*dicens*" (for inſtance) do not ſignify the ſtate "*ſpeaking*," but ſome object, expreſſed, or underſtood as "*ſpeaking*." The infinitive forms of the Latin, as well as thoſe of the Greek, much the moſt frequently denote verbal ſtates conſidered objectively; but the Latin has no prepoſitive article by which to turn the objective verb into what ſhall be equivalent to a noun ſubſtantive, firſt in one caſe, and then in another. And therefore the gerunds, and ſupines, are introduced into this language, to expreſs the objective verb when it is uſed as a ſubſtantive in different caſes. Thus, "*dicendi*" is of the ſame import as "*of ſpeaking*," "*ad dicendum*" as "*to ſpeaking*," "*in* "*dicendo*" as "*in ſpeaking*." If the verbal active ſtate is conſidered as "*the reaſon why*" ſome other ſtate exiſts, the firſt ſupine is uſed; as "*veniunt ſpectatum*," "*they come to ſee*;" i. e. "*on account of ſeeing*." If the verbal paſſive ſtate is conſidered as "*the reſpect in which*" ſome object has the quality that is denoted by an adjective, ſuch ſtate is expreſſed by the latter ſupine, as "*difficile factu*," "*difficult to be done*;" i. e. difficult in reſpect of being done, or, as to its capacity of being done.

Neither the Latin nor the Greek has a pair of forms of the verb equivalent to the Engliſh forms with "*muſt*;" and therefore the gerund in "*dum*" is uſed in Latin to ſupply theſe forms; as "*eundum eſt mihi*," "*I muſt go:*" and the Greek forms in τεον are uſed for the ſame purpoſe, as βαδιϛεον εμοι, "*I muſt go.*"

There is evidently a defect in the Greek language, occaſioned by a want of objective forms of the verb. For although the infinitive tenſes may be uſed objectively, it is not convenient to uſe them on all occaſions. Hence we find the participle frequently uſed in effect as an objective verb, as επαυσατο λαλων— "*he ceaſed ſpeaking*," μετεμελοντο αποδεδωκοτες—"*they repented* "*the giving up*," επην κεκαμω πολεμιζων—"*when I have been* "*wearied with fighting*," ἱππευων ηττων ειμι—"*I am leſs ſkilful in* "*riding*,"

" *riding*," ανηλωκει διωκων και βαλλων—" *he deſtroyed by purſuing* " *and caſting*," i. e. darts. Theſe expreſſions, if literally tranſlated, are, " *he ſpeaking ceaſed*," " *they having given up repented*," " *when I fighting have been wearied*," " *I riding am leſs ſkilful*," " *he purſuing and caſting deſtroyed*," &c. Expreſſions of the like conſtruction continually occur in the Greek, and are conſidered by the grammarians, as elegancies; but they evidently ariſe from the want of objective participles in the language.

It happens in the Latin, that there are coaleſcent participles of the very ſame forms with the gerunds, and with the firſt ſupine. For " *amandi—amando—amandum*" may be conſidered as caſes of the participle " *amandus*," and " *amatum*" may be conſidered as the accuſative caſe of the participle " *amatus*." This gives an ambiguous meaning to theſe forms. Thus " *amandus vir*" may ſignify " *a lovely man*," as " *amanda* " *vox*" ſignifies " *a lovely voice*;" but " *amandi viri*" may either ſignify " *of a lovely man*," or " *of loving a man*," and ſo " *ad* " *opus faciendum*," may ſignify either " *to the work which is to be* " *done*," or " *to doing the work*;" and in like manner " *in opere* " *faciendo*" may ſignify either " *in the work which is to be done*," or " *in doing the work.*" This has occaſioned abundance of perplexity to the grammarians, to ſhew in what a gerund or ſupine differs from a participle. But this may eaſily be determined: for when theſe forms denote objective ſtates, they are gerunds and ſupines: and when they denote coaleſcent ſtates, they are participles. The gerunds frequently carry on their caſe into ſome ſubſtantive that depends upon them, and ſometimes take the number and gender of the ſubſtantive; as " *illarum vi-* " *dendi gratiâ*," " *for the ſake of ſeeing thoſe women*;" " *mirando* " *hoc repentino gaudio*," " *with wondering at this ſudden joy*;" " *his* " *libris legendis*," " *by reading theſe books*;" " *defendendâ pace*," " *by maintaining peace.*"

Theſe

Theſe are manifeſtly all of them expreſſions of objective ſtates of being, and not of objects in coaleſcent ſtates of being: for if they were ſo, "*illarum videndi*" would mean "*of thoſe* "*women to be ſeen*;" "*mirando hoc gaudio*," "*with this joy to be* "*wondered at*;" "*libris legendis*," "*by books to be read*;" "*de-* "*fendendâ pace*," "*by peace to be maintained*;" and therefore the verbal forms are gerunds, and not coaleſcent participles. Theſe gerunds ſeem to me to have taken their name from this mode of conſtruction. For they are to be *carried on*, firſt in one caſe and then in another, into the ſubſtantives that depend upon them (which in Latin is *gerenda* or *gerunda ſunt)* ſo that the verbal form and the ſubſtantive taken together, is in effect one complex noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe. But the ſupines have ſeldom any ſubſtantive depending upon them: the latter ſupine, as I believe, never has one. And if the firſt ſupine is found with one; the caſe of the ſubſtantive is ſuch as the verb requires from whence the ſupine is derived. So that ſome grammarian ſeems to have conſidered the ſupines as indolent words, in not carrying on firſt one caſe and then another into a dependent ſubſtantive, and thence to have given them this name.

Any objective verb may either ſtand alone as a ſubſtantive in ſome caſe, or may have one or more words depending on it, to circumſtantiate the ſtate which it denotes; and the verb together with ſuch words may be conſidered as equivalent to one noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe. The verb in the infinitive mood is uſed, in all languages which I am acquainted with, in both theſe ſorts of conſtruction; and in Engliſh, Latin, and Greek, it frequently, either ſingle, or with one or more words depending on it, ſupplies the place of a noun ſubſtantive in every caſe, although no ſign of a particular caſe is united with it. Thus in Engliſh, "*to think requires attention*," "*to read books requires* "*attention*," "*to read books of mathematics requires attention*," the expreſſions "*to think*," "*to read books*," "*to read books of* "*mathematics*," are each of them equivalent to one noun ſubſtantive

ſtantive in the nominative caſe. And in the expreſſions "*de-* "*ſirous—to read—to read books—to read books of mathematics,*" the expreſſions "*to read—to read books—to read books of mathematics,*" are equivalent to ſubſtantives in the genitive caſe; for theſe expreſſions denote that "*of which*" ſome one is deſirous. And ſo in "*inclinable to read*"—or "*to read books.*" "*To read —to read books*" is that "*to which*" ſome one is inclinable; and therefore "*to read—to read books*" are here equivalent each to one ſubſtantive in the dative caſe. And in "*deſiring to read —to read books,*" "*to read—to read books*" expreſs that which is "*deſired,*" and therefore are equivalent to ſubſtantives in the accuſative caſe. And in "*prohibited—to read—to read books,*" "*to read—to read books*" denote that "*from which*" ſome one is prohibited, and therefore are equivalent to ſubſtantives in the ablative caſe. Sanctius has ſhewed by examples that the Latin infinitive verb either without or with words depending upon it, is equivalent to one noun ſubſtantive in any caſe; ſee Sancti Minerva, Book 3. Chap. 6. The Greek infinitive verb, without any article before it, moſt commonly, either alone or with ſome depending words, ſupplies the place of a ſubſtantive in the nominative or accuſative caſe; as αγαθον ως ταχιϛα επιμελεισθαι— "*to take care as quickly as poſſible is a good thing,*" where ως ταχιϛα επιμελεισθαι is equivalent to a nominative caſe. μανθανω ιππευειν— "*I learn to ride,*" where ιππευειν is equivalent to an accuſative. Yet the Greek infinitive is often found in expreſſions equivalent to other caſes, although it has no article before it; as ὡρα απιεναι— "*time to go away,*" where απιεναι is equivalent to a genitive caſe. θεειν ανεμοισιν ομοιοι—"*like the winds in running,*" where θεειν is equivalent to an ablative caſe: and ſo of many inſtances of other caſes.

Hence it appears, that the Greek uſe of the infinitive form of the verb is no more preciſe, as to giving it the ſign of a caſe, than the Engliſh is; yet ſuch ſign may be eaſily given to it by prefixing the prepoſitive article in the proper caſe, as ὡρα τω απιεναι, and ſo of other inſtances. And in Engliſh, by uſing the objective

objective participle inſtead of the infinitive verb, the ſign of the caſe may be prefixed, as inſtead of ſaying "*the time to work is* "*the day*," we may ſay "*the time for working is the day.*" The gerunds may likewiſe be ſubſtituted in Latin inſtead of the infinitive verb, as inſtead of "*parati reſpondere*," "*ready to an-* "*ſwer*," we may ſay "*parati ad reſpondendum.*" But if ſome other words depend upon a gerund, its meaning may be ambiguous, for the reaſon given above. Thus it appears, that (when the verb is uſed in its objective capacity in the manner above deſcribed) the verb itſelf, together with the words that depend upon it, are in effect a kind of complex noun ſubſtantive formed out of ſeveral words.

But theſe words taken together are not equivalent to a whole ſentence conſidered as one noun ſubſtantive. For, "*to read a book* "*—reading—of reading—by reading a book*," cannot be conſidered as expreſſions equivalent to whole ſentences. But the expreſſions "*your—their—John's—reading ſuch a book*," may be conſidered as whole ſentences, only not reduced to form, becauſe they are to be made conſtituent parts of ſome other ſentence. Thus, "*I am* "*told of your—their—John's reading ſuch a book*," are expreſſions manifeſtly equivalent to "*I am told that you read—they read—* "*John reads—ſuch a book*," and in theſe expreſſions the clauſes "*you read ſuch a book*," "*they read ſuch a book*," "*John reads* "*ſuch a book*," are ſo many compleat ſentences anſwering each to one noun ſubſtantive in the genitive caſe, ſeeing they each of them expreſs "*that of which*" I am told. This kind of conſtruction cannot be imitated by the participles, either in Latin, or Greek, becauſe they are not uſed objectively in theſe languages. Yet ſerieſes of words in themſelves equivalent to compleat ſentences muſt, in all languages, be conſidered as anſwering the effect of ſingle ſubſtantives; and in order to accompliſh this, the Engliſh, Latin, and Greek, on ſome occaſions, retain the form of the ſentence, and give notice by a particle prefixed, that it is to be conſidered as equivalent to one

ſubſtantive in ſome caſe. I have already ſhewn, that the particle "*that*" is uſed in Engliſh for this purpoſe. "*Quod*" is thus uſed in Latin and ὁτι in Greek. Thus, "*I know that truth* "*is of God,*" may be expreſſed in Latin by "*ſcio quod veritas a* "*Deo eſt,*" and in Greek by οιδα ὁτι η αληθεια εϛιν απο τυ Θευ. In all theſe inſtances a ſentence, *i. e.* "*truth is of God,*" "*veritas a* "*Deo eſt,*" η αληθεια εϛιν απο τυ Θευ, is equivalent to a noun ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe, for it is "*the thing known.*" But the ſame notice may be given, either in Engliſh, Latin, or Greek, by turning the nominative caſe of this ſentence into the accuſative, and the definitive verb into its infinitive form; as, "*I* "*know truth to be of God,*" "*ſcio veritatem a Deo eſſe,*" οιδα τηϛ αληθειαν ειναι απο τυ Θευ. It is evident, that either the placing of "*that*" before a ſentence, or turning the nominative into the accuſative, and the verb into the infinitive mood, are nothing more than notices concerning words themſelves; *i. e.* that a certain ſeries of them is to be looked upon as one noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe. The infinitive forms of verbs which are objectively uſed on other occaſions, become coaleſcent in this mode of conſtruction. For "*truth*" is here conſidered in the ſtate "*being of* "*God,*" and it is aſſerted, that I know truth as being in that ſtate.

This form of conſtruction, by turning the nominative caſe into the accuſative, and the verb into the infinitive mood, is much more frequent in Latin and Greek, than it is in Engliſh. For we in Engliſh uſually retain the definitive form of the verb with "*that*" placed before the dependent ſentence. In all compoſitions by way of narration, in Latin, this form of conſtruction by the infinitive mood occurs perpetually; and when one perſon tells what another ſaid, the whole diſcourſe takes this form. Thus when Cæſar is giving an account of what Arioviſtus ſaid at the conference held between them; he proceeds thus, "*Arioviſtus deſuis virtutibus multa prædicavit.* "*Tranſiſſe Rhenum ſeſe non ſuâ ſponte,—non ſine magnâ ſpe* "*domum reliquiſſe,—ſedes habere in Galliâ,*" &c. which in Engliſh

Engliſh is, "*Arioviſtus vaunted much of his own exploits* (ſay-
"ing) *that he had paſſed the Rhine not upon his own mo-*
"*tion,—that he had left his home not without great hopes,—*
"*that he had a ſettlement in Gaul,*" &c. The Greek uſes the like form of conſtruction on ſeveral occaſions; but it ſhould ſeem, that it was not uſual in that language to deliver whole ſpeeches of another perſon in this manner. For the Greek tranſlator of Cæſar's Commentaries turns them into direct ſpeeches. So in the inſtance above, he expreſſes the ſenſe of Cæſar's words thus. Ο δ' Αριοβιστος ωδε απημειφθη, πολλα περι της εαυτε ισχυος μεγαληγορεμενος. Εγω μεν διεβην τον Ρηνον, εφη, ουκ αυτοκελευστος, &c.—Which is directly in Engliſh, "*Arioviſtus*
"*anſwered thus, boaſting much of his own ſtrength. I,* ſays
"he, *paſſed the Rhine not of my own motion,*" &c. Serieſes of words with the accuſative caſe and the infinitive mood, are frequently turned into any caſe, in Greek, by prefixing the prepoſitive article in the caſe of which the whole ſeries is to be conſidered, ſuppoſing it were one noun ſubſtantive. Thus in Zenophon, επικρυφιζει τους πονους τω αρχοντι, το αυτον ειδεναι οτι ου λανθανει—"*his knowing that he is not unnoticed lightens a com-*
"*mander's labours,*" where το αυτον ειδεναι οτι ου λανθανει is equivalent to a nominative caſe: but in τον αρχοντα χρη διαφερειν των αρχομενων τω φιλοπονειν προθυμουμενον—"*a commander ought to*
"*excell thoſe under his command, in his being chearfully ready*
"*to undergo labour,*" τω φιλοπονειν προθυμουμενον is equivalent to an ablative caſe. And again, in εβριμητο τε τω Κυρω και τοις Μηδοις τω καταλιποντας αυτον οιχεσθαι—"*he was violently en-*
"*raged at Cyrus and the Medes for their going away and leav-*
"*ing him.*" The Latins ſometimes imitate the Greeks in this kind of conſtruction. Thus in Virgil,

——*Tunc tempus figere damas*
Stuppea torquentem balearis verbera fundæ.

"*Then is the time for one whirling the flaxen blows of the*
"*balearian ſling to pierce deer,*" where "*figere damas ſtuppea tor-*
"*quentem,*" &c. is manifeſtly equivalent to one ſubſtantive in

the genitive caſe depending on "*tempus.*" But it is evident that this kind of conſtruction in Latin, is forcing the language into a mode of expreſſion which is not ſuitable to it, as it has no prepoſitive article to give notice of the caſe in which the ſeries of words is to be conſidered. The Greeks frequently uſe a nominative caſe with an infinitive dependent verb, in clauſes of this conſtruction whereof I am treating; but there is no occaſion to multiply examples: for every one who is at all converſant in the language muſt have obſerved, that the uſe of clauſes either depending on infinitive objective verbs, or with coaleſcent infinitive verbs depending either on nominative or accuſative caſes, yet ſo that the whole clauſe expreſſed in any of theſe manners is equivalent to one ſubſtantive in ſome caſe, gives a particular caſt to the Greek language.

I now proceed to give an account of the uſe of the coaleſcent participle in clauſes which the grammarians have called "*abſo-*" "*lute.*" In theſe clauſes in Latin, the participle in the ablative caſe depends upon a ſubſtantive alſo in the ablative caſe: or if the participle depends upon a ſeries of words, ſuch ſeries is conſidered as equivalent to a ſubſtantive in the ablative caſe. Thus in "*audito regem in Sciciliam tendere,*" "*it being heard* "*that the king was going towards Sicily;*" "*regem in Sciciliam* "*tendere,*" muſt be conſidered as one ſubſtantive in the ablative caſe. The participle, in this application of it in the Greek, is much the moſt uſually placed in the genitive caſe depending upon a ſubſtantive that is likewiſe in the genitive caſe; but not always; as in this expreſſion of Zenophon, Εγωγ' εφη ὁ Κυρος οιομαι; ἁμα μεν ὑμων συναγορευοντων, ἁμα δε αισχρον ὀν αντιλεγειν— "I think ſo, ſays Cyrus, both by your ſpeaking in conjunction "with me, and likewiſe as it is infamous to ſpeak to the con-"trary." Zenoph. Cyropædia, Book 2. Sect. 14. where αισχρον ὀν αντιλεγειν is of the nominative or accuſative caſe. But in whatſoever caſe theſe abſolute clauſes are expreſſed, they are uſually equivalent to whole ſentences depending on relative adverbs;

verbs; ſuch as "*while—when—as—after*," &c. Now I have already ſhewn, that theſe adverbs deſtroy the affirmative power of a definitive verb, as a relative pronoun does. And hence it comes to paſs, that a clauſe which has no definitive verb in it, may be made to anſwer the effect of a definitive clauſe in dependence on one of theſe adverbs. Several of the conjunctions have much the ſame effect with theſe adverbs; ſuch as "*if*," "*ſince*," &c. and therefore abſolute clauſes may ſometimes be turned into equivalent expreſſions conſiſting of compleat ſentences depending on conjunctions.

When abſolute clauſes are made uſe of, there is always ſomething to be ſupplied in the mind which is not directly expreſſed; and particularly when the participle is not mentioned; which frequently happens in Latin. Thus "*te duce*" may ſignify, either "*when you were a leader*," or "*whilſt you are a leader*," or "*if you ſhall be a leader*," or "*if you were a leader*;" according to the ſenſe which the other words wherewith this clauſe is joined require to be given to it. And therefore it is no argument of excellence in any language to admit frequently of ſuch a form of conſtruction.

The Latin admits of it much more frequently than the Greek, and that for a reaſon, which, as I believe, has not hitherto been obſerved. This reaſon is, that there is no paſt participle of an active ſignification belonging to any Latin verbs, but the verbs deponent; ſuch as "*locutus*," "*having ſpoke*," "*ſecutus*," "*having followed*;" &c. and theſe verbs are but few, in compariſon of the whole number of Latin verbs. Now I have already ſhewn, that there are two ways of repreſenting an object as in a paſſive ſtate, *viz.* either by placing the name of the object in immediate dependence on an active tranſitive verb, or by placing the correſponding paſſive verb in dependence on the name of the object. Thus in the expreſſion "*James having read over the book*," "*the book*," is in the ſtate "*having been read*

"*read over by James*;" and it may be expreſſed in this latter ſituation, by the Latin clauſe "*liber a Jacobo perlectus*," but no Latin form by a participle can be found to expreſs "*James* "*having read over the book.*" The verb definitive with "*cum*," muſt be uſed for this purpoſe, as "*Jacobus cum perlegiſſet li-* "*brum*," "*James, when he had read over the book.*" Now ſuppoſe that the clauſe "*gave it to me*," depends upon "*James hav-* "*ing read over the book*," the ſentence "*James having read over* "*the book, gave it to me*," cannot be conveniently expreſſed in Latin by "*Jacobus cum librum perlegiſſet dedit illum mihi*," becauſe the uſe of "*illum*" is here, according to the Latin idiom, a kind of tautology. Therefore it muſt be expreſſed by "*Ja-* "*cobus librum a ſe perlectum dedit mihi*," which is literally "*James gave me the book read over by him.*" In the firſt Engliſh ſentence "*the book*" is twice named; once by "*the book*," and again by "*it*;" and it is repreſented as in the paſſive ſtate denoted by "*perlectus*," "*read over*," in conſequence of ſtanding after the Engliſh paſt active participle "*having read over.*" When it is again expreſſed by the pronoun "*it*," the book is in the accuſative caſe, with regard to the verb "*gave.*" Therefore "*the book*" being expreſſed by the paſſive participle as actually "*read over*" is, together with the participle, put in the accuſative caſe in Latin, "*librum perlectum dedit.*" If the pronoun "*it*" had been in any other caſe, "*liber perlectus*" muſt have been of the ſame caſe. Thus, "*James having read over the* "*book, told me the contents of it*," may be in Latin "*Jacobus li-* "*bri a ſe perlecti argumentum mihi narravit*," for "*of it*," is in the genitive caſe, and therefore "*libri a ſe perlecti*" is ſo too. Thus an object may be repreſented in a paſt paſſive participial ſtate, and (if it is expreſſed again in the ſame ſentence) when conſidered in that ſtate, it may be conſiſtently applied to ſome other word in the ſentence. But if the ſame object be only repreſented in a paſt paſſive ſtate by ſtanding after an Engliſh active paſt participle, and be no more mentioned in the ſame ſentence: it may indeed in Latin be repreſented in the paſt participial paſſive

paſſive ſtate, by making the paſſive paſt participle depend on its name; but there will now be no word to determine the caſe of its name with ſuch participle depending upon it. Thus in the ſentence "*James having read over the book, began to talk on dif-*" *ferent ſubjects.*" If the book be expreſſed as "*read over*" by the participle "*perlectus,*" there is nothing in the ſentence which determines its caſe: and when this happens, the noun and the paſſive participle, are put, in Latin, into the ablative caſe; as "*perlecto libro de diverſis rebus loqui cæpit Jacobus.*" Whoſoever has the curioſity to examine any Latin book, eſpecially on an hiſtorical ſubject, will find, that of the numerous inſtances in which the ablative caſe abſolute occurs, by far the greateſt number is occaſioned by the want of an active paſt participle in the language. For when ſuch a participle can be found (as in the deponent verbs) that participle is uſed juſt as the Engliſh active paſt participle is uſed. Thus, "*they having entered the tent, or-*" *dered him to be ſeized,*" is in Latin, "*tabernaculum ingreſſi com-*" *prendi juſſerunt;*" "*Beſſus and the reſt of his aſſociates having*" *overtaken the chariot of Darius,*" is, "*Beſſus et cæteri parti-*" *cipes vehiculum Darii aſſequuti;*" "*they having fulfilled the an-*" *ſwer of the oracle,*" is "*defuncti oraculi reſponſe.*" But when the Engliſh uſe an active paſt participle of a tranſitive verb which cannot be expreſſed by a Latin deponent, and the object which is in the correſpondent paſſive ſtate is not twice mentioned in the ſentence; then the ablative caſe is uſed abſolutely with a paſſive participle depending upon it. Thus, "*having diſtributed thoſe*" *as recruits of his forces, and having put the pirates to death,*" is in Latin, "*his in ſupplementum copiarum ſuarum diſtributis, pira-*" *tiſque ſupplicio affectis;*" and "*Alexander having paſſed the river,*" *came into the country of the Uxii,*" is "*Alexander amne ſuperato*" *in regionem Uxiorum pervenit;*" and ſo of innumerable inſtances which may be found in any Latin book, but eſpecially of a narrative or hiſtorical kind. For in every ſuch book there is a continual occaſion to repreſent objects in paſt ſtates denoted by paſſive participles, and that in ſentences wherein

wherein the object that is in ſuch a ſtate is not twice mentioned.

I have given the examples above from Mr. Clarke's grammar of the Latin tongue. For he has treated expreſsly of the ablative caſe abſolute, and has given ſix rules about it. Yet he does not ſeem to have diſcovered the reaſon why this kind of conſtruction appears ſo frequently in Latin, eſpecially in narrations. This conſtruction is uſually conſidered as an elegance in the Latin; but its frequency, in reality, ariſes from a want of active paſt participles; as any one will be fully ſenſible who ſhall conſider Mr. Clarke's examples. For at leaſt two-thirds of them relate to paſſive paſt ſtates, which have no correſponding active participles in the Latin.

The uſe of the abſolute caſe is an effectual proof of the truth of what has been determined concerning the nature of an oblique caſe, *viz.* that it is a mark of a certain mode of eſtimation of the mind of man, to be applied to premiſes or data of certain kinds. For it is clear, that a coaleſcent participle and the name of an object muſt be found or underſtood in every abſolute clauſe, and that the object's being in the ſtate denoted by the participle, is uſed either to determine the "*time when*" ſomething comes to paſs; as "*imperante Auguſto natus eſt Chriſtus*," "*when Auguſtus was emperor, Chriſt was born*;" or as a ſuppoſition whereof the conſequences are to be ſhewn; as "*quo extincto ſe pœnas daturos*," "*for if he were deſtroyed, they ſhould ſuffer*;" or to determine various other circumſtances which may be expreſſed in Latin by "*dum—quum—poſtea—quam—ſi*," and other adverbs or conjunctions, and the form of a ſentence retained; as "*dum* or *quum Auguſtus imperabat natus eſt Chriſtus*," "*ſi ipſe extinctus eſſet ſe pœnas daturos.*" But as it is conceived, in Latin, that all theſe circumſtances may be ſupplied by one and the ſame mode of eſtimation, if firſt one ſort of premiſes are uſed and then another, therefore one and the ſame caſe, *viz.* the ablative, is uſed in all the inſtances to direct to the mode of eſtimation; but the

reſult thereof is left to the judgment, to be adapted ſo as to ſuit the ſort of premiſes to which the mode of eſtimation is at any time applied. Abſolute clauſes of ſentences are not very frequent in Engliſh, but when they do appear, both the ſubſtantive and the participle are uſually in the nominative caſe; as, "*John* "*being negligent, James will get his place*;" "*things having ſuc-* "*ceeded, we ſhall now be out of fear*;" and ſo of other inſtances. But we much more uſually place a relative adverb or a conjunction before the clauſe, and expreſs it by a definitive verb; as, "*becauſe John is negligent, James will get his place*;" "*as things* "*have ſucceeded, we ſhall now be out of fear.*" This manner of expreſſion is more preciſe and determinate, than that by an abſolute clauſe, and therefore it is an excellence of the Engliſh that it makes little uſe of ſuch a clauſe.

The exceeding ſimplicity of the plan of conſtruction in the Engliſh language is ſuch, that whatſoever is farther neceſſary to be obſerved concerning it, may very properly be referred to the chapter of the practical part of this work, which contains the rules of Engliſh ſyntax. But it may be neceſſary to obſerve here, that the want of ſimplicity of ſyntax can never be compenſated by any correſpondence of cadence, or by any other advantage which can be ſuppoſed to be gained by a complex ſyntax; ſuch as that of the Greek and Latin. For the buſineſs of life is not to learn language, and therefore that plan of expreſſing our thoughts which may be ſooneſt apprehended, is undoubtedly the beſt for the generality of men, provided it be preciſe, and ſufficiently general. Neither poetry nor oratory are eſſentially neceſſary for the purpoſes of life; and therefore, although it ſhould be granted, that the Greek and Latin are more ſuited to poetry and oratory than the Engliſh is; it will not follow from hence, that the Greek and Latin are more excellent languages than the Engliſh. The excellence of the Engliſh is its ſimplicity: and if with this ſimplicity it be capable of conveying the thoughts of one man to another, on all

occaſions, with clearneſs and preciſion; the end of language is anſwered effectually by it. As to multiplicity of monoſyllables, they are not to be avoided in any language of ſo ſimple conſtruction as that of the Engliſh; becauſe the prepoſitions, and ſigns of the tenſes, muſt be kept diſtinct from the nouns and verbs, that they may be applied with any noun, or with any verb. But if they were conſidered as united into one word with the noun or the verb with which they are placed in conſtruction, ſuch word would for the moſt part contain as few ſyllables as the correſpondent Latin or Greek noun or verb. Thus, "*of a* "*man*," is an expreſſion of as few ſyllables as "*hominis*," or "ανθρωπου," and "*may run*" has as few ſyllables as "*currat*," or "τρεχοι," and ſo of almoſt all other inſtances. Therefore the complaint of the Engliſh being weakened by the auxiliar verbs, or by any other means, is without foundation; and if Tacitus, or any other author, cannot be tranſlated into Engliſh ſo ſhort as the original; neither can almoſt any good Engliſh author be tranſlated into Latin ſo ſhort as the original. Let any man take a ſcene of Shakeſpear, and try if he can turn it into iambic verſes which ſhall not exceed the number of the Engliſh verſes; and yet every iambic verſe contains twelve ſyllables, and the Engliſh heroic verſe contains but ten. Or without taking ſo much pains, let the ſpeech of Cato juſt before his death in Mr. Addiſon's tragedy be compared with the Latin tranſlation of it in N° 628 in the eighth volume of the Spectator; and it will appear, that the Latin is at leaſt one third longer than the Engliſh. Yet this ſpeech is in the character of a Roman, on a common topic; and ſo is more nearly in the Roman way of thinking than otherwiſe it would be: and hence it is more ſuited to the Latin idiom than an Engliſhman's ſpeech upon an Engliſh ſubject would be.

The reaſon why tranſlations cannot be ſo ſhort as originals, is becauſe the nouns and verbs of no two languages exactly ſuit each other, nor do the alluſions, or figures, in any two languages exactly ſuit each other; and when this happens, circum-

locution muſt neceſſarily be uſed in the language into which any original is tranſlated.

I have ſuppoſed above, that the Engliſh is not ſo proper for poetry and oratory as the Latin and Greek; yet there ſeems not to be any ſufficient reaſon to allow of theſe ſuppoſitions, in their utmoſt latitude. Mr. Addiſon ſays, that the Engliſh language ſunk under Milton. So would the Greek language have ſunk under Homer, if he had made an epic poem on Milton's ſubject. The Engliſh language cannot fall into the meaſure of the Latin and Greek heroic verſe, becauſe there are few or no ſpondees in the Engliſh, *i. e.* few or no ſingle words which have two long ſyllables the one immediately after the other. But the iambic, trochaic, anapæſtic, and many other meaſures, may be obſerved in Engliſh, as eaſily as they are in the Latin and Greek, and actually are obſerved by the Engliſh poets in variety of compoſitions. The reaſon why the Engliſh language falls into theſe meaſures is, becauſe the ſigns of caſes, and the articles, are prefixed to its ſubſtantives, and the ſigns of the tenſes to its verbs; and theſe are, with great propriety, uſually pronounced ſhort; for they are but auxiliars to the main conception which is denoted by the noun or verb itſelf. As theſe are pronounced ſhort, a neceſſity enſues of bringing the accent upon our nouns and verbs as forward as may be; that the voice may reſt ſtrong upon the accented ſyllable, after having paſſed lightly over ſeveral prefixed ſigns, articles, or other parts of words, which are merely connective. Whereas in the Latin and Greek, as we read theſe languages, the voice frequently paſſes lightly over the main part of a noun or verb, and reſts ſtrongly on the ſign of its caſe, or tenſe. The Engliſh ſeldom place a ſtrong accent on more than one ſyllable of any word of a moderate length; nor do the Latins ſeem to have done it, any more than the Engliſh, if we may judge from their iambic verſes. And if the Latins really did thus, their hexameter or heroic verſe could not be read according to the manner of ſpeaking in or-

dinary converſation, but muſt have been pronounced in a kind of recitative. The uſual pronunciation of the Greek language ſeems to have been in a ſort of modulation ſomewhat like ſinging; and this language is exceedingly ſuited for ſuch modulation, both by the number of vowels which are found in the very moſt of its words, and likewiſe by the particles which we now conſider as mere expletives, and which may be ſome of them inſerted in almoſt any ſentence, without any alteration of the ſenſe that we can perceive at preſent. But the modulation of a ſentence may be conſiderably altered by the putting in, or leaving out theſe particles; and this may have affected the ſenſe, when the language was actually ſpoke, although we cannot now determine exactly in what manner. This language, in point of modulation, ſeems to excell all others. But it is as defective in its plan of conſtruction as any language can be that is to be intelligible. For the caſes, tenſes, moods, voices, and the prepoſitions, are applied in ſo looſe and indeterminate a manner, as ſcarcely to admit of being reduced to any certain plan. Dr. Clarke has obſerved, that Homer is more perſpicuous than any other author; but if he is ſo (which yet may be queſtioned) the perſpicuity ariſes from his ſubject, and not from the language itſelf in which he writes. It may be eaſily ſhewn that this is true, from the Greek language as uſed in a mathematical book, ſuch as Euclid. For in ſuch a book, the nature of the propoſition which the writer is upon, ſhews what he muſt mean by the words of the propoſition. Yet every one who has read this book in the original Greek and in an Engliſh tranſlation, muſt be ſatisfied that the Engliſh expreſſes the propoſitions at leaſt as clearly and preciſely as the Greek, and in as ſhort a compaſs.

As to oratory, ſurely ſeveral ſet ſpeeches in Shakeſpear, are as excellent as any that ever were made. If our public ſpeakers would take as much pains to arrive at excellence as Demoſthenes and Tully did, there is little doubt but the Engliſh language would ſhew ſuch excellence as effectually as either the Greek or Latin. The

The following properties of the Engliſh language will ſhew that it is well adapted to oratory, *viz.* the great variety of ſounds both in the beginning and ending of its words. I have ſhewed why this variety of ſounds is found in the beginning of its words, when I mentioned the prepoſitions of different languages which are uſed in inſeparable compoſition with its nouns and verbs. As to the variety of the ending of its words, that muſt be much greater than it can be in the actual conſtruction of any language in which the nouns are declined by caſes, and the verbs are conjugated by final terminations. For the ſame terminations muſt be continually recurring, of all the caſes, tenſes, and perſons, in every ſuch language; and ſuch terminations muſt in many inſtances be in a kind of rhime to each other. This correſpondence of rhime between the ſubſtantive and the adjective, and between many of the terminations of the verb, in Latin and Greek, would be exceedingly tireſome in any long ſpeech, if the correſponding terminations were not removed far from each other. But the farther they are removed, the longer ſuſpenſion is created in the mind with regard to the conceptions which are to be united immediately together; and hence the moſt admired orators in theſe languages make uſe of ſentences with words ſo tranſpoſed, as to make the ſentences intricate at the firſt reading, at leaſt to an Engliſhman who is accuſtomed to a more ſimple order of conſtruction. And yet when all is done, either in the Latin or Greek, ſomething like rhimes will be occurring every now and then, from the correſpondent terminations of many of the caſes of ſubſtantives and adjectives, and of many of the perſons of the verbs. Thus in Virgil,

——*en quo diſcordia cives*
Perduxit miſeros *en queis conſevimus* agros!

And in Horace. ——*metaque* fervidis
Evitata rotis, *palmaque* nobilis.

And in Homer. ——Πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους &c.
Ἣν διὰ μαντοσύνην τὴν &c.

But it is unneceſſary to make many quotations. For it muſt be apparent to any one, that the mechaniſm of theſe languages depends in a great meaſure on the correſpondence of final ſyllables; ſo that while we are reading them, we are compelled to be continually attentive to ſuch correſpondence. Now in Engliſh, there is no danger of wearying the ear by a too frequent repetition of ſimilar final ſounds, and therefore there is no occaſion to embarraſs the conſtruction, in order to avoid this inconvenience. On the contrary, in Engliſh poetry with rhime, the conſtruction is often embarraſſed for the ſake of gaining a correſpondence of termination. But this no ways affects oratory, or proſe of any kind; which may be made as flowing and various, and yet as intelligible, as the ſpeaker pleaſes, without forcing the conſtruction of the language.

I am in hopes, that from the account of the nature and application of language given in this book, I may ſafely pronounce, that the Engliſh is an excellent language, on account of the ſimplicity of its conſtruction, and the preciſe meaning of its ſentences. And as to copiouſneſs, it ſeems capable of expreſſing every ſubject which the mind of man is capable of comprehending.

If our authors often are careleſs, or inaccurate, in their conſtruction, that is not the fault of the language in which they write: but ariſes, either from want of attention, or from an affectation of introducing plans of conſtruction from the learned languages, or from the French, and other modern languages, which the Engliſh will not admit of. As to inverſion of order, in placing words in ſentences, I believe the Engliſh admits of it in as great variety as any language can do, which obſerves a plan of conſtruction equally ſimple with it. But the conſideration of this point relates not to the grammatic, but to the oratoric, and poetic plan of conſtruction; and of conſequence is the proper province of the critic, and not of the grammarian.

The END *of the* SPECULATIVE GRAMMAR.

A

PRACTICAL

GRAMMAR.

A

Practical Grammar

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

GRAMMAR, when reduced to practice, naturally reſolves itſelf into four general heads. The firſt treating of the pronunciation and ſpelling of ſyllables and words, according to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of ſome particular language. The ſecond, of the ſeveral parts of ſpeech, and their variations by declenſion and conjugation. The third, of uniting theſe parts of ſpeech into connected ſeries, expreſſing the various conceptions of the mind of man; and this either in proſe or verſe. The fourth, of the compoſition of verſe, ſo as to preſerve harmony and cadence in each kind of meaſure that is made uſe of in poetical compoſition.

Theſe ſeveral parts of grammar are uſually diſtinguiſhed by the names of orthography, etymology, ſyntax, and proſody. I ſhall obſerve this fourfold diviſion in the following treatiſe; but ſhall conſider the firſt head as only introductory to the reſt, for reaſons which will appear in the concluſion of what is ſaid upon the letters.

INTRODUCTION.

Concerning orthography, or the pronunciation and ſpelling of ſyllables and words, according to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of the Engliſh language.

SYLLABLES may be conſidered as expreſſed either by ſounds of the voice, actually formed by a perſon ſpeaking, or by letters ſo placed, as to direct a reader to form the ſounds upon the ſight of the letters. Different ſounds of the voice require different poſitions of the organs of ſpeech, and likewiſe the breath to be emitted in different manners, ſo as to co-operate with thoſe different poſitions, firſt in forming one ſound, and then another. The principal poſitions of the organs of ſpeech, which are neceſſary in the pronunciation of a language, are uſually (but not always) denoted by ſo many ſingle letters in that language. Theſe poſitions may be called articulations, if any one pleaſes, for the ſounds which proceed from them are called articulate ſounds.

Six and twenty letters are uſed in Engliſh to denote theſe articulations, according to the table of them which is given below. Such a table is called the alphabet of a language.

Roman.		*Italic.*		*Old Engliſh.*		*Name.*
A	a	*A*	*a*	𝔄	𝔞	*a*
B	b	*B*	*b*	𝔅	𝔟	*be*
C	c	*C*	*c*	ℭ	𝔠	*ſee*
D	d	*D*	*d*	𝔇	𝔡	*dee*
E	e	*E*	*e*	𝔈	𝔢	*e*
F	f	*F*	*f*	𝔉	𝔣	*eff*
G	g	*G*	*g*	𝔊	𝔤	*jee*

Roman.		*Italic.*		*Old Engliſh.*		*Name.*
H	h	*H*	*h*	𝔥	𝔥	*aitch*
I	i	*I*	*i*		𝔦	*i*
J	j	*J*	*j*	𝔍	𝔧	*j* conſonant or *ja*
K	k	*K*	*k*	𝔎	𝔨	*ka*
L	l	*L*	*l*	𝔏	𝔩	*el*
M	m	*M*	*m*	𝔐	𝔪	*em*
N	n	*N*	*n*	𝔑	𝔫	*en*
O	o	*O*	*o*	𝔒	𝔬	*o*
P	p	*P*	*p*	𝔓	𝔭	*pee*
Q	q	*Q*	*q*	𝔔	𝔮	*cue*
R	r	*R*	*r*	𝔯	𝔯	*ar*
S	ſ s	*S*	*ſ s*	𝔖	ſ𝔰	*eſs*
T	t	*T*	*t*	𝔗	𝔱	*tee*
U	u	*U*	*u*	𝔘	𝔲	*u*
V	v	*V*	*v*	𝔙	𝔳	*v* conſonant or *ve*
W	w	*W*	*w*	𝔚	𝔴	double *u*
X	x	*X*	*x*	𝔛	𝔵	*ex*
Y	y	*Y*	*y*	𝔜	𝔶	*wy*
Z	z	*Z*	*z*	𝔷	𝔷	*zed.*

To theſe letters may be added the character &, which is uſed for *and.*

The letters are divided into two principal ſorts, called *vowels* and *conſonants.*

A, e, i, o, u, are vowels, as likewiſe *y* and *w,* in ſome applications of them. The reſt are conſonants.

Of the vowels in general.

THE articulation denoted by every vowel leaves a free paſſage for the breath through the lips; and ſo long as the breath continues to be emitted without any check, and the organs of ſpeech preſerve the articulation denoted by a particular

vowel, ſo long the ſound continues, of which the vowel is the ſign. Therefore the ſound of every vowel may be either made long or ſhort, and that in two manners. For we may either continue to emit the breath for a longer or ſhorter time, preſerving the articulation of the vowel unchanged, and then ſtop the paſſage of the breath from the lungs, ſo that all ſound ſhall ceaſe: or we may change the articulation while the breath continues to paſs, and this change may be made ſooner or later, at our pleaſure. But there are many modifications which may be given to the ſound of a vowel beſides length and ſhortneſs. For ſuch a ſound may be pronounced ſlender, or it may be made broad; or it may be pronounced open, or made cloſe; and in any of theſe manners the ſound of the ſame vowel may be long, or ſhort, for the paſſage of the breath through the lips is ſtill kept free. The diphthongs are intended to give notice of theſe varieties in the pronunciation of vowels, and therefore in Engliſh the diphthongs frequently denote ſhort ſounds. For a deep ſound may be continued only for a ſhort time. Thus, for inſtance, the diphthongs *ou* and *oo*, denote as deep ſounds as any in the Engliſh language, yet theſe ſounds are ſhort in *labour*, *vapour*, *endeavour*, and in *good*, *ſtood*, *wool*, and many other words.

The variety of ſounds which are denoted by one and the ſame vowel or diphthong, and the ſameneſs of the ſounds which are yet denoted by different vowels or diphthongs, are the greateſt imperfections which are found in the Engliſh language when written. This has chiefly come to paſs from the introducing words from ſeveral languages into the Engliſh, and retaining moſt of the letters of the original words.

Of the conſonants in general.

SOME of the conſonants direct to ſuch poſitions of the organs of ſpeech, as prevent all paſſage of the breath, either through the lips or noſe.

B, *d*, *k*, *p*, *t*, are of this kind, and therefore are called mutes. For ſo long as all paſſage of the ſpeaker's breath is ſtopped, all ſound from him muſt be likewiſe ſtopped.

But the articulation denoted by one of theſe conſonants may be run into the articulation denoted by a vowel, by diſcharging the former articulation upon the latter, and by continuing to emit the breath by the latter articulation; and thus the ſound of the vowel will partake of the modification of the conſonant which precedes it. Or the ſound denoted by a vowel may be modified by the articulation of a conſonant which ſucceeds it, if we run the vocal articulation into that denoted by the conſonant, without checking the courſe of the breath till the articulation of the conſonant is compleatly formed; for thus the ſound of the vowel will partake of the modification of the conſonant which ſucceeds it.

Some of the conſonants are ſo uſed on ſome occaſions, as to admit the breath to paſs leiſurely through the mouth or noſe while the articulations continue which they denote; and on other occaſions ſo as to prevent the breath from paſſing till the articulation enſues which is denoted by ſome other letter.

C and *g* are of this kind, and are therefore ſaid to be ſometimes ſoft and ſometimes hard. When a little of the breath paſſes during the continuance of the articulations which the letters themſelves denote, they are pronounced ſoft; as in *celebrate*, *civil*, *gem*, *giant*. When none of the voice paſſes during

during ſuch articulations, the letters are mute conſonants, and are ſaid to be pronounced hard; as in *cavil*, *compoſe*, *Cupid*, *game*, *give*, *go*.

All the other letters, viz. *f*, *h*, *j*, *g*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, *s*, (*y* and *w*, even when uſed as conſonants) *x* and *z*, direct to ſuch poſitions of the organs of utterance, as permit the breath to paſs in ſome degree either thro' the lips, or noſe, or both, without any change of theſe poſitions during the time that the breath paſſes.

F is equivalent to *p*, pronounced with the lips a little open, and with a ſmall percuſſion of the breath.

H directs to give the breath ſome percuſſion as it paſſes into the cavity of the mouth, and to keep the lips open. Therefore *f* is nearly equivalent to *ph*.

J is equivalent to *dg* when the *g* is pronounced ſoft, or without ſtopping the courſe of the breath.

Q directs to ſuch an articulation, that the breath cannot paſs the lips without pronouncing *u* after it; therefore it is never uſed without *u* immediately following it.

L, *m*, *n*, *r*, are called liquids. The particularity of ſound for which this name has been given them, proceeds from forcing the breath towards the roof of the mouth while we ſound theſe letters, and paſſing it leiſurely off, partly by the ſides of the tongue, and partly by the noſe. The breath, while it paſſes in this manner, cauſes an obſcure ſound to begin with the articulation denoted by each of theſe letters, and to continue as long as the articulation continues; and hence they are thought to partake of the nature of vowels, and are called ſemivowels.

S may be eaſily pronounced before any conſonant; for both the lips and the palate of the mouth are quite at liberty in the articulation denoted by it, ſo that they may be put into the poſition required by any conſonant during the time that the hiſſing ſound denoted by *S* is carrying on, or juſt as it is ceaſing.

V, conſonant, is the liquid *f*.

The

The articulation denoted by *w* is like that denoted by *o*, only the cavity between the tongue and the palate is larger when *w* is pronounced. The percuſſion of the breath denoted by *b* cannot be given immediately after this articulation, for the articulation requires the breath to continue to proceed with one conſtant tenor. Nevertheleſs, in the words *why*, *when*, *where*, and ſeveral others, the *b* is placed immediately after the *w*, yet the words are pronounced as if they were written, *hwy*, *hwen*, *hwere*, &c.

X is equivalent to *ks*.

Y, when uſed as a conſonant, is the liquid *j*.

Z is the liquid *ſ*.

Of the vowels in particular.

A.

THIS vowel has three ſounds in Engliſh, the ſlender, the open, and the broad.

A, ſlender, is very frequently uſed in this language; as in words ending in ſilent *e*, ſuch as *place*, *waſte*, *gaze*: and in *ation*, *ageous*, *arious*; as *vexations*, *courageous*, *various*, &c.

A, open, is like the *a* of the Italian; as *father*, *languiſh*, *graſs*.

A, broad, is the open *a* pronounced long; as *call*, *wall*; for when this ſound is pronounced ſhort, as in *ſally*, *valley*, it is the ſame with that of *a* open.

If the *a* is ſhewn to be long, by a ſilent *e* placed at the end of a word after a ſingle conſonant, it is always *ſlender*; as *face*, *gaze*, *name*: but in ſeveral words ending in ſilent *e*, after a double conſonant, *a* is broad; as *farce*, *ſcarce*.

A forms a diphthong with *i* or *y*, and with *u* or *w*. With *i* or *y*; as *vain*, *ſail*, *play*, *betray*. Theſe diphthongs have

the ſound of *a* long and ſlender; for *vain*, *ſail*, are pronounced as *vane* and *ſale*.

Au or *aw* have the ſame ſound as *a* broad; for *baul*, *awl*, *hawl*, are pronounced as *ball*, *all*, *ball*.

In ſome words derived from the Greek and Latin, *ae* appears as a diphthong, as *Æacus*, *Æneas*, *Cæſar*.

When this diphthong precedes a vowel, it has the ſound of *ee*; when it precedes a conſonant, it is ſounded as *ea*.

E.

This vowel, when placed ſingle, is ſeldom pronounced long, except in words derived from the Greek, in which it is uſed inſtead of the η or αι of that language; as *ſcene*, *demon*, from Σκηνη, Δαιμων, &c.

The *e* ſhort is the moſt common vowel in the Engliſh language. When the *e* is placed before two conſonants, or a double conſonant, the vowel is ſhort, but the ſyllable is uſually long. Thus in *bleſſing*, *bending*, *fetching*, the ſyllables *bleſs*, *bend*, *fetch*, are long, although the *e* which is in them is ſhort. This is effected by paſſing quickly from the articulation denoted by *e* to thoſe denoted by *ſſ*, *nd*, *tch*, and dwelling pretty long on the latter articulations.

This vowel is uſed at the end of many words, merely to give notice that the ſound of the laſt ſyllable is to be opened and ſoftened. The *e*, when thus uſed, is ſaid to be ſilent; as in *babe*, *ſhade*, *recede*, *ſtrike*, *hope*, *tribute*.

If the letter which precedes the ſilent *e* be a mute conſonant, it is manifeſt that the ſyllable cannot be opened by the articulation of the conſonant; becauſe in every ſuch articulation the paſſage of the breath is ſtopped. Therefore the ſyllable is opened by dwelling upon the preceding vowel with a gentle current of the breath before the articulation follows, which is denoted by the mute conſonant. Thus *rob* becomes *robe*; *lad*, *lade*; *trip*, *tripe*; *tub*, *tube*; *ſit*, *ſite*; &c. The ſilent *e* has much the ſame effect when it follows a conſonant that is not a mute; for although

though the paſſage of the breath is not quite ſtopped by the articulation of ſuch a conſonant, the ſound which follows the articulation is not agreeable to the ear; and therefore is ſeldom continued long after the ſound of the preceding vowel is modified by it.

When a ſyllable is pronounced, the breath may either all or moſt of it be emitted through the lips with a quick percuſſion; and when ſo, the ſyllable is pronounced open; as in *ſtrife*, *glaſs*, *buſs*: or part of the breath may be conveyed to the roof of the mouth, and there delayed a little till ſome of it paſſes by the noſe, or departs gently by the ſides of the tongue, which is made to obſtruct its paſſage in ſome degree; and when thus, the ſyllable is pronounced cloſe, as in *ſtrive*, *glaze*, *buzz*.

The vowel of the ſyllable which is cloſed by a ſilent *e*, is not always pronounced open by ſoftening the ſyllable. Thus in *hermitage*, *paſturage*, and in many other words in *age*, the *a* is cloſe; and in *live*, *give*, the *i* is cloſe, and in *love*, the *o* is cloſe, and in *treaſurer*, the *u* is ſo.

E, at the end of words before *n*, or after *l* and *r*, is a notice to form the ſound of the laſt ſyllable within the mouth towards the roof or palate, without ſuffering much of the breath to paſs through the lips, as in *open*, *taken*, *quadruple*, *thiſtle*, *metre*, *lucre*.

E forms a diphthong with *a*, as in *bear*, *fear*; with *i*, as in *perceive*, *vein*; and with *u*, or *w*, as in *eunuch*, *ſlew*, *grew*.

Ea has the ſound of *e* long and open, as *dream*, *ſtream*; or of *ee*, that is, of *e* long and cloſe, as *dear*, *fear*: but in *bread*, *ſtead*, *ſweat*, and ſome other words, *ea* has the ſound of *e* ſhort and cloſe.

Ei has a ſound which is intermediate between the open and cloſe ſounds of *ea* long, as in *teize*, *perceive*.

Eu has the ſound of *u* long and ſoft, but not made liquid by letting the breath eſcape by the noſe, as in *eulogy*.

The French ſpelling by *e*, *a*, *u*, is preſerved in *beauty*, and its derivatives. But the three vowels have only the ſound of *u*, or *eu*.

Ee is the mark of the ſtrong cloſe ſound of *e*, as in *agree*, *free*, *ſee*.

Eo, in *yeoman*, is ſounded as *e* open and ſhort. In *people*, it is ſounded as *e* cloſe and long. In *George*, as *o* open and long. It is found in very few other Engliſh words.

I.

I has a long open ſound in all monoſyllables in which it is found, if they end in ſilent *e*, or in *ind*, as *mine*, *vine*, *fire*, *file*, *bind*, *find*, *rind*. In other monoſyllables, its ſound is ſhort, as *rib*, *bid*, *if*, *thin*, *this*.

I before *r* is often ſounded as a cloſe *u*, as in *firſt*, *flirt*.

I forms a diphthong only with *e*, as *field*, *believe*.

This diphthong is ſounded like *e* long and cloſe.

I is joined with *eu* in *lieu*, and with *ew* in *view*, and in theſe words is ſounded as *u* long and cloſe.

O.

O is uſually long before ſingle conſonants, as in *bone*, *odious*; and ſhort before two or more conſonants, as *block*, *loll*, *worth*. Yet it is long in *toll*, *roll*; and frequently before *r*, with other conſonants after it, as in *border*, *born*, *forge*, *lord*, &c.

O may take any vowel after it to form a diphthong. But *oe* is only found in ſome few words derived from the Greek, as *oeconomy*, *oecumenical*, and is ſounded as *e* long and open.

Oa is ſounded as *o* long and open, as *coal*, *boaſt*.

Oi ſhews the ſounds of *o* and *i* very intimately united, as in *oil*, *noiſe*. *Y* is uſed with *o* at the end of words to form a diphthong, as in *coy*, *joy*, *toy*, *employ*, &c.

Oo directs the ſound of *o* to be formed towards the roof of

the mouth, while the breath is emitted by a round aperture of the lips. This aperture of neceſſity enlarges the internal cavity of the mouth, and is the articulation denoted by *w*. Therefore the ſound of *oo* is that of a cloſe *o* united with the following articulation of *w*. The ſound is neceſſarily deep, becauſe the mouth is very hollow within whilſt it is pronounced, but it may be either long or ſhort. The long ſound of *oo* is in *boot*, *ſhoot*, *cool*; the ſhort ſound in *good*, *blood*, *wool*.

Ou and *ow* denote the ſound of an open *o* united with the articulation of *u* or *w*, as in *our*, *flour*, *ſhower*, *flower*: the ſounds may be more or leſs deep, according as we make the mouth more or leſs hollow whilſt we articulate them. Thus *bowl*, an orbicular body; *bow*, an inſtrument for ſhooting; *ſow*, the female of the boar; require a deep ſound of *ow*. But *bowl*, a veſſel; *bow*, a depreſſion of the head; *ſow*, to ſcatter ſeed; require a more open ſound.

By varying the cavity of the mouth farther ſtill, and by emitting the breath more or leſs towards the lips or palate, we ſometimes vary the ſound of *ou*, till it approaches to that of *u* long and ſoft, as in *court*.

Sometimes to that of *u* ſhort and ſoft, as in *labour*, *vapour*.

Sometimes to that of *u* cloſe, as in *cou'd*, *wou'd*, for *could*, *would*.

Sometimes to that of *u* open, as in *rough*, *tough*.

Sometimes to that of *o* cloſe, as *cough*, *ſlough*, meaning a dirty deep place in a road.

U.

U has a long open ſound in the laſt ſyllables of words which end in ſilent *e*, or in *ution*, or *uſion*, as *blue*, *true*, *to uſe*, *to confute*, *reſolution*, *confuſion*.

But in the nouns *uſe*, *abuſe*, *abſtruſe*, &c. the *ſ* is pronounced hard, ſo as to give the *u* a cloſer ſound.

Its ſound is uſually cloſe and ſhort before two conſonants, or a double conſonant, as in *buſtle*, *concuſſion*; and before ſingle

conſonants at the end of words, as in *thus*, *us*, *put*.

It forms a diphthong, in the middle of words, with all the other vowels, as *quaint*, *queſt*, *queer*, *quite*, *anguiſh*, *quote*; but when thus uſed, it has the effect of *w*, which is actually uſed at the beginning of words, as in *wain*, *weſt*, *wild*, *wore*.

U is ſometimes mute before *a*, *e*, *i*, *y*, as in *guard*, *gueſt*, *guide*, *buy*.

In *ue* at the end of *virtue*, *ague*, *e* is mute, and *ue* is mute at the end of *prorogue*, *ſynagogue*, *plague*, *harangue*.

Y.

This letter, when uſed as a vowel, ſupplies the place of *i* at the end of word, as in *my*, *thy*; and before an *i*, as *dying*, *flying*; and it is uſually retained in derivative words, if it was the latter part of a diphthong in the primitives; as from *day*, *days*; from *way*, *ways*, *wayward*; from *play*, *plays*, *player*, *playful*: and ſo from *deſtroy*, *deſtroys*, *deſtroyer*; from *joy*, *joyous*, *joyful*, &c.

Of the conſonants in particular.

B.

THIS letter denotes only one articulation, and therefore is uniform in its effect when it is pronounced. But it is ſilent in *debt*, *ſubtle*, *doubt*, *lamb*, *limb*, *climb*, *dumb*, *thumb*, *comb*, *womb*, and their derivatives.

C.

C is hard before *a*, *o*, *u*, as in *can*, *concord*, *percuſſion*.

It is ſoft before *e* and *i*, as in *cellar*, *ſincere*, *civil*, *ſimplicity*.

When *c* is hard, it has the ſound of *k*, when ſoft, that of *s*; therefore it is not of abſolute neceſſity in the alphabet.

Ch, at the beginning of many words, ſounds as *tch*, as in *church*, *charm*, *child*.

It ſounds as *k* in words derived from the Greek; as in *ſcheme*, *chorus*, *chriſtian*.

Arch is ſounded *ark* in *archangel*, and ſome few other words in which it precedes a vowel. But in compoſition with words beginning with a conſonant, *arch* retains the open ſound of *ch*, as in *archbiſhop*, &c.

Ch in ſome words taken from the French, ſounds as *ſh*, as in *chaiſe*, *machine*.

C never ends a word purely Engliſh, but takes *k* after it for this purpoſe, as *black*, *neck*, *brick*, *flock*, *ſtruck*.

The cloſe *c* is uſed before *l* and *r*, as *claim*, *croſs*.

D.

This letter is uſed before *r* and *w*, as in *draw*, *dwell*. It is uniform in its effect.

F

Is uniform in its effect, and is uſed before *l* and *r*, as *flat*, *frame*, *flute*, *fruit*.

G.

G is hard, or cloſe, before *a*, *o*, *u*, as in *gather*, *go*, *gun*; likewiſe before *l* and *r*, as *glow*, *grow*; and at the end of words, as *ſtag*, *leg*, *dig*, *frog*, *ſnug*.

G before *e* is uſually ſoft, or open, as *gem*, *gentle*; except *gear*, *geld*, *geeſe*, *get*, *gewgaw*; and derivatives from words ending in *g*, as *fling*, *flinger*; *wrong*, *wronger*, *wronged*; &c. and generally before *er* at the end of words, as *finger*, *linger*; but the *g* is ſoft in *harbinger*, *ginger*, and ſome others.

G is mute before *n*, as *gnaſh*, *gnaw*, *ſign*, *foreign*.

G is hard, or cloſe, before *i*, as *gift*, *gild*; except in *giant*, *gibbet*, *Giles*, (a man's name) *gill*, a meaſure of liquids (for in *gills*, a part of a fiſh, the *g* is cloſe) *gilly-flower*, *gin*, *ginger*, *gingle*, *gipſy*.

Gh in the beginning of words has the ſound of *g* cloſe, as *ghoſt*. In the middle and end of ſome words, it is ſilent, as in *right*, *bright*, *ſtraight*, *ſought*, *thought*, &c.

At the end of words *gh* is frequently uſed for *f* pronounced ſomewhat in the throat, as in *cough*, *trough*, *tough*, *enough*, *ſlough*, meaning the ſkin which any animal caſts.

H.

This letter ſhews that ſome vowel which follows it, muſt be aſpirated, *i. e.* muſt be pronounced with a ſtrong percuſſion of the breath. Except in *heir*, *herb*, *hoſtler*, *honour*, *humble*, *honeſt*, *humour*, and their derivatives. It ſeldom (if ever) begins any ſyllable of a word, except the firſt.

J conſonant.

This letter ſounds like *dg*, the *g* being open, as in *jealous*, *joy*, *July*.

Foreigners often pronounce it as the Engliſh pronounce *y* conſonant. Thus they ſpeak the word *John* as an Engliſhman ſpeaks *yon*, and ſo of other inſtances.

K.

This letter denotes the articulation of the hard or mute *c*, and is uſed before *e* and *i*, where, according to the cuſtom of the Engliſh language, *c* would be ſoft, or open, as in *keen*, *kept*, *kind*, *kill*.

K is never doubled, but *c* is placed before it to ſhorten the preceding vowel, as *cackle*, *fickle*, *cockle*, *buckle*.

L.

This is the firſt of the liquids, or ſemivowels.

It is doubled at the end of monoſyllables, if they are not formed by a diphthong, as in *fall*, *call*, *fell*, *ſwell*, *fill*, *ſtill*, *toll*, *roll*, *full*, *dull*.

L is

L is mute in ſeveral words, as *calf*, *half*, *would*, *could*, *ſhould*, *pſalm*, *qualm*, *talk*, *ſalmon*, *falcon*.

Le at the end of words is equivalent to *el* ſounded very weak and liquid, as in *ſaddle*, *feeble*, *Bible*, *boggle*, *ſhuttle*.

M.

While the articulation denoted by this letter continues, the breath paſſes conſtantly through the noſe, and no part of it by the mouth.

It is uniform in its ſound.

N.

This letter is ſometimes mute. After *m*, as in *damn*, *condemn*, *ſolemn*, *hymn*.

It is uniform in its ſound.

P.

P is ſometimes ſilent, as in *pſalm*, *ptizan*; and between *m* and *t*, as in *tempt*, *exempt*.

Ph is uſed for *f* in words originally Greek, as *philoſophy*, *Philip*, *phantom*; in *phial*, *ph* is pronounced almoſt like *v*.

Q.

The articulation denoted by this letter might have been expreſſed by *kw*. It always has *u* after it.

In ſome words derived from the French, *qu* is ſounded like *k*, as in *conquer*, *liquor*, *riſque*, *chequer*.

R.

The ſound of this letter may be made as rough, or as ſmooth as we pleaſe, by making the mouth more or leſs hollow, and by forcing the breath more or leſs ſtrongly through the lips, ſo as to make the ſeveral parts of the mouth vibrate more or leſs ſtrongly.

At the end of a word, if the ſyllable be long, it has its rougher ſound, as in *bar*, *confer*, *cur*, *recur*, &c.

But when it goes before vowels, it has a ſmooth ſound, as in *range*, *renew*, *riſe*, *roll*, *ruin*.

Re at the end of words derived from the French, has the ſound of *er* weak and liquid, as in *theatre*, *luſtre*.

S.

This letter is uſed at the beginning of words, to denote an open hiſſing ſound, as in *ſalt*, *ſell*, *ſide*, *ſold*, *ſudden*. It denotes the ſame ſound at the end of the pronouns *this*, *us*, and of the adverb *thus*, and of a few words derived from the Latin, as *Venus*, *ſurplus*, *rebus*. In other inſtances, this ſound at the end of words is denoted by *ſs*, as in *glaſs*, *leſs*, *amiſs*, *loſs*, *truſs*.

Single *s* has a ſmooth liquid ſound at the end of words varied by what anſwers to declenſion and conjugation in Engliſh. Thus the plural of nouns is formed. As from *god*, *gods*; from *king*, *kings*; &c.

And the third perſon ſingular of verbs. As from *call*, *calls*, from *ſend*, *ſends*; &c.

And the poſſeſſive pronouns have this ſoft *s*, in their variation from the perſonal primitives; as from *him*, *his*, from *her*, *hers*; from *us*, *our*, *ours*; *you*, *your*, *yours*; *they*, *their*, *theirs*; the *s*, in this uſe of it, has a ſound almoſt the ſame with *z*, or with *s*, followed by a ſilent *e*.

S is ſoft before *y* at the end of words, as in *roſy*, *poeſy*; and in *boſom*, *deſire*, *wiſdom*, *priſon*, *preſént*, *préſent*, *damſel*, *caſement*, and their derivatives.

It is uſually ſoft before the ſilent *e*, but *verſe*, *herſe*, *worſe*, *horſe*, and ſeveral other words, muſt be excepted.

S before *ion* and after a vowel ſounds like *z*; as in *confuſion*, *intruſion*; but like *ſh* after a conſonant, as in *converſion*, *aſperſion*.

S is ſilent in *iſle*, *iſland*, *demeſne*, *viſcount*, and their derivatives.

T.

This letter being a mute conſonant, cannot denote an open articulation which ſhall produce an effect ſimilar to that of the mute *t*; yet, before vowels, *ti* is made to denote an open ſound: but this ſound is like that of *ſhi*, and not that of *ti*, on other occaſions; as in *ſalvation*, *patience*, *diſputatious*. Unleſs an *ſ* goes before *ti*, as in *queſtion*, *ſuggeſtion*, *baſtion*, *combuſtion*; or the word be derived from one that ends in *y*; as from *mighty*, *mightier*, *mightieſt*, &c.

Th denotes an articulation which foreigners find very difficult to form. In this articulation the tip of the tongue touches the inward edge of the upper teeth, and the breath is ſo emitted as to make the ſides of the tongue vibrate. If this vibration is to be ſtrong, all or moſt of the breath muſt be forced through the mouth; and if this is done, the ſound of *th* will be hard, as in *thank*, *thin*, *thunder*.

But if the breath be forced toward the palate, and ſo detained, that part of it eſcapes by the noſe, the ſound will be ſoft; as in *that*, *thine*, *thus*.

The ſound of *th* is likewiſe ſoft in *thou*, *thoſe*, *thee*, *thy*, *they*, *their*, *there*, *this*, *theſe*, *thoſe*, *them*, *then*, *though*; and in all words when between two vowels, or between *r* and a vowel, as in *father*, *mother*, *whether*, *rather*; and in *farther*, *farthing*.

When *th* is to be ſoftened at the end of a word, a ſilent *e* is added; thus, from *bath*, *to bathe*; from *breath*, *to breathe*; from *cloth*, *to clothe*.

V conſonant.

This is the liquid *f*, as from *ſtaff*, *to ſtave*; from *proof*, *to prove*; &c.

W.

This letter, at the beginning of words and ſyllables, is a conſonant; but, placed after vowels in the ſame word, it is a vowel. Hence it eaſily goes before all the vowels except *u*; and in different words it follows a vowel without any difficulty; as in *rainy weather*, &c.

Wh is pronounced as *hw*; but in *whore*, and ſometimes in *wholeſome*, it has the ſound of *h*.

X.

This letter has the ſound of *ks*, as in *ax*, *wax*. It begins no Engliſh word.

Y.

Y, when before a vowel or diphthong, is a conſonant; as *yes*, *yonder*. When it follows a vowel, it is a vowel; as in *ſay*, *joy*. When uſed as a conſonant, it is the liquid *j*.

Z.

This letter is the liquid *ſ*. It begins no word of Engliſh original.

From this conſideration of the Engliſh alphabet, and of the application of it to the ſimple ſounds of the language, it is very evident that the alphabet is redundant in ſeveral inſtances, and deficient in others. For the ſame ſound is frequently expreſſed ſeveral ways, as *ail*, *ale*; *bore*, *boar*; *deer*, *dear*; *bread*, *bred*; *coal*, *cole*; and ſo in many other inſtances of the vowels and diphthongs, as has been ſufficiently ſhewn in what is ſaid of each in particular.

Yet the vowels and diphthongs are very deficient, as to the proper expreſſion of vocal ſounds. For every long vocal ſound ſhould be expreſſed by a vocal mark, which might ſhew it to be long; and every ſhort vocal ſound, by a mark ſhewing it to be

ſhort. The diphthongs might be properly enough applied to denote long vocal ſounds. But thoſe which on ſome occaſions denote the longeſt and deepeſt ſounds in the language, on other occaſions are uſed to expreſs the ſhorteſt. Thus, in *allow*, the ſyllable *ow* is long, and the ſame in *allowed*. But in *ballow*, the ſyllable *ow* is ſhort; and the ſame in *ballowed*; and ſo of many other inſtances of the uſe of the Engliſh diphthongs.

As to the conſonants, although many of them always denote the ſame articulations, yet others do not; as is moſt evident in what has been ſaid of *c* and *g*. And yet, on ſeveral occaſions, one and the ſame articulation is denoted by different conſonants. Thus the ſame articulation, which is denoted by *f* in *for*, is denoted by *ph* in *philoſophy*, and by *gh* in *tough*: and ſo of many other inſtances.

It is poſſible, no doubt, to redreſs many, if not moſt of theſe imperfections of the Engliſh ſpelling. But it is not abſolutely neceſſary for thoſe perſons who have the ſenſe of hearing, and who live with thoſe that ſpeak the language. For learners, by hearing the words of any language frequently pronounced, and by attempting themſelves to pronounce them, become at length capable of uttering all the ſimple ſounds of the language, by mere imitation. And when this capacity is acquired in ſome degree, the aſſiſtance of a teacher quickly enables an attentive perſon to perceive what letters, or combinations of letters, require ſuch or ſuch ſounds to be applied to them. For the teacher preſents the letters to the eye of the learner, and actually pronounces the ſounds which they require. This proceeding is what we call learning to read a language. And thus the audible ideas of the ſounds of the language become intimately connected, in the mind of the learner, with the letters which are the viſible repreſentations of theſe ideas. Hence a faculty is acquired, by degrees, of expreſſing theſe audible ideas by letters,

and that even by a perſon who does not actually utter the ſounds of which he has the ideas ſucceſſively in his mind. Thus we become enabled to write down our thoughts when we ourſelves do not ſpeak: and thus the bulk of mankind arrive at the ready uſe of a language, both in ſpeaking and writing, by mere imitation, without any explicit attention to the exact poſitions of the organs of ſpeech, which each letter, or aſſemblage of letters, requires in the language which they make uſe of.

But the perſon who firſt invented an alphabet, conſidered the nature of articulate ſounds more accurately; and, by ſuch conſideration, was led on to invent marks for articulations, which, in themſelves, produce no articulate ſounds. All the conſonants are ſuch marks; and theſe are the only letters which are found in the moſt antient alphabets (as the Hebrew and Phœnician.) Now, although it be difficult, yet it is not impoſſible, to give ſome account in words, of the poſition of the organs of ſpeech which each letter requires. Dr. Wallace and Dr. Holder have done it in very ingenious treatiſes on the ſubject; but ſuch a proceeding is not neceſſary for any learners, except thoſe who are born deaf; and it was for the uſe of ſuch perſons that the learned authors above-mentioned compoſed their treatiſes. Nevertheleſs, it is of ſome uſe to all learners to have the letters ranged into claſſes. And when one letter is applied to two articulations, or ſeveral letters are uſed to denote one and the ſame articulation, to have the principal inſtances ſet down in which this variety appears. For theſe reaſons I have conſidered the letters and ſimple ſounds of the Engliſh in what is already ſaid. But as ſome ability, at leaſt, in pronouncing the ſimple ſounds of a language, muſt be acquired before the language can be uſed in rational compoſition, either by ſpeaking or writing it; and as all the other parts of practical grammar are intended to direct to a regular compoſition in ſpeaking and writing, but eſpecially in writing; I have choſe to conſider what is ſaid of the letters and ſyllables, as only introductory to the reſt.

As

As foreigners are very apt to miſtake in the pronunciation of *j* conſonant, and *th*, perhaps the following rules may be of ſome aſſiſtance to them, if committed to memory.

To ſpeak *j* conſonant, pronounce a *d*
As follow'd by a *y* or open *g*.

For the Engliſh ſound of *j* is like that of *dy*, or *dg*, the *g* being open.

On th' edge of th' upper teeth, the tongue you preſs
To ſpeak *th*, and breathe as for an *s*.

For *th* is ſpoke as *ſ*, except that the tip of the tongue preſſes againſt the inward edge of the upper teeth when *th* is ſpoken; whereas the tip of the tongue is quite at liberty when *ſ* is ſpoken.

The following rules alſo may, perhaps, be of ſome uſe to aſſiſt the memory in the different pronunciation of *c* and *g*.

C, before *a*, *o*, *u*, as *k* expreſs;
But, before *e* or *i*, ſpeak *c* as *s*.

G, before *a*, *o*, *u*, is hard in ſound,
Or at the end of any word, if found;
And before *i*: except that open *g*,
In *giant*, *gibbet*, *gillyflow'r*, muſt be.
And *ginger*, *gingle*, *gipſy*, *giblets*, claim,
And *gibe*, *Giles*, *gill*, and likewiſe *gin* the ſame.

G, before *e*, is ſoft: except in *gear*,
Geld, *geeſe*, *get*, *gewgaw*; and when words appear
With *g* before the termination *er* *.
And if a ſimple word in hard *g* ends,
The ſame on its derivatives attends.

* But in *harbinger*, *warſinger*, *ginger*, and perhaps in ſome few other words in *er*, the *g* is open or ſoft.

A

Practical Grammar

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

BOOK I.

Of etymology, or the ſeveral ſorts of words, with their grammatical variations.

SECTION I.

Of the ſorts of words, as they are diſtinguiſhed each by a grammatic name.

EIGHT ſorts of words, as the grammarians teach,
May comprehend the ſeveral parts of ſpeech.
Noun, *pronoun*, *verb*, and *participle* too,
Adverb, *conjunction*, *prepoſition*, ſhew,
With *interjection*, their reſpective names:
The *article* with theſe, a place in Engliſh claims.

The

The ſorts of words are, by eſtabliſhed cuſtom, reduced to eight in almoſt all languages, and theſe ſorts in grammar are called *the parts of ſpeech*; their names are given above, viz.

Noun,	Adverb,
Pronoun,	Conjunction,
Verb,	Prepoſition,
Participle,	Interjection.

But to theſe, in Engliſh, muſt be added, the Article.

Some writers on grammar have divided words into more or fewer ſorts than are here ſet down, and have given other names to the ſeveral ſorts. But no real benefit enſues from ſuch a proceeding; and therefore it is mere trifling, or worſe, to put the learner to the trouble of learning a new grammatical language, when the old received terms of the art will anſwer the ſame end.

I ſhall conſider each of theſe parts of ſpeech, particularly, in the order in which they are here ſet down, except the article, which will be conſidered along with nouns, called *common*, or *appellative*, becauſe of the particular relation which it bears to this ſort of nouns.

Before I proceed to treat of each of the parts of ſpeech ſeparately, it will not be improper to conſider the NOUN and the VERB, in a general manner, both together. For they are the principal parts of ſpeech, to which all the reſt are but ſo many kinds of auxiliars. And they have ſome properties in common, and ſome peculiar to each, which will be beſt underſtood by placing them in one view.

As I am obliged to uſe the word *object* in a ſenſe more extenſive than it commonly bears; it is neceſſary to give notice, that by *an object* is meant, in this treatiſe, *whatſoever gives*

gives occaſion to ſuch a conception as the mind can attend to ſingly, or ſeparately from all other conceptions.

Of the general nature of the noun and verb.

OBJECTS are named by nouns, when, in the mind,
With its own principle of being, join'd,
Each object we conceive: or when, in ſpeech,
Such principle we quite abſtract from each.

The ſtates of verbs, more latitude allow,
For on theſe ſtates, at pleaſure, we beſtow
Sep'rate exiſtence. Hence, when uſe demands,
Each verbal ſtate a ſep'rate object ſtands.
But, at our pleaſure, we from verbs reſume
Sep'rate exiſtence. Hence their ſtates become
What may with any object coaleſce,
Such object's ſtate of being to expreſs.
Yet either way conceiv'd, we may with eaſe
From verbs take all exiſtence when we pleaſe,
And give it back by fits; and thus repeat
Succeſſive periods of each verbal ſtate.
And verbal being, howſoe'er employ'd,
May be, when need requires, by negatives deſtroy'd.

Nouns are the names of objects, conceived in the mind of man under two different modes of being, or exiſtence. For theſe objects are denoted by one ſort of nouns, as each object is conceived to be or exiſt in conſequence of *a particular ſeparate principle of its own*, in which no other object partakes. And another ſort of nouns denotes the objects, as they are conceived to be deprived of all *ſeparate principle* of being, or exiſtence.

The nouns which expreſs objects under the firſt manner of conception, are called *noun ſubſtantives*. Theſe may ſtand ſingle, and yet make full ſenſe; becauſe they denote perſons and

things, as the conception of each is ſeparate and diſtinct in the apprehenſion of the mind. Thus *Socrates*, *a man*, *an animal*, *a mineral*, *the ſea*, *the houſe*, *virtue*, *vice*, *relation*, *contrariety*, are all noun ſubſtantives: for each of them expreſſes a conception which repreſents the object denoted by it as a ſingle thing, conceived to exiſt by its own principle, much as every living creature exiſts by a principle peculiar to itſelf.

The nouns which expreſs objects under the ſecond manner of conception, are called *noun adjectives*. Theſe cannot ſtand ſingle and make full ſenſe, becauſe they give notice that the principle which gives being to what each of them ſignifies, muſt be conſidered as in ſome other object or ſtate which muſt be mentioned by its name. If therefore ſuch name be not mentioned together with the adjective, the mind is at a loſs; not being able to determine the being or thing in which that which is denoted by the adjective has its exiſtence. Thus what is denoted by *godly*, *manly*, *good*, *great*, cannot be conceived in itſelf; becauſe the form of the words gives notice to look out for ſome other word expreſſing an object or ſtate with which to unite that which is denoted by each of theſe words. Therefore they are noun adjectives. But if we take the ſubſtantive *a perſon*, and form the expreſſions, *a godly perſon*, *a manly*, *good*, *great*, *perſon*, all theſe expreſſions become compleat ſenſe: for what is denoted by each of the adjectives unites in the object, *a perſon*. Or if we take the ſtate *to be*, and form the expreſſions, *to be godly*, *to be manly*, *good*, *great*, each of theſe expreſſions becomes compleat ſenſe; for what is denoted by each of the adjectives unites in the ſtate *to be*.

If we now take the names *godlineſs*, *manlineſs*, *goodneſs*, *greatneſs*, theſe words will evidently denote what was denoted by the adjectives, *godly*, *manly*, *good*, *great*, only under another mode of conception. For the names, *godlineſs*, &c. expreſs ſo many objects of the mind as ſo many diſtinct beings or things; whereas

as the adjectives repreſent them as requiring to coaleſce in ſome other object or ſtate which muſt be mentioned by ſome other word. It is manifeſt that the reality of what is denoted by *godly*, *manly*, &c. is as great as the reality of what is denoted by *godlineſs*, *manlineſs*, &c. but the being or exiſtence of what is denoted by the former words is conceived to be coaleſcent with that of other objects or ſtates; whereas what is denoted by the latter is conceived to have a ſeparate principle each in itſelf. Therefore the latter words are ſubſtantives.

Verbs are the names of ſtates of being which may either be conſidered ſingly, or ſeparately in the mind, as the objects are which are denoted by ſubſtantives: or may be conceived as coaleſcing with other objects, and denoting the ſtates of being of theſe objects. But the principle by which a verbal ſtate exiſts, is not conceived to be peculiar to one period of the ſtate only, nor to be fixed in it: but to be communicated to it, or withdrawn from it occaſionally, for the convenience of the mind.

Hence if a verbal ſtate is conſidered as an object like that denoted by a ſubſtantive, it may be conſidered as having the principle, by which it exiſts, communicated to it, and withdrawn from it by fits; and this proceeding will diſtinguiſh the ſtate into a number of ſucceſſive periods all exiſting by the ſame principle exerting itſelf by fits. As the ſtate *to be* may be conſidered as repeated *once*, *twice*, *thrice*, &c. and all by means of one and the ſame principle. Or any object or thing may be repreſented as *being in the ſame ſtate once*, *twice*, *thrice*, &c. and all by the ſame means. And any other verbal ſtate may be applied in the ſame manner. Hence every verbal ſtate muſt be capable, in every application of it, of being deſtroyed at pleaſure; for otherwiſe it could not be brought into exiſtence by fits, and ſuſpended by fits. The negative *not* is uſed to repreſent a verbal ſtate as deprived of all principle of exiſtence, either when the verb

is uſed to denote a ſeparate object, or a coaleſcent ſtate. Thus *to be*, becomes *not to be*; *a thing being*, becomes *a thing not being*; *a thing is*, becomes *a thing is not*; and ſo of other inſtances of the application of any other verb. This ſubject is treated of at large, Sect. I. Book I. of the ſpeculative part of this work.

The verb is applied, in the uſe of language, in more capacities than any other part of ſpeech, and therefore it has more grammatic forms than any other ſort of word. The power and uſe of each of theſe forms will be ſhewn, when the verb is treated of in particular.

SECTION II.

Of the noun.

NOUNS are diſtinguiſhed into two ſorts, called noun ſubſtantives, and noun adjectives, as has been already obſerved.

Of the noun ſubſtantive in particular.

NOUN ſubſtantives have the eſtabliſh'd claim
On ev'ry object to beſtow a name,
When with a principle of being ſhown
Sep'rate in each, and fixt to it alone.
Hence objects thus conceiv'd, diſcrete muſt be,
And ſuch as we may count, by one, two, three.

Noun ſubſtantives are the names of objects, as each object is conceived to be, or exiſt, by a principle peculiar to itſelf. Hence theſe objects are not conceived as capable of being renewed and deſtroyed at the pleaſure of the mind; but as ſo many ſeparate and diſtinct beings or things, which being taken together, may be counted by the numbers one, two, three, four, &c. ſo as to

aſcertain

aſcertain the number of individuals which are in any aggregate or collective quantity of them. But the object denoted by a ſubſtantive cannot be conſidered as repeated once, twice, thrice, &c. at our pleaſure; for the principle by which ſuch an object exiſts, is not conceived as revocable and communicable at pleaſure by fits or intervals.

SECTION III.

Of the ſorts of noun ſubſtantives.

OF ſubſtantives two diff'rent ſorts appear:
Since *proper* and *appellative* they are.
To ſingle individuals thoſe confin'd;
Theſe to expreſs whole ſpecies are deſign'd.

Noun ſubſtantives are of two ſorts, *the proper*, and *the appellative* or *common*.

Noun ſubſtantives proper are more uſually called *proper names*, being intended to denote particular objects, whether perſons or things. Thus every man, woman, country, river, city, ſtreet, palace, &c. has uſually a name, which is conſidered as peculiar to it only, as *John N—*, *Mary M—*, *Europe*, *England*, *the Thames*, *Holbourn*, *Whitehall*, &c.

Noun ſubſtantives, appellative or common, are names denoting conceptions ſo formed in the mind of man, that the ſame conception may repreſent any object of a whole order or ſpecies. Thus the conception annexed to the names *man*, *woman*, *tree*, *houſe*, *virtue*, *vice*, may reſpectively repreſent any man whatſoever, or any woman, tree, houſe, virtue, or vice whatſoever: therefore the names *man*, *woman*, &c. are appellative ſubſtantives.

When an object is named by one of theſe ſubſtantives, it is only diſtinguiſhed by the name, from objects denoted by other

names, and not at all diſtinguiſhed from the objects which may any of them be called by the ſame name. As for inſtance, if I ſay *a man*, the object which I ſpeak of is no ways diſtinguiſhed by this name from other men, and ſo of any other inſtance of an appellative ſubſtantive when uſed alone. Hence it is manifeſt, that appellative names only denote objects ſo far as they are ſimilar to all other objects of a certain ſort, and of conſequence, that every diſtinction which is peculiar to any invividual object, and by which it may be known from all others, is quite excluded from the meaning of every common or appellative ſubſtantive.

SECTION IV.

Of the numbers, declenſion, and caſes of ſubſtantives.

OF ſubſtantives the nature makes it fit,
That each of caſe and number ſhould admit.
Number is two-fold. Singly whatſoe'er
The mind conceives, demands the ſingular.
If of a ſpecies more than one unite
To form an object; 'tis the plural's right
Such object to denote. A proper name
Has to a plural form, no neceſſary claim.

The nature of the conceptions which are annexed to common or appellative names gives occaſion to the grammatic diſtinction of number in ſubſtantives. For it is frequently neceſſary to conſider more objects than one of a ſort as an aggregate object; and although the conception which is annexed to the name of the ſort will equally repreſent *any one* of the objects which compoſe the aggregate, yet that conception will not repreſent *the aggregate object*. To do this, ſeveral of the conceptions muſt be taken together, and conſidered as coexiſtent, and not as the ſame conception repeated ſeveral times in ſucceſſion. *The number of coexiſtent objects* which are repreſented by the aggregate conception

conception is thus encreaſed; and as the ſingle conceptions which conſtitute the aggregate conception, are all of one and the ſame ſort or ſpecies, there is no neceſſity to repeat the name of the ſpecies over and over to expreſs the aggregate conception; but it is ſufficient to denote the encreaſe of number by ſome variation of the name itſelf which denotes a ſingle object of the ſort or ſpecies. The name without any variation is conſidered as of the ſingular number, as *virtue*, *labour*; and when regular Engliſh ſubſtantives have an *s* annexed to the end without any mark of eliſion, they are conſidered as of the plural number, as *virtues*, *labours*, &c. As to proper names, it is manifeſt that they have no occaſion for plural forms.

Some modes of thought, of the moſt gen'ral uſe,
When objects to dependence we reduce
As circumſtances, ſerving to compleat
Some object partly nam'd, or verbal ſtate;
Require, in uſe of language, that we place
Thoſe marks in grammar call'd the ſigns of caſe.

It is not poſſible to form ſingle ſubſtantive names for the endleſs variety of objects which we have occaſion to mention by names; nor is it poſſible to form ſingle verbs for the endleſs variety of occaſional ſtates which occur to our obſervation. Therefore the conceptions which are ready formed into ſeparate ſubjects for the mind's contemplation muſt be uſed to enable the mind to circumſtantiate all ſorts of objects and ſtates which are not ſufficiently expreſſed by one noun or by one verb. This muſt be done without encreaſing *the number* of the object or ſtate to which more and more circumſtances are applied, although theſe circumſtances are each of them denoted by a noun ſubſtantive. For when we examine almoſt any object attentively, we diſcover many circumſtances attending it which eſcaped our firſt obſervation, and yet we find the object ſtill continues to be the ſame object, not being itſelf multiplied or *encreaſed in number* by thoſe additional

additional circumſtances, although each of them be ſo conceived in the mind as to be a ſeparate object denoted by a noun ſubſtantive. When therefore ſubſtantives are applied to denote meer circumſtances, and not capital objects, ſome notice muſt be given of it. And as what is denoted by the ſame ſubſtantive may circumſtantiate another object or a verbal ſtate in ſeveral different manners, the principal of theſe manners are denoted each by a different ſign; and when theſe ſigns are prefixed to an Engliſh ſubſtantive of either the ſingular or plural number, the expreſſion may be conſidered as a caſe of the ſubſtantive, ſeeing it anſwers to what is called by that name in Latin and Greek.

Theſe caſes have uſually been conſidered as repreſenting the object denoted by the ſubſtantive under different relations to ſome other object or ſtate expreſſed by a noun or by a verb: but it is evident that this repreſentation does not ſufficiently explain the nature of a dependent caſe. For if two objects are only repreſented as related to each other, they ſtill continue to be two diſtinct things; whereas the reſult of what is denoted by a ſubſtantive with another ſubſtantive depending upon it by the ſign of ſome caſe, is the conception of an object no ways encreaſed in number by what is denoted by the dependent ſubſtantive: thus *of a man*, *to a man*, are two dependent caſes of the ſubſtantive *a man*; yet the expreſſions, *the head of a man*, *a prejudice to a man*, do not denote plural objects, although two objects are concerned in each of them. Therefore the ſigns *of*, and *to*, are only notices to circumſtantiate the objects *head*, and *prejudice*, by different modes of proceeding with the object *a man*, within the mind itſelf; and theſe different modes of proceeding are denoted by the ſigns *of*, and *to*. The nature of the other ſigns is the ſame with that of theſe two above-mentioned; for each of them directs to a certain mode of proceeding of the mind itſelf to circumſtantiate one object by another, without encreaſing the number of the object that is circumſtantiated. This ſubject is treated of at large, Book I. Sect. XIV. of the ſpeculative part of this work.

When

When objects in connexion are ſurvey'd,
Six caſes to each number yield their aid.
The nouns themſelves in both the numbers give
The forms contained in the nom'native.
The genitive may *of* prefix, or join
S to its end. *To* is the dative's ſign.
Th' accuſative and nom'native the ſame;
O! to the vocative exerts its claim.
The particles prefix'd, *from*, *with*, *in*, *by*,
And *for* and *than*, the ablative ſupply.

Nouns in Latin appear under ſix different forms in each of the numbers, the difference of the forms being found in the laſt ſyllable, which is different in the moſt of them. Theſe forms are called caſes; and the caſes of both the numbers being placed in a certain order, form a declenſion; which is a pattern whereby to vary other nouns.

Theſe caſes are called the nominative, the genitive, the dative, the accuſative, the vocative, and the ablative; their names being given them from the principal uſe or purpoſe to which they are reſpectively applied.

Thus the nominative means the caſe which barely names a thing.

The genitive that which implies begetting.

The dative that which is uſed in giving.

The accuſative that which ſhews the perſon that is accuſed.

The vocative that which is uſed in calling to a perſon.

And the ablative that which is uſed to denote the perſon or thing whence any thing is taken.

Theſe caſes of the noun are, by eſtabliſhed cuſtom in grammar, placed under one another in the order in which I have deſcribed them, and that in both the numbers; and when ſo

placed, they form a declenſion according to the following inſtance:

	Singular Number.	
Nominative	*Dominus*	a lord or the lord
Genitive	*Domini*	of a lord or of the lord
Dative	*Domino*	to a lord or to the lord
Accuſative	*Dominum*	a lord or the lord
Vocative	*Domine*	O lord
Ablative	*Domino*	by a lord or by the lord.

	Plural.	
Nominative	*Domini*	lords or the lords
Genitive	*Dominorum*	of lords or of the lords
Dative	*Dominis*	to lords or to the lords
Accuſative	*Dominos*	lords or the lords
Vocative	*Domini*	O lords
Ablative	*Dominis*	by lords or by the lords.

The Engliſh forms of expreſſion, *of a lord*, *to a lord*, &c. which correſpond with thoſe of the Latin, may alſo be called caſes; and the pattern compoſed of theſe forms may be called the declenſion of the Engliſh noun. For if any other noun is placed inſtead of *lord*, in the form above deſcribed, that noun will appear in the ſeveral connective modes of conſideration, wherein nouns (or the objects denoted by them) moſt frequently do appear in language: for the other prepoſitions are not near of ſo general uſe as the ſigns of caſes; ſo that it is exceedingly convenient to have ſuch a pattern by heart, both as a model by which to vary other nouns; and alſo that, when rules are given for the conſtruction of ſubſtantives, the terms *nominative*, *genitive*, &c. may be uſed in this language, as they are, by eſtabliſhed cuſtom, in almoſt all others. For theſe reaſons (although ſeveral writers on grammar have not allowed of caſes in the Engliſh language) I ſhall conſider the Engliſh ſubſtantive as varied

varied by declenſion; and ſhall alſo conſider that declenſion as containing ſix caſes in each number, although the nominative and the accuſative are of the ſame form, as having no ſign prefixed to them.

Of the regular declenſion of Engliſh ſubſtantives, with its four ſubordinate varieties.

THE Engliſh ſubſtantives, by ſettled uſe,
Their plural from the ſingular deduce:
If to the ſingular an *s* ſubjoin'd,
Without increaſe of ſyllables you find,
Look on ſuch plural form as regular,
For multitudes of nouns will this formation bear.
But to four different plural forms attend,
Which on ſome ſorts of ſingulars depend.

All noun ſubſtantives in the Engliſh language, whether proper or common, are of one and the ſame form of declenſion, ſo far as concerns the particles prefixed to the caſes.

But common or appellative ſubſtantives admit of different methods of deriving the plural form from the ſingular. And this difference may be made the foundation of eſtabliſhing one regular declenſion in the language, with four ſubordinate varieties.

Thoſe ſubſtantives are of the regular declenſion, which form the plural by adding an *s* to the ſingular, without increaſing the number of ſyllables, as *God, gods.* Much the greateſt number of ſubſtantives form the plural in this manner.

Es is the plural of the ſilent *e*,
Preceded by an *ſ*, *z*, *c*, or *g*.

Thoſe ſubſtantives are of the firſt variety which end in a ſilent *e*, following *c*, *g*, *s*, or *z*; as *face*, *cage*, *caſe*, *maze*. For although theſe ſubſtantives only take an *s* after them, to form the plural, as the regular nouns do; yet the *e*, which was ſilent in the ſingular, forms an additional ſyllable in the plural; as *face*, *faces*; *cage*, *cages*; *caſe*, *caſes*; *maze*, *mazes*. Whereas it does not form ſuch additional ſyllable when it is placed after other conſonants: thus *babe*, *pike*, *love*, though in their plurals they make *babes*, *pikes*, *loves*, yet theſe plurals have no more ſyllables in them than their ſingulars.

Y final, not in diphthongs us'd, ſupplies
Its plural by the termination *ies*.

Thoſe ſubſtantives are of the ſecond variety which end in *y*, when it is not part of a diphthong, and form their plurals by ſubſtituting *ies*, inſtead of *y*; as *fly*, *flies*; *mercy*, *mercies*.

If the final *y* joins with another vowel to form a diphthong at the end of a ſubſtantive, the plural is formed in the regular manner; as *boy*, *boys*; *trey*, *treys*; *way*, *ways*.

C-h, *s*, *ſ-h*, *x*, and *z*, increaſe
Their plural forms, by each aſſuming *es*.

Thoſe ſubſtantives are of the third variety which end in *ch*, *s*, *ſh*, *x*, or *z*: for, ſeeing an *s* cannot be pronounced after theſe conſonants, the ſyllable *es* is added to them, in order to form the plural; as *church*, *churches*; *loſs*, *loſſes*; *laſh*, *laſhes*; *box*, *boxes*; *buzz*, *buzzes*.

F ſingle, or with ſilent *e*, if clos'd,
Takes plural forms, by *v-e-s* compos'd:
Except *dwarf*, *wharf*, *hoof*, *proof*; with *grief*, *relief*,
Fife, *ſtrife*, *brief*, *miſchief*, *handkerchief*, and *chief*.

Thoſe

Thoſe ſubſtantives are of the fourth variety, which either end in a ſingle *f*, or in a ſilent *e*, with an *f* before it; ſuch as *calf*, *life*, for in theſe the plural is formed by ſubſtituting *ves* inſtead of *f*, or *fe*, as *calves*, *lives*.

The following ſubſtantives are to be excepted, *brief*, *chief*, *dwarf*, *fife*, *grief*, *handkerchief*, *hoof*, *miſchief*, *proof*, *relief*, *ſtrife*, *wharf*, which form their plurals after the regular manner; as *chiefs*, *dwarfs*, *fifes*, &c. and perhaps ſome few others may be found.

Staff makes *ſtaves*, in the plural, although it ends in double *f*.

There is a double form of the genitive caſe ſingular of all the ſubſtantives of the Engliſh language, viz. that formed by *of*, which appears in the inſtance of declenſion already given; and another formed by adding an *s* to the nominative, with the mark of eliſion; as *virtue's excellence*, or *the excellence of virtue*. This double form is not found in the plural number, either of regular ſubſtantives, or of thoſe which are of any of the varieties above deſcribed: but there are ſeveral irregular nouns which form the genitive, both of the ſingular and plural, in this manner; as *man*, plural *men*, genitive ſingular *man's*, or *of man*, genitive plural *men's*, or *of men*. Nevertheleſs the nouns, which are either regular, or of ſome of the four varieties, are ſometimes uſed in the plural as genitives, without the ſign *of* before them; and when they are ſo uſed, the mark of eliſion is placed over the final *s*; as *the commons' determination*, for *the determination of the commons*. The form by *s* is placed before its correſpondent ſubſtantive, whereas the form by *of* is placed after its correſpondent ſubſtantive; as *Britain's glory*; *the glory of Britain* *.

* All the caſes but the *nominative* and *vocative*, are uſually called *obliqua caſes*, for a reaſon which appears Book I. Sect. XIII. of the ſpeculative part of this work.

As

As an article is uſually prefixed in the form of declenſion to an appellative ſubſtantive, and the particle, which is the ſign of a particular caſe, is placed immediately before the article, it is neceſſary to explain the meaning of both the articles before they are uſed in the examples of the declenſion of ſubſtantives.

SECTION V.

Of the article.

A, *an*, and *the*, are articles and give
Some limitation to a ſubſtantive.
Appellatives with *a* or *an*, import
One individual of a certain ſort;
When in ſome ſituation it appears,
In which, with others of its kind, it ſhares.
But names appellative, with *the*, relate
To objects of a ſort in ſome excluſive ſtate.
Hence *a* or *an*, *th' indefinite* becomes;
And *the*, of *definite*, the name aſſumes.

An appellative ſubſtantive is a name common to every individual object of a certain ſpecies or ſort; and therefore a ſingular appellative may as well repreſent one object of the ſpecies as another. Hence, when we repreſent an object denoted by ſuch a ſubſtantive, as in ſome certain ſtate, or in certain circumſtances; we may do it without propoſing to exclude other objects which may be denoted by the ſame ſubſtantive, from being in the ſame ſtate or circumſtances. When we proceed in this manner, the article *a*, or *an*, is prefixed to the appellative name (viz. *a*, if the name begins with a conſonant; *an*, if it begins with a vowel, or an *h*, ſounded ſoftly) and this gives notice that the object named is, or may be, equally conceerned with ſeveral other objects of the ſame ſpecies, in the ſtate or circumſtances in which it is repreſented. And hence the appellative name with this

this article, may repreſent *every one individual of a certain ſpecies*, or *any one*, or *ſome one*, or *one that may be any ways equally concerned with others of the ſame ſpecies, in the ſtate or circumſtances that are mentioned or ſuppoſed as known*, according as the ſtate or circumſtances are more or leſs comprehenſive.

But we may likewiſe mention one or more objects by an appellative name either ſingular or plural, and may propoſe to exclude all other objects of the ſpecies from the ſtate or circumſtances in which we proceed to repreſent the objects: and when this is our intention, we prefix *the* to an appellative name. And this we do whether the excluſive ſtate or circumſtances are actually mentioned, or are taken for granted or known both to the ſpeaker and hearer.

As the article *a*, or *an*, repreſents but *one object*, although the object is ſome way equally concerned with others of a certain ſpecies, this article is not uſually prefixed to nouns in the plural number. And as it does not exclude other objects, it very frequently leaves the object which it ſerves to denote, not particularly defined, or determined to one certain individual. Therefore it is called, *the indefinite article.*

Yet the noun with this article before it may be conceived to repreſent ſeveral objects, each one of which is equally concerned in ſome ſtate or circumſtances. If therefore ſuch noun be conceived to repreſent firſt one and then another of theſe objects, and this proceeding be many times repeated; the indefinite object will repreſent many objects of a ſort which the mind conſiders one after another as in the ſtate or circumſtances. Hence the expreſſions *many a man is or does ſo and ſo*, *many a houſe may be found of ſuch and ſuch dimenſions*, &c. are only elliptical forms of ſpeaking, equivalent to *each one man of many (men) is or does ſo and ſo*, *each one houſe of many (houſes) may be found of ſuch and ſuch dimenſions*, and a greater or leſs number of ob-

jects may be conſidered as in ſome circumſtances, in which any like number may alſo be. Hence the expreſſions, *a great many people or a few people ſay ſo or ſo*, are only elliptical expreſſions equivalent to *people in ſuch numbers, that each one ſet of the like numbers may be called a great or ſmall number, ſay ſo or ſo.*

As either *one*, or *more*, objects of a certain ſpecies may be conſidered as in ſome ſtate or circumſtances excluſive of all other objects of the ſame ſpecies, *the* is prefixed to nouns both ſingular and plural. And as the object whether ſingular or plural that is conſidered in ſome ſtate or circumſtances excluſive of all others, is aſcertained or defined by ſuch conſideration; therefore *the* is called *the definite article.*

This ſubject is treated of at large at Book I. Sect. XXII. of the ſpeculative part of this work.

Examples of the regular declenſions of the noun and of its four varieties.

The regular noun in which the plural is formed only by the addition of an *s* to the ſingular, without increaſing the number of its ſyllables.

	Singular.	
Nominative	a king	the king
Genitive	a king's / of a king	the king's / of the king
Dative	to a king	to the king
Accuſative	a king	the king
Vocative	o king	o the king
Ablative	by a king	by the king.
	Plural.	
Nominative	kings	the kings
Genitive	of kings	of the kings
Dative	to kings	to the kings

Accuſative

Accuſative	kings	the kings
Vocative	o kings	o the kings
Ablative	by kings	by the kings.

The firſt variety; in which the plural is formed from the ſingular ending in a ſilent *e*, only by the addition of an *s*, but ſo that the number of ſyllables is one more in the plural than it is in the ſingular. This only happens in nouns which end in a ſilent *e*, after *c*, *g*, *s*, *z*.

Singular.

Nominative	a place	the place
Genitive	{a place's / of a place}	{the place's / of the place}
Dative	to a place	to the place
Accuſative	a place	the place
Vocative	o place	o the place
Ablative	by a place	by the place.

Plural.

Nominative	places	the places
Genitive	of places	of the places
Dative	to places	to the places
Accuſative	places	the places
Vocative	o places	o the places
Ablative	by places	by the places.

The ſecond variety; in which the plural is formed from the ſingular ending in *y*, by ſubſtituting *ies*, inſtead of the *y*: this only happens when the *y* does not join with another vowel ſo as to form a diphthong. For nouns which end in a diphthong, of which *y* is the latter vowel, make their plural after the regular manner, as *day*, *days*, &c.

Singular.

Nominative	a fly	the fly
Genitive	{a fly's / of a fly}	{the fly's / of the fly}

Dative	to a fly	to the fly
Accuſative	a fly	the fly
Vocative	o fly	o the fly
Ablative	by a fly	by the fly.

Plural.

Nominative	flies	the flies
Genitive	of flies	of the flies
Dative	to flies	to the flies
Accuſative	flies	the flies
Vocative	o flies	o the flies
Ablative	by flies	by the flies.

The third variety; in which the plural is formed by the addition of the ſyllable *es* to the ſingular. This happens in nouns ending in *ch*, *s*, *ſh*, *x*, and *z*, for a ſingle *s* cannot be pronounced after theſe conſonants.

Singular.

Nominative	a church	the church
Genitive	{a church's / of a church}	{the church's / of the church}
Dative	to a church	to the church
Accuſative	a church	the church
Vocative	o church	o the church
Ablative	by a church	by the church.

Plural.

Nominative	churches	the churches
Genitive	of churches	of the churches
Dative	to churches	to the churches
Accuſative	churches	the churches
Vocative	o churches	o the churches
Ablative	by churches	by the churches.

In

In like manner,

	Singular.	
Nominative	a ſurplus	the ſurplus
	of a ſurplus	of the ſurplus, &c.
	Plural.	
Nominative	ſurpluſes	the ſurpluſes
	of ſurpluſes	of the ſurpluſes, &c.
	Singular.	
Nominative	a fiſh	the fiſh
	of a fiſh	of the fiſh, &c.
	Plural.	
Nominative	fiſhes	the fiſhes
	of fiſhes	of the fiſhes, &c.
	Singular.	
Nominative	a fox	the fox
	of a fox	of the fox, &c.
	Plural.	
Nominative	foxes	the foxes
	of foxes	of the foxes, &c.

The nouns ending in *z* are ſo few, that it is not of any moment to give any other example than that of *buzz*, already produced.

The fourth variety; in which the plural is formed by ſubſtituting *ves* inſtead of *f*, or of *f* with a ſilent *e* after it, at the end of a noun.

	Singular.	
Nominative	a loaf	the loaf
Genitive	a loaf's / of a loaf	the loaf's / of the loaf
Dative	to a loaf	to the loaf
Acccuſative	a loaf	the loaf
Vocative	o loaf	o the loaf
Ablative	by a loaf	by the loaf.

	Plural.	
Nominative	loaves	the loaves
Genitive	of loaves	of the loaves
Dative	to loaves	to the loaves
Accuſative	loaves	the loaves
Vocative	o loaves	o the loaves
Ablative	by loaves	by the loaves.

	Singular.	
Nominative	a wife	the wife
Genitive	a wife's / of a wife	the wife's / of the wife, &c.

	Plural.	
Nominative	wives	the wives
Genitive	of wives	of the wives, &c.

Theſe nouns in plural forms the rules forſake,
Man, *woman*, *ox*, men, women, oxen, take.
† Brethren and brothers, both from *brother* flow,
And cows and † kine are both derived from *cow*.
Children from *child*; *foot*, feet; *gooſe*, geeſe; *die*, dice;
Penny makes pence; *tooth*, teeth; *louſe*, lice; *mouſe*, mice.

N. B. When any word has this mark † annexed, it is a notice that the word is obſolete, or at leaſt only uſed in the ſtile of the Scriptures.

The

The ſame in both the numbers, *ſheep*, *ſwine*, *deer*,
And *pound* ſometimes as plural may appear.

There is a ſmall number of Engliſh ſubſtantives which form their plurals in a manner different from any of the former, which are therefore conſidered as irregular.

Thus, *man*, *woman*, *ox*, in the plural take *men*, *women*, *oxen*. *Brother*, has both *brothers* and † *brethren*; *child*, *children*; *cow*, both *cows* and † *kine*; *die*, has *dice*; *louſe*, *lice*; *mouſe*, *mice*; *gooſe*, has *geeſe*; *foot*, *feet*; *tooth*, *teeth*; *penny*, *pence*.

Deer, *ſheep*, *ſwine*, are the ſame in both the ſingular and plural. *Pound* is alſo uſed as a plural in the expreſſions *ten*, *twenty*, *an hundred pound*.

In the Engliſh, as in other languages, there are ſeveral claſſes of ſubſtantives which have only the ſingular form; as there are alſo other claſſes which have only the plural.

All proper names are confined to the ſingular, for the reaſons given already.

As alſo the names of virtues, vices, diſpoſitions of mind; ſuch as *goodneſs*, *juſtice*, *wickedneſs*, *injuſtice*, *idleneſs*, *indolence*, &c.

Of herbs, as *ſage*, *rue*, *parſly*, &c. except *collyflowers*, *cabbages*, *leeks*, *artichoaks*, *nettles*.

Of ſpices, as *cinnamon*, *ginger*, &c. except *cloves* and *nutmegs*.

Of drugs, as *mercury*, *opium*, *the bark*, &c.

Of liquors, as *beer*, *ale*, *vinegar*, *milk*.

Of unctuous matter, as *butter*, *fat*, *greaſe*, *pitch*, *tar*, &c.

Of metals, as *gold*, *ſilver*, *copper*, *tin*, *lead*, &c.

Of grain, as *wheat*, *rye*, *barley*, &c. except *oats*.

Of

Of abſtract qualities, *i. e.* of ſuch properties, habits, and powers, as are never obſerved to have any being ſeparate from other objects, but which are nevertheleſs conſidered as ſeparate objects, and as ſuch denoted by ſubſtantives. Such are *wiſdom*, *folly*, *modeſty*, *impudence*, *ſpeed*, *ſlowneſs*, *courage*, *cowardice*, *vigour*, *remiſneſs*, &c. To theſe may be added, *hunger*, *the vulgar*, *people*, *ofspring*; as alſo *duſt*, *ſoot*, *wool*, *ruſt*, &c.

The ſubſtantives, which have only the plural number, are chiefly the names of inſtruments, conſiſting of two principal parts correſponding to each other; ſuch as *ſhears*, *ſciſſars*, *ſnuffers*, *tongs*, *bellows*.

To theſe may be added *annals*, *Alps*, *aſhes*, *bowels*, *breeches*, *goods*, *entrails*, *ides*, *nones*, *lungs*, *creſſes*, &c.

SECTION VI.

Of the gender of nouns.

THREE genders, in the Engliſh tongue, annex
To the third perſon, difference of ſex.
The maſculine denotes each male by *he*.
Each female takes its feminine in *ſhe*.
Objects of neither ſex, may each admit
Neuter diſtinction by the pronoun *it*.
But theſe, confin'd to ſingulars, convey
No mark of gender in their plural, *they*.

The gender of nouns, in Engliſh, is confined to the diſtinction of ſex; thoſe objects which are males being of the maſculine gender, thoſe which are females being of the feminine, and thoſe which are of no ſex being of the neuter.

This diſtinction of ſex is alſo no wiſe neceſſary to be attended to, except when an object of the ſingular number is to be denoted by a pronoun of the third perſon. For, upon ſuch occaſion, any one male, of any ſpecies, is denoted by *he* or *his*; any one female by *ſhe* or *her*; and any one object of neither ſex by *it* or *its*. It is alſo uſual to ſpeak of a little child, or any diminutive animal, or any object in which the ſex is not conſidered, by *it*.

[In the Greek and Latin, and in moſt of the modern languages, all objects, which in themſelves are of no ſex, are yet conſidered as of ſome one of the genders; and as in them the diſtinction of gender is meerly arbitrary, as reſulting from cuſtom only; many rules are required to ſhew what ſubſtantives are maſculine, what feminine, and what neuter, in order to make an adjective or pronoun agree with them, by giving a maſculine, or feminine, or (in the Latin and Greek) a neuter termination to ſuch adjective or pronoun. The Engliſh language is free from this perplexity, and this is juſtly to be accounted a very great excellence of the language.]

The ſubſtantive, *ſhip*, although of no ſex, is uſually conſidered as of the feminine gender, and conſequently is ſpoke of by the pronoun *ſhe*; and any object, if it be repreſented as a perſon, may be conſidered as of the maſculine or feminine gender. Thus, if the ſun is conſidered as a god, it may be called *he*; if the moon as a goddeſs, it may be called *ſhe*; and ſo of other inſtances.

SECTION VII.

Of the noun adjective.

NOUN adjectives are *common names*, deſign'd
Objects to ſignify, from which the mind

For its convenience, by abſtraction's aid,
That principle of being has convey'd;
Which, as peculiar, we to each conceive,
When it is nam'd by a noun ſubſtantive.

Adjectives are names of objects, when conſidered as deſtitute of all principle of *ſeparate exiſtence.*

The objects denoted by adjectives are all of that kind which are called *abſtract*; that is to ſay, the conceptions of them are formed into ſeparate objects, merely by conſidering the powers, properties, qualities, and relations, of perſons and things, as withdrawn from thoſe perſons and things, and reduced to ſeveral ſorts by the operation of the mind itſelf. Thus the objects denoted by *goodneſs*, *greatneſs*, *virtue*, *vice*, *length*, *breadth*, *blackneſs*, *brightneſs*, *ſize*, *ſhape*, &c. can never have a ſeparate being each by itſelf, although the mind, for its own convenience, conſiders each of them as if it had ſuch being, and under ſuch conſideration gives a ſubſtantive name to each. As therefore the mind ſuppoſes a ſeparate being in abſtract objects, merely for its own convenience, it can withdraw this ſuppoſition at its pleaſure; and when it is withdrawn, abſtract objects are denoted by adjectives, as *good*, *great*, *virtuous*, *vicious*, *long*, *broad*, *black*, *white*, *ſizeable*, *ſhapely*, &c.

The being of objects, thus denoted, is conceived to be as real as their being is when they are denoted by ſubſtantives. But it is conceived to depend upon a principle, that is in ſome other object to be denoted by a ſubſtantive, or in ſome ſtate to be denoted by a verb. Hence the conception denoted by an adjective, cannot be conſidered conſiſtently by itſelf: for the grammatic form of the adjective is a notice to the mind to look out for ſome ſubſtantive or verb, which expreſſes an object or ſtate, with the being whereof that which is denoted by the adjective muſt unite; ſo that if no ſuch word is found, the direction of the

the grammatic form cannot be fulfilled, and of conſequence part of the meaning of the adjective is left in ſuſpence.

Hence the conceptions denoted by adjectives are ſubject to no kind of number. For they neither denote objects exiſting ſeparately; nor ſtates which depend upon ſuch a principle as can be occaſionally communicated to them, and taken from them by fits; but whatſoever is denoted by an adjective, unites with the fixed being of the object expreſſed by a ſubſtantive, or with the occaſional being of the ſtate denoted by a verb, according as the adjective is made to depend upon a ſubſtantive or a verb. This ſubject is treated of at large Book II. Sect. I.

Of number, gender, caſe, the Engliſh give
No variation to the adjective:
Yet *er* and *eſt*, as terminations join,
Or *more* and *moſt* prefix, when they define
The forms by which the three degrees are known
Denoting regular compariſon.
The adjective itſelf is ſaid to be,
In grammar, of the *poſitive degree*;
Of the *comparative*, if there appear
Or *more*, before it, or behind it *er*;
Of the *ſuperlative*, by *moſt*, or *eſt*,
When it's degree is to the height encreaſt.

Adjectives in Engliſh are wholly undeclinable, having no grammatic diverſity of number, caſe, or gender.

But the compariſon of adjectives occaſions a variety in the grammatic forms of each. For an adjective denotes a quality or property which muſt be conſidered as in ſome object or verbal ſtate. And it frequently happens that a quality or property, which may be denoted by one and the ſame adjective, is obſerved in different degrees in different objects or ſtates, or even in the ſame objects or ſtates at different times. The uſual de-

gree is denoted by the adjective without any variation, as *a wiſe man, a generous prince.* A degree exceeding the uſual degree, but not to the utmoſt limit, is denoted by giving the termination *er* to the adjective, or by prefixing *more* to it; as *a wiſer man, a more generous prince.*

The degree which extends to the utmoſt limit of exceſs, is denoted by giving the termination *eſt* to the adjective, or by prefixing *moſt* to it; as *the wiſeſt man, the moſt generous prince.*

The following adjectives, by uſe, diſown
The form of regular compariſon.
Bad, worſe, and *worſt* requires, *good, better, beſt.*
Late, latter, lateſt, laſt; *little, leſs, leaſt.*
From, much, or *many, more,* and *moſt, appear*
Deriv'd; and *nearer, neareſt, next,* from *near.*
Out, former, nether, under, upper, give
Moſt, in their forms of the ſuperlative.

The following adjectives form the degrees of compariſon irregularly. As

Good, better, beſt; *bad, worſe, worſt*; *little, leſs, leaſt*; *much, more, moſt*; *many, more, moſt*; *near, nearer, neareſt, or next*; *late, later,* or *latter, lateſt,* or *laſt.*

Some comparatives form a ſuperlative by adding *moſt* to their end; as *nether,* i. e. lower, *nethermoſt*; *outermoſt,* or *utmoſt*; *under, undermoſt*; *upper, uppermoſt*; *fore, former, foremoſt.*

Many adjectives do not admit of forming compariſon by the terminations *er,* and *eſt,* but are, by the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of the language, compared by *more,* and *moſt,* only; by which all adjectives may be compared, even thoſe which admit of the form by *er,* and *eſt*; as

Great, greater, or *more great*; *greateſt,* or *moſt great.*

Words

Words of one ſyllable are uſually compared by *er*, and *eſt*.

Words of more than two ſyllables are ſeldom compared otherwiſe than by *more*, and *moſt*.

Words of two ſyllables are ſome of them compared by *er*, and *eſt*, and others of them by *more*, and *moſt*. The following ſorts of them are ſeldom compared by change of termination, but by prefixing *more*, and *moſt*, viz.

Thoſe which end in *ain*, or *al*, as *certain*, *more*, *moſt certain*; *mortal*, *more*, *moſt mortal*; in *ed*, or *ent*, as *recent*, *more*, *moſt recent*; *fervent*, *more*, &c. *fervent*; in *id*, *ive*, or *ing*, as *ſplendid*, *native*, *charming*; in *ous*, as *captious*; in *full*, as *careful*; in *leſs*, as *childleſs*; in *ſome*, as *gameſome*; in *dy*, *fy*, *ky*, *my*, *ny*, *py*, and *ry*, as *cloudy*, *puffy*, *rocky*, *balmy*, *ſkinny*, *ropy*, *hoary*.

But theſe rules admit of many exceptions.

SECTION VII.

Of the pronoun.

THE uſe of language from itſelf ſupplies
Diſtinctions, whence the pronouns take their riſe.
Theſe of five ſorts, five different names receive;
The *perſonal*, *poſſeſſive*, *relative*.
With which the *interrogative* is placed,
And the *demonſtrative* appears the laſt.

The pronouns are all of them either ſubſtantive or adjective names of ſpecies. And the ſituations in which objects are, when of one or other of the ſpecies denoted by pronouns, are chiefly ſituations which ariſe from the uſe of language itſelf.

Pronouns are divided into the five following ſorts, perſonal, poſſeſſive, relative, interrogative, and demonſtrative.

SECTION VIII.

Of the pronouns perſonal.

OBJECTS *themſelves as ſpeaking*, *I* and *we*
Denote: as *ſpoken to*, *thou*, *you*, and † *ye*.
What neither of theſe perſonages bears,
By *he*, *ſhe*, *it*, or *they*, expreſt appears.
Theſe are the pronouns, which gramarians call,
From their juſt character, *the perſonal*.

He
Theſe are I, thou, ſhe, we, † ye or you, they.
It

I and *we* are of the firſt perſon. *Thou* and *you* or † *ye*, are of the ſecond perſon. *He*, *ſhe*, *it* and *they*, are of the third.

Whoſoever is ſpeaking and names himſelf, may do it by *I*. If he conſiders other perſons as united with himſelf, ſo as to be a complex object, diſtinguiſhed by his ſpeaking, and included together with himſelf in one name, he conſiders himſelf together with them, as a plural object of the firſt perſon, and calls this object *we*.

Whoſoever is the object to which words are addreſſed, is of the ſecond perſon; and if a ſingle object, may be called *thou*: if ſeveral objects are addreſſed at once, they become a plural object of the ſecond perſon, and may be called † *ye*, or *you*.

Thou is uſed either in the moſt ſolemn addreſſes, as to God in prayer; or in the moſt familiar addreſſes to ſome perſons with whom the ſpeaker can take the greateſt freedom, as a moſt intimate friend, for inſtance, or a ſervant: &c. for to other perſons, *you* is made uſe of, whether the addreſs be to one or more. † *Ye* ſeldom appears, except in the ſolemn ſtile of the Scriptures.

Every

Every object which neither ſpeaks and names itſelf, nor is ſpoken to, is of the third perſon. If this object be a ſingle male, it may be called *he*; if a ſingle female, *ſhe*; if a ſingle object in which the ſex is not conſidered, *it*. If ſeveral objects neither ſpeaking and naming themſelves, nor ſpoken to, are conſidered as one plural object, *they* may be uſed to denote them all together, of whatſoever ſex they are, or without regard to ſex.

I and *we* are equally the names of *any one or more objects who ſpeak and name themſelves*; *thou*, *you*, and † *ye*, of *any one or more to whom what is ſaid is addreſſed*. But in converſations carried on by word of mouth, the ſpeaker and hearer are preſent with each other, and of conſequence ſee who ſpeaks, and who is ſpoken to; ſo that there is no occaſion, when things are thus ſituated, to ſay in words, who the perſons are that are denoted by *I* or *we*, *thou*, or *you*: but in a letter, the ſight cannot determine thoſe who ſupport the firſt and ſecond perſons; and therefore the perſon who writes it, ſigns his name; and this ſhews who ſupports the firſt perſon, *i. e.* who is meant by *I* or *we* in the letter. And the direction of a letter ſhews who is the perſon addreſſed, *i. e.* who is meant by *thou*, and *you*, in the letter.

But objects of the third perſon cannot be thus aſcertained: for they are ſeldom preſent, when converſation is held by word of mouth concerning them; and all objects whatſoever are of this perſon in any particular diſcourſe, except the ſpeaker, and thoſe to whom the diſcourſe is addreſſed. Therefore objects of this perſon muſt be mentioned each by ſome name, before they are denoted by one of theſe pronouns. For otherwiſe, the hearer could not know more of the object intended to be expreſſed, than that it is a male, or female, or conſidered without regard to ſex, and that it neither ſpeaks nor is ſpoken to, in the preſent ſentence. This is ſo, ſuppoſing the object is of the ſingular number, and called *he*, *ſhe*, or *it*; for if it be of the plural number, and called *they*, nothing more can be known of it from

from the pronoun, than that it is a plural object neither ſpeaking nor ſpoken to. This name by which an object is to be mentioned, in order to aſcertain it when named by a pronoun of the third perſon, is called the antecedent to the pronoun, becauſe it almoſt conſtantly appears in the diſcourſe before the pronoun is made uſe of. Thus in the expreſſion, *the lord God made the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, to dreſs it, and to keep it. The man* is the antecedent to *him*, and *the garden of Eden* to *it*; for *him* in itſelf denotes *any male that neither ſpeaks nor is ſpoken to*, and *it* in itſelf denotes *any object of no ſex that neither ſpeaks, nor is ſpoken to*; but *the man* determines *him* to one certain male, and *the garden of Eden* determines *it* to one certain object of no ſex: and ſo of other inſtances of the uſe of the antecedent to the perſonal pronoun.

In general truths, the antecedent is often left to be underſtood or taken at pleaſure. Thus in the expreſſion, *he that hideth hatred with lying lips, and he that uttereth ſlander, is a fool*, the antecedent to *he* may be *any man*, or *every man*.

The pronouns perſonal muſt each receive
The various caſes of a ſubſtantive.
But, in the plural, none of them will bear
A derivation from the ſingular;
So different their forms. Nor yet does uſe
The caſes from the nom'natives deduce.
For here, th' accuſatives *me*, *us*, afford,
And *thee*, *you*, *him*, *her*, *them*, the added word,
Which with it's proper ſign muſt form each caſe:
But *it*, unvaried with each ſign you place.

As theſe pronouns denote objects as each is conceived to have a ſeparate principle of being, they are noun ſubſtantives, and admit of declenſion, as other ſubſtantives do; only the accuſative is a different word from the nominative, and the oblique

caſes are formed, by placing the uſual ſigns before the accuſative in both the numbers; and not before the nominative, as in other ſubſtantives.

I, and its caſes, are pronouns of the firſt perſon; and its declenſion is as follows.

Singular.		Plural.	
Nominative	I	Nominative	we
Genitive	of me	Genitive	of us
Dative	to me	Dative	to us
Accuſative	me	Accuſative	us
Vocative	o me	Vocative	
Ablative	by me.	Ablative	by us.

Thou, and its caſes, are pronouns of the ſecond perſon. Its declenſion is as below.

Singular.		Plural.	
Nominative	thou	Nominative	† ye or you
Genitive	of thee	Genitive	of you
Dative	to thee	Dative	to you
Accuſative	thee	Accuſative	you
Vocative	o thou	Vocative	o you
Ablative	by thee.	Ablative	by you.

He, *ſhe*, and *it*, with their caſes, are pronouns of the third perſon, and their declenſion is of the following form.

Singular.		Singular.		Singular.	
Nominative	he	Nominative	ſhe	Nominative	it
Genitive	of him	Genitive	of her	Genitive	of it
Dative	to him	Dative	to her	Dative	to it
Accuſative	him	Accuſative	her	Accuſative	it
Vocative		Vocative		Vocative	
Ablative	by him.	Ablative	by her.	Ablative	by it.

Plural.

	Plural.
Nominative	they
Genitive	of them
Dative	to them
Accuſative	them
Vocative	
Ablative	by them.

I have placed the vocative caſes in the declenſion of the pronoun of the firſt perſon, although, ſtrictly ſpeaking, o me! is a kind of interjection.

I have likewiſe placed *thou* and † *ye* or *you* as nominative caſes of the ſecond perſon, although, ſtrictly ſpeaking, they are vocative caſes, and the pronoun of this perſon has no nominative caſe.

SECTION IX.

Of the poſſeſſive pronouns.

PRONOUNS poſſeſſive are the adjectives
In which each pronoun perſonal receives
A coaleſcent form: as will appear
In *my*, *our*, *thy*, *your*, *his*, *her*, *its*, and *their*.
With ſubſtantives expreſt theſe forms we join:
If underſtood; *theirs*, *hers*, *yours*, *thine*, *ours*, *mine*.

Theſe are *my*, *thy*, *our*, *your*, *his*, *her*, *their*. They have each of them, except *his*, another form in Engliſh, viz. *mine*, *thine*, *ours*, *yours*, *hers*, *theirs*. The firſt form is uſed when ſome object is mentioned, and the pronoun is united immediately with its name, as *my*, *thy*, *your*, *their book*. The ſecond is uſed

uſed when the name is not mentioned with which the pronoun is to be immediately united, but is left to be underſtood, or ſupplied by the mind, as *this book is yours*, i. e. *your book*.

Theſe are all adjective names derived from the perſonal pronouns, and of conſequence they denote abſtract conceptions formed from the ſame objects which the perſonal pronouns denote. But the property, or relation, which is ſignified by a poſſeſſive pronoun, is not conceived to have any principle of being in itſelf. Thus in the expreſſion *your book*, the relation of *belonging to you* is conſidered as exiſting in union with the book; and ſo of other inſtances.

There is no grammatic variation of caſe, gender, or number in the Engliſh poſſeſſive pronouns; for they are but a ſort of adjectives; and (as we have already obſerved) the Engliſh admits of no variation in its adjectives.

SECTION X.

Of the relative pronoun.

WHO, *which*, and *that*, are relatives, and give
The coaleſcence of an adjective
To a whole ſentence: but, when this is meant,
The objects which theſe pronouns repreſent,
By other names denoted, muſt receive
The clauſe in which we uſe a relative.

What, *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whence*,
And *while*, and *whether*, each contain the ſenſe
Of relatives. And *whither*, *who*, *which*, *where*,
Whence, *what*, *when*, *how*; if plac'd before *ſoe'er*.

The ſimple pronouns of this claſs are, *who*, *which*, and *that*.
The compound pronouns, that partake of the nature of relatives,

are, *what*, *whoſoever*, *whichſoever*, *whatſoever*; for *what* is equivalent to *this which*, or *that which*, and *who—which—what—ſoever*, are only *who*, *which*, and *what*, applied to repreſent ſome object that is not fully known, or is to be taken at pleaſure.

There are alſo ſeveral words, uſually accounted adverbs, which partake of the ſignification of a relative pronoun.

As *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whence*, *whether*, *while*, *till*, or *untill*.

For *when* is equivalent to *ſometime at which*; *why*, or *wherefore*, to *ſome reaſon for which*; *how* to *ſome manner in which*; *where* to *ſome place at which*; *whither* to *ſome place to which*; *whence* to *ſome place from which*; *whether* to *which of two*; *while* to *ſome time during which*; *till*, or *untill*, to *during ſome time at the end of which*.

The following examples ſhew that theſe words have the force of a relative pronoun. For *I know*, *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whence*, *the goods were conveyed*, are expreſſions equivalent to *I know—ſometime at which—ſome reaſon for which—ſome place in or at—to—from which—the goods were conveyed*. *I know not whether to take*, is equivalent to *I know not which of the two to take*; *I ſit while you ſtand*, to *I ſit during the time in which you ſtand*; *I ſhall work till you bid me give over*, to *I ſhall work during ſome time*, *at the end of which you will bid me give over*.

Theſe words expreſs only ſome time, reaſon, manner, place, &c. conſidered as ſome way diſtinguiſhable from other times, reaſons, manners, places, &c. but not as actually diſtinguiſhed; ſo that when the diſtinction comes to be actually made, the time, reaſon, manner, place, &c. that is ſpoke of, may happen to be one or another, for any thing that is previouſly ex-

preſſed or determined. Hence theſe words are called indefinites in grammar.

The relative pronouns denote objects themſelves, as the perſonal pronouns do; and not coaleſcent *properties*, or *relations*, as the poſſeſſive pronouns do. But the relatives, when an object is denoted by one of them, give notice, that what is ſignified by a whole clauſe that bears the form of a compleat ſentence, in which the relative is concerned, is not to be conſidered as of any meaning ſeparately from ſome other name of the ſame object which the relative repreſents.

Hence the whole clauſe in which a relative is concerned, becomes of the nature of a noun adjective, although it bears the form of a compleat ſentence. But this clauſe can only be applied as an adjective to the ſame object which the relative repreſents, as that object is expreſſed by ſome other name. This other name is the antecedent to the relative. And the clauſe of the relative when united with the antecedent partakes of all the antecedent's connexions, as an adjective partakes of all the connexions of its ſubſtantive.

Every compleat ſentence muſt conſiſt of a noun ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe, or of one or more words conſidered as equivalent to one ſubſtantive in that caſe, and of a definitive verb with or without words depending on it. I ſhall ſhew at large what a definitive verb is, when I treat of the verb in particular; it is ſufficient to obſerve here, that the verbs *is*, *created*, *will judge*, *may avoid*, are definitive verbs. Let the following ſentences be formed by theſe verbs. *God is righteous*, *God created men*, *God will judge men*, *men may avoid condemnation*. And as the objects *God*, or *men*, are concerned in every two of them, any two may be reduced into one ſentence, by ſubſtituting a relative pronoun in one, inſtead of the name of the object that is common to both. Thus the ſecond may be taken into the firſt, by ſubſtituting *who*, inſtead of *God* in it, and the com-

plex ſentence will then become, *God who created men is righteous*; or the firſt may be taken into the ſecond, by ſubſtituting *who* inſtead of *God* in it, as *God who is righteous created men*; or if *whom* be ſubſtituted in the ſecond ſentence inſtead of *men*, that ſentence may be taken into the third, as *God will judge men whom he created.* Here the pronoun perſonal *he* is alſo ſubſtituted inſtead of *God*, in the ſecond ſentence, for as *God* is mentioned once in the compound ſentence, there is no occaſion to mention his name over again. If *whom* be ſubſtituted inſtead of *men*, in the third ſentence, it may be taken into the fourth; as *men whom God will judge may avoid condemnation.* In the two laſt inſtances, *whom* is ſubſtituted inſtead of *men*, and not *who.* The reaſon of this is, becauſe *whom*, and not *who*, is in the accuſative caſe of the relative pronoun, and *men* is in the accuſative caſe in the two ſentences, *God created men, God will judge men*, which are turned into relative clauſes. And farther, *whom* is not placed in the compound ſentences behind the verbs *created, will judge*, although *men*, which it repreſents, ſtands immediately behind them in the original ſentences, before they are turned into relative clauſes. This is done to bring the relative as near as poſſible to its antecedent *men*, in the compound ſentences. This ſubject is explained at large, in what is ſaid of the relative pronoun, in the Speculative Grammar, Book III. Sect. III. and rules muſt be given for the caſe and poſition of the relative in the practical ſyntax, which is to follow. So that there is no neceſſity to ſay more of the nature of the relative in this place.

Who is uſed to repreſent objects that are conceived capable of reaſon and diſcourſe: theſe are uſually called perſons. *Which* repreſents objects that are not capable of reaſon and diſcourſe: theſe are uſually called things. *That* may repreſent either perſons or things.

The declenſion of the relatives.

THE relatives no plural forms put on,
But objects of both numbers ſhew by one.
Nor do the caſes change of words allow:
Except that *whom* appears in thoſe from *who*.

Singular and Plural.	
Nominative	who
Genitive	whoſe or of whom
Dative	to whom
Accuſative	whom
Vocative	
Ablative	by whom.

Singular and Plural.	
Nominative	which
Genitive	whoſe or of which
Dative	to which
Accuſative	which
Vocative	
Ablative	by which.

Singular and Plural.	
Nominative	that
Genitive	of that
Dative	to that
Accuſative	that
Vocative	
Ablative	by that.

Singular and Plural.	
Nominative	where
Genitive	of where
Dative	to where
Accuſative	where
Vocative	
Ablative	than where.

I have placed *that*, as declined like the other relatives, although the ſign of a caſe never goes immediately before it when it is uſed as a relative, but the ſign is left where the word that is repreſented by the relative would have ſtood, if the clauſe had been a compleat ſentence. Thus the two ſentences, *I ſaw the books, you told me of them*, if reduced to one, by ſubſtituting *that* inſtead of *them*, become, *I ſaw the books that you told me of*, not *of that you told me*; and ſo of other inſtances.

When is ſometimes declined like *where*; *whoſoever*, and *whatſoever*, are declined like *who*, and *what*.

As the relative pronoun can ſeldom be uſed without its antecedent actually mentioned, the antecedent determines the number of the object which the relative repreſents; and therefore the relative, in Engliſh, has no grammatic diſtinction of number. Thus in the expreſſion, *the man of whom I ſpeak*, *whom* repreſents the ſingular object, *the man*; and in *the men of whom I ſpeak*, *whom* repreſents the plural object, *the men*.

SECTION XI.

Of the interrogative pronouns.

THESE are the relatives, when ſo they ſtand
In queſtions, as to ſhew, that we demand
Such anſwers to be giv'n, as ſhall ſupply
More fully what theſe pronouns ſignify.

Theſe are the relatives *who*, *what*, and *which*, when uſed in queſtions to repreſent *that concerning which* a queſtion is aſked.

Now whatſoever is *that concerning which* a queſtion is aſked, muſt be ſo far known to him who aſks the queſtion, that he can make the perſon, from whom he expects an anſwer, ſenſible of that to which the anſwer muſt relate. If this happens to be *one*, or *more perſons*, *who* is uſed to repreſent that about which the queſtion is, till the anſwer determines it more fully. As *who is that man?* anſwer, *Mr. N——: who are miſerable?* anſwer, *the wicked.*

If either one or more *things*, or *a verbal ſtate*, is that about which the queſtion is aſked, *what* repreſents it till the anſwer determines it more fully; as *what has happened?* anſwer, *nothing of moment: what are theſe books?* anſwer, *grammars: what are you doing?* anſwer, *writing*.

If

If that which the queſtion is about, happens to be amongſt ſome number or quantity of perſons or things, and he who aſks the queſtion wants to know ſome one or more of theſe perſons or things more particularly, *which* repreſents that about which the queſtion is, till the anſwer determines it more fully; *which is Mr. M—?* anſwer, *the gentleman who is ſitting.*

All the indefinites which were mentioned in the laſt ſection, except *while*, and *till*, or *untill*, may be uſed in aſking queſtions, as appears by the nature of their ſignification already explained. For each of them repreſents ſome object as determinable, though not actually determined. And the anſwer gives the determination. As *when, why, how, was this done?* anſwer, *at ſuch a time, for ſuch a reaſon, in ſuch a particular manner*; and ſo of other inſtances.

The interrogative pronouns are declined in the ſame manner as the relatives.

SECTION XII.

Of the demonſtrative pronouns.

Theſe are *this, that, other, another, the ſame.*

OF the demonſtratives, *this, theſe, that, thoſe,*
Another, others, and *the ſame,* compoſe
The liſt. You *this,* and *theſe,* uſe to denote
Things near you, *that* and *thoſe* things more remote.
Diff'rence perceiv'd in *other* finds a name,
Unvaried perception, in *the ſame.*

Theſe pronouns may be conſidered either as ſubſtantives or adjectives. For one of them may be united with any common or appellative ſubſtantive, as an adjective is. But if the object can be ſeen, or pointed to, or the conception of it can be any ways

ways ſupplied by ſigns, or words mentioned, or to be mentioned, one of theſe pronouns may ſtand alone to denote it. Hence they are declined like ſubſtantives, as appears below.

Singular.		Plural.	
Nominative	this	Nominative	theſe
Genitive	of this	Genitive	of theſe
Dative	to this	Dative	to theſe
Accuſative	this	Accuſative	theſe
Vocative	o this	Vocative	o theſe
Ablative	by this.	Ablative	by theſe.

Singular.		Plural.	
Nominative	that	Nominative	thoſe
Genitive	of that	Genitive	of thoſe
Dative	to that	Dative	to thoſe
Accuſative	that	Accuſative	thoſe
Vocative	o that	Vocative	o thoſe
Ablative	by that.	Ablative	by thoſe.

	Singular.	
Nominative	another	the other
Genitive	of another	of the other
Dative	to another	to the other
Accuſative	another	the other
Vocative	o another	o the other
Ablative	by another	by the other.
	Plural.	
Nominative	others	the others
Genitive	of others	of the others
Dative	to others	to the others
Accuſative	others	the others
Vocative	o others	o the others
Ablative	by others	by the others.

Nominative

Nominative	the ſame	Singular and Plural.
Genitive	of the ſame	
Dative	to the ſame	
Accuſative	the ſame	
Vocative		
Ablative	by the ſame	

This denotes any ſingular object or thing that is near, and can be ſhewn or pointed out, or that is lately mentioned, or is to be immediately mentioned; as when a perſon ſays *this*, and ſhews or points to what he means; and in the expreſſions *this which I have ſaid*, or *which I am going to ſay*.

Theſe denotes any plural object or thing in the ſituation above-mentioned.

That and *thoſe* denote, the firſt a ſingular, and the ſecond a plural object, that is ſomewhat diſtant, and can be ſhewn or pointed out, or that has been mentioned, or is to be mentioned at ſome diſtance. As when a perſon ſays *that*, and ſhews or points to what he means; and in the expreſſions, *that which I have ſaid, that which I am going to ſay*.

Other, if uſed without an article, is always applied as an adjective; and when ſo applied, it gives notice, that ſome name, or expreſſion, is or will be uſed, in what is ſaid, to ſignify ſomething of the ſame ſort with that which is denoted by the word to which *other* is joined, but that, what is denoted by this word is different in itſelf, although of the ſame ſort. As *other men may think as they pleaſe, but I think a knowledge of grammar abſolutely neceſſary*, where *I* denotes a man as well as the word *men*.

Another, *others*, the firſt of theſe is uſed to ſhew that a ſingular, and the ſecond, that a plural object of ſome ſort or ſpecies is different from ſome one or more objects of the ſpecies, as *other men* or *others may be miſtaken, but ſuch a man was preſent, and ſaw what he declares*.

The ſame is uſed, when ſome certain object or ſtate is conſidered more than once, to ſhew that it is not merely what is capable of being called by the ſame general name, or denoted by the ſame general expreſſion, but is altogether unaltered; as *the ſame ſun which ſets to-night will riſe to-morrow.*

The words *every*, *any*, *ſome*, *many*, *few*, *ſuch*, and ſome others, are much of the nature of demonſtrative pronouns, although they are uſually ranked amonſt the indefinites. For if all objects and ſtates could have each a name of its own, there would be no place in language for either demonſtrative pronouns, or thoſe words above-mentioned. This is ſhewn more at large in Book III. Sect. V. of the Speculative Grammar.

SECTION XIII.

Of the verb.

THOSE ſtates of being we to verbs allow
On which, for our convenience, we beſtow
Occaſional exiſtence; ſuch as may
Be taken, at our pleaſure, quite away,
And then reſtor'd. Hence the ſame verbal ſtate
Once, twice, or times at will, we may repeat.
Thus the ſame period of ſuch ſtate may be
What we perceive, remember, or foreſee.
States thus exiſting, either may be made
So many ſep'rate objects; or convey'd
To other objects, may the ſtates declare
In which theſe objects to the mind appear.

Hence, in the uſe of verbal forms, 'tis fit
That ſome the application ſhall admit
Of ſubſtantives which ſep'rate things expreſs;
Whilſt others ſhall with objects coaleſce,

If

If in dependence on their names they ſtand:
Or the ſame forms muſt either uſe demand.

And hence, with other words the verb muſt bear
Connexion in *a threefold character*.

The verb objective, as a ſubſtantive
Each mode of eſtimation muſt receive
Which any caſe admits, or ſign ſupplies,
Or any prepoſition ſignifies.

The verb, when in its *coaleſcent ſtate*,
Muſt with ſome object ſo incorporate,
As, for our preſent purpoſe, to confer
Upon the object a new character,
Or ſtate, in which the object we foreſee,
Perceive, or recollect by memory.
And this in words which may, in any kind
Of compoſition, with more words be joined.

When compoſition, to the mind's intent,
Compleats th' expreſſion which ſhall repreſent
The ſubject of a ſentence; would you give
This notice? uſe *the verb definitive*.

Verbs denote ſtates of being, which the mind can conceive as deſtroyed and renewed by intervals, ſo as to ſuit any occaſion, and this either in verbal ſtates conſidered as ſeparate objects, or as united with other objects, and ſhewing the occaſional ſtates of being of theſe objects.

This property of a verbal ſtate, of being ſtopped or put an end to, and then begun again, and then put an end to, and ſo on, is the reaſon why ſuch a ſtate may be counted by the numbers, once, twice, thrice, &c. For as the ſtate may be-

gin and ceaſe by intervals, or fits, it becomes thereby diſtinguiſhable into different ſucceſſive parts or periods, which may be counted by the numbers of repetition, once, twice, thrice, &c. And this no object or ſtate can be, except thoſe which are denoted by verbs.

And as no two periods of the ſame ſort of verbal ſtate that depends upon the ſame principle can exiſt together; if ſeveral of them are conceived to ſucceed each other by intervals, one of them may be actually perceived, and another merely remembered, and another barely foreſeen, or propoſed. Or the ſame individual period may be conceived as paſſing through all theſe ſituations in the mind of man; and this when the period is conſidered as a ſingle or ſeparate object. Likewiſe one and the ſame object may be conſidered as merely remembered in one of theſe ſtates, or as actually perceived in it, or as only foreſeen in it.

Hence it comes to paſs, that in the Engliſh there are three forms of the verb, called the tenſes of the infinitive mood: and of theſe, the preſent tenſe expreſſes a verbal ſtate as *it is perceived*, the paſt tenſe as *it is remembered*, and the future as *it is foreſeen or propoſed*; as *to be*, *to have been*, *to be about to be*. There are likewiſe three participles which expreſs the ſtate under the ſame diſtinctions, as *being*, *having been*, *about to be*.

Any of theſe forms of a verb, either ſingle or with one or more words in dependence upon it, may expreſs a ſtate of being, as an object which the mind conceives or contemplates ſeparately, like an object denoted by a noun ſubſtantive. As in the expreſſions, *to read*, *to have read*, *to be about to read*, *the reading*, *the having read*, *the being about to read*, or *to read a grammar*, *to have read a grammar*, *to be about to read a grammar*, *the reading a grammar*, *the having read a grammar*, *the being about to read a grammar*; for any of theſe expreſſions manifeſtly

nifeſtly denotes a conception ſimilar to that which is denoted by one noun ſubſtantive. The expreſſions formed by the participles may take the ſign of any caſe, or any other prepoſition before them; as *of reading*, *to reading*, *by reading*, *of having read*, *by having read*, &c. When the verb is thus uſed, either without or with words in dependence upon it, I think it may be ſaid to be in its *objective capacity*, ſeeing the expreſſion then denotes what may be conceived, as any object is when denoted by a ſubſtantive.

But theſe forms may likewiſe be uſed in immediate dependence upon the name or expreſſion of any object, and when ſo uſed, they expreſs *ſome occaſional ſtate of being* of the object, on the name or expreſſion whereof one of them depends.

The infinitive tenſes are ſeldom uſed in this kind of conſtruction. Yet they are ſo uſed on ſome occaſions; as in the expreſſion, *I know Mr. N— to be a good man*; where *Mr. N—, as being a good man*, is manifeſtly *the thing which I know*. The occaſions which require this kind of conſtruction will be ſhewn particularly in the ſyntax.

But the participles are chiefly thus uſed, and are continually occurring in this kind of application; as *a man reading*, *having read*, *about or going to read*; *a woman ſpeaking*, *having ſpoke*, *about or going to ſpeak*, &c.

When the verb is thus uſed, I think it may be ſaid to be in its *coaleſcent capacity*, ſeeing it then unites its ſtate with the object, on the name or expreſſion whereof it depends, ſo as to ſhew the object either as remembered, or perceived, or foreſeen in the ſtate which it denotes: as *a man reading*, ſhews the man to be conſidered as actually perceived in the ſtate *reading*; *a man having read*, ſhews him as remembered in the ſtate *reading*; *a man*

man about or going to read, ſhews him as foreſeen in the ſtate *reading*.

The verb itſelf, in its *objective capacity*, may depend on any other word by the ſign of a caſe, or other prepoſition, as has been obſerved above. And *the name of the object with which the coaleſcent participle unites*, may depend on any other word by the like means. Thus (to give inſtances of both) in *the ſatisfaction of having finiſhed a book*; *of having finiſhed a book* is equivalent to a ſubſtantive in the genitive caſe depending on *the ſatisfaction*: and in *delight in reading a book*; *in reading a book* is equivalent to a ſubſtantive in the ablative caſe: ſo that in theſe inſtances the verbs *having finiſhed*, and *reading*, are uſed in their objective capacity. But in the inſtances, *attention to a man reading*, *the ſatisfaction ariſing from labours finiſhed*, *to a man reading*, is equivalent to one ſubſtantive in the dative caſe depending on *attention*; and *from labours finiſhed*, to one ſubſtantive in the ablative caſe depending on the ſtate *ariſing*: but the verbs *reading* and *finiſhed*, are here uſed in their coaleſcent capacity, for they unite with the objects *a man* and *labours*, ſo as therewith to expreſs complex objects.

Hence the verb either in its *objective* or *coaleſcent* character may be concerned in an expreſſion which may enter into the compoſition of another expreſſion that may be farther compounded at pleaſure, and this in ſuch a manner, that the ſtate denoted by the verb ſhall only be *the ſtate of being of ſome part of the objects concerned in the expreſſion*; as in *the attention to a man ſpeaking*, the man is in the ſtate *ſpeaking*, but *the attention* is not. And this expreſſion may have more words added to it at pleaſure, as *the attention to a man ſpeaking a tedious ſpeech*, &c. Therefore the verb, whether objective or coaleſcent, gives no notice, either that the compoſition of the expreſſion, in which it is concerned, is compleated, or that the verbal ſtate affects *the*

the whole of what is denoted by the expreſſion on which the verb depends.

Now there is no poſſibility of making ſingle names to denote every kind of object about which we propoſe to ſpeak, and therefore, when ſingle names cannot be found, ſerieſes of words muſt be made which ſhall be conſidered as equivalent to ſingle names of objects; and as ſingle names may ſometimes be found ſuited to the ſpeaker's purpoſe, and ſometimes not, ſome notice muſt be given of this; as likewiſe, if a ſeries of words is uſed to denote the object about which the ſpeaker is ſpeaking, ſome notice muſt be given when this ſeries is ſufficiently compounded for the purpoſe which occaſions the expreſſing of this object. Such notice can only be given by a verb. For no other ſort of word in language expreſſes *an occaſional ſtate of being*; and when the conception of an object is raiſed in the hearer's mind, either by one name, or by a ſeries of words equivalent to a name, the whole of ſuch object muſt be repreſented in ſome ſtate, ſo as to ſuit the occaſion. Now this occaſion uſually requires a ſtate, that the object either might or might not be in for any thing the hearer knew till he was told; for otherwiſe no information is given to the hearer. Therefore the verb appears in a third character in language; and this character, I think, may be called the *definitive character of the verb*, for it ſhews *that the compoſition of the expreſſion on which it depends is ſtopped, and that the whole object denoted by this expreſſion is affected by the verbal ſtate:* this creates the form of a ſentence, as diſtinguiſhed into *ſubject* and *predicate*; that part of the ſentence which denotes the object about which the ſentence is ſpoke, is the ſubject of the ſentence; and the definitive verb, with all that depends upon it, is the predicate. Whether the ſubject conſiſts of one word or more, it is equivalent to one noun ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe; and the verbal ſtate of the predicate, whether it conſiſts of one word or more, affects the whole of what is denoted by the ſubject, as if it were an object denoted

by one ſubſtantive in that caſe. Thus in the ſentence, *a man addicted to vicious pleaſures is miſerable*; *a man addicted to vicious pleaſures*, is the ſubject of the ſentence, and *is miſerable*, is the predicate; and it is plain, that the verbal ſtate *is miſerable* affects the whole ſubject, as if it were expreſſed by one noun ſubſtantive. And in the ſentence, *to take pains in conſidering the nature of language, procures credit to a teacher*; *to take pains in conſidering the nature of language*, is the ſubject, and *procures credit to a teacher*, is the predicate. And it is evident that the ſubject is equivalent to one noun ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe, and the predicate to one verb affecting the whole ſubject.

Thus the whole buſineſs of forming words into ſentences is reduced to *finding ſingle ſubſtantives ſuited to our purpoſe, or to making ſerieſes of words to be conſidered as ſingle ſubſtantives*; and *finding ſingle definitive verbs ſuited to our purpoſe, or to making ſerieſes of words to be conſidered as ſuch verbs.*

The definitive forms of verbs have likewiſe a reference to time as diſtinguiſhed into paſt, preſent, and to come, by the act of ſpeaking the ſentence in which one of theſe verbs is uſed. As if I ſay *ſuch a thing is, was, will be*, I give notice by *is* that the thing ſpoke of exiſts at the time when I ſpeak the words, but by *was*, I give notice that it exiſted before that time; and by *will be*, that its exiſtence is not actually begun at that time, but only foreſeen or propoſed. Now there is no occaſion to tell thoſe perſons who actually hear me ſpeak the words, the preciſe point of time in which they are ſpoke. For the ſenſes of thoſe perſons determine this. And when the preſent is thus determined, the paſt and future is determined with regard to this preſent. On this account, there is no need, in words actually ſpoke, and heard by thoſe to whom they are addreſſed, to mention the particular point of time to which the preſent forms of the definitive verbs relate. But in words written down, as in letters, deeds, bonds, &c. which are to be read after the time when

when they are conſidered as actually ſpoke, this time muſt be mentioned; otherwiſe the meaning of much of what is written will be left indeterminate. For the preciſe points or periods to which the paſt, preſent, and future forms of the definitive verbs relate, as theſe forms are uſed in the letter, deed, &c. cannot otherwiſe be known; and this preſent time written down is called the date of the letter, deed, &c. And in hiſtorical narrations, uſually many of theſe dates are inſerted: for without them, the periods of time to which the preſent, paſt, and future forms of the definitive verbs relate, are undetermined: becauſe the preſent forms, *in themſelves*, equally relate *to any time in which the words are conceived to be ſpoke*, and the paſt forms *to time preceding*, and the future forms *to time ſucceeding any time in which the words are conceived to be ſpoke*. This whole ſubject of the ſeveral characters or capacities of the verb is treated of at large, Book IV. Sections II. III. IV. of the ſpeculative part of this work.

SECTION XIV.

Of the different ſorts of verbs.

THREE diff'rent ſorts of revocable ſtate
Like diff'rence in the ſorts of verbs create.
Theſe ſorts, in grammar, for diſtinction's ſake,
The names of *active*, *paſſive*, *neuter*, take.
The neuter forms and active are the ſame,
But in conſtruction diff'rent modes they claim.
Hence diff'rent names in grammar they receive,
Intranſient thoſe; but theſe are *tranſitive*.
For to dependent ſubſtantives they bear
The mind, and *correſpondent ſtates* transfer.

Verbs may be diſtinguiſhed into different ſorts, either by the manners in which they are uſed in conſtruction; or by the manners in which their grammatic forms are compoſed.

When the manners in which they are uſed in conſtruction are conſidered as diſtinguiſhing the ſorts of verbs, they are divided into *verbs tranſitive*, and *verbs intranſitive* or *neuter*. Every verb tranſitive contains in it ſeveral pairs of forms, which expreſs pairs of ſtates ſo conſtituted, that both the ſtates of each pair are conceived to owe their original to one and the ſame principle. The grammatic forms by which theſe pairs of ſtates are denoted, are uſually called the ſame tenſes, active and paſſive, of one and the ſame verb. But theſe forms not only repreſent each pair of ſtates as exiſting at the ſame times, but likewiſe as the original of each pair is owing to the ſame principle. For if either ſtate of a pair is conceived to reſult from *ability*, *freedom from contradiction*, *determination of the will*, *compulſion* or *abſolute neceſſity*, which are the ſtates denoted by *can*, *may*, *will*, *ſhall*, *muſt*, the other ſtate of the pair is conceived to reſult from the ſame principle. Hence the ſigns *can*, *may*, *will*, *ſhall*, *muſt*, are equally found in the correſponding active and paſſive tenſes of the ſame verb. As likewiſe the ſigns *have* and *had*; the firſt of which refers to time preſent, the ſecond to time paſt. But although each pair of theſe ſtates is conceived to exiſt at the ſame time, and to have its original from the ſame principle; yet the one ſtate of a pair is moſt commonly obſerved in one object, and the other ſtate in another object: and if either ſtate of a pair be mentioned, and ſome other object be conſidered as in the correſponding ſtate; there is no occaſion to mention ſuch correſponding ſtate directly, but to place the name of the object with ſome ſign or notice that the object is to be conſidered as if it were in the verbal ſtate correſponding with that which is mentioned. That ſtate of each verbal pair which uſually denotes ſome effort, that in a large ſenſe may be looked upon as *a kind of acting*, is only conſidered as tranſitive in grammar.

grammar. Every ſuch ſtate, when expreſſed by a verb, may have a ſubſtantive placed in immediate dependence upon it; and the object denoted by the ſubſtantive thus placed, is conſidered as if it were in the paſſive ſtate which correſponds with the active ſtate that is mentioned. Thus the verbs *to ſee*, *to read*, are tranſitive verbs: and in the expreſſions *to ſee a book*—*to read a book*, *the book* is conſidered as if it were in the ſtates *ſeen* and *read*, although theſe ſtates are not directly mentioned. If two objects are joined by placing a tranſitive verb between their names, the mind is enabled to paſs on from the one object to the other by means of theſe verbal ſtates. As in *a man ſeeing a book*—*a man reading a book*, we are enabled to unite *the man ſeeing* with *the book ſeen*, and *the man reading* with *the book read*, without mentioning directly the ſtates *ſeen* and *read*; and ſo of any other inſtance of the uſe of a tranſitive verb. Hence this ſort of verb has its name from its conveying the mind by a kind of tranſition from one object to another.

But many ſtates which may be conceived to be begun, ended, or repeated, occaſionally, (and which are therefore denoted by verbs) are not eaſily reſolvable into pairs correſponding in the manner above-mentioned. Such as the ſtates *to be*, *to reſt*, *to ſleep*, *to grow*, *to fade*, &c.

For they either imply no effort exerted, or if an effort is ſuppoſed, it's effect is the ſtate itſelf denoted by each verb, and not a correſponding paſſive ſtate. Therefore theſe verbs do not admit of a ſubſtantive being placed in immediate dependence upon one of them, to denote an object which is to be conceived as in a correſponding ſtate. And if one of them is placed in dependence upon a ſubſtantive, the object denoted by the ſubſtantive will be conceived to have in it the effect of the ſtate itſelf; as in the expreſſions, *ſuch a thing being*, *a man reſting*—*ſleeping*, *a tree growing*—*fading*. Hence theſe ſtates do not carry on the mind from one object to another, as the verbal tranſitive ſtates

do; and therefore they are called *intranſitives*: and, becauſe many of them denote ſtates which are neither ſtates of *acting*, nor *ſuffering*, and the reſt denote ſtates which ſeem to partake of both *acting* and *ſuffering*, the grammarians have conſidered them as neither the one nor the other, or as intermediate between both, and on this account have called them *verbs neuter*.

SECTION XV.

Of the voices and conjugation of verbs.

THREE ſets of patterns, form'd to comprehend
The ſev'ral variations which attend
The Engliſh verb, in forms of grammar take
The name of *voices*, and together make
A conjugation, which each form will give,
That verbs, when regular, in uſe of ſpeech receive.

The diſtinction of verbs by the manners in which their grammatic forms are compoſed, gives occaſion to what, in grammar, are called the voices of the verb; and theſe voices taken together are called a conjugation. The voices may be conſidered as three in the Engliſh verb; and may be called the *active*, *paſſive*, and *the middle voice*. For the forms of the firſt voice moſt frequently denote ſome ſtate of action; thoſe of the ſecond, ſome ſtate of ſuffering or paſſion; and thoſe of the third, or middle voice, on ſome occaſions, ſtates of action, and on others, ſtates of ſuffering.

The forms which compoſe theſe voices will appear at large in the patterns or paradigms of the conjugation of verbs which will be given in what follows.

One

One Engliſh conjugation may ſuffice,
Since the formations which in verbs ariſe
Of diff'rent ſtructure, no proportion bear
To thoſe which form'd by *ed* we call the regular.

On the three voices, we the names beſtow
Of *active*, *paſſive*, *middle*, thence to ſhow
The gen'ral nature of the verbal ſtate
Denoted by the forms, which to each voice relate.

The Engliſh verbs may be reduced to one regular conjugation, in which the termination *ed* is uſed in the paſt tenſes; with irregular verbs, reduced to five claſſes.

As to the voices, any verb of any of the forms of the firſt voice, is ſaid to be of the active voice. As *to call*, *I call*, *be may call*, are of the active voice. Any verb of any of the forms of the ſecond, is of the paſſive voice; as *to be called*—*I am called*—*be may be called*. Any verb of any of the forms of the laſt, is of the middle voice; as *to be calling*—*I am calling*—*I may be calling*.

Each of the voices conſiſts of five ſets of forms, called moods. And each mood, of one or more ſets of forms, called tenſes. And each tenſe of every mood, but the infinitive, of two numbers; and each number conſiſts of three forms, called perſons; and this in verbs regular or irregular.

SECTION XVI.

Of the moods of verbs.

THESE may be reduced to five, *the indicative*, *the imperative*, *the potential*, *the ſubjunctive*, and *the infinitive*.

The moods are intended to ſhew the ſame verbal ſtate under different modifications, without having recourſe to any words but

but ſuch as are conceived to be part of the verb itſelf.

If to diſtinguiſh verbal ſtates we mean,
As ſtates *perceiv'd*, *remember'd*, or *foreſeen*,
Three forms infinitive of verbs preſent
Expreſſions to accompliſh ſuch intent.
And 'tis the ſame diſtinction, which creates
Three participial forms, as names of verbal ſtates.

The infinitive is the moſt ſimple of the moods. For of its three forms, or tenſes, the firſt, or preſent, expreſſes the verbal ſtate as it is, or may be, the object of actual perception; the ſecond, or paſt tenſe, expreſſes the ſtate as it is, or may be, the object of memory; and the third, or future tenſe, expreſſes the ſtate as it is, or may be, the object of foreſight, as *to call—to have called—to be about to call.* The verb in theſe forms is much the moſt frequently uſed in an objective capacity.

The participles may be conſidered as other forms of the verb in this mood. They expreſs the ſtate as actually perceived, remembered, or foreſeen; as *calling—having called—about to call*; and may be uſed either in an objective or coaleſcent capacity.

Neither the infinitive nor participial forms of the Engliſh verb have grammatic diſtinctions of number and perſon, nor do they give the diſtinction of ſubject and predicate to a ſeries of words in which one of them is concerned.

To all the forms of other moods we give
The gen'ral title of *definitive*;
For, in conſtruction, all theſe forms depend
On ſubjects, and define, or fix the end
Of the expreſſions us'd to bring to mind
Theſe ſubjects; into which, when thus defin'd,

The verb conveys it's characteriſtic ſtate:
And *affirmation* thus becomes compleat.

The other moods are all definitive; that is to ſay, the forms of which they conſiſt, cannot be uſed but in dependence upon ſome ſubject expreſſed or underſtood, and that ſubject conſidered as ſufficiently aſcertained for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. They may be conveniently reduced to the *indicative*, *imperative*, *potential*, and *ſubjunctive*.

Th' *indicative* is uſed to declare
What objects *do* or *ſuffer*, *have*, or *are*.

The indicative mood is uſed to repreſent *ſome ſubject*, *the expreſſion whereof is aſcertained*; as in ſome ſtate of being which is *in continuance*, or which is partly or intirely *over*; *before*, or *at*, or *after*, the time of ſpeaking.

If you command, or exhortations give,
Or would entreat, apply th' *imperative*.

The imperative mood is uſed to repreſent ſome ſtate of being, which the ſpeaker ſignifies that it is his pleaſure or deſire ſome object ſhall be placed in.

On *power*, *leave*, *duty*, *will*, what ſtate ſoe'er
Depends, to the *pontential* you refer.

The potential mood is uſed to repreſent *ſome ſubject*, *the expreſſion whereof is aſcertained*, as *capable* or *free from impediment*, or *under the neceſſity* of being in ſome ſtate. Or as *itſelf reſolving* or *inclining*, or as *ſome way under obligation*, or *compulſion*, to be in ſome ſtate.

But *ſtates ſuppos'd*, or otherwiſe if made,
Contingent, call for the *ſubjunctive*'s aid.

The

The ſubjunctive mood is uſed to repreſent *ſome ſubject, the expreſſion whereof is aſcertained*, as in ſome contingent ſtate, in conſequence of the dependence which the ſubject and ſtate have upon what muſt be expreſſed by ſome other clauſe.

SECTION XVII.

Of the tenſes of verbs.

THOSE of the infinitive mood have been already deſcribed, as likewiſe the participles, which may be conſidered as another ſet of tenſes of the infinitive mood.

The tenſes of the *definitive moods* relate to time, as the periods of it are diſtinguiſhed into *paſt*, *preſent* and *to come*, by the act of ſpeaking. For the *preſent*, to which the *paſt* and *future* are referred, as denoted by theſe tenſes, is always determined by the act of ſpeaking the words of the ſentences in which theſe tenſes are uſed. Theſe periods are therefore continually ſhifting, for no two ſentences can be ſpoke at the ſame inſtant of time; ſo that if the preciſe preſent, to which they are referred, is not determined by actual ſpeaking, it muſt be written down as in the dates of letters, deeds, &c.

The ſev'ral tenſes of each finite mood,
When us'd in ſimple ſentences, include
Time in their meaning, as we eſtimate
It's periods from a tranſient preſent ſtate.
For no fix'd point by any tenſe is ſhown,
But with the time of ſpeaking all flow on.

Time thus diſtinguiſh'd in three ſev'ral pairs
Of tenſe in th' indicative appears,
To *preſent time*, there is a reference
Both in *the preſent* and *the perfect tenſe*.

Th' im-

Th' imperfect, and *pluperfect*, both aſſume
Paſt time; and *both the futures time to come.*
The firſt of ev'ry pair *anfiniſh'd ſtate*,
Denotes, the latter ſhews it as *compleat.*

The tenſes of the indicative mood are ſix, viz. the preſent, the firſt, and ſecond preterite, the pluperfect, and the firſt, and ſecond future.

The preſent and ſecond preterite, both relate to the time of ſpeaking. The preſent expreſſes the ſtate as then in continuance, and the ſecond preterite, ſo far as it is then over; as *I call, I have called.*

The firſt preterite and pluperfect, both relate to time preceding the time of ſpeaking. The firſt preterite expreſſes the ſtate either as in continuance at that preceding time, or as over at the time of ſpeaking, or as in continuance, but not actually perceived to be ſo, at any time, and therefore is an indefinite tenſe; as *he ſpoke a long time, he ſpoke the word, if he ſpoke he would be blamed*, for *if he were to ſpeak*, &c.

The preſent and firſt preterite have each of them a double form. The forms without any prefixed ſign are uſed in common affirmative clauſes. The forms by *do* and *did* are uſed in negative and interrogative clauſes, or when it is intended to add emphaſis to an aſſertion; as, *many people talk of things which they* do *not well conſider*; *I* did *not foreſee what is now come to paſs*; do *you go to-morrow?* did *you go yeſterday? I* do *aſſure you that things are as I tell you*; *they* did *give this account, although they now deny it.*

The pluperfect expreſſes the ſtate as preceding ſome period which itſelf precedes the time of ſpeaking; as *I had read half of the book before you came.*

The firſt and ſecond futures both relate to time ſucceeding the time of ſpeaking. The firſt expreſſes the ſtate as in continuance, and the ſecond ſo far as it is over at that time; as *I ſhall read the book, I ſhall have read half of the book by to-morrow night.*

There are two forms of each of the Engliſh future tenſes; the one form by *will*, and the other by *ſhall*.

Will denotes a ſtate which the perſon whoſe thoughts are declared or aſked determines concerning himſelf: but a ſtate which he foreſees, hopes, fears, believes, or is told concerning other objects.

Shall denotes a ſtate which the perſon whoſe thoughts are declared or aſked foreſees, hopes, fears, believes, or is told concerning himſelf: but a ſtate which he determines concerning other objects.

In ſimple ſentences uſed on ordinary occaſions, if no mention is made of the perſon whoſe thoughts are declared, theſe thoughts are conceived to be thoſe of the ſpeaker, *i. e.* of the ſingular or plural object which bears the firſt perſon. So that the expreſſions *I will go—we will go*, are equivalent to *I* or *we who ſpeak determine to go*; but *I ſhall go—we ſhall go*, are equivalent to *I* or *we who ſpeak foreſee our going.*

But *you—he—they will go*, are expreſſions equivalent to *I* or *we who ſpeak, foreſee your—his—their going.* And *you—he—they ſhall go*, are equivalent to *I* or *we who ſpeak, determine your—his—their going.*

In compound ſentences, if the words *it is determined—decreed—ordained*, or other words of like import, be actually mentioned, and the ſentence which contains the future ſtate depends on ſuch words, *ſhall* is uſed; as *it is determined—ordained*, &c. that *I—you—he—we—they ſhall go.*

In

In poetic or ſublime language, the words *it is irrevocably ordained—decreed*, or words of the like import, are frequently left to be underſtood from the nature of the ſtile and ſubject. Thus in Mr. Addiſon's Cato, *but thou ſhalt flouriſh in immortal youth*, i. e. *it is irrevocably decreed that thou (o ſoul) ſhalt flouriſh*, &c.

In compound ſentences, if a perſon is repreſented as determining his own future ſtate, *will* is uſed. But if the future ſtate of other objects, *ſhall* is uſed.

As *I reſolve—determine—that I will, you reſolve—determine that you will go; he reſolves—determines that he will go*; and ſo *we that we will—you that you will—they that they will go*: but *I reſolve—determine that you—he—they ſhall go, you reſolve—determine that—I—he—they ſhall go; he reſolves—determines that I—you—we—they ſhall go.*

But in compound ſentences, if a perſon is repreſented as foreſeen, believing, hoping, fearing his own future ſtate, *ſhall* is uſed; if the future ſtate of other objects, *will* is uſed. As *I foreſee—believe—hope—fear that I ſhall, we that we ſhall, thou that thou ſhalt, he that he ſhall, you that you ſhall, they that they ſhall go.*

But *I foreſee—believe, &c. that you—he—they will go, you foreſee, &c. that I—he—they will go, he foreſees that I—you—we—they will go.* Hence theſe rules ariſe for the conſiſtent application of *will* and *ſhall.*

If the perſon who is repreſented as declaring a future ſtate, or as having his thoughts declared, or as required to declare them in anſwer to a queſtion, is *both himſelf in the ſtate, and determines it*, or *is neither in the ſtate, nor determines it*, WILL is uſed. But if the perſon who is repreſented as declaring a future ſtate, or as having his thoughts declared, or as required to declare them, is *either in the ſtate, but does not determine it*, or *determines the ſtate, but is not in it*, SHALL is uſed.

This ſubject is more largely treated of, Book IV. Sect. XII. of the ſpeculative part of this work.

The ſpeaker's *preſent purpoſe*, who exhorts
Begs or commands, th' imperative imports.

The imperative mood has only one tenſe; and this tenſe is only capable of depending upon the ſpeaker; becauſe it expreſſes what *he requires to be*, yet the name of the ſpeaker is not directly mentioned, but underſtood of courſe. For *go you*, if expreſſed at length, is, *I require that you go*; and ſo of any other inſtance. As this tenſe expreſſes what the ſpeaker requires at the time when he ſpeaks, it is a preſent tenſe.

The ſtates of *power*, *leave*, *duty*, *will*, include
Four diff'rent forms in the potential mood.
Can, *may*, *ſhall*, *will*, theſe ſev'ral ſtates expreſs,
When more confirm'd: *could*, *might*, *ſhould*, *would*, when leſs.
And rank'd with theſe, a form by *muſt* appears,
Which ſtates of *fix'd neceſſity* declares.

The tenſes of the potential mood are of a complex nature, the ſigns *can*, *may*, *muſt*, *could*, *might*, *would*, *ſhould*, expreſs ſtates all of which equally relate to preſent or future time, as *I can—may—muſt—could—might—would—ſhould do this—now—to-morrow—next year*. And all of them, but *can*, may likewiſe relate to paſt time; as *I may—muſt—could—might—would—ſhould have done this yeſterday*. Hence the form of the verb that depends upon ſome of theſe ſigns directs us in ſome meaſure to the time: for the form *do* in the examples above ſhews the ſtate of *doing*, as in continuance, *and have done*, ſhews it as over partly or intirely. Now what is over can no ways be affected by any preſent ſtate of power, ſuch as is denoted by *can*, except in queſtions and ſuppoſitions, therefore the paſt form, *have done*, does not take *can* before it, unleſs by way of queſtion or ſuppoſition; as, *is it poſſible that he can have been ſo indiſcreet?* But it may imply no preſent contradiction *to ſuppoſe a ſtate as over*, and

and therefore *may* is united in direct affirmation with *have done*; and this form relates to a preſent ſuppoſition concerning time paſt; as *they may have done ſo or ſo*. The ſtates denoted by *muſt*, *could*, *might*, *would*, *ſhould*, may be ſtates either *merely remembered to have been ſtates of neceſſity—power—freedom from contradiction*, *will*, or *obligation*, or ſtates actually perceived, *which are capable of being ſtates of neceſſity*, *power*, &c. and therefore theſe ſigns may equally affect ſtates which are *over* or *in being*, or *unbegun*, and hence the time to which theſe forms relate is not directly aſcertained by the forms themſelves; and on this account other words, ſuch as adverbs of time, or ſome other ſentence which aſcertains the time, are almoſt conſtantly connected with clauſes that have theſe indefinite forms of the potential mood in them; as, *I could do this formerly, but cannot now*; *I would have ſaid more on this point hereafter, if it had been thought neceſſary*. This ſubject is conſidered at large, Book IV. Sect. X. XI. XII. of the ſpeculative part. *Should* and *would* are uſed with the like diſtinctions that *ſhall* and *will* are uſed with.

Of the ſubjunctive mood though you perceive
Some forms which differ from th' indicative
Both in the preſent and the preter tenſe,
The moods are yet equivalent in ſenſe.

The forms of the ſubjunctive mood are always uſed in clauſes which depend upon ſome *indefinite*, ſuch as *whoſoever*, *whatſoever*; or upon ſome conditional or conceſſive conjunction, ſuch as *if*, *provided*, *unleſs*, *though*, *although*, *notwithſtanding*; ſo that the ſtates denoted by this mood always imply ſome contingency, or ſome circumſtance of uncertainty. Yet as they have not this power in themſelves, but receive it from the words on which they depend, the forms of the indicative mood may be made to receive the ſame power, by depending on indefinites, or conceſſive, or conditional conjunctions; and of conſequence the one mood or the other may be made to anſwer the ſame purpoſe.

Thus the expreſſions, *whoſoever be be that ſaid ſo*, and *whoſoever be is that ſaid ſo*, are equivalent; as likewiſe *although I be miſtaken*, and *although I am miſtaken*; and ſo of other inſtances.

SECTION XVIII.

Of the numbers and perſons of verbs.

NUMBER and perſon which in verbs appear
Of forms definitive, ſerve to refer
To objects which the like diſtinctions bear.

Theſe are different terminations given to ſeveral forms of the definitive tenſes, in order to ſhew what number and perſon the capital object bears in the ſubject on which the definitive verb depends. But this is ſhewn, in objects of the firſt and ſecond perſons both of the ſingular and plural number, by uſing, in Engliſh, the pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon; as *I call, thou calleſt, we call, ye* or *you call:* and with verbs of the third perſon, either the pronouns *he, ſhe, it,* or *they,* are actually mentioned, or the ſingular or plural name of ſome object is mentioned without any pronoun. And this omiſſion of the pronoun ſhews that the object to which the verb is applied, is of the third perſon; as *he called, they called, James called, the boys called,* are expreſſions which equally ſhew that the objects to which the definitive verbs are applied, are of the third perſon, whilſt the names themſelves determine the number. So that difference of termination in the perſons and numbers of Engliſh verbs, is not of abſolute neceſſity. Hence the firſt perſon ſingular, and the three perſons plural, have the ſame termination in almoſt all the Engliſh verbs; as *I—we—you—they call.* What is hitherto ſaid of the diſtinction of number and perſon in verbs, relates to the indicative and potential moods; for the ſubjunctive forms have little or no variety of termination of number or perſon.

The

The imperative forms of the Engliſh verb are all of the ſecond perſon ſingular or plural. For they all contain an expreſſion of a ſtate that the object is required to be in, to which a command, or entreaty, or exhortation, is addreſſed. This object is *the object ſpoken to*, and of conſequence is always of the ſecond perſon, and therefore the verbal form which expreſſes the ſtate of the ſecond perſon, muſt itſelf be of the ſecond perſon. But the ſpeaker may addreſs an exhortation to himſelf, or to himſelf and others. If he does thus; himſelf, or himſelf and others, ſupport two perſons, viz. that of *the object ſpeaking*, and that of *the object ſpoken to*. When this inſtance occurs, the ſign *let* is applied to the object as *ſpoken to*, i. e. to the object as it is of the ſecond perſon. This ſign is conſidered as a verb tranſitive, and the name of the object, conſidered as of the firſt perſon, follows the verb in the accuſative caſe; as *let me*, *let us*; and the verb which expreſſes the ſtate of the ſame object, conſidered as of the firſt perſon, follows its name; as *let me conſider*, *let us conſider*. If the command, entreaty, or exhortation, is conceived to be of ſuch a nature, that *the perſon ſpoken to* is to procure an object of the third perſon to be in ſome verbal ſtate, the ſign *let* is applied to the perſon ſpoken to, and the name of the object of the third perſon in the accuſative caſe follows *let*; as *let him*, *let them*, *let the man*; and the verb which expreſſes the ſtate of this object of the third perſon, follows its name; as *let him conſider*, *let them conſider*, *let the man conſider*. But if the verbal ſtate, to which the command, entreaty, or exhortation, has reſpect, is a ſtate that the object to which the command, entreaty, or exhortation, is addreſſed, is only itſelf to be in, there is no need of the ſign *let*, but it is ſufficient to name the verb which expreſſes the ſtate, as applied to the name of the ſecond perſon in the nominative or vocative caſe; as *do you conſider*, *o*, *ſir*, *conſider*; or to leave this name to be ſupplied by the demonſtrative circumſtance *of actually addreſſing the words of the command*, *entreaty*, or *exhortation*; as when the ſpeaker looks at the perſon ſpoken to, and ſays, *conſider* or *remember*; and ſo of other inſtances.

SECTION

SECTION XXI.

Of the manner of compoſing the ſeveral grammatic forms of the Engliſh verbs.

THE compoſition of theſe forms is effected, partly by certain variations of the laſt ſyllables, and partly by prefixing other verbal forms as ſigns to ſome of the tenſes.

The ſigns are the ſame in the ſame mood and tenſe in the ſame voice of every verb. So that if they are well obſerved and remembered in any one verb, they may be eaſily applied to any other.

The verb *to have* is the moſt ſimple of all the Engliſh verbs. And the verb *to be* is the moſt irregular. Moſt of the forms of theſe two verbs are uſed as ſigns of the tenſes of the other verbs, ſo that when theſe forms are known, together with two, three, or, at moſt, four forms of any other verb, the conjugation of the other verb is alſo known through all its voices. Theſe two verbs may therefore be conſidered as auxiliars to all the reſt in Engliſh, as the verbs which correſpond with theſe are conſidered, in all or moſt of the languages of Europe. The learner muſt, of conſequence, make himſelf perfectly acquainted with theſe two verbs, before he proceeds to compoſe the forms of any other verb through its ſeveral voices: and on this account theſe auxiliar verbs are inſerted in the firſt place.

The manner of conjugating the verb *to have*.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Preſent Tenſe.

Sing. *I* have	*thou* haſt	† hath	
		he has	
Plur. *we* have	† *ye* have	*they* have	
	you		

Firſt

First Preterite.

Sing.	*I* had	*Thou* hadſt	*He* had
Plur.	*We* had	*You* had	*They* had

Second Preterite.

			† *hath*
Sing.	*I have* had	*Thou haſt* had	*He has* had
Plur.	*We have* had	*You have* had	*They have* had

Pluperfect.

Sing.	*I had* had	*Thou hadſt* had	*He had* had
Plur.	*We had* had	*You had* had	*They had* had

First Future.

Sing.	{ *I ſhall* / *I will*	have	{ *Thou ſhalt* / *Thou wilt*	have	{ *He ſhall* / *He will*	have
Plur.	{ *We ſhall* / *We will*	have	{ *You ſhall* / *You will*	have	{ *They ſhall* / *They will*	have

Second Future.

Sing.	{ *I ſhall* / *I will*	*have* had	{ *Thou ſhalt* / *Thou wilt*	*have* had	{ *He ſhall* / *He will*	*have* had
Plur.	{ *We ſhall* / *We will*	*have* had	{ *You ſhall* / *You will*	*have* had	{ *They ſhall* / *They will*	*have* had

Imperative Mood.

Sing.	*Let me* have	Have *thou*	*Let him* have
Plur.	*Let us* have	Have *you*	*Let them* have

Potential Mood.

Preſent Tenſe.

Sing.	*I may* / *I can* / *I muſt* have	*Thou mayſt* / *Thou canſt* / *Thou muſt* have	*He may* / *He can* / *He muſt* have
Plur.	*We may* / *We can* / *We muſt* have	*You may* / *You can* / *You muſt* have	*They may* / *They can* / *They muſt* have

Firſt Indefinite.

Sing.	*I might* / *I could* / *I ſhould* / *I would* have	*Thou mightſt* / *Thou couldſt* / *Thou ſhouldſt* / *Thou wouldſt* have	*He might* / *He could* / *He ſhould* / *He would* have
Plur.	*We might* / *We could* / *We ſhould* / *We would* have	*You might* / *You could* / *You ſhould* / *You would* have	*They might* / *They could* / *They ſhould* / *They would* have

The Preterite.

Sing.	*I may* / *I can* / *I muſt* *have* had	*Thou mayſt* / *Thou canſt* / *Thou muſt* *have* had	*He may* / *He can* / *He muſt* *have* had
Plur.	*We may* / *We can* / *We muſt* *have* had	*You may* / *You can* / *You muſt* *have* had	*They may* / *They can* / *They muſt* *have* had

Second Indefinite.

Sing.	*I might* / *I could* / *I ſhould* / *I would* *have* had	*Thou mightſt* / *Thou couldſt* / *Thou ſhouldſt* / *Thou wouldſt* *have* had	*He might* / *He could* / *He ſhould* / *He would* *have* had

Plur.

Plur. { *We might* / *We could* / *We ſhould* / *We would* } *have* had { *You might* / *You could* / *You ſhould* / *You would* } *have* had { *They might* / *They could* / *They ſhould* / *They would* } *have* had

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD. *If*

Sing.	*I* have	*Thou* have	*He* have
Plur.	*We* have	*Thou* have	*They* have

Firſt Preterite, as in the INDICATIVE.

Second Preterite.

Sing.	*I have* had	*Thou have* had	*He have* had
Plur.	*We have* had	*You have* had	*They have* had

The reſt, as in the Indicative.

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Preſ. *To* have—Pret. *To have* had—Fut. *To be about to* have.
Participle preſent. Having—Participle paſt. *Having* had.
Participle future. *Being about to* have.

It is to be obſerved on this verb thus conjugated, that ſo much of the ſeveral forms as is printed in Italicks, remains the ſame in every verb of the active voice. For the only difference between the verb *to have*, and other verbs of the active voice, is, that one of the roots of ſome other verb is uſed inſtead of the roots *have*, *had*, and *having*, in the ſeveral tenſes in which theſe roots appear in the Roman characters.

The form † *hath* may be uſed inſtead of *has* on any ſolemn occaſion, ſuch as a ſermon, or whereſoever it is intended to imitate

the ſtile of the Scriptures; but on other occaſions, *has* is to be uſed.

† *Ye* may be alſo uſed inſtead of *you* on any occaſion of like nature with the former; but *you* is to be uſed on other occaſions.

Any name of the ſingular number repreſenting an object neither ſpeaking and naming itſelf, nor an object to which the ſentence is addreſſed, may be ſubſtituted inſtead of *be* in the third perſon ſingular of the verb. And any name of the plural number repreſenting an object in the circumſtances above-mentioned, may be ſubſtituted inſtead of *they*.

The forms, *to be about*, *being about*, which are ſet down in the future of the infinitive mood, and in the future participle, are little uſed at preſent; for the participle *going* is now commonly ſubſtituted inſtead of *about*; as, *to be going to have*, *being going to have*. But this is only in the language of converſation.

It is almoſt unneceſſary to obſerve, that the whole preſent tenſe of the indicative mood of this verb conſtitutes the ſigns of the ſecond preterite; and that the firſt preterite conſtitutes thoſe of the pluperfect, and the firſt future thoſe of the ſecond future. And ſo in the potential mood, the preſent tenſe becomes the ſigns of the preterite, and the whole firſt indefinite becomes the ſigns of the ſecond indefinite.

The manner of conjugating the verb *to be*.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Preſent Tenſe.

Sing.	I am	Thou art	He is
Plur.	We are	You are	They are

Firſt

First Preterite.

Sing.	I was	Thou waſt	He was
Plur.	We were	You were	They were

Second Preterite.

			† *hath*
Sing.	I *have* been	Thou *haſt* been	He *has* been
Plur.	We *have* been	You *have* been	They *have* been

Pluperfect.

Sing.	I *had* been	Thou *hadſt* been	He *had* been
Plur.	We *had* been	You *had* been	They *had* been

First Future.

Sing.	I *ſhall* / I *will* be	Thou *ſhalt* / Thou *wilt* be	He *ſhall* / He *will* be
Plur.	We *ſhall* / We *will* be	You *ſhall* / You *will* be	They *ſhall* / They *will* be

Seccond Future.

Sing.	I *ſhall* / I *will* *have* been	Thou *ſhalt* / Thou *ſhalt* *have* been	He *ſhall* / He *will* *have* been
Plur.	We *ſhall* / We *will* *have* been	You *ſhall* / You *will* *have* been	They *ſhall* / They *will* *have* been

Imperative Mood.

Sing.	*Let me* be	be *thou*	*Let him* be
		† *ye*	
Plur.	*Let us* be	be *you*	*Let them* be

Potential Mood.

Present Tense.

Sing.	I *may* / I *can* / I *muſt* be	Thou *mayſt* / Thou *canſt* / Thou *muſt* be	He *may* / He *can* / He *muſt* be
Plur.	We *may* / We *can* / We *muſt* be	You *may* / You *can* / You *muſt* be	They *may* / They *can* / They *muſt* be

First Indefinite.

Sing.	I *might* / I *could* / I *ſhould* / I *would* be	Thou *mightſt* / Thou *couldſt* / Thou *ſhouldſt* / Thou *wouldſt* be	He *might* / He *could* / He *ſhould* / He *would* be
Plur.	We *might* / We *could* / We *ſhould* / We *would* be	You *might* / You *could* / You *ſhould* / You *would* be	They *might* / They *could* / They *ſhould* / They *would* be

The Preterite.

Sing.	I *may* / I *can* / I *muſt* *have* been	Thou *mayſt* / Thou *canſt* / Thou *muſt* *have* been	He *may* / He *can* / He *muſt* *have* been
Plur.	We *may* / We *can* / We *muſt* *have* been	You *may* / You *can* / You *muſt* *have* been	They *may* / They *can* / They *muſt* *have* been

Second Indefinite.

Sing.	I *might* / I *could* / I *ſhould* / I *would* *have* been	Thou *mightſt* / Thou *couldſt* / Thou *ſhouldſt* / Thou *wouldſt* *have* been	He *might* / He *could* / He *ſhould* / He *would* *have* been

Plur. { We *might* / We *could* / We *ſhould* / We *would* } *have* been { You *might* / You *could* / You *ſhould* / You *would* } *have* been { They *might* / They *could* / They *ſhould* / They *would* } *have* been

Subjunctive Mood.

Preſent Tenſe. *If*

Sing.	I be	Thou beeſt	He be
Plur.	We be	You be	They be

Firſt Preterite.

Sing.	I were	Thou wert	He were
Plur.	We were	You were	They were

Second Preterite.

Sing. I *have* been—Thou *have* been—He *have* been.

The reſt of the mood the ſame as the Indicative.

Infinitive Mood.

Preſ. *To* be—Preterite. *To have* been—Future. *To be about to* be.

Participles.

Preſ. Being—Preterite. *Having* been—Future. *Being about to* be.

It is proper to obſerve here, that the ſigns of every mood and tenſe of the verb *to be*, are exactly the ſame with thoſe of every active verb: and that there is no other difference (except in the two firſt tenſes of the indicative mood, and in the ſubjunctive) between the verbs *to have* and *to be*, but this, viz. that in all the compound tenſes

tenſes of the former, where *have* depends upon the ſigns; *be* in the latter depends upon the ſame ſigns; and where *had* depends upon the ſigns of the former, *been* depends upon the ſame ſigns of the latter; and where *having* is uſed in the former, *being* is uſed in the latter. So that in the verb *to be*, one whole tenſe does not become the ſigns of another tenſe, as happened in the verb *to have:* but ſo much only of each tenſe of *to have* as is conſidered as a ſign (and is therefore printed in Italicks) remains with the ſame tenſe of *to be*.

The whole of the forms of this verb, when thus conjugated, become themſelves the ſigns of the ſeveral tenſes of the paſſive and middle voice of the Engliſh verb, by a method of proceeding which will quickly appear by examples.

SECTION XX.

Of the roots of Engliſh verbs.

BEFORE the other verbs can be conjugated, we muſt know the capital or principal forms of each verb, which are one or other of them to be joined with the ſigns in all the compound tenſes, and two of which themſelves form the preſent and firſt preterite of the indicative mood in the active voice. Theſe forms are four in each verb, and are called *the roots of the verb*, and contain all the varieties of termination which the Engliſh verb admits of, except thoſe of the perſons in the preſent and firſt preterite of the indicative mood.

Three of theſe roots are found in the firſt perſons ſingular of the three firſt tenſes of the indicative mood, when theſe perſons of the two firſt tenſes are conſidered without the pronoun *I*, and that of the third tenſe without the pronoun and the ſign *have*. Thus in the verb *to call*, the firſt perſons of the three firſt tenſes are, *I call, I called, I have called.* Therefore the three roots of this

this verb are *call, called, called*, and if to theſe we add *calling*, we have all the varieties of termination which this verb admits of, except in the ſecond and third perſons ſingular of the preſent, and the ſecond perſon ſingular of the firſt preterite of the indicative mood. Two of the firſt three roots are the ſame words in this verb, viz. *called, called*, and are formed by adding the ſyllable *ed* to the firſt root *call*; and the fourth root is likewiſe formed from the firſt by adding the ſyllable *ing*, as *call, calling*. This manner of forming the roots of the verb may be conſidered as the regular manner: becauſe ſo very many of the verbs obſerve it.

If a verb ends in a ſilent (*e*), as *to place, to grace*, the two following roots are formed by adding only a (*d*), and not the ſyllable (*ed*) to the firſt root; as *place, placed*; *grace, graced*. For the ſilent (*e*) becomes vocal when the (*d*) follows it; ſo that the ſyllable *ed* is by this means added to the firſt root. Yet we uſually pronounce *plâced—grâced* as monoſyllables; and ſo of other inſtances. But to form the root in *ing* from the firſt root of theſe verbs, the ſilent (*e*) of that root muſt be taken away, and the ſyllable *ing* added to the reſt of it; as *place—placing*, not *placeing*; *grace, gracing*, not *graceing*.

The verbs of this formation may be alſo conſidered as regular; becauſe the ſilent (*e*) is eaſily made vocal before the *d*: and it as eaſily appears, that it is no wiſe neceſſary to retain the ſilent (*e*) before the ſyllable *ing*; for the uſe of this (*e*) in Engliſh is only to give notice, that the ſyllable which precedes it is to be lengthened in pronunciation; and if this notice is given by the ſyllables *ed* and *ing*, the ſilent (*e*) is no longer neceſſary.

The ſyllable *ed* is often ſupplied by a *d* with the mark of eliſion, as *call'd*; and in ſome verbs by a *t*, without the mark, as *dreſt* for *dreſſed*, &c. The verbs which admit of the contraction by *t*, end in *ch, ck, p, x, ll, ſs*; as *fetcht, checkt, tipt, fixt, dwelt, paſt*, &c.

If a verb end in a ſingle vowel before a ſingle conſonant, and is either a monoſyllable, or has the accent on the laſt ſyllable, the laſt conſonant muſt be doubled in all the forms of the verb which have an additional ſyllable ſubjoined.

As, *to bar—barring—barred, to fit—fitting—fitted, to ſtir—ſtirring—ſtirred*, &c.

To beſet—beſetting, to regret—regretting—regretted, to aver—averring—averred, &c.

There are four thouſand and about five hundred verbs in the Engliſh; and the roots of all of them, except about a hundred and fifty ſimple verbs with their compounds, form their roots in one of the manners above-mentionad. Therefore all the verbs, except the hundred and fifty above-mentioned with their compounds, may be conſidered as of one and the ſame regular conjugation of the following form.

SECTION XXI.

The regular conjugation in Engliſh, through all its voices.

To call. THE ACTIVE VOICE.

The roots of the verb. Call—called—called—calling.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Preſent Tenſe.

			† calleth
Sing.	I call	Thou calleſt	He calls
		† Ye	
Plur.	We call	You call	They call

Firſt Preterite.

Sing.	I called	Thou calledſt	He called
Plur.	We called	You called	They called

Second

Second Preterite.

Sing. I have	called	Thou haſt	called	He has / †hath	called
Plur. We have		You have		They have	

Pluperfect.

Sing. I had	called	Thou hadſt	called	He had	called
Plur. We had		You had		They had	

Firſt Future.

Plur. Sing. I ſhall / I will	call	Thou ſhalt / Thou wilt	call	He ſhall / He will	call
Plur. We ſhall / We will		You ſhall / You will		They ſhall / They will	

Second Future.

Plur. Sing. I ſhall have / I will have	called	Thou ſhalt have / Thou wilt have	called	He ſhall have / He will have	called
Plur. We ſhall have / We will have		You ſhall have / You will have		They ſhall have / They will have	

Imperative Mood.

Sing. Let me call	Call thou	Let him call
Plur. Let us call	Call you	Let them call

Potential Mood.

Preſent Tenſe.

Sing.	I may	Thou mayſt	He may
	I can	Thou canſt	He can
	I muſt	Thou muſt	He muſt
Plur.	We may	You may	They may
	We can	You can	They can
	We muſt	You muſt	They muſt
	call	call	call

The firſt Indefinite.

Sing.	I might	Thou mightſt	He might
	I could	Thou couldſt	He could
	I ſhould	Thou ſhouldſt	He ſhould
	I would	Thou wouldſt	He would
Plur.	We might	You might	They might
	We could	You could	They could
	We ſhould	You ſhould	They ſhould
	We would	You would	They would
	call	call	call

Preterite.

Sing.	I may have	Thou mayſt have	He may have
	I can have	Thou canſt have	He can have
	I muſt have	Thou muſt have	He muſt have
Plur.	We may have	You may have	They may have
	We can have	You can have	They can have
	We muſt have	You muſt have	They muſt have
	called	called	called

Second Preterite.

Sing.	I might have	Thou mightſt have	He might have
	I could have	Thou couldſt have	He could have
	I ſhould have	Thou ſhouldſt have	He ſhould have
	I would have	Thou wouldſt have	He would have
Plur.	We might have	You might have	They might have
	We could have	You could have	They could have
	We ſhould have	You ſhould have	They ſhould have
	We would have	You would have	They would have
	called	called	called

Subjunctive Mood.

Preſent Tenſe. *If*

Sing.	I call	Thou call	He call
Plur.	We call	You call	They call

The firſt Preterite as in the Indicative.

Second Preterite.

Sing.	I have } called	Thou have } called	He have } called
Plur.	We have }	You have }	They have }

The reſt as in the Indicative.

Infinitive Mood.

Preſ. To call—Pret. To have called—Fut. To be about to call.

Participles.

Preſ. Calling—Pret. Having called—Fut. Being about to call.

The preſent and firſt Preterite of the Indicative Mood are alſo formed in the following manner.

Preſent.

			† *doth*
Sing.	I *do* call	Thou *doſt* call	He *does* call
Plur.	We *do* call	You *do* call	They *do* call.

Firſt Preterite.

Sing.	I *did* call	Thou *didſt* call	He *did* call
Plur.	We *did* call	You *did* call	They *did* call.

And the ſecond perſon of the Imperative Mood is likewiſe by *do*; as, *do thou* or *you* call.

If

If the formation of this voice of the verb *to call* be well attended to, it will appear that it no way differs from the formation of the verb *to be*, except in the following particulars, viz. that the two firſt tenſes of the indicative mood are compoſed of forms which are derived from the roots *call*, *called*, of the verb itſelf. And that in all the other forms, where *be* is uſed in the verb *to be*, *call* is uſed in the verb *to call*; but where *been* is uſed in the verb *to be*, *called* is uſed in the verb *to call*; and where *being* is uſed in the verb *to be*, *calling* is uſed in the verb *to call*. Likewiſe in all the compound tenſes of the active voice of every other verb, the ſigns of the ſeveral tenſes remain the ſame, and nothing more is done but placing one of the roots of another verb after theſe ſigns, in order to conjugate this other verb through all the compound tenſes of this voice.

Indicative Mood. The Passive Voice.

Preſent Tenſe.

Sing. I am	called	Thou art	called	He is	called
Plur. We are		You are		They are	

Firſt Preterite.

Sing. I was	called	Thou waſt	called	He was	called
Plur. We were		You were		They were	

Second Preterite.

				† hath	
Sing. I have been	called	Thou haſt been	called	He has been	called
Plur. We have been		You have been		They have been	

Pluperfect.

Sing. I had been	called	Thou hadſt been	called	He had been	called
Plur. We had been		You had been		They had been	

Firſt

First Future.

Sing.	I ſhall be	called	Thou ſhalt be	called	He ſhall be	called		
	I will be		Thou wilt be		He will be			
Plur.	We ſhall be		You ſhall be		They ſhall be			
	We will be		You will be		They will be			

Second Future.

Sing.	I ſhall have been	called	Thou ſhalt have been	called	He ſhall have been	called		
	I will have been		Thou wilt have been		He will have been			
Plur.	We ſhall have been		You ſhall have been		They ſhall have been			
	We will have been		You will have been		They will have been			

Imperative Mood.

Sing.	Let me be	called	Be thou	called	Let him be	called		
Plur.	Let us be		Be you		Let me be			

Potential Mood.

Preſent Tenſe.

Sing.	I may be	called	Thou mayſt be	called	He may be	called		
	I can be		Thou canſt be		He can be			
	I muſt be		Thou muſt be		He muſt be			
Plur.	We may be		You may be		They may be			
	We can be		You can be		They can be			
	We muſt be		You muſt be		They muſt be			

Firſt Preterite.

Sing.	I might be	called	Thou mightſt be	called	He might be	called		
	I could be		Thou couldſt be		He could be			
	I ſhould be		Thou ſhouldſt be		He ſhould be			
	I would be		Thou wouldſt be		He would be			
Plur.	We might be		You might be		They might be			
	We could be		You could be		They could be			
	We ſhould be		You ſhould be		They ſhould be			
	We would be		You would be		They would be			

The

The Preterite.

Sing. I may have been	Thou mayſt have been	He may have been	
I can have been	Thou canſt have been	He can have been	
I muſt have been	Thou muſt have been	He muſt have been	
Plur. We may have been	You may have been	They may have been	
We can have been	You can have been	They can have been	
We muſt have been	You muſt have been	They muſt have been	

called called called called

Second Indefinite.

Sing. I might have been	Thou mightſt have been	He might have been	
I could have been	Thou couldſt have been	He could have been	
I ſhould have been	Thou ſhouldſt have been	He ſhould have been	
I would have been	Thou wouldſt have been	He would have been	
Plur. We might have been	You might have been	They might have been	
We could have been	You could have been	They could have been	
We ſhould have been	You ſhould have been	They ſhould have been	
We would have been	You would have been	They would have been	

called called called

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Preſent Tenſe. *If*

Sing. I be	Thou beeſt	He be
Plur. We be	You be	They be

called called called

Firſt Preterite.

Sing. I were	Thou wert	He were
Plur. We were	You were	They were

called called called

Second Preterite.

Sing. I have been	Thou have been	He have been
Plur. We have been	You have been	They have been

called called called

The reſt of the tenſes as in the Indicative.

INFINI-

Infinitive Mood.

Preſent—To be called. Preterite—To have been called.
Future—To be about to be called.

Participles.

Preſent—Being called. Preterite—Having been called.
Future—Being about to be called.

It is apparent, that the whole conjugation of the verb *to be*, becomes the ſigns of the tenſes of the Engliſh paſſive verb; and that in the inſtance of the verb *to call*, theſe ſigns, in all the tenſes, not only give notice of the times to which each tenſe relates, but likewiſe of the nature of the ſtate that is ſignified by the root *called*. For the word *called*, in the active voice, ſignifies a ſtate of action; as, *I called, I have called*, &c.; but in this voice, by the help of different ſigns, it ſignifies a paſſive ſtate, that correſponds with the ſtates of action that are expreſſed by the ſeveral active forms of the verb *to call*.

It is the ſame in all the regular verbs, viz. the ſame word which has an active ſenſe in the firſt preterite, and all the compound paſt, or perfect tenſes of the active voice, is applied through the whole paſſive voice in a paſſive ſignification, by the means of the forms of the verb *to be*. Thus, *I loved—I have loved—I had loved—I ſhall have loved—I may—I muſt—might—could—would—ſhould have loved*, are active expreſſions; but *I am—was—have been—had been—ſhall have been—may be—muſt be—might have been—muſt have been loved*, are all paſſive expreſſions. This word, which bears both an active and paſſive ſignification by the means of different ſigns, ends in *ed* in all the regular verbs.

Of the middle voice.

There is no occaſion to draw out this voice at large; for, in order to compoſe its ſeveral tenſes through all the moods,

nothing more is neceſſary than to take the participle in *ing*, of any verb, and to place it behind the ſeveral forms of the verb *to be*; as, *I am calling—I was calling—I have been calling —I had been calling*, &c. So that the middle voice differs in nothing from the paſſive, except in the different root that is uſed in compoſing its ſeveral tenſes.

Before the irregular verbs can be conjugated, their roots muſt be known; and as the knowledge of theſe roots can only be acquired by memory, I have reduced them, in the following ſection, to ſeveral claſſes, in order to aſſiſt the learner in remembering them the more eaſily, by having thoſe which form their roots nearly in the ſame manner placed all together in one claſs.

Obſerve, that the firſt root is called *the imperfect root*; the ſecond, *the indefinite*; and the third, *the perfect root*. There is no difficulty in the formation of the fourth root, or participle, in *ing*; becauſe it is compoſed in the irregular verbs as it is in the regulars, viz. by adding the ſyllable *ing* to the firſt or imperfect root, if that root does not end in a ſilent (*e*), and if it does, by removing the (*e*) and adding *ing* to the reſt of the imperfect root. Thus, *ſeek* is the imperfect root of the irregular verb *to ſeek*, and the fourth root is *ſeeking*; and *give* is the imperfect root of the irregular verb *to give*, and as this root ends in a ſilent (*e*) the fourth root is *giving*, not *giveing*. As therefore this root is formed in the ſame manner in all ſorts of verbs, there is no occaſion to take notice of its formation amongſt the roots of the irregular verbs.

It is likewiſe to be obſerved, that verbs ending with a ſingle conſonant preceded by a ſingle vowel, and, if of more than one ſyllable, having the accent on the laſt ſyllable, double the conſonant in every part of the verb in which a ſyllable is added; as *to ſtir, ſtirring, ſtirred*; *to remit, remitting, remitted*, &c.

SECTION

SECTION XXII.

Of the formation of the roots of the Engliſh irregular verbs.

THESE verbs may be reduced to five principal claſſes.

The firſt claſs conſiſts of verbs in which *all the roots are the ſame.*

The ſecond, of verbs in which *the ſecond and third roots,* (i. e. *the indefinite* and *perfect roots)* are the ſame, but are not formed by *ed,* as in the regular verbs.

The third, of verbs in which *the third root* is derived from *the ſecond*; i. e. in which *the perfect root* is not the ſame with *the indefinite root,* but is nevertheleſs deduced from it.

The fourth, of verbs in which *the firſt and third roots* are the ſame, *i. e.* in which *the imperfect* and *perfect roots* are the ſame.

The fifth, of verbs in which *the third root* is derived from *the firſt,* i. e. in which *the perfect root* is not the ſame with *the imperfect root,* but is nevertheleſs deduced from it.

The ſecond claſs is by much the largeſt, and therefore it will be convenient to reduce the verbs which it contains to inferior claſſes, conſiſting of ſuch verbs as are nearly the ſame with each other in the change or addition of letters in the formation of their roots.

The verbs of the FIRST CLASS, *i. e.* in which *the three roots are the ſame words*, are thirteen in number, as follows:

The form remains unvaried, which is plac'd
In the three roots of *hit*, *cut*, *coſt*, and *caſt*;
The like obtains in *hurt*, and *knit*, and *ſplit*,
Likewiſe in *let*, *put*, *ſet*, *ſhed*, *ſhut*, and *ſlit*.

Imperfect root.	Indefinite.	Perfect root.
caſt	caſt	caſt
coſt	coſt	coſt
cut	cut	cut
hit	hit	hit
hurt	hurt	hurt
knit	knit	knit
ſplit	ſplit	ſplit
let	let	let
put	put	put
ſet	ſet	ſet
ſhed	ſhed	ſhed
ſhut	ſhut	ſhut
ſlit.	ſlit.	ſlit.

As the verbs of this claſs all end in *t*, or *d*, as the indefinite and perfect roots of the regular verbs do, it has been thought unneceſſary to add to, or alter their termination in any of their roots.

The verbs of the SECOND CLASS, in which the ſecond and third roots are both alike, may be reduced to four inferior claſſes or ſorts.

The following verbs have the eſtabliſh'd claim,
To *ſecond* and *third* roots which are the ſame.
But moſt of theſe the form by *ed* forſake,
Which regulars ſo very num'rous take.

Firſt

Firſt ſort, in which the final letters of all the roots remain the ſame; the ſecond and third roots being formed by the change of one vowel for another, or by ſubſtituting the ſhort ſound of the ſame vowel inſtead of its long ſound, or by other alterations which do not affect the laſt letters of the roots.

Stand—ſtood; *hang—hung*; and *hang'd*; but *lēad* has *lĕad*;
Rēad—Rĕad; *ſprēad—ſprĕad*; *bleed—bled*; and *breed* has *bred*;
Whilſt *ſeed* and *ſpeed* have roots in *fed* and *ſped*.
Meet—met; *bide* and *abide* in *bode*; *bind—bound*;
Find, *grind*, and *wind*, have *found*, and *ground*, and *wound*;
Digged and *dug*, as roots from *dig* are found.
Stick—ſtuck; *ſwim—†ſwam*, and *ſwum*; *†flang—flung*, from *fling*;
So *cling*, *ring*, *ſing*, *ſling*, *ſpring*, *ſting*, *ſtring*, *ſwing*, *wring*,
Have roots in *†ang*, and *ung*. *†Began—begun*,
Come from *begin*. So *ſpin* has *†ſpan* and *ſpun*;
Shine -ſhined—ſhone; and *win* has *†wan* and *won*.
Or *†drank*, or *drunk*, appear as roots from *drink*;
And of like forms from *ſink*, *ſlink*, *ſhrink*, and *ſtink*.

Stand—ſt-ood—ſt-ood
Hang—h-ung—h-ung
-anged—anged
L-ead—l-ed—l-ed
Rēad—r-ĕad—r-ĕad
Spr-ead—ſpr-ĕad--ſpr-ĕad
Bl-eed—bl-ed—bl-ed
Br-eed
F-eed
Sp-eed
M-eet—m-et—m-et
B-ide—b-ode—b-ode
Ab-ide
B-ind—b-ound—b-ound

F-ind
Gr-ind
W-ind
-digged—digged
Dig—dug—dug
St-ick—ſt-uck—ſt-uck
†-am
Sw-im—ſw-um—ſw-um
Fl-ing—fl-ung—fl-ung
-ang †
Cl-ing
R-ing
S-ing
Sl-ing
Spr-ing

Spr-ing
St-ing
Str-ing
Sw-ing
Wr-ing
+-an
Beg-in—be-gun—be-gun
Sp-in
+-an

W-in—w-on—w-on
Sh-ine—ſh-one—ſh-one
+-ined—+-ined
Dr-ink—dr-unk—dr-unk
S-ink
Sl-ink
Shr-ink
St-ink.

The verbs of this ſort are thirty-eight in number.

Second ſort of the SECOND CLASS of irregular verbs, conſiſting of ſuch as form their ſecond and third roots, merely by changing the final conſonant of the firſt root from *d* to *t*.

Build, *lend*, *rend*, *ſend*, and *ſpend*, their final *d*,
In both the other roots, change to a *t*.

Theſe verbs are five in number.

Buil-d—buil-t—built
Len-d—len-t—len-t
Ren-d—ren-t—ren-t
Sen-d—ſen-t—ſen-t
Spend—ſpen-t—ſpent.

Third ſort of the SECOND CLASS of irregular verbs, conſiſting of ſuch as both change the intermediate vowels, and add the letter *d*, or *t*, to the end of their ſecond or third roots; or in which ſome conſonants in the final ſyllable are changed to a *d*.

Make, *made*; *have*, *had*; *pay*, *paid*; *ſay*, *ſaid*; *leave*, *left*;
Mean, *meant*, *reave*, and *bereave*, have roots in *reft*;
Tell, *told*; *ſell*, *ſold*. *Deal* forms its roots in *dealt*;
And *flee* has *fled*; and *feel* has roots in *felt*.

Crept, *kept*, and *ſlept*, proceed from *creep*, *keep*, *ſleep*,
And *ſwept*, and *wept*, deſcend from *ſweep* and *weep*.
Clothe, *cloth'd*, and *clad*; *ſhoe*, *ſhoe'd*, and *ſhod*, becomes;
And *loſe* in *loſt*, its radicals aſſumes.

M-ake, m-ade, m-ade.
H-ave, h-ad, h-ad.
P-ay, p-aid, p-aid.
S-ay, ſ-aid, ſ-aid.
M-ēan, m-ĕant, m-ĕant.
L-eave, l-eft, l-eft.
-eav'd, eaved.
R-eave, r-eft, r-eft,
Be-reave.
T-ell, t-old, t-old.
S-ell.
D-ēal, d-ĕalt, d-ĕalt.
F-eel, f-elt, f-elt.
F-lee, f-led, f-led.
Cr-eep, cr-ept, cr-ept.
K-eep, ept, ept.
Sl-eep.
Sw-eep.
W-eep.
Cl-othe, cl-othed, cl-othed.
Cl-ad, cl-ad.
Sh-oe, ſh-od, ſh-od.
Sho-ed, ſho-ed.
Lo-ſe, lo-ſt, lo-ſt.

Twenty-one in number.

The fourth ſort of irregular verbs of the SECOND CLASS, in which the ſecond and third roots are formed by *ught*, the *u* making the latter vowel of a diphthong. The verbs of this ſort are eight in number.

Teach, *taught*; *beſeech*, *beſeeched*, and *beſought*,
Seek, *ſought*; *buy*, *bought*; *fight*, *fought*; and *bring* has *brought*,
And *think* has *thought*; and *work* has *work'd* and *wrought*.

T-each, t-aught, t-aught.
-eeched, -eeched.
Beſ-eech, beſ-ought, beſ-ought,
S-eek, ſ-ought, ſ-ought.
B-uy, b-ought, b-ought.
Fi-ght, f-ought, f-ought.
Br-ing, br-ought, br-ought.
Th-ink, th-ought, th-ought.
-orked, -orked.
W-ork, w-rought, w-rought,

The

The THIRD CLASS of irregular verbs, in which the third, or perfect root, is not the same with the second, or indefinite root, but is nevertheless derived from it.

Upon the following verbs three roots attend,
And from their *second roots*, *the third* descend.

Lay, *laid*, and *lain*; †*brake*, *broken*, *broke*, from *break*;
So †*spake*, *spoke*, *spoken*, all descend from *speak*.
Steal, *stole*, and *stolen*; †*bare*, *bore*, *born*, from *bear*;
Share, *shore*, *shorn*, †*sware*, *swore*, *sworn*, from *shear* and *swear*;
Tare, *tore*, *torn*, †*ware*, *wore*, *worn*, from *tear*, and *wear*.
†*Clave*, *cleft*, *clove*, *cloven*, are the roots from *cleave*,
Hove, *heaved*, * *hoven*, all descend from *heave*;
Wove, *weaved*, *woven*, are deduc'd from *weave*.
Swell, *swell'd*, and †*swollen*; *tread*, *trode*, *trodden*, *trod*;
Get, †*gat*, *got*, *gotten*; †*seeth*, *seethed*, and †*sod*,
And *sodden*; *lie*, *lay*, *lain*; *stride*, *strode*, and *strid*,
And *stridden*; *hide*, in *hidden* forms, and *hid*;
So *slide*, *slid*, *slidden*; *ride*, *rode*, *ridden*, *rid*;
Bite, *bit*, and *bitten*; *write*, *writ*, *written*, *wrote*;
Choose, *chose*, and *chosen*; *shoot*, †*shotten*, and *shot*.

L-ay, l-aid, l-aid,
-ain.
†-ake.
Br-eak, br-oke, -oke.
Br-oken.
†-ake.
Sp-eak, sp-oke, oke.
Sp-oken.
St-eal, st-ole, st-ole,
-olen.
-are. †
B-ear,
Bare, -orn.
-are. †
Sh-ear,
Sh-ore, sho-rn.
-are. †
Sw-ear,
Sw-ore, -orn.
-are. †
T-ear,
T-ore, -orn.
-are. †
W-ear.
W-ore, orn.

* *Hove* and *Hoven* are of doubted authority.

Cl-eave,

-ave. †
Cl-eave, -eft, -eft.
Cl-ove, -oven.
-eaved, -eaved.
H-eave,
H-ove, -oven.
-eaved, -eaved.
W-eave, -ove.
W-ove, -oven.
-ode, -od.
Tr-ead,
Tr-od, -odden.
Sw-ell, -elled, -elled.
Sw-ollen. †

-at. †
G-et,
Got, -ot,
-otten.
-eethed, -eethed.
S-eeth,
S-od, -od.
S-odden.
L-ie, -ay.
L-ain.

-ode.
Str-ide,
Str-ide, -id.
Str-idden.
H-ide, -id, -id.
H-idden.
Sl-ide, -id, -id.
Sl-idden.
-ode, -ode.
R-ide,
-id, -id.
R-idden.
B-ite, -it, -it.
B-itten.
-ote, -ote.
Wr-ite,
-it, -it.
Written.
Ch-ooſe, -oſe, -oſe.
Ch-oſen.
Sh-oot, -ot, -ot.
Sh-otten.

Twenty-five in number.

The FOURTH CLASS of irregular verbs, in which the third or perfect root is the ſame with the firſt or imperfect root.

In *come*, *came*, *come*, and *run*, *ran*, *run*, the word Which is the firſt root, alſo is the third.

Theſe are but two in number,
C-ome, c-ame, c-ome;
R-un, r-an, r-un;

but they have ſeveral compounds, ſuch as *become*, *overcome*, *outrun*, *overrun*, &c.

The FIFTH CLASS of irregular verbs, in which the third or perfect root is not the ſame with the firſt or imperfect root, but is nevertheleſs derived from it.

Verbs of the following claſs, by ſettled uſe,
From their *firſt radical*, *the third* deduce.

Dare—dared—durſt, *forſaken* and *forſook*,
Come from *forſake*; ſo *take—taken* and *took*;
Wake, *waked*—†*woke* and *waken*; ſo *awake*;
Grave, *graved*—†*graven*; *fall*, *fell—fallen*, take;
Eat, *eat* and *eaten*; *beat*, *beaten* and *beat*.
So †*ſweaten—ſweat* and *ſweated* come from *ſweat*;
Bid, *bad—bid—bidden*, *ſitten—ſat* from *ſit*;
So †*ſpat—ſpit—ſpitted* are derived from *ſpit*;
Smite, *ſmote* and *ſmitten*; *riſe*, *ariſe*, have *roſe*
And *riſen*; *give* in *gave* and *given* ſhows
Its roots. But *riv'd* and *riven* come from *rive*;
†*Drave—drove* and *driven* are the roots from *drive*.
Thus †*ſhrive* has †*ſhrove* and †*ſhriven*; *ſtrive* has *ſtrove*
And *ſtriven*; likewiſe *thrive*, *thriven* and *throve*;
Hold, *held* and *holden*; *do* has *did* and *done*;
And *go* has *went*, from †*wend*; and likewiſe *gone*;
Burſten from *burſt*, or elſe it's roots alike;
Help, †*holpt* and †*holpen*; †*ſtricken—ſtruck* from *ſtrike*.

D-are, -ared. -urſt. -ook. D-ared.
Forſ-ake, Forſ-aken.
T-ake, -ook. T-aken.
W-ake, -aked, -ked, -oke. W-aken.
Aw-ake.

Gr-ave,

-aved, -aved.
Gr-ave,
Gr-aven.
F-all, -ell.
Fallen.
E-at, e-at.
E-aten.
B-eāt, -eăt, -eăt.
B-eāten.
-eăt.
Sw-eat,
-eāted, -eāted.
Sw-eaten. †
-ad.
B-id,
-id, -id.
B-idden.
S-it, ſ-at.
S-itten.
-at. †
Sp-it,
-it. Sp-it,
-itted.
-ote, -ote.
Sm-ite.
Sm-itten.
R-iſe, -oſe.
R-iſen.

Ar-iſe.
G-ive, -ave.
Given.
R-ive, -ived.
R-iven.
-ave. †
Dr-ive,
-ove, -ove.
Driven.
Shr-ive, -ove.
Shr-iven.
Str-ive, -ove.
Stri-ven.
Thrive, -ove.
Thr-iven.
D-o, -id.
D-one.
G-o, went.
G-one.
H-old, -eld -eld.
H-olden.
B-urſt, -urſt, -urſt.
B-urſten.
Help, -elped, -elped.
-elpt. † H-olpen.
Str-ike, -uck, -uck.
Str-icken.

Twenty-eight in number.

The following verbs are of this fifth claſs, but are placed by themſelves on account of the analogy by which the moſt of them form their ſecond or indefinite root, which is not obſerved in other verbs.

Slay, *ſlew* and *ſlain*; *ſee*, *ſaw* and *ſeen*; *fly*, *flew*
And *flown*; whilſt *draw* as roots has *drawn* and *drew*;
Saw, *ſawed*—*ſawn*; *hew*, *hewed*—*hewn*; and *ſhow*,
Showed and *ſhown*. But *blow*, *crow*, *grow*, *know*, *throw*,
Of roots which end in *-ew* and *-own* allow.

Sl-ay,	-ew,	-ain.	Cr-ow.		
S-ee,	-aw,	-een.	Gr-ow.		
Fl-y,	-ew,	-own.	Kn-ow.		
Dr-aw,	-ew,	-awn.	Thr-ow.		
S-aw,	-awed,	-awn.	Sh-ow,	-owed,	own,
H-ew,	-ewed,	-ewn.	or		
Bl-ow,	-ew,	-own.	Sh-ew,	-ewed,	-ewn.

Twelve in number.

When theſe roots of the irregular verbs are known, the formation of the ſeveral tenſes of all the voices is very eaſy.

The preſent and *the future* both receive
TH' IMPERFECT ROOT in *the infinitive*.
In *the indicative*, their forms to make,
The *ſimple preſent* and *firſt future* take
Th' imperfect root; (and the *firſt pret'rite* too,
And *preſent* when *complex*, or form'd by *did* and *do*.)
TH' IMPERFECT ROOT muſt it's aſſiſtance lend,
And *ev'ry form imperative* attend.
In *the potential preſent tenſe you find*,
And in *the firſt indefinite* ſubjoin'd,
TH' IMPERFECT ROOT, and *this alone* you take,
When *the ſubjunctive preſent tenſe* you make.

TH' INDEFINITE, or SECOND ROOT will give
The ſimple pret'rite of *th' indicative*.

In ev'ry mood to each remaining tenſe
THE PERFECT ROOT maintains it's juſt pretence.

You

You *the firſt participle* conſtitute
By *ing* ſubjoin'd to *the imperfect root*;
But if a ſilent *e* the root ſhall cloſe,
Ing us'd without the *e* muſt then the form compoſe.

The firſt or imperfect root with the ſign *to* before it, makes the preſent tenſe of the infinitive mood of the active voice; as, *to ſee*; and the future of the ſame mood with *to be about to* before it; as, *to be about to be.* The ſame root is uſed in the preſent of the indicative of this voice without any ſign; as, *I ſee*; and in the firſt future with the ſigns *ſhall* and *will*; as, *I ſhall ſee, I will ſee.* The whole imperative mood is likewiſe formed by this root; as, *let me ſee, ſee* or *ſee thou, let him ſee, let us ſee, ſee you, let them ſee.* The preſent and firſt indefinite of the potential mood are formed by the ſame root; as, *I may—can ſee, I might—could ſee*; and ſo is the preſent of the ſubjunctive; as, *if I ſee.* The forms by *do* and *did* alſo require the firſt root; as *I do ſee, I did ſee, do you ſee.*

The ſecond or indefinite root is only uſed in the firſt preterite of the active voice; as, *I ſaw.*

The third or perfect root is uſed in all the other tenſes of this voice, viz. in the ſecond preterite and pluperfect, and ſecond future of the indicative, the preterite and ſecond indefinite of the potential, the ſecond preterite of the ſubjunctive, and the preterite of the infinitive; as, *I have ſeen, I had ſeen, I ſhall have ſeen, I may have ſeen, I might—could have ſeen, if I have ſeen, to have ſeen.*

The participle preſent is the fourth root, and is formed by ſubjoining *ing* to the firſt; as *ſeeing*; only if a ſilent *e* ends the root, it muſt be removed, and *ing* ſubjoined to the remainder; as, *give, giving*, not *giveing.*

The PEREECT ROOT on *have* depending plac'd
Supplies *the active participle paſt.*

A future

A future form (but ſeldom us'd) you ſee
In the IMPERFECT ROOT join'd with *about to be.*

The participle preterite is the third or perfect root with *having* before it; as, *having ſeen.* The future participle is the firſt root with *about to*, or *being about to*, before it; as, *about to ſee, being about to ſee.* But this participle, as likewiſe the future tenſe of the infinitive mood, is little uſed.

The whole paſſive voice is formed by ſubjoining the third root to the forms of the verb *to be*;

As, *I am ſeen, I was ſeen, I have been ſeen*, &c.

The whole middle voice is formed by ſubjoining the fourth root, *i. e.* the participle in *ing*, to the forms of the verb *to be*;

As, *I am ſeeing, I was ſeeing, I have been ſeeing*, &c.

As to the formation of the perſons of the verb, there is nothing to be obſerved, except that the ſimple preſent and ſimple firſt preterite of the active voice, form the ſecond perſon ſingular, by ſubjoining the ſyllable *eſt*, or the letters *ſt*, to the firſt perſon; as from *call*, *calleſt* or *call'ſt*; from *called*, *calledſt*; from *give*, *giveſt* or *giv'ſt*; from *gave*, *gaveſt* or *(gav'ſt* pronounced as a monoſyllable.)

The two firſt tenſes of th' indicative
From the firſt perſon ſingular receive
Their ſecond ſingular; which is expreſt
By joining to the firſt *ſ-t* or *eſt.*

The third perſon ſingular of the ſimple preſent tenſe was anciently formed from the firſt, by ſubjoining the ſyllable *eth*; as from *call*, *calleth*; but this form is now diſuſed, except in the ſolemn ſtile of the Scripture, and the third perſon of this tenſe is formed from the firſt by the ſame proceeding which is uſed in forming

forming the plurals of noun ſubſtantives from the ſingulars. But there are few verbs which end either in a ſingle *f* or in *f* followed by a ſilent *e*, and in thoſe the *f* is retained, as *I chaſe*, *he chaſes*.

Th' analogy by plural forms purſu'd
Of ſubſtantives, you find in verbs renew'd.
For the *third perſons* ſing'lar, which we give
To the firſt tenſe of the indicative,
In multitudes of verbs, by *s* ſubjoin'd
Without encreaſe of ſyllables, you'll find
Flow from *the firſt*. By *es*, if ſilent *e*
Before it has an *s*, *z*, *c*, or *g*;
Y final, not in diphthongs us'd, ſupplies
This perſon by the termination *ies*;
C-h, *s*, *ſ-h*, *x*, and *z* encreaſe
This perſon from the firſt, by each aſſuming *es*.

As, 1. *I call*, *he calls*; *I ſtand*, *he ſtands*, &c.
2. *I raiſe*, *he raiſes*; *I blaze—piece—forge*, *he blazes—pieces—forges*.
3. *I fly—try—tarry—hurry*, *he flies—tries—tarries—hurries*.
4. *I teach—paſs—waſh—vex—buzz*, *he teaches—paſſes—waſhes—vexes—buzzes*.

SECTION XXIII.

Of the adverb.

BY farther circumſtance to aſcertain
What verbs, or adjectives in part explain,
Dependent adverbs are by uſe applied,
While ſubſtantives refuſe to be ſo modified.

Adverbs denote certain circumſtances to be united with what is partly expreſſed by ſome verb or adjective, and not with what is partly expreſſed by a ſubſtantive. The

The property of depending on verbs and adjectives, ſo as to unite with what is partly ſignified by them, is the principal mark by which far the greateſt number of adverbs can be known from a ſubſtantive in ſome oblique caſe, or in dependance on ſome prepoſition; particularly the adverbs which end in *ly*, and are derived from adjectives, which adjectives are themſelves derived from ſubſtantives. Theſe adverbs are exceedingly numerous in Engliſh; for almoſt every adjective has ſuch an adverb derived from it. Thus, from *admiration* a ſubſtantive, we have *admirable* an adjective, and *admirably* an adverb; from *affection*, *affectionate*, *affectionately*; and ſo of other inſtances. Theſe adverbs are all of them equivalent in meaning to ſome oblique caſe of the ſubſtantive from which each of them deſcends, or to this ſubſtantive in dependance on a prepoſition. Thus, *to perform admirably*, is of the ſame import with *to perform to admiration*; and *to be affectionately dutiful*, with *to be dutiful from affection*; and ſo of any other adverb of this claſs. There is alſo a conſiderable number of Engliſh adverbs not ending in *ly*, each of which is nevertheleſs equivalent to ſome noun ſubſtantive (either ſingle or with other words) in dependance upon a prepoſition; and as it may be of uſe to the learner to have a liſt of theſe drawn out together, I have ſubjoined ſuch a liſt. But there are likewiſe ſeveral ſorts of adverbs which are not equivalent each to a ſubſtantive depending on a prepoſition: I have therefore placed each of theſe ſorts by themſelves in what follows, and have given a ſhort account of the nature of each ſort.

A liſt of adverbs which do not end in ly, *and which yet are each of them equivalent to ſome ſubſtantive (either ſingle or with other words) depending on a prepoſition.*

Abed, in ſome bed; *aboard*, within the limits of ſome ſhip; *abreaſt*, with the breaſt in the ſame line; *abroad*, in or into ſome place of large extent; *abroach*, in the ſtate *broached*; *acroſs*, in the

the ſtate *croſſing*; *adrift*, in the ſtate *driving* or floating at random; *adry*, in the ſtate of thirſt; *afar*, at a great diſtance; † *afield*, to the field; *aflat*, on a level; *afloat*, in the ſtate *floating*; *afoot*, on the feet; *afreſh*, in a manner ſimilar to the firſt; *afront*, in front, or in the ſtate *directly fronting*; *again*, by repetition; *agape*, in the ſtate *gaping*; *agaſt*, in the ſtate *gaſted*, or violently affrighted; *agog*, in a ſtate of eager impatience from deſire; *aground*, on the ground; *alike*, in a ſtate of likeneſs; *alive*, in the ſtate *living*; *all*, in every part or reſpect; *almoſt*, nearly in every part or reſpect; *aloft*, in ſome high ſituation; *alone*, ſingly; *along*, in a ſituation or direction eſtimated by length; *along with*, in the ſtate *accompanying*; *aloof*, at a diſtance; *aloud*, with a loud ſound; *altogether*, in every reſpect; *always*, at all times; *amain*, with violence; *amiſs*, in a wrong manner; *amort*, in deadneſs of ſpirits; *anights*, at, or in a ſucceſſion of nights; *ever and anon*, or *every now and then*, conſtantly by intervals of time; *apace*, with ſpeed; *apart*, at a diſtance; *apeak*, on the point, ſpoken only of an anchor; *apiece*, each one conſidered by itſelf; *aright*, in a right manner; *arow*, in one row; *aſhore*, on the ſhore; *aſide*, to one ſide; *aſkance*, in an oblique direction; *aſkew*, out of the direct line of viſion; *aſlant*, in a direction not perpendicular; *aſleep*, in, or into the ſtate *ſleeping*; *aſlope*, in the ſtate *ſloping*; *aſquint*, in the ſtate *ſquinting*; *aſtern*, on, or towards the ſtern or hinder part of a ſhip; *aſtray*, in the ſtate *ſtraying*; *aſtride*, in the ſtate *ſtriding*; *aſunder*, in the ſtate *ſeparated*; *athirſt*, in a ſtate of thirſt; *atilt*, in the poſture *tilting* (or *being tilted*, when ſpoken of a barrel;) *atop*, on, or at the top; *aware*, in a ſtate of attention; *away*, at, or to ſome diſtance; *awhile*, during ſome ſhort time; *awry*, in an oblique direction.

Back, in a ſtate or direction contrary to the ſtate *advancing* or *advanced*; *backward* or *backwards*, towards whatſoever is conſidered as behind; *before*, in time, place, or ſituation more forward; *behindhand*, in a backward ſituation; *belike*, in all appear-

ance; *betime*, or *betimes*, before much time ſpent; *to boot*, by way of overplus.

Downward, or *downwards*, to a lower ſituation.

Early, the ſame as *betimes*; *elſewhere*, in place different from what is mentioned; *endwiſe*, on one end; *enough*, in a ſufficient quantity or degree; *ere* and † *or ever*, ſooner than; *ever*, at any time, or at all times; *forever*, or *evermore*, eternally.

Far, at or to a great diſtance; *fain*, gladly; *faſt*, immovably, cloſely, or ſwiftly; *forth*, out of; † *forthright*, ſtraight forwards; *forward* or *forwards*, towards ſomething that is before.

Headlong, with the head foremoſt; *homeward*, towards home; *however*, or *howſoever*, in any manner, degree, ſituation, or circumſtance, which may be aſſumed or ſuppoſed.

Indeed, what muſt be allowed as really true.

Juſt, ſo and no otherwiſe.

At large, in a diffuſe manner; *at laſt*, in the concluſion; *at leaſt*, taking things in the very loweſt degree; *leſt*, in order to prevent; *lief*, or *lieve*, willingly, uſed in the expreſſion *I had as lief*, i. e. *I would* with equal willingneſs; *longways*, or *longwiſe*, in the direction of length.

Needs, of neceſſity; *neither*, not even, or, nor even; *never*, in no time, or, in no degree; *never ſo good—wiſe*, &c. good or wiſe in a degree at no time to be exceeded; *ever ſo good—wiſe*, &c. good or wiſe in as great a degree as can at any time be aſſumed or imagined; *next*, at ſome time immediately ſucceeding; *no where*, not in any place.

Oft, or *often*, at many times; *once—twice—thrice*, at one, two, three periods of time; *onward*, in progreſſion; *otherwiſe*, in any or ſome different manner or reſpect; *out*, in a ſtate of diſcloſure, exhauſtion, or extinction; *outright*, without delay or reſtraint; *outward*, or *outwards*, to the outer part.

Perforce, by violence; *perhaps*, it may be; *pretty*, in ſome tolerable degree; as, *pretty well—good*, &c.

Quick,

Quick, with readineſs; *quite*, in every point or reſpect.

Sidelong, or *ſideways*, towards one ſide; *ſoon*, in a little time; *ſore*, with vehemence attended with pain or diſtreſs; *ſound*, only uſed of ſleep, meaning as in a ſtate of perfect health; *ſtill*, uninterruptedly; *ſtraight—ſtraightway*, or *ſtraightways*, directly, or without delay.

Through, from one extreme limit to the other; *throughout*, quite through; *together*, without ſeparation or intermiſſion; *together with*, in union or connexion with.

Verbatim, word for word; *very*, in an eminent degree.

Unawares, without warning, or without conſidering; *upward* or *upwards*, toward that which is higher.

Within, in the interior parts; *without*, in the outer parts.

The remaining adverbs of the Engliſh language may be reduced to five claſſes, which I ſhall take the liberty to call the NEGATIVE, the REDDITIVE, the RELATIVE, the DEMONSTRATIVE, and the CONJUNCTIVE.

The NEGATIVE ADVERB
Not.

THIS adverb is uſed to give notice, that the mind conſiders what is repreſented by a verb or adjective as never begun, or as quite deſtroyed; or that what is denoted by a ſubſtantive is to be conſidered as exterminated or removed from the reſt of the conceptions contained in a ſeries of connected words. Thus, *not to be* expreſſes the ſtate *to be* as never begun, or as deſtroyed; and *not good* expreſſes the quality *good* as without exiſtence; and *John and not James told me this*, ſhews that *James* is to be exterminated or removed from the conception expreſſed by *John and James told me this*; and ſo of other inſtances.

REDDITIVE ADVERBS
Ay, yes, no.

THESE are applied as anſwers in return to queſtions aſked by way of ſuppoſition. *Ay* or *yes* ſhews the affirmative to be true, *no* the negative.

Thus if I ſay, *is the work done?* I want to be informed which of the ſuppoſitions, *the work is done*, *the work is not done*, is true. The anſwer by *ay* or *yes* ſhews that the firſt is true; the anſwer by *no* that the ſecond is ſo. See the Speculative Grammar, Book III. Chap. IV. for a more full account of this ſubject.

Relative Adverbs.

Theſe are *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whence*, *whether*, *while*, *till*, *untill*.

They have all been explained in what is ſaid of the relative pronoun. All of them but *while*, *till* and *untill*, may be called *interrogative adverbs*, becauſe they may be uſed in aſking queſtions. The reaſon why they may be ſo uſed appears in what is ſaid of the relative and interrogative pronouns.

The adverbs *whereat*, *whereby*, *wherein*, *whereinto*, *whereof*, *whereon*, or *whereupon*, *whereſoever*, *whereto*, *whereunto*, *wherewith* or *wherewithall*, are alſo of this claſs, for they are only other forms analogous to oblique caſes of *which* or *what*. Thus, *whereat* is equivalent to *at which*; *whereby*, to *by which*, or *by what*; *wherein*, to *in which*, or *in what*; *whereinto*, to *into which*; *whereof*, to *of which*; *whereon*, or *whereupon*, to *on which time*; *whereſoever*, to *at what place ſoever*; *whereto*, or *whereunto*, to *unto what*, or *which*; *wherewith*, or *wherewithall*, to *with what*, or *with which*.

The forms of theſe adverbs, which are equivalent to any caſe of *what*, may be uſed in queſtions; as, *whereunto ſhall I liken this or that?* is of the ſame import as *to what ſhall I liken this or that?* and ſo of other inſtances.

Demonstrative Adverbs.

These are ſuch as require ſome demonſtrative circumſtance to determine their meaning, and therefore include in that meaning ſome demonſtrative pronoun which has the object denoted by it

aſcertained by ſomething already ſaid, or by ſome circumſtance attending the act of ſpeaking the ſentence in which the demonſtrative adverb is uſed. Thus, *afterwards* is equivalent to after this or that time, the time to be determined by ſomething already ſaid, or by ſome circumſtance attending the diſcourſe; *anon*, immediately after this inſtant time; *by and by*, ſoon after this or that time; *ere long*, before a long time paſſes over from this time; *now*, at this or that inſtant of time; *ere now*, before this inſtant; *erſt*, long before this inſtant; *forthwith*, immediately after this or that time; *hence*, from this place, or from this time; *henceforth*, or *henceforward*, in all time ſucceeding this or that time; *here*, in this place, the place to be determined by what is already ſaid, or by ſome demonſtrative circumſtance; *hereabouts*, near this place; *hereafter*, after this time; *hereat*, at this; *hereby*, by this; *herein*, in this; *hereof*, of or from this; *hereon*, upon this; *herewith*, with this; *heretofore*, the ſame as *formerly* or *erſt*; *hither*, to this place, the place to be determined by ſome deſcription in words, or by the actual ſituation of the ſpeaker; *hitherto*, to this place; *hitherwards*, towards this place; *at preſent*, at this inſtant time of ſpeaking; *ſince*, or *ago*, before this inſtant time of ſpeaking; *then*, at that time, the time to be determined by ſomething already ſaid; *thence*, from that place, the place to be determined by ſomething already ſaid, or by pointing to it, or ſome other demonſtrative circumſtance; *thenceforth*, or *thenceforward*, continually from that time; *there*, at that place, the place to be determined as above; *thereabout*, or *thereabouts*, near that place, time, quantity, or number, the place, time, &c. to be determined as above; *thereat*, at that place or circumſtance; *thereafter*, according to that; *thereby*, by that; *therefore*, for this, or, for that; *therefrom*, from that, or, from this; *therein*, in that, or, in this; *thereinto*, into that, or, into this; *thereof*, of that, or, of this; *thereon*, or *thereupon*, on, or, upon that, on, or, upon this; † *thereout*, out of that; *thereto*, or *thereunto*, to, or, unto that; † *thereunder*, under that; *therewith*, with that, or, at that time; *therewithall*, together with that; *thither*, to

that

that place; *thitherwards*, towards that place, the place to be determined as above; *thus*, in this manner, the manner to be determined by ſome previous deſcription, or by actually ſhewing the proceſs which determines it; *whilom*, at ſome time long before this inſtant of ſpeaking; *yet*, at this time, or beyond this time or degree; the time or degree to be determined by what is ſaid, or by ſome demonſtrative circumſtance.

It is manifeſt that theſe adverbs all require antecedents as much as the demonſtrative pronouns do, and that theſe antecedents are ſometimes to be expreſſed by words, and that ſometimes the adverbs may be ſupplied with what is equivalent to an antecedent by the demonſtrative circumſtances which attend the diſcourſe.

The points or periods of time to which the demonſtrative adverbs of time relate, are all determined as the points or periods are to which the definitive verbs relate. Thus *ſince*, in itſelf, equally relates to time preceding *any time of ſpeaking*; *now*, to time coexiſtent with *any time of ſpeaking*; and *hereafter*, to time ſucceeding *any time of ſpeaking*; and *the very point of time* to which they relate in any particular ſentence, muſt be determined by actually ſpeaking the ſentence; or, in a letter, deed, &c. by putting a date to it; and ſo of other inſtances. Yet theſe words are not verbs; and therefore the relation which a verb has to time, as diſtinguiſhed into paſt, preſent, and to come, by the act of ſpeaking, is not a property peculiar to the verb only.

Conjunctive Adverbs

Alſo, too, farther, farthermore, moreover, beſides, likewiſe.

Each of theſe adverbs is a notice, that what is denoted by ſome one or more words, in dependence on, or connexion with, the adverb, is to be conſidered as put to the reſt of a ſeries by an additional

additional proceeding of the mind, beyond that which is abſolutely and indiſpenſably neceſſary to compleat the ſentence in which the adverb is found.

Even, *ev'n*, *e'en*; theſe words ſhew, that what depends on one of them is exactly as it is repreſented, notwithſtanding any appearance of unlikelineſs, difficulty, or contrariety.

Forſooth, this word gives notice, that ſomething which is ſaid, is to be looked upon as certain, although it be attended with ſome ſeeming impropriety.

Nay, in old language, the ſame as *no*. It is now uſed to ſignify *not only ſo, but even*.

It is manifeſt that all the words of this claſs are of the nature of conjunctions; for they ſignify ſome additional declaration concerning that with which they are connected; and this declaration is by way of ſupplement to that of the ſentence in which one of them is concerned; and this kind of declaration is the characteriſtic of a conjunction, as appears fully in what is ſaid of that part of ſpeech in the ſpeculative part of this work.

Some of the adverbs contained in the liſt which is given firſt, may perhaps be as properly placed in ſome one of the five following claſſes: as *perhaps* may be conſidered as a conjunctive adverb; and ſo of ſome other inſtances. But as I have explained the general nature of each particular adverb of the firſt liſt, every one may range them, as he finds moſt convenient, into more and more ſubdiviſions or inferior ſorts or claſſes.

SECTION

SECTION XXIV.

Of the conjunction.

CONJUNCTIONS are the marks of ſupplement
To affirmation; ſhewing an intent
Words to reſume in ſentences, and bear
To other words therein: or to declare
That ſentences themſelves muſt ſo attend
On other ſentences, as to depend
The one upon the other, in the views
In which the ſpeaker's thought theſe ſentences purſues.

Conjunctions are additional declarations of certain connexions amongſt words in the ſame ſentence, and likewiſe between one ſentence and another; which connexions cannot be ſhewn, with any convenience, by the uſual manner of affirmation or declaration.

The conjunctions, when uſed to ſhew the connexions amongſt words in the ſame ſentence, give notice that there is ſome word or expreſſion in the ſentence, which is either to be referred to ſeveral words, or that ſeveral words are to be referred to it, whilſt the ſeveral references do not circumſtantiate each other; but the common word or expreſſion either circumſtantiates, or is circumſtantiated in every reference.

And, *either*, *or*, *neither*, *nor*, *but*, are the principal conjunctions which are thus applied. *And* ſhews that the reſults of all the references made by it are equally neceſſary for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. Thus the ſentence, *John and James and George came yeſterday*; "*came yeſterday*" is the common expreſſion to which references are all to be made, and the ſenſe of the whole is equivalent to *John came yeſterday, James came yeſterday, George came yeſterday*: and in the expreſſion, *the good and wiſe and merciful*

ciful God; *the God* is the common name to which the references are all to be made; and the expreſſion is equivalent to *the good God, the wiſe God, the merciful God*; and ſo of other inſtances.

When *either* is placed before a part of a ſeries of words, and *or* before ſome other part of the ſame ſeries, notice is given, either that any one of the references, or that ſome one of them, is ſufficient for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. Thus in the expreſſion, *either John or James may go to morrow*, that which is ſignified by *John may go to-morrow*, or by *James may go to-morrow*, is equally proper for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. But in, *either John or James muſt go to-morrow*, only one of the ſentences, *John muſt go to-morrow, James muſt go to-morrow*, can take place. As it is not determined which of the references is to take place, whilſt yet it is ſignified by theſe conjunctions, that no more than one actually does take place, the hearer is obliged to keep them all in his mind as much as the references which are made by the conjunction *and*.

Neither is equivalent to *not either*; and *nor* is the negative of *or*. Theſe are therefore only uſed to deny, in the ſame manner that *either* and *or* are uſed to affirm. Therefore theſe conjunctions ſhew, that *not any one* of the references in which they are concerned will anſwer the ſpeaker's purpoſe, if theſe references are taken affirmatively. Thus, *neither James, nor John, nor George, muſt go to-morrow*, is equivalent to, *not either James, or John, or George, muſt go to-morrow*.

When *but* appears before a part of a ſeries of words, directing that part to be referred to ſome other expreſſion; it is a notice that the reference expreſſes ſomething which looks like an exception to what might have been expected from the circumſtances which attend the diſcourſe. Thus in the expreſſion, *who but a fool would labour to undo himſelf?* it is inſinuated, that

the fool is an exception to what might be expected; for it is reaſonable to think, that *no man whatſoever* would labour to undo himſelf; and ſo of other inſtances of the uſe of *but*, when it is applied to ſhew the connexions of words in the ſame ſentence.

All theſe conjunctions which I have ſpoke of, as joining words together in the ſame ſentence, are likewiſe uſed to ſhew whole ſentences as depending on, or connected with, each other; and there are ſeveral conjunctions which are not uſed to connect words together in the ſame ſentence, that are applied to ſhew the connexion of one whole ſentence with another whole ſentence.

The whole number of conjunctions may be reduced to the following ſorts or claſſes. The COPULATIVE, the DISJUNCTIVE, the DISCRETIVE, the CONDITIONAL, the ADVERSATIVE or CONCESSIVE, the REDDITIVE, the CAUSAL, the ILLATIVE, the EXCEPTIVE, the RESTRICTIVE, and the SENTENTIAL DEMONSTRATIVE.

COPULATIVE CONJUNCTIONS.

And, alſo, as well as, likewiſe.

THESE ſhew that all the references made, or that all the ſentences connected by their means, equally obtain, or make for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. Thus, *in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, and the earth was without form and void,* is equivalent to, *in the beginning God created the heaven; in the beginning God created the earth; the earth was without form; the earth was void*; and ſo of other inſtances.

DISJUNC-

Disjunctives.

Either, or.

These ſhew that any of the references made, or any of the ſentences connected by them, or at leaſt that ſome one of them muſt obtain or make for the ſpeaker's purpoſe, but without determining which: thus in *either your brethren have miſerably deceived us*, or *power confers virtue*. Swift. Only one of theſe ſentences, *your brethren have miſerably deceived us*; *power confers virtue*; obtains, but it is not determined which of them does obtain.

Discretives.

But, except, ſaving.

These ſhew, that what depends upon one of them is either directly excepted out of what is expreſſed by the other part of the ſeries of words in which any of them is concerned; or, at leaſt, is different from what might reaſonably be expected from the circumſtances which attend the diſcourſe. As *we have no objection but the obſcurity of ſome paſſages*. Swift. i. e. except the obſcurity.

And in *did but men conſider the true notion of God, he would appear full of goodneſs*. Tillotſon. It is inſinuated, that "*men conſider the true notion of God*" expreſſes an exception to the notion of God which men really do conſider, and that exception ſuch as could not reaſonably be expected.

Conditionals.

If, if ſo be, provided, unleſs.

These ſhew, that what depends upon one of them contains a ſuppoſition with which ſome other ſentence is ſo connected,

that it is true or falſe, according as the ſuppoſition is true or falſe; as, *if a thing be true, it is impoſſible to be falſe.* Tillotſon.

Unleſs is the negative of *if*, ſignifying, *if not.* Thus, *I ſhall ſucceed, unleſs you diſappoint me*; and ſo of other inſtances.

Adversatives *or* Concessives.

Though, although, notwithſtanding.

These ſhew, that what depends upon one of them expreſſes what may be taken for granted, and if ſo, that it has the appearance of being adverſe to, or withſtanding what is contained in another ſentence, whilſt yet it does not prevent the other ſentence from being true. Thus, in *many things are believed, although they exceed the capacity of our wits.* Hooker. It is taken for granted, that many things exceed the capacity of our wits. It is alſo ſignified, that this circumſtance ſeems to withſtand or be adverſe to, theſe things being believed; but that in fact it does not prevent their being believed.

Redditives.

Yet, ſtill, neverthelefs.

These ſhew, that what depends upon one of them is no leſs true on account of ſome other ſentence which expreſſes what appears to oppoſe ſuch truth. Thus, in *many of our men were gone to land, neverthelefs the admiral, with ſuch ſhips only as could be put in readineſs, made forth towards them.* Bacon. It is aſſerted, that the admiral's making forth, &c. is no leſs true, on account of many of our men being gone to land, which yet appears to oppoſe the truth of it.

Causals.

CAUSALS.

For, becauſe, ſeeing, foraſmuch; and *ſince, ſo, when, whereas,* in ſome applications of them.

THESE ſhew, that the ſpeaker is proceeding to give a reaſon either for what is already ſaid, or intended to be ſaid. Thus, in *Chriſt died for him, becauſe he died for all.* Hooker. That Chriſt died for all men, is ſhewn to be the reaſon why it is aſſerted, that he died for the particular man who is denoted by *him.*

ILLATIVES.

Therefore, wherefore; and *now, then,* in ſome applications of them.

THESE ſhew, that the ſpeaker is proceeding to draw a conſequence from ſomething promiſed, except *now,* which ſhews that ſome additional help is going to be introduced to the deduction which is intended to be made; as, *he bluſhes; therefore he is guilty.* Spectator. i. e. for this reaſon he is guilty. *Now it is true that I am thy near kinſman.* Old Teſt.

Sometimes a queſtion is aſked by *wherefore*; as,

O wherefore was my birth from heaven foretold
Twice by an angel? *Milton.*

i. e. for what reaſon was my birth, &c.?

EXCEPTIVES.

Unleſs, otherwiſe.

I HAVE already ſhewn, that *unleſs* is equivalent to *if not.*

Otherwiſe gives notice, that the ſpeaker is going to declare what is the conſequence on the aſſumption that things are in

in any other manner than they are already repreſented; ſo that (when uſed as a conjunction) it is equivalent to, *but* or *for if things are not thus*; as, *take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be ſeen of them: otherwiſe ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven.* New Teſtament.

Restrictives.

As, ſo.

These are uſed to give notice, that ſome circumſtance or ſituation is to be aſcertained by it's ſameneſs with, or ſimilarity to, what is or will be expreſſed in the diſcourſe, or by ſome demonſtrative circumſtance; as, *were I as you?* Philips.

The Sentential Demonstrative

That.

This particle is uſed to give notice, that a whole ſentence is to be conſidered as one noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe. As in the expreſſion, *I know that virtue is the excellence of man*; *that virtue is the excellence of man*, is equivalent to one ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe, for it is *the thing known*. And in *I give you notice that the cauſe will be tried to-morrow*; *that the cauſe will* be *tried to-morrow*, is equivalent to one ſubſtantive in the genitive caſe depending on the ſubſtantive *notice*, for it is the thing *of which* notice is given. And ſo in Cowley, *forgive me that I thus your patience wrong*; *that I thus your patience wrong* is the thing which is *to be forgiven* me, and therefore is equivalent to one ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe; and *me* is equivalent to a dative caſe. This latter form of conſtruction will be taken notice of particularly in the ſyntax.

This

This whole ſubject of the conjunctions is treated of at large in the fifth book, Section II, of the ſpeculative part of this work.

SECTION XXV.

Of the prepoſition.

THE prepoſitions are as marks deſign'd
Of modes of thought exerted, when the mind
By ſubſtantives ſo circumſtantiates,
Or objects nam'd by nouns, or verbal ſtates,
That ſev'ral things unite in diff'rent views,
And no encreaſe of number thence enſues.

It is the capital property of a prepoſition, that when by means thereof a ſubſtantive is placed in dependance upon another ſubſtantive, or verb, the compound expreſſion denotes the conception of an object, or ſtate, no ways encreaſed in number, although the parts of the conception are ſeparate and diſtinct in the mind, till they are united by the particular mode of thought which the prepoſition denotes. Thus *the Creator of the univerſe*, denotes but one object, although two diſtinct objects, viz. *the Creator* and *the univerſe*, are concerned in the expreſſion. And *to preſide over the univerſe*, denotes but one verbal ſtate, although the object *univerſe*, as well as the ſtate *to preſide*, is concerned in the expreſſion; and ſo of other inſtances. Therefore the prepoſitions are not meer marks of relations amongſt objects and ſtates, but directions to the mind to apply its diſcurſive powers in certain manners, in order to circumſtantiate that which is denoted by a noun or verb, by what is denoted by a ſubſtantive that depends on ſuch noun or verb by the means of a prepoſition. For objects eſſentially ſeparate, howſoever related to each other,

can never by that relation unite into an object not encreaſed in number. But the conceptions of theſe objects may be uſed in aſſiſting the mind to circumſtantiate verbal ſtates, or other objects, by certain modes of proceeding of the mind itſelf; and different marks may be uſed to denote different modes of proceeding, and the prepoſitions are ſuch marks.

Relations very different in themſelves may be apprehended and applied by the ſame mode of proceeding, and therefore it frequently happens, in the uſe of language, that very different relations are denoted by the ſame prepoſition. Thus in the two Engliſh expreſſions, *to be at a place*—*to be at cards*, two very different relations are denoted by the prepoſition *at*, but they are both conceived to be apprehended and applied by the ſame mode of operation, and therefore are both denoted by the ſame ſign *at*; and ſo of all other inſtances of the uſe of a prepoſition. This is the reaſon that meer cuſtom has ſo much power in the application of this part of ſpeech in all languages. For as different ſorts of relations may be denoted by the ſame prepoſition, there are no certain means of knowing what ſorts of relations are actually denoted by a particular prepoſition in a particular language, but by obſerving the uſe of that language, and thence determining the various applications of the ſame prepoſition which ſuch uſe or cuſtom has eſtabliſhed.

The prepoſitions are applied for two different purpoſes in language, viz. either to connect one word with another in continued diſcourſe; or in fixed union or compoſition with ſome one word, ſo that both the prepoſition, and the word with which it is united, are conſidered together as one compound word. Few of the original Engliſh prepoſitions are uſed in inſeparable compoſition; for moſt of our compound words have been borrowed from the Latin or Greek; and therefore the prepoſitions of theſe languages uſually appear in ſuch words.

The

The original Engliſh prepoſitions appear in the following liſt.

Afore, before.
Againſt.
Beſide, beſides.
Near, nigh, and (by, denoting vicinity of place.)
With.
Toward, towards, to, unto, into.
At.
In, within.
Between, betwixt.
Among, amongſt.
Amidſt.
About, around.
Through, thorough, throughout.
Out of, without.
After, behind.
Beyond.
Off, from.
Above, over.
On, upon.
Below, beneath, underneath.
Up. Down.
Of.
By.
For.
Than.

All theſe, except *of*, *by*, *for*, and *than*, are uſed to denote relations of place, and by analogy, to denote the connections amongſt objects which are not capable of local ſituation. An account of the principal applications of each of them will be given in the ſyntax.

The principal of the French prepoſitions, which are found in inſeparable compoſition in Engliſh words, are, *contre* or *counter*, *em*, *en*, *entre* or *enter*, *pour*, *ſur*.

Thoſe of the Latin are, *ab*, *ad*, *ante*, *circum*, *con*, *contra*, *de*, *di*, *dis*, *e* or *ex*, *extra*, *in*, *inter*, *intro*, *ob*, *per*, *poſt*, *præ*, *preter*, *pro*, *re*, *rètro*, *ſub*, *ſubter*, *ſuper*, *trans*.

Thoſe of the Greek are, *amphi*, *ana*, *anti*, *apo*, *cata*, *dia*, *epi*, *ex*, *en*, *hyper*, *hypo*, *meta*, *para*, *peri*, *pro*, *pros*, *ſyn*, or *ſym*.

Theſe prepoſitions, as likewiſe ſome few of thoſe which are originally Engliſh, are placed in compoſition at the beginning of words; and frequently the compound word has a very different ſenſe to that which the parts whereof it is compounded ſeem to

denote. Thus *to undertake, an undertaker*, do not ſignify the action of taking the under-part of any thing, nor the perſon who does ſo; but the action of entering into an obligation to perform or execute ſomething, and the perſon who enters into ſuch obligation; and ſo of many other inſtances.

The Engliſh prepoſitions are frequently ſubjoined to verbs, ſo as to make a kind of compound verbs differing in ſignification from the ſimple verbs. Thus, *to diſpenſe* is of the ſame meaning with *to diſtribute*; but *to diſpenſe with* is of the ſame import as *to excuſe* or *diſannul*; as, *to diſpenſe with a man's attendance*, means *to excuſe his attendance*, or *to be ſatisfied with his not attending*; and *to diſpenſe with an oath*, means *to diſannul the effect of it*. The Engliſh language has many of its verbs thus compounded, as may be ſeen in Mr. Johnſon's excellent dictionary of the language.

SECTION XXVI.

Of the interjection.

THE ſev'ral ſounds which unconnected ſtart,
Expreſſive of emotions of the heart;
And words which we in ſituations uſe
That regular connected ſpeech refuſe,
Are interjections, form'd to repreſent,
With inſtant force, the ſpeaker's main intent.

This part of ſpeech uſually expreſſes ſome ſudden emotion of the mind of the ſpeaker: or his intention, when he is in ſome ſituation which makes him incapable of holding connected converſation with the hearer. The interjections therefore are inconnective in their nature, and each of them ſingly is a declaration of the ſituation of the ſpeaker's mind, or of his intention, if he is too far diſtant from the hearer, or otherwiſe incapacitated from holding continued converſation with him.

The

The principal interjections of the Engliſh language are the following.

Adieu, an expreſſion of the good wiſhes of the ſpeaker for a perſon of whom he is taking leave.
Ah! an expreſſion of diſlike, ſorrow, contemptuous exultation, or plaintive compaſſion in the ſpeaker, or in thoſe who are repreſented as ſpeaking.
Ah that, of great concern that things ſhould be as they are repreſented, but of little hope that they are ſo.
Aha! of pleaſing ſurpriſe, or contemptuous exultation.
Alack! of ſorrow, real or ironical.
Alack aday! the ſame as alack.
Alas! of lamenting ſorrow, pity or concern.
Alas the day! alas the while! the ſame as ah unhappy day! ah unhappy time!
Aroynt, avaunt, or be gone. Uſed to a witch.
Avaunt, be gone inſtantly.
Foh, an indication of abhorrence in the ſpeaker.
Fy, of diſapprobation, a word of reproof.
† *Go to*, of exhortation with contempt.
Ha! of ſurprize.
Ha, ha, or *he, he*, laughter.
Hab, an indication of the exertion of ſome violent effort.
Hail, ſolemn ſalutation at meeting.
Halloo, incitement to dogs to purſue the chace.
Hark! an exhortation to liſten.
Havock! incitement to ſlaughter.
Heigh ho! an indication of uneaſy languor.
Hey, joyous congratulation or exhortation.
Hey day! an indication of wonder attended with chearfulneſs.
Hiſt, an exhortation to ſilence.
Ho, or *hoa*, notice to attend to what the ſpeaker is going to ſay.
Holla, notice to ſome one at a great diſtance to ſtop and attend.
Hum, a notice of deliberation in the ſpeaker, proceeding from doubt.

Huſh, the ſame as *hiſt*.
Huzza, an expreſſion of exulting joy.
Lo, and ſometimes *la*, an exhortation to give attention, properly to ſome object of ſight, but ſometimes applied to other things, either expreſſed or underſtood.
Mum, an exhortation to continue in ſilence.
O, an indication of wiſhing or being anxious either from deſire of ſomething good, or from apprehenſion of ſomething evil.

This particle is alſo uſed in the ſolemn form of the vocative caſe, and is a notice to the perſon to whoſe name it is prefixed, that he is the perſon to whom the ſolemn addreſs is made. In poetry and in ſolemn language, it ſometimes happens that inanimate things are conſidered as perſons, and are addreſſed by *O!*

Off, an injunction to retire, proceeding from diſguſt in the ſpeaker, at the near ſituation of ſome object.
Oh! an indication of bodily pain, ſorrow, or ſurprize at any diſagreeable object.
Peace, an injunction to deſiſt from ſpeaking.
Piſh, or *pſhaw*, or *pugh*, indications of diſguſt attended with contempt.
See, the ſame as *lo*.
Silence, the ſame as *peace*.
So, or *ſo then*, an indication that the ſpeaker is ſatisfied of the certainty of what he is going to ſay, although he gives no reaſon why he is ſatisfied.
Soft, an injunction not to proceed ſo faſt.
Soho, a ſignification to a perſon at a great diſtance, that the perſon who ſpeaks directs his words to the diſtant perſon.
Strange! an indication of wonder in the ſpeaker.
Tuſh, or † *tut*, an indication of contempt in the ſpeaker.
† *Welaway*, or † *weladay!* the ſame as *alas!* or *alas the day!*
Welcome, a ſignification of joy in the ſpeaker at the arrival of a ſtranger.
Well done, an expreſſion of approbation in the ſpeaker of what is done.

Well

Well met, an expreſſion of ſatisfaction in the ſpeaker at the meeting of another perſon.
What? an indication of ſurpriſe producing a queſtion.
What ho, the ſame as *hola*, or *ſoho*.

It is manifeſt that theſe interjections are all affirmations either *declarative*, *imperative*, or *optative*; and conſequently that each of them is equivalent to a full ſentence containing a definitive verb, either of the indicative or the imperative or the optative mood in it. But the demonſtrative circumſtances which attend the uſe of an interjection make it unneceſſary, and ſometimes impoſſible, to form a regular ſentence to declare what the interjection denotes; as when *hola* or *ſoho* are uſed to ſome perſon at a great diſtance from the ſpeaker. Theſe circumſtances always exiſt at the time when the interjections are uſed, and therefore an interjection is always equivalent to a ſentence containing a definitive verb of the preſent tenſe in it, *i. e.* a definitive verb which relates to time, not *preceding* or *ſucceeding*, but *coexiſtent with* the time in which the interjection is actually pronounced. Hence it appears, that the property of *affirmation* it not peculiar to the definitive verb only, but is common to it with the interjection: only, in the uſe of interjections, the ſubject of affirmation is ſupplied by demonſtrative circumſtances; whereas, in the uſe of a definitive verb, the ſubject is expreſſed by one or more words which are equivalent to one noun ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe.

A Prac-

A

Practical Grammar

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

BOOK II.

OF SYNTAX.

THIS part of grammar conſiſts of rules directing how to unite words in connected ſeries, ſo as to expreſs the various conceptions of the mind of man.

In order to produce this effect, it is neceſſary not only to repreſent all the words of a ſeries as united together; but likewiſe to give notice which of the words are to be taken in immediate connexion with each other: for the very ſame words may be placed in various orders; and in ſome of the orders it may not be eaſy to diſcern which words are to be conſidered as immediately connected together. In the Latin and Greek, that correſpondence of termination which is obſerved between the numbers and perſons of ſubſtantives and definitive verbs; of gender, number, and caſe, between ſubſtantives and adjectives; and of gender, number, and perſon, between the relative and perſonal pronouns and their antecedents; is made uſe of to direct to thoſe words which are to be conſidered as immediately united, although they are not placed cloſe by each other. This correſpondence is called concord in grammar, and by means thereof the ſame words may be placed in various orders in theſe languages,

languages, and yet continue intelligible in any of the orders. The Engliſh makes ſome uſe of diverſity of termination of number and perſon in its definitive verbs, and of gender and number in its pronouns, for the ſame purpoſes that the concords are uſed in Latin. But the principal effect of theſe concords is anſwered in the Engliſh by obſerving a certain order of poſition in the words of its ſentences. And therefore although it be neceſſary in Engliſh ſyntax to take notice of the concords, and to give ſome rules concerning them, it is likewiſe neceſſary to give rules for the order of poſition of words, and to conſider theſe rules as rules of concord adapted to the Engliſh language.

I have ſhewed at large in the ſpeculative part, Book VI, Section II, why ſerieſes of words expreſſing the conceptions of the mind of man take the form of a ſentence, and why there muſt be in every compleat ſentence one nominative caſe of a ſubſtantive (or that which is equivalent to ſuch caſe) and one definitive verb. If there is no more than one ſuch ſubſtantive and one ſuch verb in the ſentence, it is called a ſimple ſentence. Several ſuch ſentences may be reduced to one complex ſentence, by the means of relative pronouns or conjunctions; but ſuch a complex ſentence may be reſolved into the ſimple ſentences of which it conſiſts; ſo that the order of poſition, which obtains in ſimple ſentences, in effect extends to all others with very few exceptions.

Rules for the order of poſition of words, which in the Engliſh anſwers ſeveral of the purpoſes of what is called concord in the Latin and Greek.

1. IN ſentences at large uſed to declare,
   The nominatives before the verbs appear.
2. But in a queſtion, wiſh, or a command,
   The nom'natives behind their verbs muſt ſtand

Of ev'ry ſimple tenſe; but if complex,
3. After the ſigns we nom'natives annex.
4. And ſuppoſitions, not by *if*, receive,
After the verb or ſign, a nom'native.

1. In declarative ſentences, the nominative caſe ſtands before the verb; as,

THE LORD GOD FORMED man of the duſt of the ground. Old Teſt.
THE WORD WAS MADE fleſh, and dwelt among us. New Teſt.
OUR VIRTUES WOULD BE PROUD, if our faults whiſpered them not. Shakeſpeare.

2. But when a queſtion is aſked, or a command given, or a wiſh expreſſed, if the verb be of any ſimple tenſe, the nominative caſe is placed behind the verb; as,

IS ANY THING too hard for the Lord? Old Teſtament.
BELIEVEST THOU the prophets? New Teſtament.
GO YE therefore and teach all nations. New Teſtament.
STAND THOU here by me. Old Teſtament.
FAR BE THE THOUGHT OF THIS from Henry's heart. Shakeſpeare.

3. If the verb be of any compound tenſe, the nominative caſe is placed after the ſign of the tenſe; as,

HAST THOU EATEN of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou ſhouldeſt not eat? Old Teſtament.
SHALL I HIDE from Abraham that thing which I do? Old Teſt.
DO WE BEGIN again to commend ourſelves? New Teſtament.
DID I REQUEST thee, Maker, from my clay
To mould me man? DID I SOLICIT thee? Milton.
Be not afraid, neither BE THOU DISMAYED. Old Teſtament.
MAY YOU LIVE happily and long for the ſervice of your country. Dryden.

4. And when a ſuppoſition is made without giving notice of it by *if*, the nominative caſe ſtands after the verb, if it be of any ſim-

ple tenſe, and after the ſign, if the verb be of any compound tenſe; as,

I would make the remembrance of them to ceaſe among men: WERE IT NOT that I feared the wrath of the enemy. Old Teſtament.

WERE I ſo minded; I here could pluck his Highneſs' frown upon you. Shakeſpeare.

HADST THOU BEEN there—thou couldſt not have diſcern'd Fraud in the ſerpent. Milton.

COULD GREAT MEN THUNDER
As Jove himſelf does; Jove would ne'er be quiet. Shakeſpeare.

In compound tenſes, adverbs oft are ſeen,
And ſometimes other words, the verb and ſign between.

Adverbs are often placed between the ſign and the verb of all the compound tenſes; as,

I WAS NEVER BETTER PLEASED in my life. Spectat. N° 556.

HE WOULD REALLY WANT a dictionary——and WOULD HARDLY AT FIRST BELIEVE at what a low rate the higheſt ſtrains and expreſſions of kindneſs DO COMMONLY PASS in current payment. Tillotſon.

I HAVE HITHERTO ONLY ARGUED againſt the partiality. Spectator, N° 564.

This kind of poſition of adverbs is continually occurring, and ſometimes other words are placed between the ſign and the verb; as,

If I had but one ſoul, it COULD NOT AT THE SAME TIME PANT after virtue and vice. ibid

The genitive by *'s*, uſe has decreed
Muſt go before a noun, and that by *of* ſucceed.

Thoſe who conſider change of termination as that only which conſtitutes a caſe, will allow of no other oblique caſe in Engliſh nouns, but this only, which they call the poſitive caſe. It always goes before the ſubſtantive with which it is connected; *Now*

Now Sarai ABRAM'S *WIFE bare him no children.* Old Teſt.
And he ſaid, Hagar, SARAI'S MAID, *whence cameſt thou?*
Old Teſtament.

No ceremony that to great ones 'longs,
THE MARSHAL'S TRUNCHEON, nor THE JUDGE'S ROBE,
Becomes them with one half ſo good a grace
As mercy does. Shakeſpeare.

After verbs tranſitive thoſe nouns appear,
To which the verbs their paſſive ſtates transfer.

The poſition of a ſubſtantive after a tranſitive verb ſupplies, in Engliſh ſubſtantives, the effect of the accuſative caſe, which in Greek and Latin has a different termination from the nominative.

The Engliſh perſonal pronouns, *I, thou, he, ſhe; we, ye,* and *they*; and the relative *who*; have indeed each an accuſative caſe different from the nominative; but the perſonal pronoun *it*, and the relatives *which* and *that*, have no ſuch caſe.

The effect of this caſe, howſoever expreſſed, is to ſhew the object denoted by a noun ſubſtantive, as having in it the paſſive ſtate of the verb on which the noun in this caſe depends.

As in the expreſſion, *John ſees—hears—helps—hinders James*; *James* is evidently the perſon who is *ſeen—heard—helped—injured*; and ſo of other inſtances of the uſe of tranſitive verbs, with ſubſtantives in this caſe depending upon them.

My father peradventure WILL FEEL ME, *and I ſhall ſeem to him as a deceiver.* Old Teſtament.
If ſinners INTICE THEE, *conſent thou not.* Old Teſtament.
Jehoſheba TOOK JOASH, and STOLE HIM *from among the king's ſons which were ſlain.* Old Teſtament.

Before their clauſes plac'd, by ſettled uſe,
The relatives theſe clauſes introduce.

The relative pronouns are always placed at the beginning of the clauſes which are made dependent on other clauſes by their means. This will appear by examples in what will be ſaid of the caſe of the relative.

To adjectives prefix'd we adverbs find,
But verbs require them to be plac'd behind.

Adverbs are uſually placed before adjectives; as,

And God ſaw every thing that he had made, and behold, it was VERY GOOD. Old Teſtament.

Wiſdom alone is TRULY FAIR. Milton.

*The ſecret villain—*SO RASHLY BRAVE *to dare the ſword of Theſeus.* Smith.

And after verbs; as,

Admitting their principles to be true, they ACT WISELY. Rogers.

When he came to die, he made him THINK MORE REASONABLY. Dryden.

Theſe rules for the order of poſition of words in Engliſh are not ſo fixed as never to admit of exceptions, eſpecially in very ſolemn or very familiar language, and in poetry. Thus in the beginning of the Goſpel of St. John we find the expreſſion, *In the beginning was the Word*, inſtead of, *The Word was in the beginning*; and in common colloquial language we frequently uſe *ſays he*, inſtead of *he ſays*; and Mr. Pope uſes the expreſſion, *ſounds the tough bow*, inſtead of *the tough bow ſounds*; and Mr. Dryden begins his tranſlation of Virgil's Eneis with, *Arms and the man I ſing*, inſtead of *I ſing arms and the man*; and inſtances occur continually in which theſe rules for the poſition of words are not ſtrictly obſerved. But notwithſtanding this, theſe rules are generally to be obſerved in the ordinary conſtruction of the language, and nothing but much obſervation and judgment can determine the inſtances in which we may ſafely depart from them.

I have already obſerved, that we make ſome uſe, in Engliſh, of forms of conſtruction like the Latin concords. Theſe are three

three in the Latin, but might be reduced to two in Engliſh; becauſe our adjectives have no difference of termination, either of caſe, gender, or number. But we ſupply the want of ſuch difference of termination by the poſition of the adjective with regard to the ſubſtantive on which it depends, and therefore this poſition may be conſidered as a kind of concord.

The firſt concord; or that between the nominative caſe and the verb.

IN perſonal conſtruction verbs receive
Number and perſon from a nom'native.

The obſervation of this concord determines the form of a ſentence; and, if the ſentence be of the very ſimpleſt kind, no rule is neceſſary to be obſerved in the conſtruction of it, but that of poſition, and this concord.

The moſt ſimple of all ſentences which can be expreſſed at large, are ſuch as conſiſt each of one nominative caſe, and one definitive verb. The moſt ſimple of all words which can be applied as ſubſtantives in the nominative caſe, are the perſonal pronouns. Therefore the forms, *I have—thou haſt—he has, we—you—they have*; *I am—thou art—he is, we—you—they are*; *I call—thou calleſt—he calls, we—you—they call*, &c. which appear in the conjugation of the definitive moods of the verb, are all ſentences of the moſt ſimple form; and if they are well obſerved, will ſhew the meaning of the firſt concord.

For the three ſingular forms of the preſent tenſe of the indicative mood have each a peculiar termination; and the firſt of theſe terminations correſponds with a nominative caſe of the firſt perſon, the ſecond termination with a nominative of the ſecond perſon, and the third with a nominative of the third perſon. Therefore we muſt not ſay, *I haſt* or *I has*, but *I have*; nor *thou am* or *thou is*, but *thou art*; nor *he call* or *he calleſt*, but *he calls* (or *he calleth*, in ſolemn language); and ſo of other inſtances.

inſtances. There is alſo a difference of termination between the ſingular and plural number, in ſome of the tenſes of the verb *to be*; and therefore we muſt not ſay, *I are—thou are—he are*, nor apply the verb *are* to any nominative caſe of the ſingular number. There is no Engliſh verb, but the verb *to be*, which has a plural termination in any tenſe different from the termination of the firſt perſon ſingular. But this verb is uſed as an auxiliar in all the paſſive and middle verbs, and therefore a regard to difference of number, as well as of perſon, muſt be attended to in the firſt concord, as applied to the Engliſh language.

Any ſubſtantive of the nominative caſe ſingular and of the third perſon (*i. e.* which denotes what neither ſpeaks and names itſelf, nor is ſpoken to) may be ſubſtituted inſtead of *he*; as, *John has—Jane calls:* and any ſubſtantive of the nominative caſe plural of this perſon may be ſubſtituted inſtead of *they*; as, *the men have—the women call.* But if the nominative caſe be of the firſt perſon ſingular or plural, the perſonal pronouns muſt be retained together with ſuch caſe; as, *I John N—— declare—we the underwritten perſons promiſe.* There is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, no nominative caſe of the ſecond perſon; becauſe every object of that perſon is *the object ſpoken to*; and therefore its name, even when it is the ſubject of a ſentence, is of the vocative caſe. But the name of an object of the ſecond perſon anſwers all the purpoſes of a nominative caſe with regard to the definitive verb, which depends upon it; and therefore the pronouns, *thou*, *you*, and *ye*, are uſually conſidered as nominative caſes of the ſecond perſon. Theſe pronouns muſt alſo be retained in declarative ſentences, together with the ſubſtantives of the ſecond perſon; as, *thou Lord art gracious—you children muſt be ſilent.* The reaſon why the perſonal pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſons muſt be uſed with the verb in Engliſh, is, becauſe each perſon of each number of the verb has not a different termination, as in Greek and Latin; and therefore the pronouns in Engliſh are uſed to diſtinguiſh both the firſt and ſecond perſons from the third.

A noun

A noun of multitude, *i. e.* which ſignifies many objects, may have a verb plural in dependence upon it, although it be of a ſingular grammatic form; as, *The* ASSEMBLY *of the wicked* HAVE *encloſed me.* Old Teſtament.

And ſeveral nominative caſes ſingular may be joined by copulative conjunctions, and ſuch an expreſſion may be conſidered as the name of a plural object; and of conſequence, if a definitive verb depends upon it, when thus conſidered, the verb muſt be of the plural number; as, ABRAHAM AND SARAH WERE OLD. Old Teſtament.

But a noun of multitude may be conſidered as denoting one complex object, and if ſo, the verb muſt be ſingular; as, THE MULTITUDE *of the city* WAS *divided.* New Teſtament.

And a verb of the ſingular number may be conſidered as firſt applied to one, and then to another of the ſubſtantives ſingular, which are joined by copulative conjunctions; as,
SAND, *and* SALT, *and* A MASS OF IRON, IS *eaſier to bear, than a man without underſtanding.* Eccleſiaſticus, ch. 22. ver. 15.

The want of variation of perſon in the plural number of the Engliſh verb contributes to the ſimplicity of the language. For a plural object may conſiſt of ſingle objects of all the three perſons; as, *I, thou and he are met together,* which in Latin would be *ego, tu & ille convenimus*; which is as if we were to ſay in Engliſh, *I, thou and he* WE *are met together*; and *thou and he are met together* is in Latin *tu & ille conveniſtis*; which is as if we ſaid in Engliſh, *thou and he* YOU *are met together*; and ſo of other inſtances in which ſeveral ſubſtantives of different perſons require a verb plural in dependence upon them. For no one termination of the perſon of the verb can ſuit plural objects ſo conſtituted; and therefore the Engliſh, with great propriety, makes the termination of all the perſons plural the ſame in the ſame tenſe.

Thus we are freed, in Engliſh (ſo far as the verb is concerned) from the perplexity occaſioned to children in Latin by the rule;

The firſt perſon is more worthy than the ſecond, and the ſecond than the third.

A verb infinitive, or train of words
Sometimes, what anſwers to this caſe affords.

A verb of the infinitive mood, either alone, or with one or more words depending upon it, may ſupply the place of one noun ſubſtantive in any caſe. It frequently ſupplies the place of a nominative caſe of the third perſon ſingular; as in the following examples.

To HAVE RESPECT OF PERSONS *is not good.* Old Teſtam.
To me TO LIVE *is Chriſt, and* TO DIE *is gain.* New Teſtam.
To BE WEAK *is to be miſerable.* Milton.
If TO HAVE DONE THE THING YOU GAVE IN CHARGE
Beget your happineſs; be happy then. Shakeſpeare.

A whole ſentence with *that* before it may likewiſe ſupply the place of one noun ſubſtantive in any caſe, and often ſupplies a nominative to the verb. But when it does ſo, the ſentence is uſually introduced by *it*, and the ſentence with *that* before it is placed after the verb; as,

It CAME TO PASS *upon a day,* THAT JONATHAN THE SON OF SAUL SAID UNTO THE YOUNG MAN THAT BARE HIS ARMOUR, COME, AND LET US GO OVER TO THE PHILISTINES' GARISON. Old T.
It MAY BE THAT *I* WILL ABIDE, *yea,* AND WINTER WITH YOU. New Teſtament.

This kind of conſtruction uſually appears with the paſſive verbs, *it is ſaid—denied—thought—believed—foretold—ordained—decreed*, &c. For that which is *ſaid, thought, denied*, &c. muſt be expreſſed by a ſentence on almoſt all occaſions; and this ſentence muſt in effect be a nominative caſe to the paſſive verb with which it is connected; as,

It is denied, THAT IT IS *neceſſary to the character of a fine gentleman,* THAT HE SHOULD TRAMPLE UPON ALL ORDER AND DECENCY. Spectator, N° 65.

It.

It muſt be confeſſed, THAT THE GREAT FAMILIARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO SEXES, ON THIS OCCASION, MAY SOMETIMES PRODUCE VERY DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES. Spectator, N° 68.

The ſecond concord: or that between the ſubſtantive and the adjective.

THE adjectives unvaried in their end
By gender, number, caſe, on ſubſtantives attend.
Before their ſubſtantives our ſpeech applies
Thoſe adjectives which nothing modifies,
Adverbs excepted: but removes behind,
When other words dependent are ſubjoin'd.

The Engliſh adjectives have no diverſity of caſe, gender, or number; but, without change of termination, are applied to all kinds of ſubſtantives of every caſe, gender, and number, and coaleſce with them by meer appoſition.

But it muſt be obſerved, that the diſtributives, *every, each, either,* are only applied to ſingulars, or to plurals conſidered as denoting collective quantities taken ſeparately; as,

All the congregation are holy, EVERY ONE OF THEM. Old Teſt.
EVERY TWELVE YEARS. Bacon.
By hunger, that EACH OTHER CREATURE *tames,*
Thou art not to be harm'd. Milton.
How unreaſonable it is to expect the ſame proof for EVERY THING. Tillotſon.

Theſe diſtributives are really a kind of pronouns, and as ſuch are frequently uſed by themſelves to repreſent objects; as,

The virtue and force of EVERY *of theſe three.* Hammond.
Let EACH *his adamantine coat gird well.* Milton.
Nor EITHER *cares for him.* Shakeſpeare.

Hence the ſubſtantives, with which theſe words are ſometimes connected, may be conſidered as antecedents; and if ſo, the

conſtruction of theſe pronouns will fall under the rule, *Pronouns to antecedents*, &c. which appears in the third concord.

If the adjective is ſimple (*i. e.* if it have no word depending upon it,) we uſually place it immediately before its ſubſtantive, and the article before it, if an article is required; as, *a good man*, *the large houſes:* or if an adverb unites with the adjective, it is frequenly placed immediately before the adjective which precedes the ſubſtantive; as, *a very good man*; *the infinitely wiſe God.*

But if one or more dependent words modify an adjective, it follows the ſubſtantive immediately; except an adverb is alſo concerned; and if ſo, the adverb follows the ſubſtantive, and the adjective follows the adverb; as, *a man good to others*; *a houſe very convenient for ſummer.*

All theſe rules for the poſition of adjectives admit of exceptions. For even ſimple adjectives follow their ſubſtantives, if thoſe ſubſtantives depend immediately upon a verb, and the adjectives expreſs the circumſtances attending the verbal ſtates in which the objects denoted by the ſubſtantives are repreſented; as, *to make a man happy*; *to find a friend melancholy*; *I left the company chearful.* And if the adjective be emphatical; as, *Alexander the Great*; *James the Leſs.*

As to adjectives with adverbs, they are almoſt as frequently placed behind a ſubſtantive as before it, and before a verb as behind it; as,

A man exceſſively paſſionate; *a woman remarkably chearful.*
There is SOMETHING WONDERFULLY DIVINE *in the airs of this picture.* Addiſon.
I VERY MUCH APPROVE *of the contempt the ſociety has of beauty.* Spectator, N° 32.

And the article is placed behind *all*, *ſuch*, *many*, and any adjectives depending on *as*, *ſo*, and *how*; as, *all* THE *company ſtayed*; *ſuch* A *perſon has been here*; *many* A *time*; *he is* AS GREAT A PRINCE

as

as Auguſtus; he is not SO GREAT A PRINCE *as Auguſtus;* HOW GREAT A PRINCE *was Auguſtus!*

The third concord: or that between the pronoun and its antecedent.

PRONOUNS to antecedents muſt refer
Their gender, number, and their perſon bear.

With ſubſtantives we the poſſeſſives place,
Unchang'd by gender, number, or by caſe.

All the pronouns in Engliſh take their gender, number and perſon from the antecedent. For even the poſſeſſive pronouns, *his*, *her* or *hers*, *its*, admit of no grammatic variation of gender and number, ſo as to ſuit thoſe of the ſubſtantive, to which they are applied, any more than the other adjectives of the language do.

The Engliſh perſonal pronouns of the third perſon have a diſtinction of ſex or gender in the ſingular number; for *he* muſt repreſent a male; *ſhe*, a female; and *it*, an object of no ſex; or, at leaſt, an object in which the ſex is not conſidered; as a little child, for inſtance, or any diminutive animal. But the plural *they* equally repreſents objects of all the three genders; for a plural object may conſiſt of ſingular objects, ſome of which are maſculine, others feminine, and others neuter; as, *a man and a woman and ſome iron were in the waggon, and* THEY *were all overturned.*

The poſſeſſive pronouns have alſo a diſtinction of gender in the ſingular number; for *his* ſhews what is related to a male; as, *his houſe—his eſtate: her* ſhews what is related to a female; as, *her houſe—her eſtate:* and *its* ſhews what is related to an object in which the ſex is not conſidered; as, *its ſize—its price:* but *their* ſhews what is related to a plural object, but without any diſtinction of ſex or gender. For the plural object referred to may conſiſt of ſingle objects of all the

three genders; as, *a man and a woman and ſome iron ſhould have been in the waggon, but* THEIR *place was taken up by other goods*

This frees the Engliſh, in a great meaſure, from the perplexity of ſuch rules, as, "The maſculine gender is more "worthy than the feminine, and the feminine than the neuter, "unleſs in things not apt to have life, for in them the neuter "is the moſt worthy gender." Theſe rules ariſe in the Latin and Greek, becauſe the adjectives and poſſeſſive pronouns muſt agree, in grammatic gender, with the gender of the ſubſtantives to which they are applied; and when ſeveral ſubſtantives of different genders happen to denote a complex object, no one gender of an adjective or poſſeſſive pronoun, will ſuit thoſe of ſuch a ſeries of ſubſtantives. And therefore neither the Engliſh adjectives, nor the plural perſonal, nor the plural poſſeſſive pronouns, have a diſtinction of gender.

The demonſtrative pronouns, *this, theſe, that, thoſe*, &c. are ſometimes conſidered as adjectives; and if they are ſo conſidered, theſe adjectives have a diverſity of number, and *this* and *that* can only unite with ſubſtantives of the ſingular number, *theſe* and *thoſe* with ſubſtantives of the plural. But it is more eaſy to conſider the ſubſtantives with which theſe pronouns unite as a kind of antecedents, aſcertaining the meaning of the pronouns more fully, and if the ſubſtantives are thus conſidered, the conſtruction of theſe pronouns falls under the rule given above, viz. *Pronouns to antecedents*, &c.

It ſometimes happens, that a plural object, conſiſting of objects of different perſons, is to be expreſſed over again by a perſonal or poſſeſſive pronoun; and if ſo, the ſame pronoun cannot take notice of all the perſons. When this inſtance occurs, the firſt perſon is preferred before the ſecond or third, and the ſecond before the third; as, *I, you, and he muſt ſhare this amongſt us; neither you nor ſhe have done your buſineſs.*

To

To things we *which* apply, to perſons *who*,
While *that* may either things or perſons ſhow.

The relatives *who* and *which* have a diſtinction as to the nature of the objects which they repreſent. For *who* is only applied to perſons, and *which* only to things; but *that* may equally repreſent either perſons or things.

None of the relative pronouns have a diſtinction of number in Engliſh; for *who* equally repreſents one man, woman, or rational being, or more than one of ſuch beings; as, *the man* WHO *came—the men* WHO *came:* and *which* equally repreſents one thing, or more than one; as, *the ſum* WHICH *will be paid*, or *the ſums* WHICH *will be paid:* and *that* equally repreſents a ſingular or plural object of any kind; as, *the man* THAT *came—the men* THAT *came—the ſum* THAT *will be paid—the ſums* THAT *will be paid*; and ſo of other inſtances. This contributes to make the conſtruction of the relative in Engliſh, eaſier than it is in the Latin and Greek.

Of the caſe of the relative.

THE relatives are in the nom'native,
Number and perſon when to verbs they give.
Which characters, when other names confer,
The relatives dependent caſes bear:
Such as the verbs require; or other words,
Which to the relative the clauſe affords.
But whatſoe'er their caſe, by ſettled uſe
The relatives their clauſes introduce.

The caſe of the relative muſt always be the ſame, as that of its antecedent would be, if the antecedent were ſubſtituted in the clauſe inſtead of the relative. This proceeding would turn the relative clauſe into a compleat ſentence, and every relative

clauſe is ſuch a ſentence, before it is incorporated into another ſentence, by ſubſtituting the relative inſtead of its antecedent, to give notice of ſuch incorporation. Thus, the man *who ſpoke—of whom I ſpoke—to whom you ſpoke—whom Mr. N. ſent—by whom we are injured—with whom you debated—for whom the people work*, are expreſſions which evidently conſiſt of the ſentences, *he ſpoke—I ſpoke of him—you ſpoke to him—Mr. N. ſent him—we are injured by him—you debated with him—the people work for him*, all applied to the antecedent *the man*; only the ſentences are turned into relative clauſes by uſing *who—of whom—to whom—whom—by, with, for whom*; inſtead, of *he—of him—to him—him—by, with, for him.*

In the firſt inſtance, viz. *the man who ſpoke, who* is the nominative caſe to the verb *ſpoke*; but in all the other inſtances, there are other nominative caſes to the ſeveral verbs; as, *you, Mr. N.*; *we, the people*; and when this happens, the relative is in the ſame depending caſe which the pronoun *he* would be in, ſuppoſing that the relative clauſe had been expreſſed as a ſentence of itſelf, viz. as it appears in, *I ſpoke of him—you ſpoke to him—Mr. N. ſent him*, &c. But the relative is always at the beginning of the clauſe; and therefore when it is in any dependent caſe, it does not ſtand in the ſame place where its antecedent ſtands in the ſentence which is turned into a relative clauſe; for *I ſpoke of him*, if turned into a relative clauſe, becomes, *of whom I ſpoke*; *Mr. N. ſent him*, becomes, *whom Mr. N. ſent*; and ſo of other inſtances.

If on a prepoſition *that* depends,
Such prepoſition in the clauſe attends
Somewhere behind the verb. But *which* and *who*
Of prepoſitions plac'd before allow.
Yet even when thoſe are us'd, the following train
Of words the prepoſition may contain.

When *that* is uſed as a relative pronoun, it does not admit of a prepoſition before it, but the prepoſition is placed where it ſhould

ſhould have ſtood in the ſentence, which is turned into a relative clauſe. Thus if the ſentences, *I ſpoke of him—you ſpoke to him*, are turned into relative clauſes, by uſing *that* inſtead of *him*, the clauſes muſt be, *that I ſpoke of—that I ſpoke to*; as, *the man that I ſpoke of—the man that I ſpoke to*; and not *the man of that I ſpoke—the man to that I ſpoke.* But if *whom* be uſed inſtead of *him*, the relative clauſes may either be, *of whom I ſpoke*, or *whom I ſpoke of*; *whom I ſpoke to*, or *to whom I ſpoke*; as, *the man of whom I ſpoke*, or *the man whom I ſpoke of*; and ſo of other inſtances. *Which* is uſed in the ſame manner as *whom*; for we equally ſay, *the place from which I came*, or *the place which I came from*; and ſo of other inſtances: but we do not ſay, *the place from that I came*, but *the place that I came from.*

Anſw'ring to *ſuch*, *as*, *ſo*, you *as* perceive
Plac'd in conſtruction like a relative.

As, when redditive to *ſuch*, *as*, or *ſo*, very frequently ſupplies the place of a relative pronoun; as,

Such precepts AS TEND *to make men good, ſingly conſidered, may be diſtributed into ſuch* AS ENJOIN *piety towards God, or ſuch* AS REQUIRE *the good government of ourſelves.* Tillotſon.
He has not done ſo well AS *was expected.*
They have done AS *much* AS *could be deſired.*

Of the conſtruction of the oblique caſes of ſubſtantives.

Of the GENITIVE CASE.

THE genitives are in dependence ſeen
On nouns, when correlations intervene.

When a ſubſtantive in the genitive caſe depends on another noun, either ſubſtantive or adjective, the objects denoted by the two

two nouns are ſo united, as they would be if a verb tranſitive were placed between them, and one of the objects were in the active or paſſive ſtate of ſuch verb, and the other object in the correſponding paſſive or active ſtate of the ſame verb. This correſpondence between the active and paſſive, or between the paſſive and active ſtate of any tranſitive verb, is what is meant by the word *correlation* in the rule, becauſe either of theſe ſtates ſuppoſes the other, as the terms of all correlations do. Thus the word *parent* ſuppoſes *offspring*, and the word *offspring* ſuppoſes *parent*; for the ſtates *generating* and *generated* are contained in the ſignification of the words; ſeeing a parent is *an object generating*, and offspring is an *object generated*, and either of the ſtates, *generating*, or *generated*, ſuppoſes the correſponding ſtate. Therefore we may either ſay, *the parent* OF *ſuch offspring*, or *the offspring* OF *ſuch a parent*; and ſo of very many inſtances of the genitive caſe of one noun ſubſtantive in dependence upon another. And in the expreſſion, *deſirous of honour*, the ſtate *deſiring* is included in the adjective *deſirous*, and *honour* is *the object deſired*; and this correſpondence is denoted by the ſign *of*, or by *of honour*, conſidered as a ſubſtantive of the genitive caſe; and ſo of other inſtances of adjectives, with a genitive caſe in dependence on them.

It is uſually laid down as a rule, that when two ſubſtantives, ſignifying different things, come together, the latter muſt be in the genitive caſe; and indeed correlations are much the moſt frequently found between different things. But one and the ſame object may be conſidered in two capacities, and a correlation may exiſt between theſe two capacities; as appears in the expreſſions, *an injurer of himſelf—lovers of themſelves*, &c.; for here the ſame perſon is *the object injuring* and *that which is injured*, and the ſame perſons are *the objects loving* and *thoſe loved*.

The pronouns perſonal are ſeldom uſed in dependence upon ſubſtantives by the ſign *of*, but the pronouns poſſeſſive are uſed. Thus

Thus we do not ſay, *the eſtate, loſs, gain, faults,* &c. *of me, of thee, of him, of us, of you, of them*; but *my, thy, his, our, your, their eſtate, loſs, gain, faults,* &c.

Adjectives derived from the names of nations and cities are frequently uſed inſtead of the genitive caſe of theſe names; as, *the Engliſh fleet, the Roman emperors, Spaniſh gold, Swediſh iron,* &c. inſtead of *the fleet of England, the emperors of Rome,* &c.

Adjectives which denote the fixed qualities of objects, are likewiſe frequently uſed, ſo as to be equivalent to a ſubſtantive in the genitive caſe, which ſubſtantive is contained in the ſignification of the adjective.

Thus, *a wiſe, worthy, virtuous man,* are expreſſions equivalent to, *a man of wiſdom, of worth, of virtue*; and ſo of many other inſtances, which uſe and experience only can ſhew; for we do not ſay, *a man of vice, of folly, of covetouſneſs*; but *a vicious, fooliſh, covetous man*; and ſo of many other inſtances.

On verbs depending *of* to objects leads
From out whereof the verbal ſtate proceeds.
Or to the objects of our words or thought;
Or thoſe whence things are borrow'd, begg'd, won, bought;
Or to the things by deprivation gain'd
From others; or by force or fraud obtain'd.

A ſubſtantive, when made dependent upon a verb by the ſign *of*, denotes objects in different kinds of connexions or dependencies, according to the nature of the ſtate ſignified by the verb with which the ſubſtantive is united by this ſign.

After verbs of *making, framing, compounding,* &c. *of* directs to the material out of which ſomething is made, framed, &c. as,

All the days of his ſeparation ſhall he eat nothing that is made OF THE VINE TREE. Old Teſtament.

The Lord God formed man OF THE DUST OF THE GROUND. Old Teſt.

Zeal ought to be compoſed OF THE HIGHEST DEGREES OF ALL PIOUS AFFECTIONS. Sprat.

After verbs of *lineal deſcent*, *of* directs to the family, or lineage, whence the deſcent is eſtimated; as,

Man that is born OF A WOMAN. Liturgy.

Of Priam's royal race thy mother CAME. Dryden.

After verbs denoting *the exertion of the intellectual, or diſcurſive, powers of the mind*, *of* directs to the ſubject upon which theſe powers are exerted; as,

To SPEAK *plainly* OF THIS WHOLE WORK. Spectator, N° 65.

He proceeds in his inquiry into ſciences, reſolved to JUDGE OF THEM *freely.* Locke.

After verbs of *accuſing*, *convincing*, *admoniſhing*, *acquitting*, &c. *of* directs to the name of the crime, fault, &c. concerning which the accuſation, admonition, &c. is; as,

If any be blameleſs—not ACCUSED OF RIOT. New Teſtament.

The diſcovery of a truth formerly unknown, DOTH *rather* CONVINCE *men* OF IGNORANCE, *than nature* OF ERROR. Raleigh.

*Things that at the firſt ſhew ſeemed poſſible—*HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF IMPOSSIBILITY. Bacon.

——*He* OF THEIR WICKED WAYS

SHALL *them* ADMONISH. Milton.

I HAVE ACQUITTED *myſelf* OF THE DEBT. Dryden.

Verbs of *requiring*, *receiving*, *buying*, *borrowing*, *begging*, or any kind of getting that is not fraudulent or compulſive, require the ſign *of* before the object whence the acquiſition is made; as,

They that carried us away captive REQUIRED OF US *a ſong.* Old Teſt.
Whatſoever good thing any man doeth, the ſame SHALL *he* RECEIVE OF THE LORD. New Teſtament.
The ſepulchre that Abraham BOUGHT *for a ſum of money* OF THE SONS OF EMMOR. New Teſtament.
They BORROWED OF THE EGYPTIANS *jewels of ſilver.* Old Teſt.
To ASK *alms* OF THEM *that entered into the temple.* New Teſtam.

But verbs of *depriving*, *preventing*, *robbing*, *cheating*, or of any kind of getting that is compulſive or fraudulent, require the ſign *of* before the name of that which is loſt by ſuch proceeding; as,

Why SHOULD I BE DEPRIVED OF YOU BOTH *in one day?* Old Teſt.
The Janiſaries DISAPPOINTED *by the baſſas* OF THE SPOIL *of the merchants.* Knolles.
Let a bear ROBBED OF HER WHELPS *meet a man, rather than a fool in his folly.* Old Teſtament.
She TRICKS US OF OUR MONEY. Gay.

A kind of expreſſions, much of the nature of adverbs, are formed by the ſign *of* after a verb, and with a ſubſtantive depending upon the ſign; as, *he did it of himſelf*, i. e. without being prompted or ſolicited; and ſo, *of neceſſity*, *of choice*, *of his own motion*, &c.

Theſe are particular expreſſions,

To be ſick—To die OF *a diſtemper. To ſurfeit* OF *play.* Locke.
To BE TIRED OF THE VANITIES *of the world.*
To make SURE OF *the bear.* L'Eſtrange.
To CRY OUT OF *an unequal management.* Atterbury.
i. e. to complain loudly againſt it.

Of the DATIVE CASE.

The limits whither ſtates or objects tend,
In names of dative forms, on nouns and verbs attend.

States of approach, either of *local motion*, or of *the attention*, or of *direction*, whether expreſſed by nouns or verbs, admit a ſubſtantive in this caſe to depend upon them; which ſubſtantive determines the object whither the motion or direction tends, or that with which the attention cloſes; as, *to go* TO *a place—to direct a letter* TO *ſuch a man—to attend* TO *the direction*; and ſo,

I promiſed to call upon him—that WE MIGHT GO TOGETHER TO THE ABBEY. Spectator, N° 329.
Continued APPLICATION TO *public affairs.* Addiſon.
Apply thine heart UNTO INSTRUCTION, *and thine ears* TO THE WORDS *of knowledge.* Old Teſtament.
——ſtill TO THIS PLACE *My heart* INCLINES. Rowe.
The laws of our religion TEND TO THE UNIVERSAL HAPPINESS *of mankind.* Tillotſon.

States of *adding*, *giving*, *inclining*, *applying*, *appropriating*, *proportioning*, &c. are included in the former, and therefore admit of a noun in this caſe to depend upon them; as,

Addition TO *a ſtore—to add* TO *a ſtore—to apply* TO *ſuch a ſtudy—application* TO *ſuch a ſtudy—applicable* TO *ſuch a ſtudy*, &c. and ſo,
To WHICH *the knight* ADDED. Spectator, N° 329.
The ſatisfaction which it HAD GIVEN TO THE OLD MAN. Spectator, N° 335.
ENCLINE *your ears* TO THE WORDS *of my mouth.* Old Teſtament.
What he ſays of a portrait IS APPLICABLE TO POETRY. Dryden.
Marks of honour ARE APPROPRIATED TO THE MAGISTRATE. Atterbury.

In

In the loſs of an object WE DO NOT PROPORTION *our grief* TO *the real value it bears; but* TO THE VALUE *our fancies ſet upon it.*
Spectator, N° 256.

The ſubſtantives, *advantage, diſadvantage, benefit, profit, harm,* &c. may take either a genitive or dative caſe after them to ſhew the object to which the advantage, &c. accrues; as, *the advantage, diſadvantage* OF *or* TO *ſuch a man.*

But the adjectives *advantageous, diſadvantageous, beneficial, profitable, harmful,* &c. require a dative caſe only; as, *advantageous, diſadvantageous,* &c. TO *ſuch a man,* or TO *ſuch a cauſe.*

A kind of adverbial expreſſions are frequently formed by this prepoſition; as, *face to face, hand to hand, foot to foot,* i. e. *face* OPPOSED *to face,* &c. So, *two to one, five to four,* &c. i. e. *two* OPPOSED IN A WAGER *to one,* &c.

The names of *limits whither*, you'll perceive,
Plac'd with ſome verbs as in th' accuſative.
Such as, *to give, procure, get, leave, fetch, ſend,*
To *borrow, carry, do, make, raiſe,* or *lend,*
To *tell, appoint, advance, provide, ſell, bring,*
To *teach, coſt, cut, deliver, anſwer, ſing*;
Theſe verbs in active forms, of courſe, retain
Double accuſatives in their dependent train.
And in their paſſive forms they may receive
A noun which bears the form of an accuſative.

The object which is the limit whither ſeveral ſtates tend, is ſo very eaſy to be diſtinguiſhed in a connected ſeries of words, that there is no neceſſity to place the ſign *to* or *for* before the name of ſuch object. The ſtates which have this property are uſually called *acquiſitive ſtates* in grammar; and if an active tranſitive form of any of theſe verbs is applied *acquiſitively*, ſuch form may

may in Engliſh have two ſubſtantives depending upon it without any ſign; as, *to make him a preſent—to ſend her a letter*, &c. which are of the ſame import, as, *to make a preſent to him—to ſend a letter to her*; and ſo of other inſtances.

Hence it comes to paſs, that ſeveral of theſe verbs, in their paſſive forms, have a ſubſtantive following, of the form of an accuſative, which ſubſtantive ſupplies the place of a dative; as, *a demand was made for ſeveral things which had been lent* HIM—*given* HIM—*ſold* HIM, &c. inſtead of, *lent to* HIM—*given to* HIM—*ſold to* HIM, &c.

It is to be obſerved in this kind of conſtruction, that the name of the object to which the acquiſition accrues, ſtands immediately after the verb, and if a noun in the accuſative caſe is alſo uſed, it follows the other. Thus we ſay, *he ſent me a letter—they paid the labourers ſo much*, and not *he ſent a letter me—they paid ſo much the labourers*; but we ſay, *he ſent a letter* TO *me—they paid ſo much* TO *the labourers*. This kind of conſtruction, by ſubſtantives placed as if they were both in the accuſative caſe, appears in the following inſtances, out of multitudes of others which may be found in almoſt every Engliſh book.

I have had letters, &c. that requeſt I WOULD GIVE THEM AN EXACT ACCOUNT *of the ſtature of the prince, &c.*
Spectator, N° 340.

To learn whether the peaſant, who SHEWED HIM THE WAY, *is drawn in the map.*
ibid.

Upon going TO PAY HER A VISIT *one morning,* HE WRIT HER A VERY PRETTY EPISTLE *on this hint.*
Spectator, N° 343.

Give ME THE DAMSEL *to wife.*
Old Teſtament.

Prepare ME A LODGING.
New Teſtament.

Eliſha telleth THE KING OF ISRAEL THE THINGS *thou ſpeakeſt.*
Old Teſtament.

Of

Of the ACCUSATIVE CASE.

The active verbs their paſſive ſtates transfer
On nouns which in th' accuſative appear.

I have already obſerved, that a ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe, when placed in dependence upon a tranſitive verb, ſhews the object expreſſed by the noun in this caſe, as having in it the paſſive ſtate which correſponds with the active ſtate of the verb on which the noun depends. Thus in the expreſſions, *to ſee, hear, meet, follow a man*; the man is in effect repreſented as *the object ſeen, heard, met, followed*; and ſo of other inſtances.

All the Engliſh perſonal pronouns, except *it*, have an accuſative different from the nominative, as likewiſe the relative *who*: all the prepoſitions, as well as thoſe which are conſidered as the ſigns of caſes, require the accuſative forms in dependence upon them; as, *at me, at him, behind us, behind them, above whom, below whom*; not, *at I, at he, behind we, behind they, above who, below who*, &c.

Of the VOCATIVE CASE.

Objects to which our language we addreſs,
If nam'd, we by the vocative expreſs.

The name of every object to which words are addreſſed is of this caſe, and every ſuch object may be called *thou* or *you*; therefore *thou* and *you* are really of the vocative caſe, and the pronoun perſonal of the ſecond perſon has no nominative caſe.

We may addreſs ourſelves to a perſon, and never ſpeak any thing united with the name of that perſon, in the whole of what is addreſſed to him. If ſo, the name of ſuch perſon (if mentioned) muſt appear in the vocative caſe, without any word connected with it; as,

My heart is fixed, O God, my heart is fixed, I will ſing and give praiſe. Old Teſtament.

If the vocative caſe is made part of a ſentence, the pronoun of the ſecond perſon is united with it; as,

Thou, O Lord, art a God full of compaſſion. Old Teſtament.

Unleſs the verb which forms the ſentence be of the imperative mood, for with ſuch verb the pronoun is often omitted; as,

Open thy doors, O Lebanon—Howl fir tree, for the cedar is fallen. Old Teſtament.

Of the Ablative Case.

From, by, with, in, for, may be conſidered as the ſigns of this caſe; and *than* after an adjective of the comparative degree; but *than* is a redditive conjunction rather than the ſign of a caſe.

From.

The ablatives by *from* as names we uſe
Of limits whence the mind a ſtate purſues.

This ſign is the reverſe of *to,* and therefore ſtates of *forſaking* are referred by it to *the limit whence* the forſaking is eſtimated; as,

It came to paſs as they journeyed from the East, that they found a plain. Old Teſtament.

Hence ſuch ſtates as *freedom, deliverance, exemption, abſtinence, reſtraint,* &c. whether expreſſed by nouns or verbs, admit of this ſign prefixed to the name of the objects whence theſe ſtates are conceived to remove or withhold; as *freedom from labour—exemption from tribute—free from labour—exempt from tribute—to free men from labour—to exempt them from tribute*; and ſo, He

Hè that is dead, is freed FROM SIN. New Teſtament.
Deliver us FROM EVIL. ibid.
No man is exempt FROM THE CHANCES *of human life.* Atterbury.
Abſtain FROM ALL APPEARANCE *of evil.* New Teſtament.
This they begin to do, and now nothing will be reſtrained FROM THEM. Old Teſtament.

It is manifeſt, that every ſtate which the mind can conſider as forſaking one object and approaching another, may be referred to *the object forſaken* by *from*, and to *the object approached* by *to*; as, *a journey* FROM *ſuch a place* TO *ſuch a place—a continuance* FROM *ſuch a time* TO *ſuch a time—to continue* FROM *ſuch a time* TO *ſuch a time*, &c.

By an elliptical conſtruction, this ſign is placed before ſeveral adverbs and prepoſitions which chiefly relate to place and time; as, *from above*, *from afar*, *from below*, &c. i. e. *from ſome place above*, *far diſtant*, *below*, &c.

By.

After verbs paſſive ablatives in *by*
The correſpondent active ſtates ſupply.
And *by* is likewiſe us'd with names that ſhow
The means made uſe of, or the method how.
But *by* to place referring, will appear
To ſignify *adjoining to* or *near*.

It has already been ſhewn, that this ſign, when placed after a paſſive verb, gives notice, that the active correſponding ſtate of the ſame verb is in the object denoted by the name which depends on the ſign; as in the expreſſions, *James heard, ſeen, injured, extolled by William, by the multitude, by himſelf*; William, the multitude, or James himſelf, is *the object hearing, ſeeing, injuring, extolling*; and ſo of other inſtances.

The ſign *by* is likewiſe uſed to refer to names expreſſing *the means, order, courſe,* or *method,* by which continued action is regulated; as, *to proceed by ſtratagem—to live by rule—to build by a plan—to judge by circumſtances—to advance by pairs, by companies—to ſell, buy by the ell, by the ounce—to take a journey by ſea, by land, by night, by day—to ſit, ſtand, live, by one's ſelf,* &c. and ſo,

By THIS MEANS *they would inſenſibly arive at proper notions of courage.* Spectator, N° 337.

Such a method as this would very much conduce to the public emolument, BY MAKING *every man living good for ſomething.* Spectator, N° 43.

That prince conveys himſelf BY A BEAUTIFUL STRATAGEM *into his mother's apartment.* Spectator, N° 44.

They conſulted that they might take Jeſus BY SUBTLETY, *and kill him.* New Teſtament.

Thou ſhalt drink alſo water BY MEASURE. Old Teſtament.

The ſame ſubſtantive is frequently twice repeated for the purpoſes above-mentioned and *by* placed between the two ſubſtantives; as, *to examine a writing line by line, page by page—to ſearch a place houſe by houſe—to pay ſums year by year,* &c.

When *by* refers to place, it has the ſignification of *near*; as,

Before Pi-habiroth ſhall ye encamp, BY THE SEA. Old Teſtam.

The ſign of a ſavage man ſtanding BY A BELL. Spectator, N° 28.

And when it refers to time, it ſignifies that the time which is mentioned will be come when ſomething mentioned will likewiſe be; as, *we ſhall be gone* BY TO-MORROW NIGHT.

To-morrow BY THAT TIME THE SUN BE HOT, *ye ſhall have help.* Old Teſtament.

In

In ſolemn forms of adjuration, or earneſt entreaty, *by* refers to the object for which the perſon adjured, or entreated, is conceived to have the higheſt regard; as,

I adjure thee BY *the living God.* New Teſtament.
By THOSE HAPPY SOULS *who dwell*
In yellow meads of aſphodel,
Reſtore Euridice, &c. Pope.

And ſo of curſing; as,

The Philiſtine curſed David BY HIS GODS. Old Teſtament.

WITH.

Of ablatives by *with* 'tis the intent
Concomitants or adjuncts to preſent.

The name which depends upon this ſign denotes an object which is conſidered as *the concomitant*, or *adjunct*, in ſome ſtate.

All verbs active denoting ſuch ſtates as admit of an inſtrument to be uſed in effecting what is produced or accompliſhed by the ſtate, as likewiſe the paſſive forms correſpondent to ſuch verbs active, take the name of the inſtrument in dependence upon them by the ſign *with*; as, *to work—to be wrought* WITH *a tool —to write—to be written* WITH *a pen.*

They ſlew Hamor and Shechem his ſon WITH THE EDGE *of the ſword.* Old Teſtament.
If he ſmite WITH AN INSTRUMENT *of iron.* Old Teſtament.

Some verbs neuter admit of the ſign *with* in the like conſtruction; as, *to point with a rod—to walk with a cane.*

We labour, working WITH OUR OWN HANDS. New Teſtament.

But many of the verbs neuter take the ſign *by* in this reference; as, *to fall by the ſword.*

By THE BLAST *of God they periſh.* Old Teſtament.

Any circumſtance of ſituation may be applied by *with*, if that circumſtance be conſidered meerly as the adjunct of the principal object, or ſtate, concerned in the ſituation; as,

One cried, God bleſs us! and amen! the other,
As they had ſeen me WITH THESE HANGMAN'S HANDS. Shakeſpeare.
Let go thy hold when a great wheel runs down hill, leſt it break thy neck WITH FOLLOWING IT. Shakeſpeare.
An emperor hid under a cruſt of droſs, after cleanſing, has appeared WITH ALL HIS TITLES *freſh and beautiful.* Addiſon on Medals.
Rebeckah came forth WITH HER PITCHER *on her ſhoulder.* Old Teſt.

States of *contending, ſtriving, vying*, &c. whether expreſſed by nouns or verbs, are referred to the object which is the oppoſite, or antagoniſt, by the ſign with; as, *a ſtruggle, conteſt with ſuch a man—to ſtruggle, fight, contend with ſuch a man*; and ſo,

The younger ſons may be placed in ſuch a way of life, as may enable them to vie WITH THE BEST OF THEIR FAMILY. Addiſon.
Plead my cauſe, O Lord, WITH THEM *that ſtrive* WITH ME. ibid.
Whether they quarrelled among themſelves, or WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS. Spectator, N° 70.

All ſituations or ſtates of mutual intercourſe, whether expreſſed by nouns or verbs, are referred by *with*, to the objects which are equally concerned with other objects in ſuch ſtates or ſituations; as, *converſation, dealings, trade with ſuch people—to converſe, to deal, to trade with ſuch people*; and ſo,

——Where the ſapient king
Held dalliance WITH HIS FAIR EGYPTIAN SPOUSE. Milton.

That

That high all-ſeer, WHICH I dallied WITH,
Hath turn'd my feigned prayer on my head. Shakeſpeare.

States of *partaking*, *ſharing*, *dividing*, *mixing*, *compounding*, &c. take the ſign *with* to refer to the name of any object that is equally concerned with others in ſuch ſtates; as, *to partake of*, *ſhare*, *divide ſuch things with a partner*. *To mix wine with water*—*to compound one thing with another*, &c. and ſo,

Thou haſt been partaker WITH ADULTERERS. Old Teſtament.
He ſhall divide the ſpoil WITH THE STRONG. ibid.

The ſtates of *being pleaſed*, *diſpleaſed*, *ſatisfied*, *diſſatisfied*, *contented*, *diſcontented*, *wearied*, *refreſhed*, *loaded*, *beſet*, and ſeveral others, require the ſign *with* before the name of the object which occaſions *the pleaſure*, *diſpleaſure*, &c. as, *pleaſed with trifles*—*ſatisfied with a little*—*beſet with dangers*, &c. and ſo,

I was very much awed and delighted WITH THE APPEARANCE of the god of wit. Addiſon, Spectat. N° 64.
A fault in the ordinary method of education, is the charging of children's memories WITH RULES AND PRECEPTS. Locke.

The native hue of reſolution
Is ſicklied o'er WITH THE PALE CAST OF THOUGHT. Shakeſpeare.

Qualities or circumſtances conſidered as *concomitants of ſome ſtate*, take the ſign *with* before their names, when in dependence on ſuch ſtate; as, *to go with ſpeed*—*to ſtrive with eagerneſs*—*to advance with reſolution*—*to act with vigour*, &c. and ſo,

Did not Paul and Barnabas diſpute WITH VEHEMENCE about a very little point of conveniency? Atterbury.

The adverbs in *ly* uſually expreſs qualities or circumſtances under the ſame connexion as that denoted by *with*; for the expreſſions above are of the ſame import; as, *to go ſpeedily*—*to ſtrive eagerly*

eagerly—to advance reſolutely—to act vigorouſly; and ſo of other inſtances.

With likewiſe refers to the name of any object, *upon* or *amongſt* which ſome other object has an influence; as, *to have intereſt, credit, authority with ſuch a man, with ſuch a company*, &c.

But intereſt is her name WITH MEN *below.* Dryden.

i. e. amongſt men below.

With is ſometimes uſed to expreſs a ſtate as proceeding in its duration, and continuing the ſame time that ſome other object continues; as,

With HER *they flouriſh'd, and* WITH HER *they die.* Pope.

Sometimes *with* gives notice, that as ſoon as one thing came to paſs, another alſo happened; as,

With THIS *he pointed to his face.* Dryden.

i. e. as ſoon as this was ſaid or done, he pointed, &c.

IN.

Containing objects, when dependent ſeen
On nouns or verbs, claim ablatives by *in*.
Likewiſe the objects of our care, or pains,
Or thoſe by which its views the mind reſtrains.

This ſign directs to the name of any object which determines either place or time that may be conceived as *comprehending* or *containing* other objects or ſtates.

As, *a man in a houſe—a horſe in a field—to be in a houſe, in a field—this was in ſuch a month—this came to paſs in ſuch a year—in the reign of ſuch a king*, &c. and ſo,

There were IN THE SAME COUNTRY *ſhepherds abiding* IN THE FIELD. New Teſtament.

It

It came to paſs IN THOSE DAYS, *that there went out a decree from Cæſar Auguſtus.* New Teſtament.

When the wife of Hector, IN HOMER'S ILIADS, *diſcourſes with her huſband about the battle,* IN WHICH *he was going to engage.* Addiſon, Spect. N° 57.

What would it work, trimmed IN THE GORGEOUS ELOQUENCE *of Pindar?* Sidney.

Such a one does not behold his life, as a ſhort, tranſient, perplexing ſtate; but ſees it IN QUITE ANOTHER LIGHT. Spect. N° 75.

But we ſay *on ſuch a day—at ſuch a time.*

All ſorts of ſtates which are ſuppoſed to continue for a time, may have their names united by *in* with any object or ſtate which is repreſented as under the influence of thoſe ſtates; as, *a man in ſorrow, tranſport, fear, hope, love,* &c. *to be, to have been in ſorrow, tranſport, fear, hope, love,* &c.

This is the ſituation in which verbs denoting the condition of the mind, when depending upon ſubſtantives, repreſent the objects denoted by theſe ſubſtantives; for, *a man ſorrowing, tranſported, fearing, hoping, loving,* are expreſſions equivalent to *a man in ſorrow, tranſport,* &c.

And ſo, *to be in a confederacy, a conſpiracy, a plot, in arms, in trade,* &c. denote ſituations analogous to the verbal ſtates *to be confederated, conſpiring, plotting,* &c.

Any *object contained* may be referred to *the object containing* by the ſign *in,* as well as by the ſign *of.* Hence, *a chapter in a book,* or *of a book—the parts in ſuch a whole,* or *of ſuch a whole,* are equivalent expreſſions; and ſo of many other inſtances.

The materials upon which any art or performance is exerted, may be conſidered as containing or comprehending the effect of

ſuch performance. Hence the expreſſions, *to work in wood, ſtone, ſilver,* &c.

And the ſubject upon which any kind of pains is employed may be conſidered in the ſame manner. Hence the expreſſions, *to take pains in the languages—in the mathematics; to be diligent in buſineſs—to be aſſiduous in attending,* &c. and ſo,

They divide the whole twenty-four hours among them IN SUCH A MANNER, *that the club ſits day and night.* Spect. N° 72.
Lord Clifford vows to fight IN THY DEFENCE. Shakeſpeare.

Any rate or proportion which is conſidered as analogous to ſome leſs ſum or quantity contained by a larger, may be expreſſed by *in*; as, *five in the hundred—twelvepence in the pound—four in every five,* &c. and ſo,

Ten IN THE HUNDRED *lies here engraved.* Shakeſpeare.

Solemn forms of denunciation are frequently expreſſed by *in*; as, *in the name of God let this be done.*

——IN THE POWER *of us, the tribunes,*
We baniſh him. Shakeſpeare.

Several adverbial expreſſions are formed by *in*; as, *in all probability, in reaſon, in juſtice,* &c. Theſe are reſtrictive expreſſions, and ſhew that things muſt be conſidered no farther than probability, reaſon or juſtice, allows.

FOR.

In ablatives by *for* we names deſcry,
That ſhew the reaſon, cauſe, account, or purpoſe why.

This ſign directs to the name of the *final cauſe*, i. e. to the name which expreſſes the motive that influences rational agents to proceed in ſome particular manner; as, *to work for hire—to fight for honour—to write for bread,* &c. It

It likewiſe refers to whatſoever expreſſes *that upon account of which* things appear ſo or ſo, or are conſidered or treated ſo or ſo; as,

Convenient, inconvenient for the ſummer, for the winter, for the ſea, &c. *condemned, deteſted, for cruelty,* &c. *remembered, remarked for ſingularity,* &c. and ſo, *I took you for ſuch a perſon; let him go for a rogue.*

He dies for a deſerter. Gay.
It is an argument of a light mind, to think the worſe of ourſelves FOR THE IMPERFECTIONS OF OUR PERSONS. Spectator, N° 33.
There is nothing ſo bad FOR THE FACE, *as party-zeal.* N° 57.
The ax methinks would have been a good figure FOR A LAMPOON. Addiſon, Spectator, N° 58.

The account for which we exert our powers and faculties, is frequently that others may be excuſed from doing what we do. When we proceed in this manner, we ſupply the place, or ſtand inſtead of thoſe *for whom* we exert ourſelves. Hence *a ſubſtitute* FOR *another, to appear, plead, ſerve, project, plan, contrive,* &c. FOR *ſuch a one*; i. e. in his ſtead or behalf.

In buying, ſelling, making wagers, &c. *for* refers to the name of whatſoever is received, paid, or hazarded; as, *to ſell, buy ſuch goods for ſo much; a wager for ſuch a ſum; I cannot do it for my life*; i. e. if my life were at ſtake.

A paltry ring, whoſe poeſy was
For ALL THE WORLD *like Cutler's poetry.* Shakeſpeare.

i. e. as like Cutler's poetry, as if all the world had been at ſtake on the exactneſs of the likeneſs.

Whatſoever is conſidered as *that towards which* any *diſpoſition, preparation, intention,* &c. is directed, admits of the ſign *for* before the name or expreſſion of it; as, *Ariſtotle is for poetic juſtice; Jove was for Venus; he is all for ſuch a thing*, i. e. diſ-

poſed in favour or inclination towards poetic juſtice, towards Venus, towards ſuch a thing. *I am for you*; i. e. ready or prepared to receive you.

We ſailed FOR GENOA. Addiſon.

i. e. with intention to arrive at Genoa.

The words *fit*, *right*, *proper*, or other words of like import, are often omitted, and *for* correſponds with what is omitted or underſtood; as, *it is for kings to conſult the public good*; i. e. to conſult the public good is fit, right, proper for kings.

——*It were* FOR ME
To throw my ſceptre at the injurious Gods. Shakeſpeare.

i. e. it were fit, proper, for me to throw, &c.

With names of periods of time, *for* frequently gives notice that ſome ſtate continues quite through the period; as,

Hired FOR LIFE. Prior. *i. e.* during or quite through life.

To guide the ſun's chariot FOR A DAY. Garth.

i. e. during one day, &c.

I never knew a party-woman that kept her beauty FOR A TWELVE-MONTH. Addiſon, Spectator, N° 57.

THAN.

Than is a ſign by which the mind refers
To that wherewith it any thing compares.

I have already obſerved, that this particle is (in its general application) not properly a prepoſition, but a conjunction, directing to that part of a ſeries of words, which is united to the reſt by containing that with which a compariſon is made, and by which ſome exceſs or defect is eſtimated. Therefore an adjective or adverb of the comparative degree appears in the ſeries of words with *than*, to ſhew the quality or property that is compared;

pared; as, *a man wiſer, richer, leſs wiſe, leſs rich than another; a thing done more or leſs prudently than was expected*; and ſo,

Thou art fairer THAN *the children of men.* Old Teſtament.
The glory of this latter houſe ſhall be GREATER THAN *of the former.* Old Teſtament.
I have no greater joy THAN TO HEAR THAT MY CHILDREN WALK IN TRUTH. New Teſtament.

Many of the expreſſions in which *than* is concerned, although they have not the form of two full ſentences depending the one upon the other, may nevertheleſs be eaſily compleated into ſuch ſentences, by ſupplying what is left to be underſtood. Thus, *thou art wiſer than I*, is equivalent to, *thou art wiſer than I* AM; *you love him more than me*, to, *you love him more than* YOU LOVE *me*, &c.

In expreſſions of this nature in Latin, it is uſual to put the ſubſtantive, that denotes the object with which the compariſon is made, in the ablative caſe; as, *me ſapientior es*, which (if *than* be conſidered as a ſign of the ablative caſe) may be tranſlated, *thou art wiſer than me.* The beſt Engliſh writers have conſidered *than* as ſuch a ſign; as,

You are a much greater loſer than ME. Swift.
She ſuffers more than ME. Swift.
A ſtone is weighty and ſand heavy, but a fool's wrath is heavier than THEM *both.* Old Teſtament.
Thou art a girl as much brighter than HER,
As he was a poet ſublimer than ME. Prior.

If theſe expreſſions are compleated into full ſentences, they will become, *you are a much greater loſer than I* AM—*ſhe ſuffers more than I* SUFFER—*a fool's wrath is heavier than* THEY *both* ARE —*thou art a girl as much brighter than* SHE WAS, *as he was a poet ſublimer than I* AM. But if the expreſſions are turned into rela-

tive clauſes, by ſubſtituting the relative inſtead of the perſonal pronouns, the clauſes will be, *I than* WHOM *you are a much greater loſer—I than* WHOM *ſhe ſuffers more—ſand and ſtone* THAN BOTH WHICH *a fool's wrath is heavier—ſhe than* WHOM *thou art a girl as much brighter—I than* WHOM *he was a ſublimer poet*; and in all theſe inſtances it is evident, that the relative is in an oblique caſe by the force of the ſign *than*. Therefore it ſeems to me that the expreſſions, *you are a much greater loſer than* ME, and the reſt of that form, muſt be allowed of in grammar; and if ſo, *than*, which is moſt uſually a conjunction, muſt on ſome occaſions be allowed likewiſe to be a prepoſition or ſign of an oblique caſe; juſt as *for* muſt likewiſe be allowed to be. For whether the ſentences are ſupplied, in which *than* is concerned, or the oblique caſes, *me*, *them*, *her*, are uſed, and the ſentences are not directly made up, the reſult will amount either way to the ſame thing; only if the ſentences are ſupplied, the mode of eſtimation is conceived to be of one kind; and if the oblique caſes are uſed, the mode is conceived to be of another kind; and therefore the form of expreſſion varies when the mode of eſtimation does ſo, although the reſult of either form amounts to the ſame thing. The reaſon why one and the ſame complex object or ſtate may be expreſſed by different modes of eſtimation, is ſhewn at large, Book I, Section XIV; and Book V, Section III, of the Speculative Grammar.

Of the conſtruction of ſubſtantives in like caſes.

NAMES to intitle or deſcribe deſign'd
Conceptions rais'd already in the mind
By other names, muſt the ſame caſes bear
In which the names that firſt are us'd appear.

Sometimes no verb like caſes comes between;
But the verb ſubſtantive may intervene:
Likewiſe ſuch paſſive verbs, as *nam'd*, *eſteem'd*,
Accounted, *made*, *intitled*, *call'd* or *deem'd*.

When

When ſeveral names, each of which equally denotes one and the ſame object, are applied together in order to deſcribe or intitle ſuch object more fully, theſe names are in the ſame caſe; as,

THE LORD JEHOVAH—MOSES THE SERVANT of the Lord. Old Teſtament.

JESUS of Nazareth THE KING of the Jews. New Teſtament.

SIMON PETER, A SERVANT and AN APOSTLE of Jeſus Chriſt. ibid.

To poſſeſs NATIONS greater and mightier than thyſelf, A PEOPLE great and tall, THE CHILDREN of the Anakims. Old Teſtament.

This manner of conſtruction is uſually called appoſition in grammar.

The forms of the verb ſubſtantive, *i. e.* of the verb *to be*, may connect any two names of one and the ſame object in the ſame caſe; as,

GODLINESS IS GREAT RICHES, if a man be content with that he hath. New Teſtament.

TRUTH was THE FOUNDER of the family. Spectator, N° 35.

Menippus knew IT to be THE PRAYER of his friend Licander. Spectator, N° 391.

In this laſt example, *it* and *the prayer* are both of the accuſative caſe, as denoting *the thing which was known.*

The expreſſion, *it to be the prayer*, is equivalent to, *that it was the prayer.* The reaſon of this coincidence of the two forms, is given at Book VI, Section II, page 282, of the Speculative Grammar; and ſo,

The Lord ſent me to anoint THEE TO BE KING over Iſrael, Old Teſt. is equivalent to, *The Lord ſent me to anoint thee, THAT THOU SHOULDEST BE KING over Iſrael.*

Likewiſe the paſſive verbs, *named, accounted,* &c. may connect two names of the ſame object in the ſame caſe; as, *a child named*

named John—ſuch a one is made a judge—is appointed ambaſſador to ſuch a court; and ſo,

MAN is ſaid to be A SOCIABLE ANIMAL. Spectator, N° 9.
I am ONE OF THOSE DESPICABLE CREATURES CALLED A CHAMBERMAID. Spectator, N° 366.
I and MY SON SOLOMON ſhall be accounted OFFENDERS. Old Teſt.

The active forms of the verbs above-mentioned admit of the two names of the ſame object in the accuſative caſe; as, *to name a child John—to make ſuch a man a judge*; and ſo,

I ever thought IT A MOST IMPIOUS BLASPHEMY againſt that holy religion, to father any thing upon it that eaſily tended TO MAKE A FREE AND HAPPY PEOPLE SLAVES. Fleetwood.
The Lord which choſe me before thy father, TO APPOINT ME RULER over the people of the Lord. Old Teſtament.
The Lord hath eſtabliſhed HIM KING. ibid.

Of the conſtruction of ſingle words, or of ſerieſes of words, ſo as to have the effect of one noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe, although without any ſign or prepoſition.

TH' infinitive, and what on it depends,
Oft as a name on nouns and verbs attends.
This form may names of any caſe ſupply;
But chiefly ſhews *the cauſe* or *purpoſe why*.
And with the verb *to be* it aſcertains
Appointed ſtates, or thoſe which any rule ordains.

The verb in the infinitive mood, either without or with other words in dependence upon it, may ſtand in any connexion with other words in which a noun ſubſtantive may ſtand. Thus in,

TO BE or NOT TO BE; that is the queſtion. Shakeſpeare.

To

To be or not to be, is in effect a ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe. And in,

I had the misfortune TO BE AN UNCLE *before I knew my nephews from my nieces.* Spectator, N° 402.

The misfortune to be an uncle, is equivalent to, *the misfortune of being an uncle*; ſo that *to be an uncle* is here of the ſame effect as a ſubſtantive in the genitive caſe; and ſo in,

Fond TO SPREAD FRIENDSHIPS. Pope.

To ſpread friendſhips is *that of which* the perſon is fond; and in, *They were deſirous* TO ASK HIM: *to aſk him* denotes *that of which* they were deſirous; and ſo of many other inſtances.

In, *I have known one of theſe gentlemen think himſelf obliged* TO FORGET THE DAY *of an appointment.* Spectator, N° 473.

To forget, &c. is equivalent to a dative caſe; for it expreſſes *that to which* the gentleman thought himſelf obliged.

As to the force of an accuſative caſe, the verb of the infinitive mood has ſuch force whenſoever it depends upon a tranſitive verb. Thus in,

I attempt TO BRING INTO *the ſervice of honour and virtue every thing in nature.* Spectator, N° 466.

To bring into the ſervice of virtue, &c. is, *that which is attempted*, and therefore is equivalent to a ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe; and ſo of other inſtances which occur continually.

But the uſe of the infinitive verb in dependent conſtruction is chiefly to ſhew *the purpoſe why* ſome verbal ſtate is enjoined, or otherwiſe affected; as,

Strive TO ENTER IN *at the ſtrait gate.* New Teſtament.

Where, *to enter into at the ſtrait gate*, expreſſes, *that for which*, or *on account of which*, we are enjoined to ſtrive; and ſo of many

other inſtances. The prepoſition *for* appears, in the older Engliſh writers, before the infinitive mood in this kind of conſtruction; as,

All their works they do FOR TO BE SEEN *of men.* New Teſtament.

But this conſtruction is not now in uſe.

The infinitive mood, in dependence upon the forms of the verb *to be*, is frequently uſed to repreſent ſome ſtate that is appointed, or propoſed, or which is the conſequence of any rule laid down or ſuppoſed; as,

The tent of Darius IS TO BE PEOPLED *by the ingenious Mrs. Salmon, where Alexander* IS TO FALL IN LOVE *with a piece of wax-work.* Addiſon, Spectator, N° 31.

And, *There* IS TO BE *a ſcene of Hockly in the Hole, in which* IS TO BE REPRESENTED *all the diverſions of the place.* ibid. edit. 1744.

Here the expreſſion *is to be repreſented* is of a wrong number; it ſhould be *are to be*, becauſe *diverſions* are of the plural number. But perhaps this is an error of the preſs.

If all political power be derived from Adam, and BE TO DESCEND *only to his ſucceſſive heirs.* Locke.

Of whole ſentences uſed as ſubſtantives.

THE caſual *that* whole ſentences may place
As a noun ſubſtantive in any caſe.

The ſentential or caſual demonſtrative *that*, when prefixed to a ſentence, is a notice that the ſentence is to be conſidered all of it together as one ſubſtantive in ſome caſe. Thus in,

It came to paſs at the end of forty days, THAT NOAH OPENED THE WINDOW OF THE ARK. Old Teſtament.

That Noah opened the window of the ark, denotes *that which came to paſs*, and therefore is a kind of nominative caſe; and in,

I know

I know THAT MY REDEEMER LIVETH. Liturgy.

That my Redeemer liveth, denotes *that which is known,* and therefore is a kind of accuſative caſe; and in,

I am credibly informed, THAT ALL THE INSINUATIONS ARE FALSE. Spectator, N° 372.

That all the inſinuations are falſe, is *that of which* I am informed, and is therefore equivalent to a genitive caſe; and ſo of other inſtances.

Or if what ſhould be nom'native becomes
Accuſative, and to itſelf aſſumes
A verb infinitive; the whole will give
What anſwers to a noun in the accuſative.

A ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe, with a verb in the infinitive mood depending upon it, frequently ſupplies the place of a ſentence depending on *that*; ſo as to anſwer the effect of one noun ſubſtantive in the accuſative caſe. Thus,

The king commanded HIS SON, ON FOOT, TO LAY HIS RIGHT HAND ON THE GENTLEMAN'S STIRRUP. Spectator, N° 382.

is equivalent to, *the king commanded that his ſon, on foot, ſhould lay his right hand on the gentleman's ſtirrup*; and *that his ſon on foot,* &c. is manifeſtly *that which is commanded,* and is therefore equivalent to an accuſative caſe; and ſo in,

My landlady has forbidden ANY SUCH CEREMONY TO BE USED IN THE HOUSE. Spectator, N° 12.

Any ſuch ceremony to be uſed, is equivalent to, *that any ſuch ceremony ſhould be uſed*; and as this expreſſes *that which has been forbidden,* it is equivalent to an accuſative caſe.

With caſual *that* we often may diſpenſe,
Or with a relative, and yet preſerve the ſenſe.

As *that*, when uſed in the capacity of a ſentential demonſtrative, or caſual particle, is only a notice concerning words themſelves; *i. e.* a notice that a whole ſeries of them which bears the form of a compleat ſentence is to be conſidered as one noun ſubſtantive in ſome caſe; it is frequently unneceſſary to apply it, becauſe the nature of what is ſaid ſhews how the dependent ſentence is to be conſidered, without any particular direction. Thus in the following inſtances;

It is often ſaid, after a man has heard a ſtory with extraordinary circumſtances, it is a very good one, if it be true.
Spectator, N° 322.

I fear it comes too much from the heart. ibid.

That is omitted before *it is a very good one*; and likewiſe before *it comes too much*, &c. For it is manifeſt, that *it is a very good one*, &c. is *that which is ſaid*, and is therefore a kind of nominative caſe depending on the paſſive verb, *it is ſaid*; and, that *it comes too much from the heart*, expreſſes *that which is feared*, and therefore is a kind of accuſative caſe depending on the verb tranſitive *I fear*; and in,

I remember laſt winter there were ſeveral young girls ſitting about the fire. Spectator, N° 12.

that is omitted before *laſt winter*; and ſo of very many inſtances in any Engliſh book.

The relative pronoun may alſo frequently be omitted without ambiguity; for it only denotes its antecedent as concerned in a ſentence, which is to be made a dependent member of another ſentence, in which the antecedent is alſo concerned. Thus in,

I have now gained the faculty, I have been ſo long endeavouring after. Spectator, N° 556.

The relative *which* is omitted before *I have been ſo long*, &c. and in,

There

There are none can properly be called rich, who have not more than they want. Spectator, N° 574.

The relative *that* or *who* is omitted before *can be properly*; and in,

The averſion I for ſome years have had to clubs in general, gave me a perfect reliſh for your ſpeculation on that ſubject. Spect. N° 24.

The relative *which* or *that* is omitted before *I*; and ſo of very many other inſtances which occur in almoſt any Engliſh book.

Of the conſtruction of verbs impersonal.

THE Engliſh verbs impersonal appear
Placed in dependence or on *it* or *there*.
Impersonals, if form'd by *there*, receive
The number of a following nom'native:
Thoſe form'd by *it*, to ſingulars confin'd,
A ſentence often take by *that* ſubjoin'd,
Or verb infinitive, or any train
Of words, which, in effect, a nom'native contain.

I have already ſhewed, that every verb definitive has relation to ſome ſubject, and that the grammatic form of ſuch verb, independently of the reſt of its ſignification, is a notice that the expreſſion of the ſubject on which the verb depends, is ſufficiently compleated for the ſpeaker's purpoſe. Nevertheleſs, it is not convenient, in all inſtances, to expreſs this ſubject at large, before the definitive verb is mentioned; for in ſome inſtances, the ſubject is conceived to be known of courſe; and in other inſtances, the ſubject is better expreſſed at large in that part of the ſentence which follows the definitive verb, than in that part which precedes it. In inſtances of the kinds above-mentioned, *it* may either be uſed to repreſent any ſingular object which is conceived to be known of courſe; as, *it rains*, *it is fair*, *it thunders*, &c. *i. e.* the air, or the ſky, rains, is fair, thunders, &c.

Or any object which is to be mentioned more fully in the following part of the ſentence, eſpecially an object denoted by a verb of the infinitive mood, either without or with other words; as, *it is neceſſary to conſider—to conſider this point attentively*; i. e. *to conſider—to conſider this point attentively, is neceſſary*; ſo that in effect, *to conſider—to conſider this point attentively*, are expreſſions equivalent each to one noun ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe, either of which is repreſented by *it*, on which the definitive verb *is* depends; and ſo,

It is highly laudable to pay reſpect to men deſcended from worthy anceſtors. Spectator, N° 612.

i. e. *to pay reſpect to*, &c. *is highly laudable.*

It is likewiſe uſed to repreſent what is denoted by a full ſentence depending on *that* in the following part of the ſentence; as, *it was told Laban, that Jacob was fled*; i. e. that Jacob was fled was told Laban.

Let it not diſpleaſe my Lord that I cannot riſe up before thee. Old Teſtament.

i. e. let not the behaviour expreſſed by, *I cannot riſe up before thee*, diſpleaſe my Lord; and ſo of other inſtances.

Sometimes a whole narration is introducee by *it*, ſo that all which follows is ſhewn to have come to paſs in the ſituation, or at the time, expreſſed by the clauſe to which this article is prefixed; as,

'Twas at the royal feaſt from Perſia won
By Philip's warlike ſon.
Aloft in awful ſtate
The godlike hero ſat, &c. Dryden.

i. e. it was at the royal feaſt, &c. that the godlike hero ſat, &c.

'Twas

'Twas when the ſeas were roaring
With hollow blaſts of wind,
A damſel lay deploring, &c. Gay.

i. e. it was when the ſeas were, &c. that a damſel, &c.

It is frequently uſed to denote the ſubject of enquiry, of whatſoever perſon that ſubject may be; as, *Lord, is it I?* New Teſtament.

Or the ſubject of any verbal ſtate which is to be fully declared by a relative clauſe, of whatſoever perſon that ſubject may be; as,

'Twas I that kill'd her. Shakeſpeare.

And ſo it might be ſaid, *'twas thou that killedſt her.*

As *it* is made, in theſe inſtances, to repreſent a ſubject, which, when it comes to be expreſſed particularly, is of the firſt or ſecond perſons ſingular, ſome authors have uſed *it* to repreſent a plural ſubject, till it is expreſſed particularly; as,

——*Who was't came by?*
'Tis two or three, my Lord, that bring you word, &c. Shakeſp.
'Tis theſe that early taint the female ſoul. Pope.

The propriety of this form of expreſſion is diſputed; but it occaſions no ambiguity, and therefore may be tolerated, if it appear much more convenient on any occaſion than a more regular form.

There is only uſed to give notice that the nominative caſe ſtands behind the verb, and therefore is no more than a notice concerning the ſtructure of words themſelves; as,

There were that thought it a part of Chriſtian charity to inſtruct them. Hooker.

i. e. ſome perſons were that thought, &c.

Wherever

Wherever THERE *is ſenſe or perception.* Locke.
i. e. wherever ſenſe or perception is.
There are tenebrificous and dark ſtars. Spectator, N° 582.
i. e. tenebrificous and dark ſtars are; and ſo of other inſtances.

I have called this kind of conſtruction *imperſonal*, in compliance with the received terms of grammar. But in reality, every definitive verb muſt have a ſubject, and that ſubject muſt be fully expreſſed, or ſuppoſed to be fully known to the hearer; for otherwiſe, the definitive grammatic form of the verb could not be conſiſtently uſed.

Of the conſtruction of participles.

PARTICIPLES may either be uſed in an objective or coaleſcent capacity; when uſed objectively, they ſupply the office of ſubſtantives, and admit of every ſign which a ſubſtantive admits of; as, *of*, *in*, *by*, *with calling*, &c. and,

In your dressing, let there be ejaculations fitted to the ſeveral actions of dressing; as, at washing your hands, pray to God to cleanſe, &c. Taylor.

When uſed in coaleſcence, they unite with ſome name, and ſhew the object denoted by that name, as in ſome occaſional ſtate of being; as, *a man calling—having called*, &c.

The name upon which a coaleſcent participle depends, may be in any kind of connexion with, or dependence upon, other words; as, the voice *of a man calling*—attention *to a man calling*, &c.

Whate'er dependent caſe a verb may claim,
Its participle may command the ſame.

Participles,

Participles, whether uſed objectively, or in coaleſcence, admit of ſubſtantives in dependence upon them, by the ſame modes of connexion as the verbs do from which the participles are derived. If therefore the verb be *tranſitive*, its active participles are alſo *tranſitive*, and admit of an accuſative caſe in immediate dependence upon them; as, *a man calling us—having called them*, &c and ſubſtantives in dependence on all the prepoſitions may follow a participle as they follow the verb to which the participle belongs; as,

Satan's TRAVERSING THE GLOBE, *and ſtill* KEEPING WITHIN THE SHADOW *of the night, as fearing* TO BE DISCOVERED BY THE ANGEL *of the ſun.* Addiſon, Spectator, N° 351.

She is repreſented as APPROACHING ADAM. Spectator, N° 357.

She is deſcribed as RENEWING *her addreſſes* TO HIM. ibid.

My old friend ſtarted, and RECOVERING OUT OF HIS BROWN STUDY, *told Sir Andrew,* &c. Spectator, N° 359.

Of nouns uſed adverbially.

THE names of *parts of time* or *any ſize*
By meaſure aſcertain'd, our ſpeech applies
As adverbs; yet theſe ſorts of names appear
Without the uſual forms which adverbs bear.

The names of parts or periods of time, of diſtance, and of meaſure, are uſually applied in Engliſh without any ſign or additional termination, although theſe names, when thus applied, are of the nature of adverbs, or of ſubſtantives in ſome oblique caſe; as,

It has indeed been, TIME OUT OF MIND, *generally remarked, that this family of ſtarers have infected public aſſemblies.* Spectator, N° 20.

i. e. during, or quite through, a length of time beyond the memory of man.

The foot and artillery was FOUR MILES *behind.* Clarendon.

And ſo, *a road* FIVE YARDS *broad; a well* TEN FATHOM *deep,* &c.

Of conjunctions as joining words.

THE copulative conjunctions may connect
Like caſes, moods, and tenſes, which reſpect
Some common word; or may, to ſuit the ſenſe,
Attend a different caſe, or mood, or tenſe.
And in the like conſtruction, you'll perceive
Both the disjunctive, and the diſcretive.

The copulative conjunctions moſt frequently connect like caſes, moods, and tenſes; becauſe they moſt frequently connect objects and ſtates under ſimilar ſituations and circumſtances. But they may be uſed to connect different caſes, moods, and tenſes, when thoſe proceſſes of the mind which are denoted by theſe conjunctions, are applied to objects or verbal ſtates in different ſituations and circumſtances. Thus they join like caſes and tenſes in,

HOMER AND HESIOD INTIMATE to us how this art ſhould be applied, when they repreſent the muſes as SURROUNDING Jupiter, AND WARBLING HYMNS about his throne. Spectator, N° 406.

But in,

True happineſs is OF A retired NATURE, and AN ENEMY to pomp and noiſe. Spectator, N° 15.

And refers *an enemy*, which is of the nominative caſe, to *is*; although *of a nature* which is of the genitive, depends upon the ſame verb in the preceding clauſe: and in,

I am deſired by the company to inform you, that THEY SUBMIT it to your cenſures, AND SHALL HAVE YOU in greater veneration than Hercules was in of old. Spectator, N° 36.

Shall have of the future tenſe is referred to *they* by the conjunction *and*, after *ſubmit* of the preſent tenſe is united with the ſame word *they*; and ſo of many other inſtances.

Of

Of the conjunctions and indefinites which require a verb of the ſubjunctive mood.

TO expreſs uncertain ſtates, *except*, *leſt*, *ſo*,
Before, *ere*, *till*, *if*, *howſoever*, *though*,
Although, *unleſs*, with *who* and *what-ſoe'er*
And *whether*, the ſubjunctive mood prefer.

As all theſe words imply ſomething of contingency or uncertainty, and the ſubjunctive mood is peculiarly adapted to expreſs contingent ſtates, it is uſually found in dependence upon theſe words; as,

I will not let thee go, EXCEPT THOU BLESS *me.* Old Teſtament.
Except I be by Silvia in the night,
There is no muſick in the nightingale. Shakeſpeare.
Let us go and ſacrifice to the Lord our God, LEST HE FALL *upon us with peſtilence.* Old Teſtament.

——*This let him know,*
Leſt, wilfully tranſgreſſing, HE PRETEND
Surpriſal. Milton.

——*Revenge back on itſelf recoils.*
Let it. I reck not, SO IT LIGHT *well aim'd.* Milton.

So, in this conſtruction, is uſed for, *if ſo be that.*

Let there be ſome more teſt made of my metal,
BEFORE *ſo noble and ſo great a figure*
BE STAMPT *upon it.* Shakeſpeare.
How long will it be ERE THOU BE *quiet?* Old Teſtament.

——*There mingle broils,*
ERE *this avenging ſword* BEGIN *thy doom.* Milton.
Seek out his wickedneſs TILL THOU FIND *none.* Old Teſtament.

To boundleſs vengeance the wide realm be giv'n,
Till vaſt deſtruction GLUT *the queen of heav'n.* Pope.
If thou LET *this man go, thou art not Ceſars friend.* New Teſt.
If Oedipus DESERVE *thy care.* Pope.
However it BE. Pope.
Though our outward man PERISH. New Teſtament.

——*Though heav'ns king*
Ride on thy wings. Milton.
Although my houſe BE *not ſo with God.* Old Teſtament.
He ſhall not eat of the holy things, UNLESS HE WASH *his fleſh with water.* Old Teſtament.

Unless an age too late, or cold
Climate, or years, DAMP *my intended wing.* Milton.
He that troubleth you ſhall bear his judgment, WHOSOEVER HE BE. New Teſtament.

Whatever be our fate, yet let us try. Pope.
Whether it were I or they, ſo we preach. New Teſtament.
Whether it be that the richeſt of theſe diſcoveries fall into the pope's hands. Addiſon.

It is likewiſe to be obſerved, that, if the ſubject of a command is expreſſed by a ſentence depending on *that*, the verb of this ſentence muſt be of the ſubjunctive mood; as,

Beware THAT *thou* BRING *not my ſon thither.* Old Teſtament.

Or if *that* be underſtood in ſuch command; as,

See THOU TELL *no man.* New Teſtament.

Of the conſtruction of prepoſitions.

TO prepoſitions, not themſelves the ſigns
Of caſes, uſe th' accuſative ſubjoins.

As no words in Engliſh, except ſome of the pronouns, have an accuſative form different from the nominative, the appli-

cation

cation of prepoſitions, ſo far as grammatic form is concerned, is very eaſy in Engliſh.

But one and the ſame prepoſition is frequently applied to expreſs relations or connexions of ſo very different kinds, that the proper application of the prepoſitions is undoubtedly one of the greateſt difficulties which a ſtranger will find in the language; becauſe mere arbitrary cuſtom has prevailed in many inſtances ſo far, as to reduce even contrary relations to expreſſions formed by the ſame prepoſition. Thus we uſually ſay, *an averſion to ſuch a thing—averſe to ſuch meaſures*, although the ſign *from* ſhould ſeem to be here required; becauſe the word *averſion* ſignifies a ſtate of disjunction, and *from* is uſually applied in references where ſuch ſtates are concerned. Many other inſtances may eaſily be given of the application of the ſame prepoſition, with little regard to the nature of the connexion which is denoted by it. This creates no difficulty to thoſe who are brought up where the language is conſtantly ſpoken, and therefore directions on this head are not neceſſary for them. But to perſons who attempt to learn the language, after they have been brought up in another, directions are neceſſary; and although no directions can be given which extend to every particular, yet ſuch accounts of the principal inſtances of the application of each prepoſition may be given, as will make this intricate ſubject much eaſier to a foreigner; and for this reaſon, I have conſidered all the prepoſitions in what follows, as thoſe which are equivalent to ſigns of caſes have been already conſidered.

Afore, Before.

The names which have theſe prepoſitions before them, denote objects which are conſidered as *not ſo far onward in place*, or as *preceded in time*, or *the object to which any thing is conſidered as prior or ſuperior or preferred*, or *that which any thing is conſidered as fronting or facing*, or as *in the preſence, ſight, or under the cognizance of*; as,

Who ſhall go BEFORE THEM *in a cloud.* Milton.
Do thy diligence to come BEFORE WINTER. New Teſtament.
The eldeſt ſon is BEFORE THE YOUNGER *in ſucceſſion.* S. Johnſon.
The Lord which choſe me BEFORE THY FATHER *and* BEFORE ALL HIS HOUSE. Old Teſtament.
To ſtand—ſit BEFORE THE FIRE; i. e. ſo as to front or face it.
They could not take hold of his words BEFORE THE PEOPLE. New Teſtament.
Both parties ſhall come BEFORE THE JUDGES. Old Teſtament.
The Alps and Pyreneans ſing BEFORE HIM. Addiſon.
To bring a cauſe BEFORE THE HOUSE OF LORDS, &c.

Before is much more frequently uſed as an adverb, than as a prepoſition; becauſe ſome ſentence expreſſed, or ſomething underſtood, more uſually determines that by which *priority*, or the other relations denoted by it, are eſtimated, than ſingle ſubſtantives do; as in ſuch expreſſions as the following, BEFORE I HAD DONE SPEAKING IN MY HEART, *behold Rebekah came forth.* —BEFORE THEY CALL, *I will anſwer—I tell you* BEFORE IT COME.

The battle was BEFORE *and* BEHIND; i. e. before and behind the army of Judah.
Who was BEFORE *a blaſphemer*; i. e. I Paul, before I was put into the miniſtry. 1ſt Tim. ch. i. ver. 13.

AGAINST.

The ſubſtantives which depend on this prepoſition, denote ſomething conſidered as *oppoſed*, or *for the coming whereof proviſion is made before-hand*; as,

AGAINST WHOM *haſt thou exalted thyſelf.* Old Teſtament.
Theſe things cannot be ſpoken AGAINST. New Teſtament.
Trouts and ſalmons ſwim AGAINST THE STREAM. Bacon.
AGAINST THE PROMIS'D TIME *provides with care.* Dryden.

Thou

Thou ſhalt ſtand by the river's brink AGAINST HE COME.
Exodus, chap. vii. ver. 15.

Where it is obſervable, that *he come* is of the ſubjunctive mood.

BESIDE, BESIDES.

Theſe denote, that whatſoever depends upon them, if it relates to place, is that *by or near the ſide of which* ſomething is repreſented; as,

Bleſſed are thoſe that ſow BESIDE ALL WATERS. Old Teſtament.
Beside him hung his bow. Milton.

Theſe prepoſitions likewiſe refer whatſoever is conſidered as *over and above*, or *not quite according to*, or *ſomeways deviating*, to other names; as,

Besides all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed.
New Teſtament.
It is BESIDES MY PRESENT BUSINESS *to enlarge upon this ſpeculation.* Locke.
Paul, thou art BESIDE THY SELF. New Teſtament.

NEAR, NIGH.

Theſe prepoſitions direct to the name of ſome object or ſtate, from which ſomething is conſidered as not far diſtant; as,

Paſſing through the ſtreet NEAR HER CORNER. Old Teſtament.
This child was VERY NEAR BEING EXCLUDED OUT OF THE SPECIES OF MAN, *barely by his ſhape.* Locke.
Salvation is NIGH THEM *that fear him.* Old Teſtament.

In the tranſlation of the Old and New Teſtament, *to* or *unto* is very frequently uſed after *near* and *nigh*; as,

Jacob went NEAR TO *Iſaac—Give me thy vineyard, becauſe it is* NEAR UNTO *my houſe—A virgin* NIGH TO *him may be defiled.*

The

The Lord is NIGH UNTO *them that are of a broken heart.*
Pſalm xxxiv. verſe 18. New Tranſlation.

This conſtruction is not uſed at preſent, unleſs in ſuch ſtile as is very ſolemn.

Near hand, nigh hand, near at hand, are adverbial expreſſions of vicinity.

By has frequently the ſignification of *near*; as,

Stand here BY *thy burnt offering.* Old Teſtament.

By and by is an adverbial expreſſion of time conſidered as near the time of ſpeaking.

TOWARD, TOWARDS.

Theſe refer to expreſſions which denote the objects by which ſome *direction* or *tendency of approach* is aſcertained; as,

I will look again TOWARDS THY HOLY *temple.* Old Teſtament.
His heart relented TOWARDS HER. Milton.
It is TOWARDS EVENING. New Teſtament.

UNTO.

Of the ſame meaning as *to*; but is now little uſed.

INTO.

This prepoſition refers to any name which aſcertains place that is conſidered as *entered*, or any thing beyond the outer parts whereof the attention is carried, or any ſtate to which things are brought by ſome cauſe or means; as,

The children of Iſrael went INTO THE MIDST OF THE SEA. Old Teſt.

The younger ſon took his journey INTO A FAR COUNTRY. New Teſt.
To look INTO LETTERS. To examine *into things*, &c.
Compound bodies may be reſolved INTO OTHER SUBSTANCES *than thoſe* WHICH *they are* INTO *by fire.* Boyle.
A man may whore and drink himſelf INTO ATHEISM, *but it is impoſſible he ſhould think himſelf* INTO IT. Bentley.

AT.

This prepoſition ſhews, that what depends upon it denotes a circumſtance conſidered as *merely preſent*, or *coexiſtent* with ſome object or ſtate.

If this circumſtance be place, or any object that aſcertains place, *at* ſhews that this place is ſo preſent with the object or ſtate on which it depends, as to determine the place or direction of ſuch object or ſtate; as,

A friend AT LONDON—AT SEA—AT LAND.
To be AT LONDON—AT SEA—AT LAND.
All the city was gathered together AT THE DOOR. New Teſtam.

So, *to look, ſtrike, puſh, run, aim* AT A MAN, or other object.
Thou haſt thruſt ſore AT ME. Old Teſtament.
Peter knocked AT THE DOOR. New Teſtament.

If the circumſtance be time, or what determines time, *at* ſhews the time to be coexiſtent with that ſtate of things to which the circumſtance is applied; as,

Things were ſo and ſo AT *ſuch* A TIME—*We muſt march* AT THE FIRST SIGNAL—*A bill payable* AT SIGHT.
AT HIS TOUCH, *they preſently amend.* Shakeſpeare.
It ſhakes AT EVERY BLAST. Dryden.
Deſerted AT HIS UTMOST NEED. ibid.

It

It follows from hence, that the beginning, ending, middle, or any period of continued ſtate, may be aſcertained by repreſenting it as *at* any circumſtance which determines *the place where*, or *time when*, or *any mark of diſtinction coexiſtent therewith*; as,

To begin, end, live, die, AT ſuch a place, AT Rome, &c.

But if the place be a country, *in* is uſed; as,

To begin, end, live, die, IN Italy, France, England, &c.

To begin, end, live, die, AT ſuch a time, AT the birth of our Saviour, &c.

So, *AT the moſt—AT the leaſt—AT beſt*; i. e. at the ſituation in which, or the time when *the moſt, leaſt, beſt*, of ſuch things or ſtates appear, or are ſuppoſed.

Any ſtates denoted by ſubſtantives, and which only continue for a time, may be repreſented as coexiſtent with verbal ſtates by *at*; as,

To be AT peace, war, variance, AT work, AT play.

So, *to be*, or *to play, AT cards, dice, bowls*, or any other game. Likewiſe,

To do a thing AT ſuch a one's coſt, AT the inſtigation, AT the ſuit, command, entreaty of ſuch a one.

And, *to be AT command—to have one AT command*; i. e. ready whenſoever a command is given.

To deſerve well, ill, ſomething, nothing, AT a man's hands, are peculiar expreſſions; for we ſay, *to deſerve well, ill, ſomething, nothing, OR a man.*

WITHIN.

This prepoſition refers to place or time, which are conſidered as *extending farther* than the place or time in which that exiſts which is referred by the prepoſition; as, *The*

The river is afterwards wholly loſt WITHIN *the waters of the lake, and one diſcovers nothing like a ſtream till* WITHIN *about a quarter of a mile from Geneva.* Addiſon.

——*Within theſe three hours, Tullus,*
Alone I fought in your Corioli walls. Shakeſpeare.
There was a little city, and a few men WITHIN *it.* Old Teſtament.
He may redeem it WITHIN *a whole year after it is ſold.* ibid.

Hence whatſoever is conſidered as *not being or going beyond* the efficacy, influence, extent, reach, &c. of that which is denoted by a ſubſtantive, may be referred to the ſubſtantive by *within*; as,

This latter which is more WITHIN *our comprehenſion.* Locke.
The deſp'rate ſavage ruſh'd WITHIN *my force.* Otway.
Both he and ſhe are ſtill WITHIN *my power.* Dryden.
Be informed how much your huſband's revenue amounts to, and be ſo good a computer as to keep WITHIN *it.* Swift.

Within doors—Withindoor arts. Bacon.

Theſe are peculiar expeſſions, ſignifying relation to the inſide of a houſe, in oppoſition to the open air.

Between, Betwixt.

Whatſoever is conſidered as ſo related to two objects, as that it equally affects both, whether by *ſituation*, *duration*, *intercourſe*, *partnerſhip*, *ſeparation*, or *diſtinction*, may be referred to the names of the objects by *between* or *betwixt*.

If the objects referred to are both of the ſame ſpecies, they may be both denoted by one plural name; as, *the diſtance* BETWEEN *the towns, places*, &c. *the time* BETWEEN *theſe payments*, &c. If the objects referred to are not of the ſame ſpecies, two names are joined by the conjunction *and*; as, *the diſtance* BETWEEN *England and France*; *the interval* BETWEEN *the creation of the world and the flood.*

Zacharias whom ye ſlew BETWEEN *the temple and the altar.*
New Teſtament.

He ſhould think himſelf unhappy if things ſhould go ſo BETWEEN THEM. Bacon.

Caſtor and Pollux with only one ſoul BETWEEN THEM. Locke.

I will put a diviſion BETWEEN MY PEOPLE AND EGYPT.
Old Teſtament.

I am this day fourſcore years old, and can I diſcern BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL? Old Teſtament.

Children quickly diſtinguiſh BETWEEN *what is required of them, and what not.* Locke.

I am in a ſtrait BETWIXT TWO. New Teſtament.

AMONG, AMONGST.

Whatſoever is conſidered as ſo related to more than two objects, as to be affected equally by all, whether by *mingling with them*, or *uniting with them ſo as to make part of their number*, may be referred by *among* or *amongſt* to the names of the objects; as,

——*They heard,*
And from his preſence hid themſelves AMONG
The thickeſt trees. Milton.

Bleſſed art thou AMONG WOMEN. New Teſtament.

He had diſpoſed all the remarkable ſhows about town, AMONG THE SCENES *and decorations of his piece.* Addiſon, Spectator, N°31.

AMIDST OR AMID.

Theſe words have ſometimes the ſame ſignification as *in the middle of*, and ſometimes that of *amongſt*; as,

But of the fruit of this fair tree AMIDST
THE GARDEN, *God hath ſaid, ye ſhall not eat.* Milton.

The boar AMIDST MY CHRYSTAL STREAMS *I bring.* Dryden.

What tho' no real voice nor ſound
Amid their radiant orbs be found? Addiſon.

About.

This prepoſition, when applied to determine local ſituation, is equivalent to *ſurrounding*, *encircling*, or to *near to*; as,

Haſt thou not made a hedge ABOUT HIM? Old Teſtament.
About his neck ſhe caſt her trembling hands. Dryden.
There was no room to receive them, no not ſo much as ABOUT THE DOOR. New Teſtament.

In the ſenſe of *near to*, *about* is frequently applied to periods of time, and names of quantity; as,

When he was ABOUT AN HUNDRED YEARS *old.* New Teſtament.
He went out ABOUT THE THIRD HOUR. ibid.
It was ABOUT AN EPHAH OF BARLY. Old Teſtament.

Perhaps *about* may be conſidered as an adverb in this uſe of it; but a ſenſe in which it is uſed as a prepoſition is derived from the above-mentioned, when it is applied to ſignify *appendant to*, or *officiating near the perſon of*; as,

If you have this ABOUT YOU, *you may*
Boldly aſſault the necromancer's hall. Milton.
She hath no body to do any thing ABOUT HER *when I am gone.* Shakeſpeare.

And hence the moſt general ſenſe ſeems to be taken in which *about* is uſed, when it ſignifies *concerning*, and refers to the ſubject upon which the attention or diſcurſive powers are employed; as,

I muſt be ABOUT *my Father's* BUSINESS. New Teſtament.
The ſhekels of ſilver ABOUT WHICH *thou curſedſt.* Old Teſtament.

They ſignify either a ſpeculative knowledge of things, or a practical ſkill ABOUT THEM. Tillotſon.

To let us know in our mother tongue, WHAT *it is our brave countrymen* ARE ABOUT. Spectator.

Here *which* or *that* is underſtood after *is*, and *about* refers to the relative underſtood; i. e. *what it is* THAT *our brave countrymen are* ABOUT; or, ABOUT WHICH *our brave countrymen are employed.*

AROUND.

The ſame as *about* when applied to place; i. e. *ſurrounding*, or *encircling.*

THROUGH or THOROUGH.

From one extremity to the other; as,

There is one God and Father of all; who is above all, and THROUGH ALL, *and in you all.* New Teſtament.

A ſimplicity ſhines THROUGH ALL *he writes.* Dryden.

Hence *through* is often applied with ſtates of *piercing* or *paſſage*, to denote the object that is *compleatly pierced* or *perforated* or *paſſed from one extremity to the other*; as,

Where in a plain defended by the wood,
Crept THROUGH THE MATTED GRASS *a chryſtal flood.* Dryden.

Through is likewiſe applied in reference to the object which is conſidered as *the means* or *motive* by which any thing is effected; as,

Ye are clean THROUGH THE WORD *which I have ſpoken unto you.* New Teſtament.

Some THROUGH AMBITION, *or* THROUGH THIRST OF GOLD
Have ſlain their brothers. Dryden.

THROUGH-

THROUGHOUT.

Quite through; or in every part of; as,

This goſpel ſhall be preached THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE WORLD.
New Teſtament.

OUT OF.

Of in the ſenſe of *from* is the prepoſition, and *out* is an adverb in compoſition with it in order to modify its ſignification.

When it refers to place, or any object which determines place, it ſignifies *from within*; as,

Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts. New Teſtament.
To grow out of clefts. Bacon.

And hence it is applied to refer to whatſoever is conſidered as that from the ſubſtance, capacity, content, whereof any thing proceeds, is formed, derived, &c. as,

In the ſweat of thy face ſhalt thou eat bread, till thou return into the ground; for out of it waſt thou taken. Old Teſtam.
He performs all out of his own fund. Dryden.
All the fruits out of which drink is preſſed. Bacon.
There were dwelling at Jeruſalem, Jews, devout men, out of every nation under heaven. New Teſtament.

Or to refer to any ſituation in which objects are not when the reference is made, although they have been in ſuch ſituation, or are perhaps uſually in it; as,

One born out of due time. New Teſtament.
Chiefs out of war, and ſtateſmen out of place. Pope.
To fright, perſuade a man out of his ſenſes.
Be inſtant out of ſeaſon. New Teſtament.

When

When the mouth is OUT OF TASTE. Bacon.
Bells OUT OF TUNE. Shakeſpeare.
Darts OUT OF ORDER *thrown.* Dryden.
Both OUT OF HEART, *and* OUT OF WIND. Hudibras.
They are OUT OF THEIR ELEMENT. Baker.
To be OUT OF LOVE *with any thing; out of hearing, reach, diſtance, proportion,* &c.

Out of is likewiſe uſed to refer to *the means, motive,* or *reaſon whence* things become ſo or ſo; as,

Trade and commerce might doubtleſs be ſtill varied a thouſand ways, OUT OF WHICH *would ariſe ſuch branches as have not yet been touched.* Spectator, N° 283.
A war in which we engaged, not OUT OF AMBITION, *but for the defence of all that was dear to us.* Atterbury.
And ſo, *To do ſo or ſo* OUT OF *cowardice, lazineſs, igorance, pride, fear, conſcience,* &c.

WITHOUT.

When this prepoſition refers to place, it is equivalent to *at the outſide of*; as,

Jeſus alſo ſuffered WITHOUT THE GATE. New Teſtament.

Therefore, in this uſe of it, it is the negative of *within.*

On other occaſions it is the negative of *with,* and therefore as *with* may be applied to all ſorts of concomitance, *without* may be uſed to deny concomitance of all ſorts, and may imply *not having—not taking—not in company with—not within the ſphere or limits of—not by the direction or help of,* &c. &c. as,

Iſrael hath been WITHOUT THE TRUE GOD. Old Teſtament.
The labourers are gone WITHOUT THEIR WAGES.
There is no living with thee nor WITHOUT THEE. Addiſon.

Eternity

Eternity is WITHOUT OUR REACH. Burnet.
Wiſe men will do it WITHOUT LAW. Bacon.
To make bricks WITHOUT STRAW.

AFTER.

Whatſoever is conſidered as *following*, whether in time, or by ſucceſſive poſition, motion, imitation, or any diſcurſive operation, may be referred by this prepoſition to *the object followed*; as,

Ye know that AFTER TWO DAYS *is the feaſt of the paſſover.* New Teſtament.
Sometimes I placed a third priſm AFTER A SECOND. Newton.
The army of the Chaldeans purſued AFTER THE KING. Old Teſt.
There are many particular figures of her, made AFTER THE SAME DESIGN. Addiſon.
This alluſion is AFTER THE ORIENTAL MANNER. Pope.
He takes greatneſs of kingdoms according to bulk and currency, and not AFTER THEIR INTRINSICK VALUE. Bacon.

BEHIND.

This prepoſition is not applied with names of time; yet it is often uſed to refer to ſuch objects as remain after ſome other is gone; as,

He left BEHIND HIM *myſelf and a ſiſter.* Shakeſpeare.
i. e. he left at his going away myſelf and a ſiſter.
And ſo, *He has left his gloves, whip, cane* BEHIND HIM; *i. e.* at his departure.

And ſo with regard to death; as,

What he gave me to publiſh, was but a ſmall part of what he left BEHIND HIM. Pope. *i. e.* at his death.

As

As to place, this prepoſition refers to the hinder part of any thing, or that which is on the contrary ſide to the front or face of it; as,

To ſit, ſtand, ride BEHIND *a perſon.*
Thou haſt caſt me BEHIND THY BACK. Old Teſtament.
And ſo, *to ſtand behind a ſcreen, curtain, bed,* &c.

When *behind* is joined with ſtates of motion, it is equivalent to *following*, as *to walk behind* is *to follow.*

And hence it frequently refers to an object which is conſidered as excelling or preceding ſome other; as,

They wept which beheld how much this latter (houſe of God) *came* BEHIND IT; *i. e.* the firſt houſe. Hooker.

BEYOND.

On the contrary ſide of, farther in diſtance than, more advanced than, exceeding; as,

The good land that is BEYOND JORDAN. Old Teſtament.
The arrows are BEYOND THEE. ibid.
What's fame? a fancy'd life in others breath,
A thing BEYOND US, *ev'n before our death.* Pope.
They were ſore amazed in themſelves BEYOND MEASURE. New Teſtament.

And ſo, *beyond thought, conception, diſpute,* &c.
Beyond their power, income, ability, capacity, &c.

OFF.

This prepoſition is the negative to *on* or *upon*; as,

I was never OFF MY LEGS. Temple.
i. e. never otherwiſe than on or upon my legs.

It likewiſe ſignifies *diſtant from*; as,

Cicero's Tuſculum was at a place called Grotta Ferrata, about two miles OFF THIS TOWN. Addiſon.

ABOVE.

Higher than, more than; as,

The mountain of the Lord's houſe ſhall be exalted ABOVE THE *hills.* Old Teſtament.

The diſciple is not ABOVE HIS MASTER. New Teſtament.

The man was ABOVE FORTY YEARS OLD. ibid.

Hence ſtates of *excelling* or *exceeding* of any kind are often referred by *above* to that which is conſidered as excelled or exceeded, poſtponed or diſdained; as,

There is one God who is ABOVE ALL. New Teſtament.

Things may be ABOVE OUR REASON, *without being contrary to it.* Swift.

Above all things, my brethren, ſwear not. New Teſtament.

And hence, *above* ſometimes ſignifies *too high ſpirited for*; as,

He is ABOVE SO MEAN AN ACTION.

Kings and princes, in the earlieſt ages of the world, were ABOVE NOTHING *that tended to promote the conveniencies of life.* Pope.

ON, UPON.

When theſe prepoſitions are applied to *place*, they refer to the object, to the upper ſurface whereof, or cloſe to the ſide whereof, the attention is carried; as,

To be ON A HILL—ON HORSEBACK—ON THE SEA—ON SHORE, &c.

Berwick UPON TWEED—*Stratford* UPON AVON, &c.

In two villages UPON THE RIVER KENNET. Clarendon.

——*On each side of her*
Stood pretty dimpled boys. Shakeſpeare.
The Rhodians ON THE OTHER SIDE *valiantly repulſed the enemy.* Knolles.

Whatſoever is applied to the upper ſide, or part, of any thing, may be referred by *on* or *upon*; as, *to place, throw things* ON *or* UPON *the table, floor—liquor ſpilled* ON *or* UPON *the ground*, &c.; and ſo,

Perch'd ON THE TREE. Dryden.
As I did ſtand my watch UPON THE HILL. Shakeſpeare.

And in imprecations, the name of whatſoever is to cover or overwhelm the object prayed againſt, has *on* or *upon* before it; as,
Sorrow ON THEE, *and all the pack of you.* Shakeſpeare.

And in accumulations, *on* or *upon* is uſed to refer one object to another; as,
Horrour ON HORROUR! *Theſeus is return'd.* Smith.

Hence theſe prepoſitions are uſed to refer to that which is conſidered as the foundation by which any thing is ſupported; as,

A wiſe man which built his houſe UPON A ROCK.
A fooliſh man which built his houſe UPON THE SAND. New Teſt.

And hence they are uſed to refer to whatſoever is the object of reliance, reſt, dependence, &c.; for ſuch object is conſidered as a kind of foundation thereof; as,

God commands us, by our dependance UPON HIS TRUTH, *to believe a fact that we do not underſtand.* Swift.
Saul leaned ON HIS SPEAR. Old Teſtament.

We now may boldly ſpend, UPON THE HOPE
Of what is to come in. Shakeſpeare.

But the ſtates, truſt, confidence, to truſt, to confide, take *in* when thus referred; as,

Truſt IN THE LORD. *Charge them that are rich in this world, that they be not highminded, nor* TRUST IN UNCERTAIN RICHES, *but* IN THE LIVING GOD. New Teſtament.
Having confidence IN YOU ALL. ibid.

A reference is frequently made by *on* or *upon* to that which is the foundation of a charge or proteſtation or threat; as,

We charge you, ON ALLEGIANCE TO OURSELVES,
To hold your ſlaughtering hands. Shakeſpeare.

And ſo when a perſon ſays, UPON MY HONOUR *things are ſo or ſo.*

Hence, ON THY LIFE; *the captive maid is mine.* Dryden.

And the ſubject which detains the thought or ſpeech has *on* or *upon* before it; as, *to think, ſpeak, deliberate* ON *or* UPON *this or that ſubject*; and ſo,

But while he thought ON THESE THINGS, *behold an angel of the Lord appeared to him.* New Teſtament.
Bear Worceſter to death, and Vernon too,
OTHER OFFENDERS *we ſhall pauſe* UPON. Shakeſpeare.

And *to call on* or *call upon a perſon.*

In like manner, muſical inſtruments, as being objects which detain the thought and ſkill of the practitioner, have *on* or *upon* before their names; as, *to play* ON *or* UPON *the harp, violin, flute,* &c.

Th' unhappy huſband, huſband now no more,
Did ON HIS TUNEFUL HARP *his loſs deplore.* Dryden.
To the chief ſinger ON MY STRINGED INSTRUMENTS. Old Teſt.
Habakkuk, chap. iii. verſe 19.

Unleſs it be from touching the upper part of ſome inſtruments of muſick in uſing them, that the reference by *on* or *upon* has been introduced with regard to theſe, and thence extended to all other inſtruments.

The time or occaſion when, and the conſideration or account why, things happen or are done, frequently admit of the reference by *on* or *upon*; as,

Becauſe Jeſus had healed ON THE SABBATH-DAY. New Teſtam.

But *on* is uſed with no name of time, except *day*; and ſometimes *hour* in the Scriptures.

The beſt way to be taken ON ANY OCCASION. Locke.
The exſtaſy of a Harlequin ON THE RECEIPT OF A LETTER *from his miſtreſs.* Dryden.
Syllogiſm is made uſe of, ON OCCASION, *to diſcover a fallacy.* Locke.

BELOW.

This prepoſition refers whatſoever is conſidered as *not ſo high*, or *inferior*, either in place, dignity, worth, or deſert, to that by which the degree of height is eſtimated; as,

His Idylliums of Theocritus are as much BELOW HIS MANILIUS, *as the fields are* BELOW THE STARS. Felton.
This method is not only dangerous, but BELOW THE PRACTICE *of a reaſonable creature.* Spectator, N° 25.

BENEATH.

BENEATH.

When this prepoſition is applied to place, it has the ſignification of *directly below*, i. e. of *underneath*; as,

Their woolly fleeces, he laid BENEATH HIM. Dryden.
And palms for thee BENEATH HIS LAURELS *grow.* Prior.

And in expreſſions of preſſure; as,

And ſink BENEATH THE BURDENS *which they bear.* Dryden.

In other inſtances, *beneath* is equivalent to *below*; as,

He will do nothing BENEATH HIS HIGH STATION. Atterbury.

UNDER.

This prepoſition refers to that which is ſo much below, as to be in ſubjection, covered, ſheltered, or concealed, to the object that keeps in ſubjection, or affords the cover, ſhelter, or concealment; as,

We are not UNDER THE LAW. New Teſtament.
We are no longer UNDER A SCHOOLMASTER. ibid.
The world was UNDER JOVE. Dryden.
To be UNDER WATER—*to work* UNDER GROUND.
Many a good poetic vein is buried UNDER A TRADE. Locke.
The Lord God of Iſrael, UNDER *whoſe* WINGS *thou art come to truſt.* Old Teſtament.
UNDER COVERT *of the wind.* Dryden.

The falſe Trojan UNDER SAIL *was ſeen.* Dryden.
He does it UNDER NAME *of perfect love.* Shakeſpeare.
Morpheus is repreſented UNDER THE FIGURE *of a boy aſleep.* Addiſ.
This faction, UNDER THE NAME *of Puritan, became very turbulent.* Swift.

The

The notion of *bearing* ſail, or ſuch a name or figure, is manifeſtly implied in the four laſt examples; and hence ſtates of being loaded, oppreſſed, reſtrained, dejected, may be referred to that which is conſidered as born or ſupported, by *under*; thus,

As many ſervants as are UNDER THE YOKE. New Teſtament.
I am carnal, ſold UNDER SIN. ibid.
To groan and ſweat UNDER THE BUSINESS. Shakeſpeare.
The laws and conditions UNDER WHICH *they enter upon their authority.* Locke.

And ſo, *under a neceſſity, diſadvantage, penalty,* &c.

Whoſoever is lower in ſituation, is commonly full in view of thoſe who are in a higher ſituation. Hence, *under* is applied in references of view, proof, conſideration, correction; as,

To preſent them all UNDER ONE VIEW. Burnet.
The thing UNDER PROOF *is not capable of demonſtration.* Locke.
The ſubject UNDER CONSIDERATION. Locke.
A poem which lay ſo long UNDER VIRGIL'S CORRECTION. Addiſon.

Whatſoever is lower, is deficient in height or degree; therefore *under* is often uſed to refer to that by which the defect is eſtimated; as,

If you write UNDER YOUR OWN STRENGTH. Dryden.
There are ſeveral hundred pariſhes in England UNDER TWENTY POUNDS *a year.* Swift.
He will take nothing UNDER SUCH A SUM, QUANTITY, NUMBER, &c.

To give UNDER ONE'S HAND, or *to leave* UNDER ONE'S HAND, are particular phraſes, ſignifying *to give*, or *leave* atteſted in writing.

UNDER-

UNDERNEATH.

Directly under, or quite under; as,

UNDERNEATH THIS STONE doth lie.
As much beauty as could die. B. Johnſon.

UP, DOWN.

Theſe words, when uſed as prepoſitions, are only applied with ſtates of motion, to ſhew the direction of ſuch ſtates; *up*, conveys the mind to place continually higher and higher; *down*, to place continually lower and lower; as,

To go UP A HILL, to climb UP A TREE; to go DOWN A HILL, to fall DOWN A PRECIPICE.

Of the conſtruction of interjections.

AS theſe are not connective parts of ſpeech, they have little or no effect on the form of conſtruction of the other words which may be mentioned together with them. Only *ah me!—wo is me!* and ſome few other expreſſions of the paſſions, may be conſidered as a kind of interjections compounded out of ſeveral words; and in theſe two inſtances the oblique caſe *me* is made uſe of.

Of abſolute conſtruction.

THIS kind of conſtruction appears, when a ſeries of words is united with another ſeries, without directly mentioning the conjunction, or relative adverb, or other word which is uſed in the common courſe of conſtruction, to ſhew the connexion; but by leaving the form of conſtruction itſelf to ſupply what is omitted. In

In abſolute conſtruction you'll perceive
Sometimes the verb plac'd in th' infinitive.
And nom'natives with participles join'd
In abſolute conſtruction, oft you'll find.

The verb in the infinitive mood is ſometimes found in a kind of conſtruction which may be conſidered as abſolute; as,

I ſhall conſider this book under four heads, in relation to the celeſtial, the infernal, the human, and the imaginary perſons, who have their reſpective parts allotted in it.

To BEGIN WITH THE CELESTIAL PERSONS, &c.
Addiſon, Spectator, N° 357.

Here, *To begin with the celeſtial perſons*, ſignifies in effect, *I think proper to begin with*, or ſomething of the like import.

To RESUME ONE OF THE MORALS OF MY FIRST PAPER, *and to confirm Clarinda in her good inclinations, I would have her to conſider what a pretty figure ſhe would make*, &c.
Addiſon, Spectator, N° 323.

i. e. *It is not improper to reſume one of the morals of my firſt paper, and therefore in order to confirm Clarinda*, &c.

And ſo in, *but to proceed.*

To ſay THE TRUTH, *I have been miſtaken.—To* SUPPOSE THE WORST, *we ſhall only loſe our labour.*

With many other inſtances of the like kind of expreſſion.

But the moſt common uſe of abſolute conſtruction, is when a ſeries of words which are equivalent to a whole ſentence depending on a relative adverb or a conjunction, is expreſſed by a participle depending on a ſubſtantive in the nominative caſe, and the mode of dependence is left to be underſtood, or ſupplied, by the mind itſelf; as, THE

THE COOL OF THE EVENING BEING A CIRCUMSTANCE with which Holy Writ introduces this great ſcene; it is poetically deſcribed by our author. Addiſon, Spectator, N° 357.

i. e. *Foraſmuch as* the cool of the evening *is* a circumſtance with which, &c.

This cacoethes is as epidemical as the ſmall-pox; THERE BEING VERY FEW who are not ſeized with it, ſome time or other in their lives. Spectator, N° 582.

i. e. *Seeing there are* very few, &c.

YOU HAVING, in your two laſt Spectators, GIVEN the town a couple of remarkable letters in very different ſtiles: I take this opportunity to offer you ſome remarks, &c. Spectator, N° 618.

i. e. *As you have given,* &c.

I BEING IN THE WAY, the Lord led me to the houſe of my maſter's brethren. Old Teſtament.

i. e. *Whilſt I was in the way.*

If a man borrow ought of his neighbour, and it be hurt or die, THE OWNER THEREOF NOT BEING WITH IT; he ſhall ſurely make it good. Old Teſtament.

i. e. *If the owner thereof be not with it.*

Inſtances may be found in which this kind of conſtruction ſupplies the place of a ſentence in dependence upon almoſt any relative adverb or conjunction.

Of figurative conſtruction.

THE forms of conſtruction which have hitherto been conſidered, and for which rules have been given, are uſually conſidered as regular forms; but it is often convenient to depart from them, either for the ſake of diſpatch, or of variety; and

if this be done with judgment, the ſtile is often improved by it; for in the application of all ſorts of inſtruments or means in a great variety of practice, it is often convenient, and ſometimes neceſſary, to depart from general rules. When this appears in language, it is called figurative conſtruction, and the grammarians have reduced this conſtruction under four general heads, which they have called ELLIPSIS, PLEONASM, ENALLAGE, and HYPERBATON.

Of the figure ELLIPSIS.

WHEN words are conſtructed according to this figure, ſomething is omitted, or left to be ſupplied by the mind from the nature of what is expreſſed.

One or more words of any part of ſpeech may be omitted in a ſeries of words, when either previous knowledge ſuppoſed in the hearer or reader, or demonſtrative circumſtances attending the words when ſpoke, may ſupply the omiſſion. Thus in theſe words of St. Paul, *While one ſaith, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos*, it is taken for granted, that the nature of the ſubject muſt enable every reader to ſupply *the convert*, or ſome words equivalent to them, before *of Paul—of Apollos*. And in the expreſſion of the grave-digger in Shakeſpeare, *come, my ſpade*; the words *give me*, or others of the ſame import, are ſupplied by the ſituation, or by ſome action of the ſpeaker; and ſo of innumerable inſtances. In Proverbs alſo many words are uſually left to be ſupplied from the trite obvious nature of what is denoted by them; as, *out of ſight, out of mind*; *like maſter, like man*; and many others. In paſſionate ſpeeches alſo, much is uſually left to be ſupplied from the ſituation and circumſtances of the ſpeaker. Thus in the celebrated ſcene of Lear in Shakeſpeare,

Deny to ſpeak with me! they're ſick; they're weary, &c.

and

and in many others of that paſſionate character, there are continual ellipſes; but it is ſufficient in a work of grammar juſt to touch on inſtances of this kind, which properly belong to the art of rhetorick.

But there are three inſtances of ellipſis that appear in the conſtruction of the Engliſh, which muſt be particularly taken notice of in grammar, becauſe theſe inſtances are the reſult of mere cuſtom.

Infinitives without their ſign, ſucceed
The verbs, *ſee, hear, feel, bid, dare, let, have, need.*

The active forms of the verbs, *to ſee, hear, feel,* and the reſt which are mentioned in the rule, if they have a verb in the infinitive mood in dependence upon them, uſually require the verb without the ſign *to*; as,

Thou ſhalt not SEE *thy brother's ox or his aſs* FALL *down by the way, and hide thyſelf from them.* Old Teſtament.
We HEARD *him* SAY, *I will deſtroy this temple.* New Teſtament.
I FEEL *the pain* ABATE.
He BID *her* ALIGHT. Shakeſpeare.
One who DURST *his deſtiny* CONTROUL. Dryden.

Dare only admits of this conſtruction, when it is uſed as a verb neuter; for when it is uſed as a verb active, ſignifying *to defy* or challenge, it requires the ſign *to* before an infinitive dependent verb; as, *I* DARE *thee but* TO BREATHE *upon my love.* Shakeſpeare.
Moſes LET *his father* DEPART. Old Teſtament.
If thou LET *this man* GO, *thou art not Ceſar's friend.* New Teſt.
I would fain HAVE *any one* NAME *to me that tongue, that any one can ſpeak as he ſhould do by the rules of grammar.* Locke.

Let and *have*, in this application of them, are not auxiliar verbs, but verbs active, *let* ſignifying *to ſuffer*, and *have*, *to procure* or *prevail upon*.

He that would diſcourſe of things as they agreed in the complex idea of extenſion and ſolidity, NEEDED *but* USE *the word body.* Locke.

The verb *to need*, in the Engliſh of the Scriptures, has the regular infinitive after it; as,

A workman that NEEDETH *not* TO *be aſhamed.* New Teſtam.

But we ſhould now ſay, *a workman that needs not be aſhamed.*

Some other verbs may be found in this kind of conſtruction; as, *perceive* in the expreſſion, *I perceived it riſe*; and in, *you ought not walk*, in Shakeſpeare; but theſe are not authorized by the general conſtruction of the language.

With caſual *that* we often may diſpenſe,
Or with a relative, and yet preſerve the ſenſe.

This being a kind of ellipſis that very frequently occurs, is taken notice of already among the ordinary forms of conſtruction.

Do and *did* are often uſed to ſave the repetition of ſome verb; as,

They promiſed to come, but if they DO *not, we muſt proceed without them*; i. e. *if they do not* COME.

For by the nature of the Engliſh language, the repetition of any verb may be ſpared, by mentioning its ſign; as,

They muſt and ſhall be puniſhed—you may go, but I cannot; i. e. *they muſt be puniſhed—I cannot go.*

This conſtruction therefore by *do* and *did*, although it be elliptical, is only one inſtance of the general ellipſis which runs through the language, when words, and not full ſentences, are united by conjunctions.

Of

Of PLEONASM.

THE conſtruction which falls under this figure ſeldom occurs in Engliſh, and when it does occur, is uſually conſidered as a fault. Thus, *God* HE *knows.*

Now will I write letters to Angelo,
The provoſt HE *ſhall bear them;*

and other expreſſions of like conſtruction in Shakeſpeare, are not now in uſe; and the uſe of *do* or *did* merely to fill up a verſe, which ſometimes appears in poets ſo late as the beginning of the preſent century, and often in thoſe of earlier times, is now diſuſed, and has been ridiculed by Mr. Pope in,

Expletives their feeble aim DO *join.*

Of ENALLAGE.

THE kind of conſtruction which may be reduced to this figure principally appears, in Engliſh, when one part of ſpeech is uſed with the power and effect of another.

Thus a ſubſtantive often has the force of an adjective by being prefixed to another ſubſtantive, and linked to it; as, *a land-animal, ſea-water, a pen-knife, iron-wedges,* &c.

Any ſort of word, or ſeries of words, when uſed to ſignify the ſound, or written appearance only, may be a ſubſtantive; as,

Her innocent FORSOOTHS, YES'S, AND'T PLEASE YOU'S, *moved the good old lady.* Spectator, N° 266.

On the other hand, adjectives are often applied as ſubſtantives; as,

Abſtain from all appearance OF EVIL. New Teſtament.
In poetry, as in architecture, not only THE WHOLE, *but the principal members, ſhould be great.* Addiſon, Spectator, N° 267.

I have

I have heard, BY MANY, of this man. New Teſtament.

And ſo, *the righteous—the wicked.*

There ſhall be a reſurrection of THE DEAD, both of THE JUST and UNJUST. New Teſtament.

You are in THE WRONG. Shakeſpeare.

Adjectives likewiſe are ſometimes uſed as adverbs. Thus, *ſure*, for *ſurely*; *in ſhort*, for *in a few words*; *at leaſt*, *at the worſt*, for *taking things in the loweſt degree*, *in the worſt ſituation*; and ſo of many other inſtances.

The participles are continually aſſuming the nature of adjectives, by being applied to ſignify, not occaſional or revocable ſtates, but permanent qualities or ſituations; as, *a running ſtream*; *a ſtriped*, *flowered*, *fringed garment*; *a learned man*; *a thorough-paced villain*, &c.

The particle *that* appears in ſo many characters, that it may not be improper to give rules to diſtinguiſh when it belongs to one part of ſpeech, and when to another.

Whenever *that* may in its place receive
Or *who* or *which*, it is a relative;
But to a ſentence when it gives a caſe,
Of a conjunction it ſupplies the place:
Or when applied with ſentences to ſhow
Them as dependent or on *ſuch* or *ſo*:
With names united, or inſtead of names
When plac'd, to be demonſtrative it claims.

Thus in,

Every one THAT has read the critics. Spectator, N° 321.

That is a relative pronoun, for *who* may be uſed inſtead of it.

And

And in,

The only objection THAT *ſhe ſeems to inſinuate* Spect. N° 605.

That is a relative, for *which* may be uſed inſtead of it. But in,

It happened THAT *the king himſelf paſſed through the gallery during this debate.* Spectator, N° 289.

That is a caſual or ſentential particle of the nature of a conjunction; for it gives notice that the whole ſentence, *the king himſelf paſſed*, &c. is to be conſidered as a kind of nominative caſe anſwering to *it*. Likewiſe in,

I applied myſelf with ſo much diligence to my ſtudies, THAT *there are very few celebrated books which I am not acquainted with.* Spectator, N° 1.

To SUCH A DEGREE *was my curioſity raiſed,* THAT *I made a voyage to Grand Cairo on purpoſe to take the meaſure of a pyramid.* ibid.

For in theſe examples, *that* is a kind of redditive to *ſo* and *ſuch*.

Whereas when it is ſaid, THAT *is a Latin book*, or THAT BOOK *is a Latin book*, it is a demonſtrative pronoun; and ſo of other inſtances.

This figure of enallage might be much enlarged upon; but in a treatiſe of this kind it is ſufficient to mention ſome few of the principal inſtances to which it extends.

Of the HYPERBATON.

THIS figure relates to the order of words in a ſentence; for when the ſimpleſt order is not obſerved, the figure takes place. This order conſiſts in placing the ſubject of a ſentence before the definitive verb; and, if the ſubject conſiſts of ſeveral words, in placing the words which immediately affect each other as near together as poſſible; and if the predicate conſiſts of ſeveral words,

in placing them in the ſame manner; but it is often convenient to depart from this order, even in proſe. Thus the ſentence,

For the moving of pity, our principal machine is the handkerchief.
Addiſon, Spectator, N° 44.

if reduced to the ſimpleſt order, would be, *our principal machine for the moving of pity is the handkerchief.* And,

Having purſued the hiſtory of a pun, from its original to its downfall, I ſhall here define it. Addiſon, Spectator, N° 62.

would be, *I having purſued the hiſtory of a pun, from its original to its downfall, ſhall here define it.*

There is no end of giving inſtances of the different ways in which we may depart ſafely from the moſt ſimple order of conſtruction. But this we may obſerve, that, in general, the moſt ſimple order is the moſt perſpicuous and eaſy, and the leaſt liable to ambiguity.

We ought to be particularly careful when we place two ſubſtantives of the ſame number, the one in the nominative, and the other in the accuſative, both before the active tranſitive verb; for if the verbal ſtate be ſuch as either of the objects denoted by the ſubſtantives may be in, it always requires ſome little additional obſervation to determine which object is in the active, and which in the paſſive ſtate. Thus if this line of Pope in the Dunciad ſtood ſingle,

Blockheads with reaſon wicked wits abhor,

it would not be eaſy to determine, whether *blockheads*, or *wicked wits*, are *the objects abhorring*, or which are *the objects abhorred*; but when the following line is read,

But fool with fool is barbarous civil war,

we perceive that the poet repreſents *blockheads* as *abhorring*, and *wicked wits* as *abhorred by blockheads.*

And

And even when the verbal ſtate is not ſuch as both the objects can be in which are denoted by the ſubſtantives, it ſtill occaſions ſome perplexity if we place the accuſative caſe before the verb. Thus in Shakeſpeare's Tempeſt; in,

You are three men of ſin, whom deſtiny
(That hath to inſtrument, this lower world
And what is in't) the never-ſurfeited ſea
Hath cauſed to belch up.

we perceive an obſcurity; becauſe the words ſhould be placed, *whom deſtiny hath cauſed the never-ſurfeited ſea to belch up.*

But the order of poſition is beſt regulated, both in poetry and oratory, by the ear, which ought to be conſulted, ſo that perſpicuity be not hurt by a regard to ſound. Whatſoever is difficult to pronounce, is harſh to the ear when pronounced; for the organs of utterance, and the organs of hearing are ſo formed, that eaſe in articulating creates a pleaſure in hearing, independent of the ſenſe of what is ſpoken. But pleaſure in hearing, independent of the ſenſe of what is ſpoken, is of very ſhort duration; and if left unſupported by ſtrong ſenſe conveyed together with it, we are quickly cloyed, and even diſguſted with the abſurdity of the proceeding; whereas, if clear ſtrong ſenſe be conveyed in words ſomewhat harſh to the ear, we are apt to overlook the defect in the conveyance, out of regard to the excellence of that which is conveyed.

A

Practical Grammar

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

BOOK III.

OF PROSODY.

THIS part of grammar treats of ſyllables conſidered as long or ſhort, and of the order of ſucceſſion in which theſe ſyllables are placed in poetry ſo as to conſtitute harmony.

The diſtinction of ſyllables, with regard to length and ſhortneſs, is called *quantity* in grammar; and certain numbers of theſe ſyllables taken together in certain laws of quantity, are called *feet*; and certain numbers of feet placed in certain orders, conſtitute verſes of different kinds, not only with regard to length; but likewiſe with regard to *rithmus* or ſucceſſive modulation.

Of the quantity of ſyllables in Engliſh words.

SYLLABLES, when conſidered with regard to quantity, are either *long* or *ſhort*. Every long ſyllable is ſuppoſed to take up twice as much time in pronouncing as a ſhort ſyllable does.

does. This proportion is not indeed obſerved very exactly between every long ſyllable and every ſhort one; but it is obſerved with ſufficient exactneſs to diſtinguiſh the ſorts of feet whereof different kinds of verſes conſiſt, which is all that is required in technical proſody.

A long ſyllable has this mark (¯), or the accent (′) over it; a ſhort ſyllable has this mark (˘) over it, or is without any mark.

In the pronunciation of the Engliſh, a diſcernable ſtreſs of the voice is laid upon ſome one ſyllable of every word which has more than one ſyllable in it, and ſeveral words which conſiſt of more than two ſyllables require this ſtreſs of voice on more than one of their ſyllables. Our grammarians have agreed to call this ſtreſs of the voice, *accent*; although it is frequently laid upon a ſyllable without altering the tone as to height. But the ſtreſs gives a ſtrength to the utterance of the ſyllable, and this either by dwelling upon ſome vowel or diphthong; as in, *ámiable, ómen, túmult, capácious, jóyous*; or by running ſome vowel or diphthong upon one or more conſonants which follow it, and dwelling upon them; as in, *ámicable, óminous, túmble, capácity, bóaſter*; ſo that *accent*, or ſtrong articulation, and *long quantity*, coincide in Engliſh.

I. All monoſyllables take or omit
The accent, as the writer ſees moſt fit.

All monoſyllables may be pronounced either without or with the accent, and are therefore what the grammarians call *common*, i. e. either long or ſhort, as occaſion requires. Indeed the articles *a, an, the*, the ſigns of the tenſes *have, had, ſhall, will, may*, &c. and the conjunctions and prepoſitions of one ſyllable, are uſually pronounced without much ſtreſs of the voice, and therefore are uſually ſhort; but if they are at any time emphatical, the ſtreſs may be given to them, and if ſo, they become long ſyllables.

The

The ſign of a tenſe is always emphatical when it is placed without its verb, *i. e.* when its verb is left to be underſtood or ſupplied by the mind; as in,

But thoſe who cannot write, and thoſe who cán. Pope.

The prepoſitions are often emphatical when they follow verbs; as in,

Bows and votes ón, ín court and parliament. Pope.
Full many a beaſt goes ín, but none come óut. Pope.

And ſo of other like inſtances, which occur continually.

II. Short ſyllables to words ſubjoin'd we place,
As marks of number, perſon, tenſe or caſe.
And in compariſon you likewiſe find
Short ſyllables to adjectives ſubjoin'd.
And *ly*, which to ſo many adverbs ſtands
Subjoin'd, no length'ned utterance demands.

Syllables are ſhort which are acquired at the end of ſome ſubſtantives by declenſion and variation of number; and thoſe which are acquired at the end of ſome forms of the verb by conjugation, are likewiſe ſhort.

The ſyllable *es* is, in effect, acquired in the genitive caſe ſingular by ſome ſubſtantives which end in ſilent *e*, ſuch as *judge*; and by others which are of the firſt or third variety. Thus,

The marſhal's trancheon nor the judge's robe. Shakeſpeare.
But for the wits of either Charles's days. Pope.

This ſyllable is always ſhort.

ĕs ſhort, is likewiſe ſubjoined in the plural of all ſubſtantives of the firſt and third variety; as, *facĕs*, *cagĕs*, *churchĕs*, *loſſĕs*, *foxĕs*, &c.

The

The ſame ſyllable, viz. *ĕs* ſhort, is likewiſe ſubjoined in the third perſon preſent of the indicative mood of verbs that end as the ſubſtantives do which form the plural by *ĕs* ſhort; as, *be placĕs*, *eaſĕs*, *fixĕs*, *daſhĕs*, &c.

eſt, the termination of the ſecond perſon ſingular of the ſame tenſe, is likewiſe ſhort; as, *thou bearĕſt*, *grantĕſt*, *ſtandĕſt*, &c. But this ſyllable is uſually contracted; as, *thou bearſt*.

The ſyllables *ing* and *ed*, which are affixed to the root of the verb in order to form either the definitive tenſes, or thoſe of the infinitive mood, or the participles, are ſhort; as, *callĭng*, *I have callĕd*, *a man callĕd*; but *ed* is very often contracted; as, *call'd*.

The ſyllables *er* and *eſt*, which are affixed to adjectives in order to form the degrees of compariſon, are ſhort; as, *fairĕr*, *fairĕſt*, &c.

The ſyllable *ly*, ſubjoined to adverbs, is ſhort; as, *fairly*, *deſervedly*, &c.

Theſe rules admit of few or no exceptions.

Of the quantity of words of two ſyllables.

THERE are few or no words in Engliſh which have two long ſyllables ſucceeding each other, and as ſome one ſyllable of every word of more than one ſyllable has a ſtreſs of the voice upon it, it is manifeſt that Engliſh diſſyllable words muſt either conſiſt of a long ſyllable followed by a ſhort one, or of a ſhort ſyllable followed by a long one.

Diſſyllables are either original words, or derivatives from monoſyllables, or compounds from monoſyllables: and whether they become diſſyllables by derivation or compoſition, it is manifeſt

nifeſt that only one ſyllable can be added to the original monoſyllable; for if more ſyllables were added, the reſult would be a word of three or more ſyllables.

The Engliſh words have been borrowed from ſo many languages, that it is very difficult to determine what diſſyllables are to be conſidered as original words, and what as not ſo. And as both derivative and compound words are formed ſometimes by ſubjoining a ſyllable, and ſometimes by prefixing a ſyllable to an original word, it is equally difficult to determine what words are to be conſidered as derivatives, and what as compounds; and when derivatives or compounds are made by particles prefix'd, the ſame particle is long in ſome words and ſhort in others.

Thus *ex* is long in, *éxit*, *éxtant*; but is ſhort in *expréſs*, *extént*, *extól*, and many other words. This has come to paſs from our retaining many of the letters of thoſe languages whence ſo many of our words are taken, without retaining the pronunciation of the languages.

III. Diſſyllables in *age*, *en*, *et*, *iſh*, *ow*,
Our, *y*, *le*, *ter*, *c-k*, ſeldom allow
Of accent on the laſt; except in words
Which compoſition frequently affords
With monoſyllables, when they are found
Following a prepoſition ſhort in ſound.

Words of two ſyllables of every part of ſpeech which end in *age*, *en*, *et*, *iſh*, *ow*, *our*, *y*, *le*, *ter*, *ck*, have uſually the laſt ſyllable ſhort; as, *bóndage*, *máiden*, *quíet*, *ſélfiſh*, *féllow*, *aúthour*, *jólly*, *ſúbtle*, *síſter*, *myſtick*, *frólick*, &c. *to mánage*, *to ópen*, *to pócket*, *to láviſh*, *to fóllow*, (except *allów*) *to lábour*, *to súlly*, *to púzzle*, *to flátter*, *to frólick*; &c.

But

But a ſhort prepoſition is frequently found placed before monoſyllables of theſe terminations, ſo as to form diſſyllables with the accent on the original word, which is now the laſt ſyllable of the compound word; as in, *engáge*, *aſſwáge*, *beſét*, *unwíſh*, *foreſlów*, *contoúr*, *complý*, *replý*, *dený*, *intér*, *refér*, *confér*, *unlóck*, &c.

IV. The nouns diſſyllable which end in *er*
Upon the firſt a length'ned accent bear.

Nouns of two ſyllables which end in *er* have the accent upon the firſt ſyllable; as, *thundĕr*, *wondĕr*, *wintĕr*, *ſplintĕr*, *ſpeakĕr*, *bearĕr*, *readĕr*, &c.

V. But nouns diſſyllable, if they contain
A diphthong in the laſt (ſave *ous*, *eign*, *ain*)
Require that on the laſt the voice ſhall long remain.

Nouns of two ſyllables, if they have a diphthong in the laſt ſyllable, have the accent on the laſt; as in a re*treát*, a ſur*véy*, a de*láy*, ap*plaúſe*, &c.

But nouns which end in *ain* muſt be excepted; as, *cértain*, *moúntain*, *foúntain*, *chieftain*, &c. And in *eign*; as, *fóreign*, *sóv'reign*, and ſome others.

And ſeveral adjectives in *ous*; as, *fámous*, *jeálous*, *zealous*, &c.

Nouns in *ow* and *our*, although they have a diphthong in the laſt ſyllable, have that ſyllable ſhort, by the firſt rule concerning words of two ſyllables; as, *a ſwállow*, *a féllow*, *a billow*, &c, *fávour*, *lábour*, &c.

VI. In

VI. In verbs diſſyllable, if on their end
Diphthongs or ſev'ral conſonants attend,
Or ſilent *e* following a conſonant,
A length'ned accent to the laſt we grant.

Verbs of two ſyllables which have a diphthong in the laſt ſyllable, or end with two conſonants, or in ſilent *e* following a conſonant, have the accent on the latter ſyllable; as, *to repáir, to enjóy, to deſtróy, to appeár, to betráy, to alláy*, &c.; *to diſtréſs, to commánd, to depárt, to regárd, to deſért*, &c.; *to beháve, to atóne, to abáte, to aríſe, to conclúde*, &c.

VII. In ſev'ral words diſſyllable which bear
At once of noun and verb the character,
The noun has on the firſt its accent plac'd,
But by the verb 'tis taken on the laſt.

In ſeveral words of two ſyllables which are uſed both as nouns and verbs, the noun has the accent upon the former ſyllable, and the verb on the latter; as, *ábſent, to abſént; ábſtract, to abſtráct; cément, to cemént; a cónſort, to conſórt; a cónteſt, to contéſt*; &c.

But this rule admits of many exceptions; for there are very many diſſyllable nouns which do not end either in *age, en, et, iſh, our, y, le, ter*, or *ck*, and which of conſequence have the accent on the latter ſyllable: and yet there are verbs of the ſame form with theſe nouns; as, *an expréſs, to expréſs; an eclípſe, to eclípſe; a divíne, to divíne; diſtrúſt, to diſtrúſt; a diſguíſe, to diſguíſe; a regárd, to regárd; repóſe, to repóſe; a repórt, to repórt*; &c.

And there are many diſſyllable verbs which end in *age, en, et, iſh, our, y, le, ter*, or *ck*, and which of conſequence have the accent on the former ſyllable, and yet there are nouns of the ſame

ſame form with theſe verbs; as, *fórrage, to fórrage; a hóiden, to hóiden; a gárden, to gárden; a billet, to billet; a réliſh, to réliſh; a lábour, to lábour; a fávour, to fávour; a ſálly, to ſálly; a fáble, to fáble; a ſtrúggle, to ſtrúggle; a clátter, to clátter; bútter, to bútter; a frólick, to frólick*; &c.

Of the quantity of words of three ſyllables.

VIII. IF to diſſyllables prefix'd you find
One only ſyllable, or one ſubjoin'd;
The accent ſtill continues as it fell
Upon th'original diſſyllable.

If a ſingle ſyllable is either placed before or behind a word of two ſyllables, the compound or derivative word of three ſyllables uſually retains the accent upon the ſame ſyllable on which it was placed upon the original word of two ſyllables before the added ſyllable was prefixed or ſubjoined to it. Thus from *légal, illégal*; from *écho, reécho*; from *vénom, invénom*; from *rúly, unrúly*; and ſo of very many other triſyllables which have the accent on the firſt, by prefixing a ſyllable to the original words. But from *ómen*, we have *óminous*; from *óffice, ófficer*; from *ódour, ódorous*; from *níggard, níggardly*; from *nímble, nímbleneſs*; and ſo of very many other triſyllables formed from diſſyllables which have the accent on the firſt, by ſubjoining a ſyllable to the original words.

Likewiſe from *inſtáte*, we have *reinſtáte*; *from aſsign, reaſsign*; from *ſuppóſe, preſuppóſe*; from *matúre, immatúre*; *decéive, undecéive*; *compóſe, diſcompóſe*; *engáge, diſengáge*; and many others with the accent ſtill on the laſt ſyllable, though a ſyllable is prefixed. And from *invént, invéntive*; *repént, repéntance*; *delíght, delíghtful*; *reſpéct, reſpéctive*; *condúce, condúcive*; and many others with the accent on the laſt ſyllable but one, though

a ſyllable is ſubjoined. So that the accent remains as it ſtood on the original diſſyllable, before a ſyllable was ſubjoined to it.

IX. Triſyllables in *al*, *ate*, *ent*, *ous*, *y*,
Ude, *ĭon*, *ce*, *le*, *re*, long ſounds deny
On both their latter ſyllables, and hence
Muſt each with a long ſyllable commence.

Triſyllables ending in *al*, *ate*, *ent*, *ous*, *y*, *ude*, *ĭon*, *ce*, *le*, *re*, have their accent upon the firſt; as, *cápital*, *tóllerate*, *ádequate*, *cóntinent*, *órient*, *cáptious*, *fáctious*, *vánity*, *quántity*, *grátitude*, *ínterlude*, *nátion*, *ſúction*, *váriance*, *éminence*, *pórtable*, *tángible*, *théatre*, *fúrniture*, &c.

But obſerve that triſyllables in *ate*, *ent*, and *ce*, have the accent upon the ſecond, if they are formed by ſubjoining a ſyllable to diſſyllables which have an accent upon the laſt; as, *compénſate*, *abſórbent*, *connívance*, &c.

Or if they have a vowel in the ſecond ſyllable before two conſonants; as, *intéſtate*, *incúmbent*, *relúctance*, &c.

And ſeveral triſyllables in *le*, have their accent on the middle ſyllable, in conſequence of ſeveral conſonants placed after a vowel which is in that ſyllable; as, *apóſtle*, *epíſtle*, *diſciple*, *quadrúple*, &c.

X. The middle of triſyllables in ſound
Is long, if with a diphthong it be found,
Or following conſonants in it attend
A vowel, or the word in *atour*, *ator*, end.

If the middle ſyllable of a word of three ſyllables have a diphthong in it, or if this ſyllable be formed by two or

more conſonants following a vowel, or if the word end in *atour*, or *ator*, the accent is upon the middle ſyllable; as, *endeávour*, *encoúnter*, *accoútre*, *imbróider*, &c.; *delínquent*, *vindíctive*, *doméſtic*, *reſpléndent*, *patérnal*, *appréntice*; *creátour*, *tranſlátor*.

Moſt of the triſyllables in *atour* and *ator* are derived from diſſyllables in *áte*, which have the accent upon the laſt, and therefore are included in the eighth rule.

XI. Some French triſyllables long ſound admit
Upon the laſt; on which 'tis likewiſe fit
When two preceding ſyllables are plac'd
Merely to modify the meaning of the laſt.

Several words of three ſyllables, which together with the manner of accenting them have been borrowed from the French, have the laſt ſyllable long; as, *magazíne*, *harlequín*, *reparée*, *diſhabílle*.

And monoſyllables modified by prepoſitions of two ſyllables prefixed, often retain the accent in the compound word of three ſyllables; as, *overcóme*, *underſtánd*, *intermíx*.

Of the quantity of words of more than three ſyllables.

XII. IF polyſyllables from words compos'd
By ſingle added ſyllables are clos'd;
Or have one ſyllable prefix'd; the ſound
Remains as on the ſimple word 'tis found.

In words of more than three ſyllables which are formed from other words, either by ſubjoining or prefixing one ſyllable, the

the accent remains upon the ſame ſyllable of the compound or derivative word, on which it was placed in the ſimple word; as, from *perſídious*, *perſídiouſneſs*; *profé́ſſor*, *profé́ſſorſhip*; *vénture-ſome*, *vénture-ſomeneſs*; *réconcíle*, *réconcílement*; *ſignífícant*, *ſignífícancy*; *ſurvívour*, *ſurvívourſhip*; &c. and from *ámiable*, *unámiable*; *cóntinent*, *incóntinent*; *únion*, *reúnion*; *aſſúmption*, *reaſſúmption*; *aſſémble*, *reaſſémble*; *defeáſible*, *indefeáſible*; &c.

This rule admits of ſeveral exceptions; as, from *áccident*, *acciděntal*; *párent*, *paréntal*; *abſtáin*, *ábſtinence*; *ádamant*, *ádamántine*; &c.

XIII. If polyſyllables in *ĭon* cloſe,
Upon the laſt but two the accent muſt repoſe.
And thoſe in *ĭan*, *ĭate*, *ĭcal*, claim
ĭty and *ous*, their accent on the ſame.
But thoſe in *ator*, *atour*, which appear
Upon the laſt but one, an accent bear.
On all the reſt, ſuch accent muſt attend,
As reſts upon the words, from which theſe words deſcend.

Polyſyllables which end in *ĭon*, *ĭan*, *ĭate*, *ĭcal*, *ĭty*, *ous* and *le*, have an accent on the laſt ſyllable but two; as, *accommodátion*, *admonítion*, *abſolútion*, *rhetorícian*, *phyſícian*; *licéntiate*, *appróp̆riate*, *exfól̆iate*, *aſsóciate*; *geográphical*, *hypothétical*, *analógical*; *declívity*, *rotúndity*, *acídity*, *actívity*, *abílity*; *advantágeous*, *courágeous*, *acrimónious*, *contémptuous*.

Polyſyllables which end in *atour* or *ator* have an accent upon the laſt ſyllable but one; as, *adminiſtrátor*, *dictátor*, *moderátour*, *dedicátor*.

Polyſyllables which do not fall under theſe rules uſually preſerve the accent of the words from whence they are derived; as, from

from *tólerate, tólerable*; *accoúnt, accoúntable*; *contémpt, contémptible*; *accúſe, accúſative*; *compúlſion, compúlſory*; *provóke, provócative*; *declaim, declámatory*; &c.

The thirteen rules laid down above, contain the beſt directions which I could find or give for the quantity of the ſyllables of Engliſh words. Many of them admit of exceptions, for which the reader or learner is referred to uſe and the obſervation of the poets, which in any language is the ſureſt of all rules.

Of the compoſition of Engliſh verſes.

I HAVE already obſerved, that certain numbers of ſyllables, taken in certain laws of quantity, conſtitute what are called *feet* in poetry; and that certain numbers of feet, placed in certain orders, conſtitute verſes.

The feet which are to be principally attended to in compoſing Engliſh verſes, are *the iambic* foot, which conſiſts of a ſhort ſyllable before a long one; as, *rĕpōſe, cŏnfīde, dĭſtrēſs:* the *trochee*, which conſiſts of a long ſyllable before a ſhort one; as, *lāboŭr, vīrtŭe, ēvĕr:* the *dactyl*, which conſiſts of one long ſyllable before two ſhort ones; as, *wōndĕrĭng, lāboŭrĕr, tīmŏrŏus:* and the *anapæſt*, which conſiſts of two ſhort ſyllables before a long one; as, *ŭnăwārēs.*

It is not eaſy to find anapæſts conſiſting of ſingle words in Engliſh; although the foot frequently occurs in our verſes, by placing a ſhort ſyllable before a word, the firſt ſyllable of which is ſhort, and the ſecond long; as, *tŏ ăvōid*; or two ſhort monoſyllables before a third, which is pronounced long; as, *bў thĕ nўmphs.*

Our verſes are uſually compoſed of iambic or trochaic feet, and therefore have been often repreſented as each kind of verſe conſiſting of a certain number of ſyllables, and not of a certain number

number of feet; for as an iambic or trochaic foot, each conſiſts of two ſyllables; if any number of the one or the other, or of both intermixed, are placed in a verſe, the verſe muſt contain twice as many ſyllables as it contains feet; yet a dactyl is often in effect placed inſtead of one of theſe feet; but when it is ſo, one of its ſhort ſyllables is conſidered as taken from it, and a mark of eliſion is ſometimes placed over the ſyllable that is conſidered as taken away. Thus, *gathering*, *every*, *ponderous*, and many other words, are conſidered as diſſyllables with the ſecond ſhort, and are often ſpelled in verſe, *gath'ring*, *ev'ry*, *pond'rous*; but a good reader pronounces them as dactyls, and a good ear perceives that they ought to be ſo pronounced. And *violent*, *watery*, and ſeveral others, are conſidered as contracted in the ſecond ſyllable; and *ſumptuous*, *chriſtian*, *vexation*, *officious*, *advantageous*, and ſeveral other words ending in *an*, *on*, *ous*, preceded by a vowel, are conſidered as if that vowel were cut out, and the words contained one ſyllable leſs than they really do. Yet a good reader pronounces the ſyllable with a ſmooth flow of the breath, ſo as to make it ſomewhat liquid, and unite gently with the following ſyllable.

But far the greateſt number of the feet of our verſes are either iambic or trochaic, and therefore it is the moſt convenient to meaſure by theſe feet; and if ſo, each verſe may be conſidered as containing a certain number of ſyllables. But the learner muſt be told, that to put the number of ſyllables together without regard to quantity, is not ſufficient for the proper ſucceſſion of modulation which the verſe requires. Thus our heroic verſe uſually conſiſts of ten ſyllables; but theſe ſyllables muſt be alternately ſhort and long, *i. e.* the verſe muſt conſiſt of five iambic feet; or the firſt ſyllable muſt be long, the ſecond and third ſhort, and the fourth long, and the reſt alternately ſhort and long, *i. e.* the verſe muſt conſiſt of a trochee followed by four iambic feet; or if not thus, ſuch verſe will in moſt inſtances be harſh, and in ſome inſtances utterly unmuſical. Thus the following line of Dr. Donne,

Better

Better pictures of vice, teach me virtue. Sat. 4. line. 72.

has exactly ten ſyllables, but has not the rithmus or modulation of an heroic verſe; for to give it ſuch modulation the quantities ſhould be,

Bĕttēr pĭctūres ŏf vīce, teăch mē vĭrtūe;

whereas the quantities are,

Bēttĕr pīctŭres ŏf vīce teāch mĕ vīrtŭe.

Many of the lines of this author are equally faulty in the diſpoſition of the long and ſhort ſyllables, and therefore theſe lines cannot be conſidered as verſes, although they have a juſt number of ſyllables.

Of the iambic meaſure.

OUR verſes of iambic meaſure conſiſt of four, ſix, eight, ten or twelve ſyllables.

Of Four.

With rávish'd eárs
The mónarch heárs,
Assúmes the Gód,
Affécts to nód. Dryden.

At déad of níght
A gláring ſpríght
With hídeous ſcreáms
I'll haúnt thy dreáms. Addiſon.

Unheárd, unknówn,
He mákes his móan. Pope.

Of

Of Six.

Blow, blów, thou wínter-wínd,
Thou árt not ſó unkínd
As mán's ingrátitúde;
Thy toóth is nót ſo keén,
Becáuſe thou árt not ſeén,
Althoúgh thy bréath be rúde. *Shakeſpeare.*

In peáce, at ónce will I'
Both láy me dówn, and ſleép;
For thóu alóne doſt keép
Me ſáfe, where'er I líe. *Milton.*

The two kinds of meaſures, of which the ſpecimens above are given, are ſeldom uſed, except in odes, and in ſongs; and even in theſe, they are uſually intermixed with other meaſures.

Of Eight.

And máy at láſt my wéary áge
Find oút the peáceful hérmitáge,
The háiry gówn, the móſſy cell,
Where I' may sít and ríghtly ſpéll
Of év'ry ſtár that heáv'n doth ſhéw,
And év'ry hérb that síps the déw. *Milton's Il Penſeroſo.*

Quoth ſhe, ſome ſay the ſoul's ſecure
Againſt *diſtreſs* and *forfeiture*;
Is free from *action*, and exempt
From *execution* and *contempt*;
And to be ſummon'd to appear
In th'other world, 's illegal here,
And therefore few make any account
Into what incumbrances they run't;
For moſt men carry things ſo even
Between this world, and hell, and heaven,

Without the leaſt offence to either,
They freely deal in all together;
And equally abhor to quit
This world for both, or both for it. *Butler's Hudibras.*

If the good Pope remains at home,
He's the firſt prince in Chriſtendom.
Chooſe then, good Pope, at home to ſtay,
Nor weſtward curious take thy way.
Thy way unhappy ſhouldſt thou take
From Tiber's bank to Leman lake,
Thou art an aged prieſt no more,
But a young flaring painted whore;
Thy ſex is loſt; thy town is gone;
No longer Rome, but Babylon.
That ſome few leagues ſhould make this change,
To men unlearn'd ſeems mighty ſtrange. *Prior's Alma.*

This meaſure is chiefly uſed in tales and fables.

Of Ten.

This is the principal meaſure in the Engliſh language, being uſed in heroic poetry, tragedy, ſatyr, and in poems of any conſiderable extent on all kinds of ſubjects, and that whether theſe poems are in rhime or not.

The Saviour comes! by ancient bards foretold:
Hear him ye deaf, and, all ye blind, behold!
He from thick films ſhall purge the viſual ray,
And on the ſightleſs eye-ball pour the day.
'Tis he th'obſtructed paths of ſound ſhall clear,
And bid new muſic charm th'unfolding ear:
The dumb ſhall ſing, the lame his crutch forego,
And leap exulting like the bounding roe.
No ſigh, no murmur the wide world ſhall hear;
From ev'ry face he wipes off ev'ry tear.

In

In adamantine chains ſhall death be bound,
And hell's grim tyrant feel th'eternal wound. *Pope's Meſſ.*

I through the ample air in triumph high
Shall lead hell captive, maugre hell! and ſhow
The powers of darkneſs bound. Thou at the ſight
Pleas'd out of heaven ſhalt look down, and ſmile;
While by thee rais'd I ruin all my foes,
Death laſt, and with his carcaſs glut the grave:
Then, with the multitude of my redeem'd
Shall enter heav'n long abſent, and return,
Father! to ſee thy face, wherein no cloud
Of anger ſhall remain; but peace aſſur'd
And reconcilement: wrath ſhall be no more
Thenceforth, but in thy preſence joy entire. *Milt. Par. loſt.*

A verſe of twelve ſyllables, called an Alexandrine, is ſometimes uſed amongſt the verſes of ten ſyllables, if the verſes are in rhime; as,

He ceas'd: and ceaſing, with reſpect he bow'd,
And with his hand, at once, the fatal ſtatue ſhow'd. *Dryd.*

Waller was ſmooth; but Dryden taught to join
The varying verſe, the full reſounding line,
The long majeſtic march, and energy divine. *Pope.*

The pauſe in the Alexandrine verſe muſt be after the ſixth ſyllable.

The modern Engliſh poets make no uſe of verſes of more than twelve ſyllables, and of thoſe of twelve only occaſionally, and not two of them following each other. Some whole poems were formerly made altogether of Alexandrines, as by Drayton and ſome others; and Chapman tranſlated Homer in verſes of fourteen ſyllables: but theſe long meaſures have been found unſuitable to the rapidity of the language.

Of the trochaic meaſure.

OUR verſes of this meaſure conſiſt of three, five, or ſeven ſyllables; for although a trochaic foot conſiſts but of two ſyllables, the firſt long, and the ſecond ſhort; a trochaic verſe has uſually an additional ſyllable ſubjoined at the end of the verſe after a full foot, for the ſake of reſting the voice upon it.

Chíll'd with teárs,
Kíll'd with féars. *Addiſon's Roſamond.*

Dréadful gleáms,
Díſmal ſcréams,
Fíres that glów,
Shríeks of wóe,
Súllen móans,
Hóllow gróans. *Pope's ode on St. Cecilia's day.*

Of Five.

Gíve the véngeance dúe
Tó the váliant créw. *Dryden's ode on the ſame.*

Of Seven.

Mélanchóly lífts her héad,
Mórpheus róuſes fróm his béd;
Slóth unfólds her árms and wákes,
Líſt'ning E'nvy dróps her ſnákes. *Pope.*

Of

Of the dactylic meaſure.

THIS meaſure conſiſts of one or more dactyls with a ſyllable prefixed to the verſe, and one ſubjoined for the pauſe.

One dactyl, with a ſyllable prefixed, and one ſubjoined.

No, nó, 'tis decréed
The tráytreſs ſhall bléed;
No feár ſhall alárm,
No píty diſárm. *Addiſon.*

Two dactyls, with a ſyllable prefixed, and one ſubjoined.

Diógenes, ſúrly and próud,
Who ſnárl'd at the Macedon yóuth,
Delíghted in wíne that was góod,
Becáuſe in good wíne there was trúth.

Three dactyls, with a ſyllable prefixed, and one ſubjoined.

My tíme, O ye múſes, was háppily ſpént,
When Phoébe went wíth me whereéver I wént.

Many parts of Tuſſer's book on huſbandry are in this meaſure.

Of the anapæſtic meaſure.

IF one ſhort ſyllable be prefixed to the dactylic meaſures, above deſcribed, they will become anapæſtic meaſures.

In my rágе ſhall be ſéen
The revénge of a quéen. *Addiſon.*

Amidſt Rhódope's ſnóws. *Pope.*

See

See the Fúries aríſe!
See the ſnákes that they réar;
How they híſs in their háir,
And the ſpárkles that fláſh from their ey'es! *Dryden.*

And the Kíng ſeiz'd a flámbeau with zéal to deſtróy. *ibid.*

All theſe meaſures, of which I have treated and given examples, are varied by many combinations, and ſometimes by double endings, either with or without rhime, as in the heroic.

To be, or not to be; that is the queſtion.
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to ſuffer
The ſlings and arrows of outrageous fortune;
Or to take arms againſt a ſea of troubles,
And by oppoſing, end them. *Shakeſpeare.*

Nor ſuffers Horace more in wrong tranſlations
By wits, than critics in as wrong quotations. *Pope.*

And in the iambic meaſure of eight ſyllables.

She made it plain, that human paſſion
Was order'd by predeſtination. *Prior.*

And in that of ſix.

'Twas when the ſeas were roaring
With hollow blaſts of wind,
A damſel lay deploring
All on a rock reclin'd. *Gay.*

When the trochaic meaſures are formed by double endings, the laſt ſyllable of the uſual meaſure, which ſerved as a reſt for the voice, is ſupplied by a full trochaic foot, and this makes the meaſure exceedingly ſoft.

Rích the tréaſure,
Swéet the pléaſure. *Dryden.*

Pleaſure

Pleaſure courting!
Charms tranſporting!
Fancy viewing,
Joys enſuing. *Addiſon.*

O the pléaſing pléaſing ánguiſh,
Whén we lóve, and whén we lánguiſh. *Addiſon.*

Sóftly ſwéet in Ly'dian méaſures,
Sóon he ſóoth'd his ſóul to pléaſures.
Wár, he ſúng, is tóil and tróuble;
Hónour bút an émpty búbble,
Néver énding, ſtíll begínning,
Fíghting ſtíll, and ſtíll deſtróying;
I'f the wórld be wórth thy wínning,
Thínk, O thínk it wórth enjóying.
Lóvely Tháis síts beside thee,
Táke the góod the góds províde thee. *Dryden.*

The dactylic and anapæſtic meaſures are likewiſe frequently ſoftened by a double ending.

For of ús pretty féllows,
Our wíves are ſo jéalous,
They né'er have enoúgh of our dúty. *Addiſon.*

Now with fúries ſurróunded,
Deſpáiring, confóunded. *Pope.*

The rules and examples laid down above, may be ſufficient to direct a learner how to place the words in every kind of Engliſh verſe, ſo as to preſerve true quantity. But it is to be obſerved, that the iambic meaſures, eſpecially the heroic, or verſe of ten ſyllables, and the verſe of eight, admit of other feet beſides iambic feet in ſeveral places, in order to diverſify the modulation, or to adapt the ſound to the ſenſe on ſome occaſions.

A tro-

A trochee is often uſed inſtead of an iambic foot at the beginning of a verſe; as,

Dāphnĕ, farewell, and all the world adieu. *Pope.*

And a ſpondee (or two long ſyllables ſucceeding each other) is uſed to expreſs ſlowneſs of motion, or difficulty of execution; as,

When Ajax ſtrives ſome rock's vāſt wēight to throw,
The line tōo lābours, and the words mōve ſlōw. *Pope.*

And other changes of one foot for another, on particular occaſions, may be obſerved in Milton, and indeed in every other poet who has uſed the iambic meaſure with ſucceſs. But a particular conſideration of this ſubject is the province of criticiſm, and not of grammar. The reader will find it conſidered with much judgment by Mr. Foſter in his treatiſe lately publiſhed on the Greek accents, Chap. III. and more largely, and with great elegance of ear and taſte, by Lord Kayme, in his Elements of Criticiſm, Chap. XVIII. Sect. IV.

As to the licences of Engliſh poetry, the great licence of making almoſt every word of one ſyllable either ſhort or long upon occaſion, makes it almoſt needleſs to admit of others.

I have already obſerved, that we contract many words by the expulſion of a ſhort vowel. This frequently happens when the vowel precedes a liquid conſonant; as, *temp'rance*, *violence*, pronounced as, *vi'lence*, &c. or when two ſhort vowels coaleſce into one ſyllable; as *varĭance*, *juſtĭan*, *reſolutĭon*, &c.

The final *e* of *the* is often cut off, by ſynalæpha or the figure *eliſion*, before a vowel; as, *th'advent'rous baron*. And the *o* in *to* is ſometimes cut off in the ſame poſition; as,

But when t'examine ev'ry part he came. Pope.

And *e'er* is uſed for *ever*, and *o'er* for *over*, and *'em* for *them*; as,

——*and you'll forget 'em all.* Pope.

And ſome few other eliſions are made in poetry, which will eaſily appear to any obſerver.

Butler, in his Hudibras, ſometimes uſes eliſions which are not found in other poets; as in the paſſage quoted above, in *any account*, *any* is to be read as if it were of one ſyllable, and the *y* were prefixed to *account*; and *into what* is to be read, as if it were *int'what*; and ſo of many other inſtances which may be found in that moſt excellent performance. But theſe contractions are often harſh, and therefore have ſeldom been followed, even by Prior in his Tales, or Gay in his Fables, who are the principal authors that have written in the iambic meaſure of eight ſyllables ſince Butler's time.

Lord Kayme, in the ſection referred to above, has fully ſhewn the great variety of modulation which the Engliſh heroic verſe is capable of, eſpecially when without rhime; all the other meaſures are uſually with rhime, and the iambic meaſures of four and ſix ſyllables, and the trochaic, dactylic, and anapæſtic meaſures, are ſeldom uſed but in lyric poetry, and in ſongs. Dryden's and Pope's Odes on St. Cecilia's Day, will ſatisfy any one who ſhall examine them, of how great extent and variety of harmony the Engliſh language is capable.

I have made no particular obſervations on rhime; for to treat of this point effectually, it would be neceſſary to make a kind of dictionary, in order to ſhew what words rhime to each other in this language, and this would exceed the limits of a grammar. But, indeed, uſe and trial are the moſt effectual methods of arriving at the ready faculty of writing in rhime, and to that the learner muſt be referred in this, as in many other inſtances of the proper application of language, both in poetry and proſe. It

eaſily appears from what is ſaid at the cloſe of the Speculative Grammar, why the Latin and Greek verſes do not admit of rhime, viz. becauſe theſe languages are overloaded, even in proſe, with correſpondences of termination; ſo that to affect ſuch correſpondences ſtill farther in theſe languages, muſt occaſion diſguſt. Whenſoever rhime has been attempted in Latin, it has always been double rhime; as,

Et nunc dilectum *ſpeculum pro more* retectum
Pulvis ſuavis odore, *et epiſtola ſuavis* amore.

For ſingle terminations, which rhime to each other, occur too frequently, in this language, without ſtudy; and therefore ſhould be avoided as much as poſſible; and much more the double rhimes, which were only uſed in times of barbariſm. But this is no reaſon why rhime ſhould not be admitted in a language, the plan of conſtruction whereof is not formed on correſpondence of termination, which is the caſe of the Engliſh. Indeed, in long poems of a ſerious nature, rhime ſeems to be leſs proper, becauſe the ſame ſounds, or nearly the ſame, muſt recur too frequently; but on gay or ludicrous ſubjects, rhime ſeems to be very proper; and in lyric poetry, on any ſubject whatſoever.

FINIS.

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